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Reportable IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA

CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION  

CIVIL APPEAL NO. 1727 OF 2016

Nidhi Kaim and another … Appellants

versus

State of Madhya Pradesh and others … Respondents

With

Civil Appeal Nos. 1720-1724 of 2016 Civil Appeal No. 1726 of 2016 Civil Appeal No. 1728 of 2016 Civil Appeal No. 1729 of 2016 Civil Appeal No. 1733 of 2016 Civil Appeal Nos. 1734-1741 of 2016 Civil Appeal Nos. 1742-1749 of 2016 Civil Appeal Nos. 1750-1751 of 2016 Civil Appeal No. 1752 of 2016 Civil Appeal Nos. 1753-1758 of 2016 Civil Appeal Nos. 1759-1764 of 2016 Civil Appeal No. 1765 of 2016 Civil Appeal No. 1766 of 2016 Civil Appeal Nos. 1767-1768 of 2016 Civil Appeal Nos. 1769-1774 of 2016 Civil Appeal Nos. 1776-1787 of 2016 Civil Appeal No. 1788 of 2016 Civil Appeal Nos. 1789-1791 of 2016 Civil Appeal Nos. 1792-1794 of 2016 Civil Appeal Nos. 1795-1798 of 2016 Civil Appeal Nos. 1799-1805 of 2016 Civil Appeal Nos. 1806-1808 of 2016 Civil Appeal No. 1809 of 2016 Civil Appeal Nos. 1810-1811 of 2016 Civil Appeal No. 1812 of 2016 Civil Appeal Nos. 1813-1814 of 2016 Civil Appeal No. 1815 of 2016 Civil Appeal Nos. 1816-1817 of 2016 Civil Appeal Nos. 1818-1819 of 2016 Civil Appeal No. 1820 of 2016 Civil Appeal Nos. 1822-1824 of 2016 Civil Appeal No. 1825 of 2016 Civil Appeal No. 1826 of 2016 Civil Appeal No. 1827 of 2016 Civil Appeal No. 1828 of 2016 Civil Appeal No. 1830 of 2016 Civil Appeal Nos. 1831-1832 of 2016 Civil Appeal No. 1833 of 2016 Civil Appeal No. 1834 of 2016 Civil Appeal No. 1835 of 2016 Civil Appeal Nos. 1836-1837 of 2016 Civil Appeal No. 1838 of 2016 Civil Appeal No. 1839 of 2016 Civil Appeal No. 1840 of 2016 Civil Appeal No. 1841 of 2016 Civil Appeal No. 1842 of 2016 Civil Appeal No. 1843 of 2016 Civil Appeal No. 1844 of 2016 Civil Appeal No. 1845 of 2016 Civil Appeal No. 1846 of 2016 Civil Appeal Nos. 1847-1852 of 2016 Civil Appeal Nos.2503-2504 of 2017

(Arising out of SLP(C) Nos.101-102 of 2015) Civil Appeal No. 2505 of 2017 (Arising out of SLP(C) No.182 of 2015)

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J U D G M E N T

Jagdish Singh Khehar, CJI.

1. Leave granted in the special leave petitions.

2. Orders  were  passed  by  the  Madhya  Pradesh  Professional  Examination

Board  (hereinafter  referred  to  as,  ‘Vyapam’),  cancelling  the  results  of  the

appellants,  of  their  professional  MBBS  course,  on  the  ground  that  the

appellants had gained admission to the course, by resorting to unfair means,

during  the  Pre-Medical  Test.   These  orders  were  passed,  with  reference  to

candidates, who had been admitted to the above course, during the years 2008

to 2012.  A challenge to the orders of cancellation, was raised by the appellants,

by invoking the jurisdiction of the High Court of Madhya Pradesh (hereinafter

referred to as, ‘the High Court’) under Article 226 of the Constitution.  All writ

petitions  raising  the  above  challenge  were  dismissed.   Resultantly,  the

appellants approached this Court.  The orders of the High Court were affirmed

by a Division Bench (hereinafter referred to as, the ‘former Division Bench’), on

12.05.2016.  However, in exercise of jurisdiction vested in this Court,  under

Article  142  of  the  Constitution,  J.  Chelameswar,  J.  (the  Hon’ble  Presiding

Judge, of the ‘former Division Bench’) expressed the view, that complete justice

in the matter would be rendered, if the qualifications successfully acquired by

the appellants were not annulled, and the knowledge gained by them, was not

wasted.  This, for the simple reason, that knowledge could not be transferred to

those, who had been wrongfully deprived of admission, and cancellation of the

results of the appellants, would not serve any purpose.  Abhay Manohar Sapre,

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J. (the Hon’ble Companion Judge – in the ‘former Division Bench’) expressed his

disinclination for invoking jurisdiction under Article 142, to sustain the benefit

of education acquired by the appellants, through a separate order of the same

date – 12.5.2016.   This,  for the simple reason, that those who had adopted

unfair means, could not be extended any indulgence.  

3. On account of the divergence of opinion expressed by the ‘former Division

Bench’,  through  their  separate  orders  (dated  12.5.2016)  referred  to  above,

Hon’ble the Chief Justice of India, constituted this larger Division Bench, to deal

with the matter.  During the course of hearing, Mr. Shyam Divan, learned senior

counsel submitted, that this Court had granted leave, in the petition filed by his

client (and many others, similarly situated) on 24.2.2016.  It was pointed out,

that  all  these appeals  had remained pending before this Court,  wherein the

correctness  of  the  impugned  judgment(s)  rendered  by  the  High  Court,  was

under  consideration.  It  was  submitted,  that  leave  having  been  granted,  the

principle underlying the doctrine of  merger would entail,  that the judgments

rendered by the High Court would eventually merge in the final or operative

determination of this Court.  It was also pointed out, that in terms of Article

145(5) of the Constitution, no judgment could be delivered by this Court, save

with the concurrence of majority of Judges, present and hearing the case.  It

was submitted, that there was no majority judgment on 12.5.2016, when the

two Hon’ble Judges constituting the ‘former Division Bench’, passed separate

orders.  According to learned counsel, in the absence of merger, all  the civil

appeals in hand, must be deemed to have remained on the docket of this Court,

awaiting decision by an appropriate bench.  It was contended, that the correct

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course to be followed, where there is a divergence of opinion between the two

Hon’ble Judges was, a rehearing of the entire matter by a larger Bench.  The

above  determination,  according  to  learned  counsel,  emerges  from  the  legal

position expressed by this Court in Gaurav Jain v. Union of India, (1998) 4 SCC

270.  It was submitted, that in the absence of a majority judgment, in terms of

Article 145(5), and consequently in the absence of an effective judgment of this

Court (despite the two separate orders passed by the ‘former Division Bench’ on

12.05.2016), there existed no judgment in the eyes of law.  It was accordingly

submitted, that the present Division Bench (of three-Judges) by a mandate of

law, was required to adjudicate upon the civil appeals fully, on all issues.  It is

therefore, that this Bench passed the following order on 28.7.2016:

“After hearing had gone on for sometime, wherein the limited issue canvassed was, whether this Court was justified in exercising jurisdiction under Article 142 of the Constitution of India, our attention was invited to the mandate contained in Article 145(5) of the Constitution, so as to suggest,  that the entire controversy needed to be heard afresh, in view of the following order passed by the Bench on 12th May, 2016:  

“In view of the divergence of opinion in terms of separate judgments pronounced by us in these appeals today, the Registry is directed to place  the  papers  before  Hon'ble  the  Chief  Justice  of  India  for appropriate further orders.”  

We are of the view that the instant issue can be resolved by referring the matter back to the Bench, for a clarification, of the order dated 12th May, 2016, whether the reference required re-hearing of the entire matter, and if not, the limited issue referred for consideration.  We have chosen to adopt the above course, so as to save precious time of the Court. In the above view of the matter, the Registry is directed to place the files  of  this  case,  before  Hon'ble  the  Chief  Justice  of  India,  for  seeking clarification of the Division Bench which passed the order dated 12th May, 2016. Post the matters for hearing, after clarification.”

4. On  30.8.2016,  the  ‘former  Division  Bench’  passed  another  order,  in

furtherance  of  the  order  extracted  above.   Relevant  extract  of  the  same  is

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reproduced below:

“Pursuant to the Order dated 28th July, 2016 of the larger Bench, the matter was placed before this Bench.  Heard the learned counsel.  It  appears from the above-mentioned order that,  it  was argued before the larger  Bench  that  by  the  Order  of  this  Bench  dated  12th  May,  2016,  a Reference was made to a larger Bench. The submission is factually incorrect.  It  is  clear  from  the  Order  dated  12th  May,  2016  that  there  was  a disagreement between both of us regarding the final order to be passed in the appeals  before  us.  Both  of  us  recorded  a  concurrent  opinion  that  the examination process in issue in these appeals, conducted by Vyapam for the years 2008 to 2012 was vitiated with reference to the appellants before this Court  and  few  others.  We  also  agreed  upon  the  conclusion  that  the appellants herein are the beneficiaries of such vitiated process.  The  only  point  of  divergence  between  both  of  us  is  that  whether  the appellants  should  be  disentitled  to  retain  the  benefits  of  the  training  in medical course which they secured by virtue of their being beneficiaries of a tainted examination process conducted for the purpose of admitting them for training in medical colleges.  While one of us (Justice Abhay Manohar Sapre) is clearly of the opinion that the case of the appellants deserves no further consideration, the moment we concluded  that  they  are  the  beneficiaries  of  such  tainted  examination process, the other (Justice J. Chelameswar) opined for the reasons recorded that  their  cases  deserve  some  consideration  and  also  opined  that  the appellants should be permitted to pursue their medical course and complete the same subject to certain conditions indicated in the order.  We completely fail to understand the reference made to Article 145(5) of the Constitution in the Order dated 28th July, 2016. We are of the opinion that neither the Constitution of India nor any other law of this country provides an  intra-court  appeal  insofar  as  the  Supreme  Court  is  concerned.  A re-hearing of the entire matter as apparently suggested to the larger Bench, in our opinion, would amount to an intra-court appeal. If the larger Bench of this  Court  wishes to  create  such an intra-court  appeal,  we obviously  are powerless to stop it. We can only record our understanding of the law on the question and it is as recorded above.  Ordered accordingly.”

In view of the order extracted above, it is apparent that, we are only dealing with

the issue, whether the jurisdiction vested in this Court under Article 142 of the

Constitution, should be invoked in favour of the appellants, in order to render

complete justice in the matter.

5. According to Mr. R. Venkataramani, learned senior counsel appearing for

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the appellants in Civil Appeal Nos. 1727, 1720-1724, 1726, 1728, 1776-1787

and 1846 of 2016, the invocation of Article 142 in favour of the appellants was a

just and rightful determination, inasmuch as, complete justice was sought to be

rendered without adversely affecting or impinging upon the rights of any other

party.   It  was  submitted,  that  there  is  a  distinction  between  “inherent

jurisdiction”  and “inherent  power”.   Likewise,  there  is  a  distinction between

ensuring, that the ends of justice are met – as against, rendering of complete

justice.  It was pointed out, that Section 151 of the Code of Civil Procedure,

1908 (hereinafter  referred  to  as,  ‘the  CPC’)  and  Section 482  of  the  Code  of

Criminal  Procedure,  1973 (hereinafter  referred  to  as,  ‘the  CrPC’)  provide  for

situations, wherein a Court can exercise inherent powers.  It was submitted,

that  inherent  powers  as  contemplated  under  Section  151  of  the  CPC,  and

Section 482 of the CrPC, are controlled, and had limitations.  It was asserted,

that  the  power  conferred  on  the  Supreme  Court  under  Article  142  of  the

Constitution, was aimed at allowing this Court to do complete justice, in any

cause or matter.  The instant power vested in this Court, it was submitted, is

unlimited.  It  was  pointed  out,  that  the  expanse  of  Article  142,  was  clearly

distinct  from  the  inherent  power  contemplated  under  the  two  procedural

enactments, referred to above. In order to substantiate his contention, learned

counsel placed reliance on a treatise by Roscoe Pound – An Introduction to the

Philosophy of Law, (Sixth Indian Reprint - 2012, published by the Universal Law

Publishing Co. Pvt. Ltd.).  Learned counsel invited the Court’s attention to the

following opinion expressed by the author:

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“If  we look back at  the means of  individualizing  the application of  law which have  developed  in  our  legal  system,  it  will  be  seen  that  almost without exception they have to do with cases involving the moral quality of individual conduct or of the conduct of enterprises, as distinguished from matters  of  property  and of  commercial  law.   Equity  uses its  powers of individualizing to the best advantage in connection with the conduct of those in whom trust and confidence has been reposed.  Jury lawlessness is  an agency of  justice  chiefly  in  connection with  the moral  quality  of conduct  where  the  special  circumstances  exclude  that  “intelligence without passion” which, according to Aristotle, characterizes the law.  It is significant that in England today the civil jury is substantially confined to cases of  fraud,  defamation,  malicious prosecution,  assault  and battery, and breach of  promise of  marriage.   Judicial  individualization through choice  of  a  rule  is  most  noticeable  in  the  law  of  torts,  in  the  law  of domestic relations, and in passing upon the conduct of enterprises. The Application of Law The elaborate system of individualization in criminal procedure has to do wholly with individual  human conduct.   The informal methods of  petty courts are meant for tribunals which pass upon conduct in the crowd and hurry of our large cities.  The administrative tribunals, which are setting up on every hand, are most called for and prove most effective as means of regulating the conduct of enterprises. A like conclusion is suggested when we look into the related controversy as  to  the  respective  provinces  of  common  law  and  of  legislation. Inheritance  and  succession,  definition  of  interests  in  property  and  the conveyance thereof, matters of commercial law and the creation, incidents, and transfer of obligations have proved a fruitful field for legislation.  In these cases the social  interest in the general security is the controlling element.  But where the questions are not of interests of substance but of the  weighing  of  human  conduct  and  passing  upon  its  moral  aspects, legislation has accomplished little.  No codification of the law of torts has done more than provide a few significantly broad generalizations.  On the other hand, succession to property is everywhere a matter of stature law, and  commercial  law  is  codified  or  codifying  throughout  the  world. Moreover the common law insists upon its doctrine of stare decisis chiefly in the two cases of  property and commercial  law.  Where legislation is effective,  there  also  mechanical  application  is  effective  and  desirable. Where  legislation  is  ineffective,  the  same  difficulties  that  prevent  its satisfactory operation require us to leave a wide margin of discretion in application,  as  in  the  standard  of  the  reasonable  man  in  our  law  of negligence and the standard of the upright and diligent head of a family applied by the Roman law, and especially by the modern Roman law, to so many questions of fault, where the question is really one of good faith.  All attempts to cut down this margin have proved futile.  May we not conclude that  in the part  of  the law which has to do immediately  with conduct complete justice is  not to be attained by the mechanical  application of fixed rules?  Is it not clear that in this part of the administration of justice

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the trained intuition and disciplined judgment of the judge must be our assurance that  causes will  be decided on principles of  reason and not according to the chance dictates of caprice, and that a due balance will be maintained between the general security and the individual human life?”

Based  on  the  aforesaid,  it  was  submitted,  that  matters  involving  individual

conduct, or conduct of enterprises, need to be distinguished from matters of

property and commercial law.  It was pointed out, that the rule of equity, in

dealing with individual conduct or conduct of enterprises, was a tool adopted to

the best advantage of the parties concerned, especially when, the controversy

did not relate to property matters or commercial law.  Referring to the law of

inheritance and succession, which had a direct nexus to interest in property

(and conveyance), it was submitted, that there was a feeling, that social interest

was generally the controlling element,  in such matters.   However,  where the

question was not of  substance,  but of  human conduct  (or the moral  aspect

thereof),  legislation  could  not  be  depended  upon,  to  furnish  any  answer.

According  to  learned  counsel,  on  the  subject  being  dealt  with,  there  is  no

express  legislation.   Therefore,  it  is  necessary  to  keep  in  mind,  that  the

controversy in hand, is not one which would return a finding of breach of any

existing legislative enactment.   It  was submitted, that if  there had been any

such legislation, on the issue being dealt with, the matter would have to be

examined differently.  However, in the absence of legislation, or in situations

where legislation is ill-effective, Courts had a wide margin of discretion.  For

such  situations,  determination  has  to  be  made,  on  the  touchstone  of

reasonableness founded on good faith.  It was submitted, that in the facts and

circumstances of  the present controversy,  a trained intuition and disciplined

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judgment of the adjudicator, would have to be invoked.  Because, the cause

would  have  to  be  adjudicated  on  the  principle  of  prudence  and  rationality.

Herein, according to learned counsel,  the remedy provided would have to be

handcrafted,  rather  than  the  routine  –  mechanical  exercise  of  enforcing

legislative intent.  Herein, the events would have to be evaluated, keeping in

mind the  special  circumstances  –  and their  significance,  in  order  to  render

complete justice.

6. It  was  submitted,  that  in  exercise  of  judicial  intuition  and  judicial

discretion, J. Chelameswar, J. had categorized the controversy as one where the

appellants had acquired “knowledge”.  The cancellation of their admission would

not be of any advantage to the more meritorious candidates, who were deprived

of admission, as it is not possible to transfer the “knowledge” acquired by the

appellants.  In the present situation, it was submitted, that it was not possible

to restore  status quo ante.  The instant controversy, it was pointed out, could

not be dealt with like a dispute concerning immovable property, wherein, on the

culmination  of  the  lis,  the  property  can  be  restored  to  the  rightful  owner.

Herein, the meritorious candidates, who ought to have been admitted in place of

the appellants, cannot have the advantage of transfer of “knowledge” acquired

by the appellants.  It was submitted, that to deal with the acquired “knowledge”,

J. Chelameswar, J.,  had taken recourse to Article 142, to legitimize only the

“knowledge” acquired by the appellants, and not their actions or conduct.  This

determination, was also considered to be, of societal advantage. It would take

five years (- the duration of medical course) of national resources, to acquire

what  had  been  annulled  by  Vyapam.   Invalidation  of  the  fruits  of  gained

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“education”  was  considered  by  the  Hon’ble  Presiding  Judge  of  the  ‘former

Division Bench’, as an inappropriate means, to deal with the situation.  It was

submitted, that this advantage was far superior to the individual gains which

would accrue to the appellants,  or the individual  loss which may have been

suffered  by  the  meritorious  candidates  deprived  of  admission.   It  was  also

asserted, that while invoking Article 142 to the advantage of the appellants, the

situations wherein the jurisdiction could not  be  invoked,  were  dealt  with  in

detail.  Only after arriving at the conclusion, that the situation in hand, would

not trample upon the determined legal position, the Hon’ble Presiding Judge

had chosen to exercise its discretion, to do complete justice in the matter.  It

was submitted, that in the absence of, violation of any laid down parameters, it

would be unjust, if this Court was to set at naught, long years of educational

endeavour, successfully undertaken by the appellants, which had resulted in

acquisition of “knowledge” – an ability, which would enable the appellants to

render valuable service to the society – and thereby serve the citizens of this

country.

7. It  was also the contention of  learned counsel,  that at the time of  their

admission, most of the appellants (-if not all) were juvenile, and as such, could

not  be  blamed  of  the  irregularity  and/or  illegality  in  the  procurement  of

admission to the MBBS course.  It was submitted, that this Court must also

take  into  consideration,  the  fact  that  the  impugned  orders  set  at  naught,

admissions gained by the appellants to the MBBS course, during the years 2008

to 2012, and as such, may be well beyond the purview of consideration, under

the law of limitation, even for examining their culpability/criminality.

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8. As  a  special  emphasis,  learned counsel  invoked the  conscience  of  this

Court, by reiterating that the “knowledge” acquired by the appellants, could not

be described as tainted, even though the means of acquiring the “knowledge”,

may  have  been  tainted.   As  such,  it  was  submitted,  that  the  purity  of

“knowledge”, acquired by the appellants, consequent upon their admission to

the professional institutions, needed to be preserved, through the invocation of

Article 142 – to do complete justice.  

9. Based on an analysis of  the judgments rendered by this Court,  it  was

submitted, that in the judgments of this Court wherein Article 142 had been

invoked, would demonstrate, that whenever the law applicable to, and governing

a particular cause, was found to be inadequate, or whenever the law applicable

did not provide means for a complete resolution of the dispute, the endeavour of

a Court ought to be, to discover and to address the manner of doing complete

justice.  It was submitted, that even though the law provided for the situation

obtaining in a particular  cause,  and there was scope for a better  and more

fulfilling outcome, this Court should search for the same, and give effect to it.  It

was contended,  that this Court had found good reason to invoke the power

vested in it, to do complete justice between the parties (- through the reasoned

order, of the Hon’ble Presiding Judge, of the ‘former Division Bench’).  It was

submitted, that whenever legal resources and materials were found to be in a

state of indeterminacy, calling for articulation of new principles, and fashioning

new remedies, this Court would reach out to a just cause, by invoking Article

142, by filling up the lacuna.  It was pointed out, that indeterminacy or lack of

completeness of law and legal resources, in a given case, was the foundation for

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invocation of Article 142.  Learned counsel ventured to clarify, that in doing

complete justice, whilst a Court would not act in disregard to binding provisions

of  law,  the said restraint  was applicable  only  with reference to  an available

statutory  regime/scheme.   Thus  viewed,  whenever  there  was  an  available

statutory scheme, Courts would not ordinarily take recourse to Article 142, but

in the absence thereof, the field would always remain wide open, for this Court

to intervene, and render complete justice.  It was pleaded, that there could not

been a better case, than the one in hand, to invoke such power.

10. It  was also submitted,  that the power conferred on this Court through

Article  142,  could  not  be  put  in  a  straightjacket.   Being  constitutional  in

conferment, this Court whenever persuaded for a just cause, would step in to

render  complete  justice,  by  exercising  its  inherent  power.   This  exercise  of

inherent power, according to learned counsel, was free from any fetters. And for

exercise of such power, this Court ought never and never, close the doors for

creative  engagement.   Whenever  a  situation  for  exercise  of  such  power  is

triggered  by  its  conscience,  this  Court  should  not  be  lax,  in  providing  the

desired  relief.   It  was  submitted,  that  the  present  controversy  exhibited  an

important perception for doing justice.  Based on an exploration of a relevant

legal principle, the Hon’ble Presiding Judge of the ‘former Division Bench’, had

invoked the inherent power to render complete justice.  According to learned

counsel,  the Hon’ble Presiding Judge,  had balanced the cause of  justice,  by

extending societal benefits to the citizens of the country, and at the same time,

provided for measures to be taken against the appellants,  and also made sure,

that there was sufficient deterrence.  It was submitted, that the course adopted

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for the invocation of Article 142, had successfully preserved the “knowledge”

acquired  by  the  appellants,  which  constituted  a  national  resource.   It  was

contended,  that  by requiring  the  appellants  to  render service  in  the  field  of

medicine,  on  the  payment  of  nominal  charges,  would  result  in  a  win-win

situation, for all concerned.  It was asserted, that trained minds should not be

lost, merely because the appellants had gained admission, to the MBBS course

by foul means. Service by the appellants, to the nation, for a period of 5 years

(postulated in the order passed by the Hon’ble Presiding Judge), according to

learned  counsel,  was  an  apt  balancing  factor,  which  would  also  act  as  a

deterrent to others in future.

11. It was also submitted, that on a composite understanding of various facts

and circumstances of the case, it was clear, that the view taken by the Hon’ble

Presiding  Judge  (of  the  ‘former  Division  Bench’),  cannot  be  described

outlandish.   Nor  could  it  be  considered,  as  being  violative  of  any  accepted

principle of law, and not even in contravention of any statutory scheme.  It was

submitted,  that  the exercise of  jurisdiction under Article  142,  by one of  the

Hon’ble Judges of the ‘former Division Bench’,  could be termed as an act of

rendering  corrective  justice.   Justice  which  was  particularly  invoked,  to

ameliorate  the  ruinous  effect,  which  the  appellants  would  have  to  suffer,

consequent to the cancellation of their admission to the MBBS course.

12. It  was  submitted,  that  in  ordinary  circumstances  of  wrongful  gain,

principles  of  law  can  be  invoked  to  legitimately  require  the  beneficiary  to

surrender the fruits of his gains.  Such wrongful fruits of gain, would then be

transferred to the rightful beneficiary.  Referring to the present controversy, it

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was  submitted,  that  the  alleged  wrong  committed  by  the  appellants  in  the

present case, had resulted in the acquisition of “knowledge”.  It was submitted,

that the appellants were beneficiaries of intellectual property.  Such intellectual

property, cannot be withdrawn from the appellants, and transferred to those

who ought to have been granted admission (in place of the appellants).  Since

the  “knowledge”  wrongfully  gained  by  the  appellants,  was  not  transferable,

according to learned counsel, the principles ordinarily invoked, whereby gains

are transferred to the rightful beneficiary, cannot be implemented, in this case.

It was pointed out, that the State and the students have invested considerable

resources,  both  monetary  and  human,  ever  since  the  appellants  had  been

admitted to the MBBS course.   Based whereon,  the appellants had pursued

their academic careers, and thereby, gained knowledge in the field of medicine.

By any order, cancelling the appellants’ admission to the MBBS course - the

institutions would lose,  the State would lose,  and the appellants would also

lose.  It needed to be kept in mind, that such cancellation would not result in a

reciprocal gain, for those who had been deprived of admission.  And as such,

this Court should affirm the invocation of Article 142 in the manner expressed

by the Hon’ble Presiding Judge (of the ‘former Division Bench’), so that, all is not

lost.

13. It  was  also  the  submission  of  learned  counsel,  that  the  prosecution(s)

which had been initiated, and were pending against some of the appellants, or

which  may  be  launched  against  them,  should  not  restrain  this  Court  from

taking  such  action,  as  it  considers  just  and  proper.   Alternatively,  it  was

submitted, that if the appellants were to be acquitted, none of these adverse or

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impinging consequences would flow.  It was submitted, that while examining the

controversy in hand, the criminality of the charges which the appellants may be

blamed of, should be kept apart, as the relevant statutory provisions provide for

appropriate measures of punishment.  Insofar as the civil aspect of the matter is

concerned, namely, the validity of the “knowledge” acquired by the appellants,

in pursuit of their academic qualifications –should not be jeopardized.  Rather,

according  to  learned  counsel,  the  way  forward,  suggested  by  the  Hon’ble

Presiding  Judge  (of  the  ‘former  Division  Bench’),  was  the  most  appropriate

course, for dealing with the controversy, as it rendered complete justice in the

matter.  The course adopted, according to learned counsel, while benefiting the

appellants, would also benefit the citizens of this country, and would not result

in any consequential loss.

14. It  was  pointed  out,  that  the  proceedings  which  the  appellants  have

pursued,  whilst  challenging the cancellation of  their  admission,  through the

current litigation(s),  and the proceedings which the appellants might have to

suffer, consequent upon the criminal cases which have been commenced - or

which may be instituted against them, would result in an unfathomable amount

of strain and suffering, which will always remain with them, for the rest of their

lives, as an inseparable shadow.  According to learned counsel, this pain and

sorrow, would serve the purpose of justice, in the facts and circumstances of

this case.  In this behalf, it was also submitted, that the diminished respect of

the  appellants,  in  the  eyes  of  the  general  public  (which  the  public  would

perceive,  because  of  the  wrongful  admission  of  the  appellants),  should  also

weigh with the Court, as a relevant consideration for the invocation of Article

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142. It was submitted, that the conclusions drawn, on relevant and acceptable

parameters, in favour of the appellants, (by the Hon’ble Presiding Judge, of the

‘former Division Bench’), should not be negated, so as to deny to the appellants,

the right of utilization of the “knowledge” acquired by them.

15. On the issue in hand, learned counsel placed reliance on Union Carbide

Corporation v. Union of India, (1991) 4 SCC 584, and referred to contentions (A)

and  (B)  delineated  in  paragraph  55  thereof,  which  are  being  extracted

hereinbelow:

“Contention (A) The proceedings before this Court were merely in the nature of appeals against  an  interlocutory  order  pertaining  to  the  interim-compensation. Consistent with the limited scope and subject-matter of the appeals, the main suits themselves could not be finally disposed of by the settlement. The jurisdiction of this Court to withdraw or transfer a suit or proceeding to itself is exhausted by Article 139-A of the Constitution. Such transfer implicit in the final disposal of the suits having been impermissible suits were  not  before  the  Court  so  as  to  be  amenable  to  final  disposal  by recording a settlement. The settlement is, therefore, without jurisdiction. Contention (B) Likewise  the pending criminal  prosecution was  a  separate  and distinct proceeding  unconnected  with  the  suit  from  the  interlocutory  order  in which the appeals before this Court arose. The criminal proceedings were not under or relatable to the 'Act'. The Court had no power to withdraw to itself those criminal proceedings and quash them. The orders of the Court dated February 14 and 15, 1989, in so far as they pertain to the quashing of criminal proceedings are without jurisdiction.”

In order to invite our attention to the conclusions recorded by this Court, with

reference  to  the  above  two  contentions,  learned  counsel  pointed  out  to  the

following paragraphs of the above judgment:

“62.  The  purposed  constitutional  plenitude  of  the  powers  of  the  Apex Court to ensure due and proper administration of justice is intended to be co-extensive in each case with the needs of justice of a given case and to meeting any exigency. Indeed, in Harbans Singh v. State of U.P., (1982) 2 SCC 101, the Court said: (SCC pp. 107-08, para 20)

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“Very wide powers have been conferred on this Court for due and proper administration of justice. Apart from the jurisdiction and powers conferred on  this  Court  under  Arts.     32     and     136     of  the  Constitution  I  am  of  the opinion that this Court retains and must retain, an inherent power and jurisdiction  for  dealing  with  any  extra-ordinary  situation  in  the  larger interests of administration of justice and for preventing manifest injustice being  done.  This  power  must  necessarily  be  sparingly  used  only  in exceptional circumstances for furthering the ends of justice. Having regard to the facts and circumstances of this case, I am of the opinion that this is a  fit  case  where  this  Court  should  entertain  the  present  petition  of Harbans Singh and this Court should interfere.” 63. We find absolutely no merit in this hypertechnical submission of the petitioners' learned counsel. We reject the argument as unsound.”

Based on the aforesaid conclusions, it was submitted, that a similar approach

should  be  adopted  in  this  matter  also,  as  it  was  rightful  to  preserve  the

“knowledge” acquired by the appellants, to enable them to use the same, to the

best advantage of the society, and the citizens of the country.

16. In his endeavour to persuade this Court, that the exercise of jurisdiction

under Article 142, had rightly been invoked in favour of the appellants (by the

Hon’ble  Presiding  Judge,  of  the  ‘former  Division  Bench’),  our  attention  was

drawn, to a treatise by Fali S. Nariman – India’s Legal System: Can it be saved?,

published by Penguin Books India Pvt. Ltd., wherein the author also expressed

his views, with reference to the exercise of  jurisdiction by this Court,  under

Article 142.  Relevant extract of the opinion, is reproduced below:

“If the framers of the Constitution had contemplated an era when judicial power (not prompted by any legal  provision)  would be exercised in the vaccum created by governmental or state inaction, they may have been a little  surprised;  but  then  (I  like  to  believe)  they  may  have  felt  the compulsion  to  remove  the  fetter  of  Article  37,  making  the  Directive Principles of State Policy directly enforceable by the courts! Individual notions of justice according to individual judges, unguided by law, sometimes known as ‘palm-tree justices’ or ‘Cadi justice’ appear to be excluded  under  our  Constitution.   As  if  to  emphasize  this,  the  oath required to be taken by all judges of the higher judiciary significantly omit any reference to ‘justice’.  Every judge of a high court or Supreme Court

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takes an oath to perform the duties of his or her office without fear or favour, without affection or ill will, and to ‘uphold the Constitution and the law’. But some judges are more equal than others, and in our three-tier system of court administration, judges of the Supreme Court are constitutionally placed in a class apart. Under  Article  136  of  the  Constitution,  ‘the  Supreme Court  may  in  its discretion  grant  special  leave  to  appeal  from  any  judgment,  appeal, determination, sentence or order, in any cause or matter passed or made by any court or tribunal in the territory of India’.  The governing words are ‘in  its  discretion’.   And there  is  a plethora of  case law to  support  the proposition that even where a court or tribunal below the Supreme Court has transgressed the law, the Supreme Court is not bound to interfere, and will not interfere and set it aside under its extraordinary jurisdiction under Article 136, if it is satisfied that the interests of justice have been served.  There is no compulsion for the highest court to set aside even incorrect or illegal decisions of lower courts, high courts or tribunals, if the overriding considerations of justice do not so warrant.  Even after special leave  is  granted  under  Article  136,  and  an  appeal  gets  admitted,  the appellant must show that exceptional and special circumstances do exist, and that if there is no interference by the highest court, substantial and grave injustice would result. Under our Constitution, judges of the Supreme Court have been conferred a special  and unique power,  not conferred on judges of  high courts or judges of any other courts in the country.  Article 142(1) provides that the Supreme Court, in the exercise of its jurisdiction, may pass such decree or make such order as is necessary ‘for doing complete justice in any cause or matter pending before it’, and any decree so passed, or order so made, is enforceable throughout the territory of  India.   Judges of  the highest court, conferred with this extraordinary power, are apparently empowered to disregard statutory prohibitions—‘apparently’ because there has been a flip-flop in the approach of the court— judges speaking in different voices at different times. In 1991, reading Article 142, a Constitution Bench of the Court said that any prohibition, stipulation or restriction contained in ordinary law could not act as a limitation on its constitutional powers under Article 142.  But seven years later, another Constitution Bench of five Justices read Article 142(1)  as  not  empowering the  Supreme Court  to  bypass  or  override  a specific statutory provision.  The latter was an instance of a hard case making  bad  law.   For  the  shocking  behavior  in  Court  of  an  advocate (always an officer of the Court), the advocate was not only punished (by a Bench of three Justices of the Supreme Court) for contempt of court, but he was also suspended from practice for a period of three years.  Since the power of  suspension was  statutorily  vested  only in  the Bar  Council  of India, and could be reviewed by the highest court only on an appeal from a decision of the Bar Council to it, a Bench of five Justices set aside the

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earlier order of suspension, holding that the Bench of three Justices ought not to have overlooked an express statutory provision. In my view, the apex court has virtually denuded itself of its constitutional power  to  do  ‘complete  justice’.   To  be  at  all  meaningful,  the  words ‘complete  justice’  must  comprehend  a  power  to  disregard  statutory provisions  in  exceptional  circumstances,  unless  the  provisions  are themselves based on some fundamental principles of public policy. When declining to exercise its extraordinary jurisdiction under Article 136 of the Constitution,  the Supreme Court may (and often does) refuse to correct orders and decisions passed by high courts and other courts and tribunals even where they are illegal and contrary to law, i.e., where the justice of the case calls for no-interference.  Yet under the law as now declared by the Constitution Bench, the highest court whilst deciding a particular case before it  cannot consciously overlook or bypass enacted law  when  exercising  its  wide  powers  under  Article  142.   An  obvious inconsistency in approach.  If the Supreme Court can be trusted under Article  136 to  cock a blind eye at  a decision of  a  high court  which is contrary to law (but which is otherwise ‘just’), the highest court must be likewise  trusted  when  it  deliberately  ignores  the  law  in  the  overriding interest  of  doing  complete  justice  in  a  particular  case  before  it  under Article 142.”

17. Learned  counsel,  then  drew  our  attention  to  the  decision  in  State  v.

Sanjeev Nanda, (2012) 8 SCC 450, and pointed out to the following observations

recorded therein:

“122.  Convicts  in  various  countries,  now,  voluntarily  come  forward  to serve  the  community,  especially  in  crimes  relating  to  motor  vehicles. Graver the crime greater the sentence. But, serving the society actually is not a punishment in the real sense where the convicts pay back to the community  what  they  owe.  Conduct  of  the  convicts  will  not  only  be appreciated by the community,  it  will  also  give  a lot  of  solace  to  him, especially in a case where because of one's action and inaction, human lives have been lost.”

Based on the above, it was the contention of learned counsel for the appellants,

that Courts can consider, whether it was necessary to travel one extra mile, to

do complete justice.  It was submitted, that the question whether this Court

should travel an extra mile, in the facts of this case, is not difficult to answer.  It

was  submitted,  that  this  Court  must  travel  the  extra  mile,  to  preserve  the

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“knowledge” acquired by the appellants, which would enable them to give effect

to the same, by effectively utilizing it for the welfare of the nation.  According to

learned counsel, in his opinion, the case in hand, did not present a situation,

where anyone could have a second thought, simply because, there would be no

one adversely affected, by adoption of such a course.   

18. Learned counsel also placed reliance on Sushil Ansal v. State, (2015) 10

SCC 359,  and highlighted the position expressed in paragraph 11,  which is

extracted below:

“11. In view of the aforestated undisputed facts, the issue with regard to imposition of sentence upon the appellants is to be decided by us. We are concerned with imposition of  sentence in a criminal case and not with awarding  damages  in  a  civil  case.  Principles  for  deciding  both  are different.”

It was submitted, that on the basis of the aforesaid determination, cumulative

benefit  of  the society,  in receiving service rendered by professionals (like the

appellants), should also be taken into consideration.

19. Last of all, reliance was placed on Priya Gupta v. State of Chhattisgarh,

(2012) 7 SCC 433,  wherein also,  illegal  admissions were dealt  with.   In  the

above judgment, this Court held as under:

“71. In the present case, we have no doubt in our mind that the fault is attributed to all the stakeholders involved in the process of admission, i.e., the Ministry concerned of the Union of India, the Directorate of Medical Education in the State of Chhattisgarh, the Dean of Jagdalpur College and all the three members of the Committee which granted admission to both the appellants on 30-9-2006. But the students are also not innocent. They have certainly taken advantage of being persons of influence. The father of Appellant 2 Akansha Adile was the Director of Medical Education, State of Chhattisgarh at the relevant time and as noticed above, the entire process of  admission  was  handled  through  the  Directorate.  The  students  well knew that the admissions can only be given on the basis of merit in the entrance test and they had not ranked so high that they were entitled to

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the admission on that basis alone. In fact, they were also aware of the fact that no other candidate had been informed and that no one was present due to non-intimation. Out of favouritism and arbitrariness, they had been given admission by completing the entire admission process within a few hours on 30-9-2006.

*** *** *** 73. In the present case, we are informed that the students have already sat for their final examination and are about to complete their courses. Even if we have to protect their admissions on the ground of equity, they cannot  be  granted  such  relief  except  on  appropriate  terms.  By  their admissions,  firstly,  other  candidates  of  higher  merit  have  been  denied admission in the MBBS course. Secondly, they have taken advantage of a very low professional college fee, as in private or colleges other than the government colleges, the fee payable would be Rs. 1,95,000/- per year for general admission and for management quota, the fee payable would be Rs. 4,00,000/- per year, but in government colleges, it is Rs. 4,000/- per year.  So, they have taken a double advantage. As per their merit,  they obviously would not have got admission into the Jagdalpur College and would have been given admission in private colleges. The ranks that they obtained  in  the  competitive  examination  clearly  depict  this  possibility, because  there  were  only  50  seats  in  Jagdalpur  College  and  there  are hundreds of candidates above the appellants in the order of merit. They have also, arbitrarily and unfairly, benefited from lower fees charged in Jagdalpur College. 74. On the peculiar facts and circumstances of the case, though we find no  legal  or  other  infirmity  in  the  judgment  under  appeal,  but  to  do complete justice between the parties within the ambit of Article 142 of the Constitution of India, we would permit the appellants to complete their professional courses, subject to the condition that each one of them pay a sum of Rs. 5 lakhs to Jagdalpur College, which amount shall be utilized for developing the infrastructure in Jagdalpur College.”

20. In order to further illustrate the scope of the exercise of jurisdiction, vested

in this Court under Article 142, learned counsel placed reliance on Academy of

Nutrition Improvement v. Union of India, (2011) 8 SCC 274.  It was submitted,

that in the above case, the controversy related to a ban on non-iodized salt.  The

said ban was unsustainable in law.  Be that as it may, the Court in exercise of

its  jurisdiction  under  Article  142,  invoked  the  ground  of  public  health,  to

continue the existing position, till such time as remedial action was taken by

Parliament.   In  this  behalf,  our  attention  was  drawn  to  the  following

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observations of this Court:

“What Relief? 68. We have already noticed that as at present there is no material  to show that universal salt iodisation will be injurious to public health (that is to the majority of populace who do not suffer from iodine deficiency). But we are constrained to hold that Rule 44-I is ultra vires the Act and therefore,  not  valid.  The  result  would  be  that  the  ban  on  sale  of non-iodised salt for human consumption will be raised, which may not be in the interest  of  public  health.  We are  therefore,  of  the view that  the Central Government should have at least six months’ time to thoroughly review  the  compulsory  iodisation  policy  (universal  salt  iodisation  for human consumption)  with reference to latest inputs and research data and if after such review, is of the view that universal iodisation scheme requires to be continued, bring appropriate legislation or other measures in accordance with law to continue the compulsory iodisation programme. 69.  The question is having held that Rule 44-I to be invalid, whether we can permit  the continuation of  the ban on sale  of  non-iodised salt  for human consumption for any period. Article     142     of the Constitution vests unfettered independent jurisdiction to pass any order in public interest to do complete justice, if exercise of such jurisdiction is not be contrary to any express provision of law. 70. In Supreme Court Bar Assn. v. Union of India, (1998) 4 SCC 409, this Court observed: (SCC p. 432, para 48)

“48.  The  Supreme  Court  in  exercise  of  its  jurisdiction  under Article     142     has the power  to  make such order  as  is     necessary for doing complete justice     ‘between the parties in any cause or matter pending before it’. The very nature of the power must lead the court to  set  limits  for  itself  within which to  exercise  those  powers  and ordinarily  it  cannot  disregard  a  statutory  provision  governing  a subject,  except  perhaps  to  balance  the  equities  between  the conflicting claims of the litigating parties by ‘ironing out the creases’ in a cause or matter before it. Indeed this Court is not a court of restricted jurisdiction of only dispute settling.  It is well recognised and established that this Court has always been a law maker and its role travels beyond merely dispute settling. It is a ‘problem solver in the nebulous areas’ (see. K. Veeraswami v. Union of India, (1991) 3 SCC 655)  but the substantive statutory provisions dealing with the subject-matter of a given case, cannot be altogether ignored by this Court,  while  making  an  order  under  Article     142.  Indeed,  these constitutional  powers  cannot,  in  any  way,  be  controlled  by  any statutory  provisions  but  at  the  same  time  these  powers  are  not meant  to  be  exercised  when  their  exercise     may  come  directly  in conflict     with what has been expressly provided for in statute dealing expressly with the subject.”  

71. In Kalyan Chandra Sarkar v. Rajesh Ranjan, (2005) 3 SCC 284, this Court after reiterating that this Court in exercise of its jurisdiction under

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Article 142 of  the  Constitution  would  not  pass  any  order  which  would amount to supplanting substantive law applicable to the case or ignoring express statutory provisions dealing with the subject, observed as follows: (SCC p. 294, para 27)

“27. It may therefore be understood that the plenary powers of this Court under Article     142     of the Constitution are inherent in the court and  are     complementary  to  those  powers  which  are  specifically conferred on the court by various statutes though are not limited by those statutes. These powers also exist independent of the statutes with a view to do complete justice between the parties...and are in the nature of supplementary powers...(and) may be put on a different and perhaps even wider footing than ordinary inherent powers of a court  to  prevent  injustice.  The  advantage  that  is  derived  from a constitutional provision couched in such a wide compass is that it prevents  'clogging  or  obstruction  of  the  stream  of  justice’.  (See: Supreme Court Bar Assn. (supra))”.

72. In view of the above and to do complete justice between the parties in the interest of public health, in exercise of our jurisdiction under Article 142     of the Constitution, we direct the continuation of the ban contained in Rule 44-I for a period of six months. The Central Government may within that period review the compulsory iodisation programme and if it decides to continue, may introduce appropriate legislative or other measures. It is needless to say that if it fails to take any action within the expiry of six months from today, Rule 44-I shall cease to operate.”

Based on the conclusions drawn in the above judgments, it was submitted, that

in the same manner in which judicial notice was taken by this Court, on the

ground of  “public  health”,  this  Court  needed to  take into  consideration,  the

“knowledge” component (acquired by the appellants), and the impossibility of

transferability  of  the  intellectual  property,  to  invoke  Article  142  of  the

Constitution,  to  legitimize  the  curriculum  successfully  completed  by  the

appellants.  As such, it was pointed out, that the present consideration also falls

within the permissible constitutional parameters.  It was accordingly pleaded,

that the view expressed by the Hon’ble Presiding Judge (of the ‘former Division

Bench’), should be affirmed.

21. Having  adverted  to  the  situations  wherein  this  Court  has  positively

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exercised power under Article 142, to provide relief to the concerned parties,

learned counsel also placed for our consideration, two judgments rendered by

this Court, wherein the Court had declined to exercise the power vested in it

under  Article  142.   First  of  all,  reference  was  made  to  Priyanka  Estates

International Private Limited v. State of Assam, (2010) 2 SCC 27, wherein this

Court held as under:

“58. In the case in hand, it is noted that a number of occupiers were put in possession of the respective flats by the builder/developer constructed unauthorisedly in violation of the laws. Thus, looking to the matter from all angles it cannot be disputed that ultimately the flat owners are going to be the greater sufferers rather than builder who has already pocketed the price of the flat. 59.  It is a sound policy to punish the wrong-doer and it is in that spirit that the courts have moulded the reliefs of granting compensation to the victims in exercise of the powers conferred on it. In doing so, the courts are required to take into account not only the interest of the petitioners and the respondents but also the interest of public as a whole with a view that public bodies or officials or builders do not act unlawfully and do perform their duties properly. 60. In the case in hand, admittedly, at no point of time Appellant 1, M/s. Priyanka Estates International (P) Ltd. was able to show to its prospective purchasers the Occupancy Certificate or Completion Certificate issued by the authorities concerned. The same could not even be shown to us and without it, Appellant 1 could not have embarked into sale of flats as it was mandatorily required. 61. The instant case is not a case of breach of contract. It is a clear case of breach of the obligation undertaken to erect the building in accordance with building regulations and failure to truthfully inform the warranty of title and other allied circumstances. 62. Even though at the first instance, we thought of invoking this Court's jurisdiction conferred under Article 142 of the Constitution of India so as to  do  complete  justice  between  the  parties  and  to  direct  awarding  of reasonable/suitable compensation/interest to the flat owners, whose flats are ultimately going to be demolished, but, with a heavy heart, we have restrained ourselves from doing so, for variety of reasons and on account of various disputed questions that may be posed in the matter. However, we  grant  liberty  to  those,  whose  flats  are  ultimately  going  to  be demolished,  to  exhaust  the  remedy  that  may  be  available  to  them in accordance with law.”

It was submitted, that the aforesaid judgment pertained to violations of building

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norms,  and  the  Court  considered  it  inappropriate,  to  provide  relief  to  the

persons who had purchased flats, despite their vehement contention, that they

were not guilty of violating the building regulations (as the builders who had

sold  the flats  to  them,  had raised constructions  in violation of  the building

norms).  Additionally, reference was made to Uttar Pradesh Avas Evam Vikas

Parishad  v.  Uttar  Pradesh  Power  Corporation  Limited,  (2011)  10  SCC  643,

wherein our attention was invited to the following observations:

“29.  Mr.  Pallav  Shishodia,  learned  Senior  Counsel  also  urged  that  the appellants are migrants from Gujarat. They have settled in Chidambaram about  thirty  years  back  and  the  livelihood  of  the  entire  family  of  the appellants which comprised of about 40 members is dependant on the saw mill existing on the subject land. Having regard to these facts, he would submit  that  we  invoke  our  jurisdiction  under  Article  142  of  the Constitution and declare the acquisition of the appellants’ land bad in law to do complete justice. 30. There is no doubt that by compulsory acquisition of their land, the appellants have been put to hardship. As a matter of fact, the RDO was alive to this problem. In his report dated 14-9-1989, the RDO did observe that the landowners have spent considerable money to raise the level of the land for constructing compound wall and running saw mill. He was, however, of the opinion that the appellants’ land was very suitable for the expansion of the depot and that suitable compensation can be paid to the landowners  to  enable  them  to  purchase  an  alternative  land.  The appellants, however, proceeded to challenge the acquisition. The litigation has  traversed  upto  this  Court  and  taken  about  22  years.  The  public purpose has been stalled for more than two decades. 31. Being the highest court, an extraordinary power has been conferred on this Court under Article 142 to pass any decree, order or direction in the matter to do complete justice between the parties. The power is plenary in nature and not inhibited by constraints or limitations. However, the power under Article 142 is not exercised routinely. It is rather exercised sparingly and very rarely. In the name of justice to the appellants, under Article 142, nothing should be done that would result in frustrating the acquisition of land  which  has  been  completed  long  back  by  following  the  procedure under the Act and after giving full  opportunity to the appellants under Section 5-A. The possession of the land has also been taken as far back as on 25-7-2001.”  

It  was  submitted,  that  the  contours  and  parameters  of  the  consideration

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recorded in the two cases referred to by him, could not be extended to the case

of the appellants, which is unique and distinguishable from the cited cases, for

reasons already expressed above.

22. Our attention was also drawn to the judgment rendered in State of Punjab

v. Rafiq Masih (Whitewasher), (2014) 8 SCC 883, wherein this Court recorded

the distinction between the exercise of jurisdiction vested in this Court under

Article 136 as against Article 142.  The relevant determination was expressed in

the following paragraphs:

“8.  In our view, the law laid down in Chandi Prasad Uniyal case, no way conflicts with the observations made by this Court in the other two cases. In those decisions, directions were issued in exercise of the powers of this Court  under  Article 142 of  the  Constitution,  but  in  the  subsequent decision this Court under Article 136 of the Constitution, in laying down the  law  had  dismissed  the  petition  of  the  employee.  This  Court  in  a number of cases had battled with tracing the contours of the provision in Articles 136 and 142 of the Constitution of India. Distinctively,  although the  words  employed  under  the  two  aforesaid  provisions  speak  of  the powers of this Court, the former vest a plenary jurisdiction in the Supreme Court in the matter of entertaining and hearing of appeals by granting special leave against any judgment or order made by a Court or Tribunal in any cause or matter. The powers are plenary to the extent that they are paramount  to  the  limitations  under  the  specific  provisions  for  appeal contained in the Constitution or other laws. Article 142 of the Constitution of India, on the other hand is a step ahead of the powers envisaged Under Article 136 of the Constitution of India. It is the exercise of jurisdiction to pass such enforceable decree or order as is necessary for doing 'complete justice' in any cause or matter.  

*** *** *** 12. Article 142 of the Constitution of India is supplementary in nature and cannot supplant the substantive provisions, though they are not limited by  the  substantive  provisions  in  the  statute.  It  is  a  power  that  gives preference to equity over law. It is a justice-oriented approach as against the  strict  rigours  of  the  law.  The  directions  issued  by  the  court  can normally be categorized into one, in the nature of moulding of relief and the other, as the declaration of law. “Declaration of law” as contemplated in  Article 141 of  the  Constitution:  is  the  speech  express  or  necessarily implied by the highest court of the land. This Court in the case of Indian Bank v.  ABS Marine Products (P)  Ltd.,  (2006) 5 SCC 72, Ram Pravesh Singh v. State of Bihar, (2006) 8 SCC 381 and in State of U.P. v. Neeraj

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Awasthi, (2006) 1 SCC 667, has expounded the principle and extolled the power of Article 142 of the Constitution of India to new heights by laying down  that  the  directions  issued  under  Article 142 do  not  constitute  a binding precedent unlike Article 141 of the Constitution of India. They are direction issued to do proper justice and exercise of such power, cannot be considered as law laid down by the Supreme Court under Article 141 of the  Constitution  of  India.  The  Court  has  compartmentalized  and differentiated the relief in the operative portion of the judgment by exercise of  powers  under  Article 142 of  the  Constitution  as  against  the  law declared. The directions of the Court under Article 142 of the Constitution, while moulding the relief, that relax the application of law or exempt the case in hand from the rigour of the law in view of the peculiar facts and circumstances do not comprise the ratio decidendi and therefore lose its basic premise of making it a binding precedent. This Court on the qui vive has expanded the horizons of Article 142 of the Constitution by keeping it outside the purview of Article 141 of the Constitution and by declaring it a direction of the Court that changes its complexion with the peculiarity in the facts and circumstances of the case.”

Based  on  the  above  distinction  between  the  exercise  of  jurisdiction  under

Articles 136 and 142 of the Constitution, it was submitted, that the power to do

complete justice under Article 142, was far-far beyond the power vested in this

Court under Article 136.  It was therefore, the submission of learned counsel,

that  this  Court  should  not  refrain  from  extending  complete  justice  to  the

appellants,  in  the manner expressed by the Hon’ble  Presiding Judge (of  the

‘former Division Bench’).

23. Mr. Shyam Divan, learned senior counsel, entered appearance on behalf of

an appellant (in C.A. No.1752 of 2016).  Some of the submissions advanced by

learned counsel, were the same as were canvassed by Mr. R. Venkataramani.

Rather than repeating the same, we have incorporated the said submissions,

along with the contentions advanced by Mr. R. Venkataramani.   Mr. Shyam

Divan during the course of advancing his submissions, pointed out, that even

though the appellant represented by him, was admitted to the MBBS course in

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2008, he had not yet qualified all the professional examinations of the course.

It  was  submitted,  that  the  cancellation  order  in  case  of  the  appellant,  was

passed after 6 years of his admission (- in April 2014).  Referring to the factual

position noticed in the impugned judgment, dated 7.10.2014 (rendered by the

High Court of Madhya Pradesh), it was submitted, that in the Pre-Medical Test

conducted for admissions in the year 2008, the candidatures of 42 students

were cancelled, on account of discovery of tampering in their roll numbers.  It

was highlighted, that only 10 of the above 42 candidates, whose roll numbers

were discovered to have been tampered, had actually taken admission to the

MBBS course.  And 32 of the said candidates, who could have been admitted,

did not even come forward to enrol themselves for the course.  This, according

to learned counsel, is a vital factor which needs to be taken into consideration.

In addition, learned counsel invited the Court’s attention to certain observations

made by the Hon’ble Presiding Judge, which are extracted hereunder:

“7. The enquiry was conducted. The pattern of the enquiry is similar to the one conducted concerning PMT 2013. Based on the enquiry reports, the Board  came  to  two  conclusions:  (i)  there  was  a  tampering  with  the examination process in each one of the abovementioned five years; and (ii) the appellants as well as some others students resorted to unfair means at the  said  examinations.  They  were  beneficiaries  of  such  tampered examination process. The BOARD, therefore, cancelled the admissions of the appellants and some others. …..”

*** *** *** “12.  Admittedly,  there  was  no  show  cause  notice  to  any  one  of  the students before cancelling their admissions. No speaking order indicating the reasons which formed the basis for the cancellation of the admissions was either passed or served on any one of the appellants. Reasons were spelt out for the first time in the High Court. It appears from the impugned judgment and the submissions made before us that respondents relied upon circumstantial evidence  to reach the two conclusions referred to in para 7 (supra).”

*** *** *** “36.  There  is  nothing inherently  irrational  or  perverse  in  the  BOARD’s

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conclusions    (i)    that the examination process was tampered with; and    (ii) that all  the appellants herein who are identified to be members of  the ‘pairs’  (referred  to  earlier)  are  beneficiaries  of  such  manipulated examination  process,  relying  upon  the  circumstances  (mentioned  in Footnote  7  supra)  if  they  are  unimpeachable.  Each  one  of  the circumstances is an inference which flows from certain basic facts which either individually or in combination with some other facts constituted the circumstance.  One  or  more  of  such  facts  (constituting  circumstances mentioned in (iii) to (vi) of Footnote 7 supra) are demonstrated to be not true (with reference to some of the appellants).”

Footnote 7, referred to in paragraph 36 extracted above, is reproduced below:

“7 . The Circumstances are:-  (i)  with respect to each of the five years in question, a definite pattern was followed by the BOARD in allotment of Roll numbers as well as examination centres. But, it is detected on enquiry that allotment of both the Roll number and the examination centre  with respect  to  some of  the students  was in deviation from the pattern adopted for the year;  (ii)  Such deviations with reference to several centres occurred in pairs. The logical pattern employed for the generation of Roll numbers was broken with respect  to  some  pairs  of  students.  They  were  allotted  sequential  Roll numbers,  though they could not have been allotted those numbers if  the logical pattern were followed. Further, such pairs of students were allotted examination Centres which they could not have been allotted having regard to  Roll  numbers  allotted  to  them,  and  the  pattern  of  the  Roll  numbers allotted to the particular examination Centre.  (iii)  in such pairs, once again there is a pattern i.e. the more accomplished student is made to sit in front of the other of the pair (referred to in the impugned  judgment  as  “Scorer”  and  “beneficiary”  respectively).  Such  an arrangement was made in order to enable the “beneficiary” to copy from the “scorer”;  (iv) with reference to most of the identified pairs, the candidates not only got substantially similar (if  not identical)  marks, but also their answers,  both correct and incorrect, with reference to each one of the questions answered by them matched to a substantial extent.  (v) in most of the cases of the identified pairs, the ‘scorer’ did not belong to Madhya Pradesh. (vi)  Such  ‘scorers’  in  most  of  the  cases  though  secured  sufficiently  high marks in the PMT, did not take admission in any one of the medical colleges of  Madhya Pradesh.  The  respondents,  therefore,  believe  that  the  ‘scorers’ were not genuinely interested in securing admission in any medical college of MP and they appeared in the examination only to facilitate the ‘beneficiary’ to obtain good marks to enable the beneficiary to secure admission.”

Based  on  the  aforesaid  observations,  learned  counsel  was  emphatic  in

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highlighting,  that  even  the  Hon’ble  Presiding  Judge  (of  the  ‘former  Division

Bench’),  was  conscious  of  the  fact,  that  some of  the  findings  recorded with

reference  to  some  of  the  appellants,  were  not  correct,  in  respect  of  the

parameters  adopted.   Stated  differently,  it  was  submitted,  that  the  Hon’ble

Presiding  Judge  had  a  lurking  feeling,  that  some  of  the  appellants  were

innocent.  It was submitted, that this was one of the considerations, which must

have weighed with the Hon’ble Presiding Judge, to invoke Article 142, to render

complete justice in the matter.

24. In  continuation  of  the  above  submission,  learned  counsel  invited  our

attention  to  the  principles  culled  out  by  the  Bench  for,  recording  its

conclusions,  based on the analysis  of  the judgments relied upon by learned

counsel for the rival parties, which are extracted hereunder:

“34.  From  an  analysis  of  the  above  decisions,  the  following  principles emerge:-  

1.  Normally,  the  rule  of  audi  alteram  partem  must  be  scrupulously followed in the cases of the cancellation of the examinations of students on the ground that they had resorted to unfair means (copying) at the examinations. 2. But the abovementioned principle is not applicable to the cases where unfair means were adopted by a relatively large number of students and also to certain other situations where either the examination process is vitiated  or  for  reasons  beyond  the  control  of  both  students  and  the examining  body,  it  would  be  unfair  or  impracticable  to  continue  the examination  process  to  insist  upon  the  compliance  with  audi  alteram partem rule.  3. The fact that unfair means were adopted by students at an examination could be established by circumstantial evidence.  4. The scope of judicial review of the decision of an examining body is very limited. If there is some reasonable material before the body to come to the conclusion that unfair means were adopted by the students on a large scale, neither such conclusion nor the evidence forming the basis thereof could be subjected to scrutiny on the principles governing the assessment of evidence in a criminal court.

Cases  such  as  the  one  on  hand  where  there  are  allegations  of  criminal conspiracies resulting in the tampering with the examination process for the

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benefit  of  a  large  number  of  students  would  be  certainly  one  of  the exceptional circumstances indicated in    Sinha’s case     provided there is some justifiable material to support the conclusion that the examination process had been tampered with. In  the  light  of  the  principles  of  law  emerging  from  scrutiny  of  the abovementioned judgments, we are of the opinion that case on hand can fall within the category of exceptions to the rule of   audi alteram partem   if there is reliable material to come to the conclusion that the examination process is vitiated.   That leads me to the next question – whether the material relied upon by the BOARD  for  reaching  the  conclusion  that  the  examination  process  was contaminated insofar as the appellants (and also some more students) are concerned and  the  appellants  are  the  beneficiaries  of  such contaminated process, is tenable?”

Based on the principles culled out, the Hon’ble Presiding Judge, recorded the

following conclusion in paragraph 38:

“38. The other submission of the appellants in this regard is that if there is a deviation  from  the  general  pattern  with  regard  to  the  allotment  of  Roll Numbers and the examination Centres, the appellants could not be blamed or ‘penalised’ because the entire process of the allotment was done by the BOARD and its  officials.  In  my opinion,  the question of  either  ‘blame’  or ‘penalty’  does not arise in the context.  If  tampering with the examination process took place, whether all or some of the appellants are culpable is a matter for a criminal court to examine as and when any of the appellants is sought to be prosecuted.  

But the fact that the examination process was tampered with is relevant for administrative action such as the one impugned herein. The said fact formed the foundation for the further enquiry for identifying the beneficiaries of such contaminated process. Having regard to the circumstances relied upon, I do not  see  anything  illogical  or  untenable  in  the  conclusions  drawn  by  the expert  committee  which formed the basis  for  the impugned action of  the BOARD. It is argued that the formula adopted by the BOARD to record the conclusion that the members of the identified pairs resorted to unfair means at  the  examination  is  without  any  scientific  basis.  I  do  not  see  any irrationality either in the formula or the decision of the BOARD to assign greater  weightage  to  the  incorrect  matching  answers.  There  is  nothing inherently suspicious about two candidates sitting in close proximity in an examination and giving the same correct answer to a question because there can only one correct answer to a question. On the other hand, if they give the same wrong answer to a given question and if the number of such wrong answers  is  high,  it  can  certainly  generate  a  doubt  and  is  a  strong circumstance indicating the occurrence of some malpractice. Such a test was approved by this Court in   Bagleshwar Prasad’s   case.

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Even otherwise, in my opinion, it would be futile to pursue the inquiry in this regard.  Assuming  for  the  sake  of  argument  that  the  submission  of  the appellants  is  right  and  there  are  some  cases (of  appellants)  where  the appellants  can  demonstrate  (if  an  opportunity  is  given  to  them)  that  the circumstantial  evidence is not foolproof and therefore the impugned order must be set aside on the ground of failure of natural justice, the BOARD would still be entitled (in fact it would be obliged in view of the allegation of systematic tampering with the examination process year after year) in law to conduct afresh enquiry after giving notice to each of  the appellants.  That would  mean  spending  enormous  time  both  by  the  BOARD  and  by  the appellants  for  the  enquiry  and  the  consequential  (inevitable)  litigation regarding the correctness of the eventual decision of the BOARD. For  the  abovementioned  reasons,  I  do  not  propose  to  interfere  with  the impugned judgment on the count that the rule of    audi alteram partem   was not complied with by the respondents before cancelling the admissions of the appellants herein.”

A perusal of the aforesaid consideration, according to learned counsel, leads to

the  inevitable  impression,  that  the  Hon’ble  Presiding  Judge  (of  the  ‘former

Division Bench’) was of the view, that the question of holding an inquiry in the

matter was futile, even if the contention advanced at the hands of the appellants

was correct (namely, that the appellants could demonstrate, that the material

relied upon by the authorities  would not  have the effect  of  being absolutely

conclusive).  It was accordingly submitted, that it was apparent from the order

itself,  that  the  Hon’ble  Presiding  Judge,  did  not  allow  the  appellants  an

opportunity to substantiate their claim(s) of innocence before the authorities, as

that would take “enormous time”.  Be that as it may, it was the submission of

learned counsel, that the conclusions recorded by the Hon’ble Presiding Judge

(in paragraph 38, extracted above), reveal a lurking impression in the Court’s

mind, that some of the appellants may not have been blameworthy, of what they

were being accused of.   

25. Likewise,  for the same purpose, learned counsel placed reliance on the

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observations recorded by the Hon’ble Presiding Judge (of the ‘former Division

Bench’):

39. The next question that requires examination is the legality of the action of the respondents after a lapse of considerable time. It varies between one to five  years  with  reference  to  each  of  the  appellants.  The  decision  of  the respondents  necessarily  led  to  litigation  which  consumed  another  three years. The net result is that appellants, who belong to 2012 batch, spent four years undergoing the training in medical course; others progressively longer periods  extending  up  to  eight  years  but  could  not  acquire  their  degrees because of the impugned action and the pendency of this litigation. Most of the appellants would have acquired their degree in medicine by now if they had been successful at the examinations.”

Relying  on  the  above  observations,  it  was  submitted,  that  the  lapse  of

considerable time, also weighed heavily in the mind of the Hon’ble Presiding

Judge, for not interfering with the determination rendered by Vyapam.  It was

therefore, that the Hon’ble Presiding Judge expressed the view, that adoption of

the aforesaid course, would prolong the process of litigation for another three

years, which in turn would result in the prolongation of the period required by

the appellants, to clear their professional examinations (by a further period of

three  years).   It  was therefore  submitted,  that  the decision rendered by the

Hon’ble Presiding Judge, by taking recourse to Article 142, was aimed at putting

a quietus  to the judicial process, and thereby, alleviating young fertile minds

from the rigors of any strict interpretation of law.  

26. For the same purpose, as has been recorded hereinabove, learned counsel

for  the  appellants,  placed  reliance  on  paragraph  46  of  the  judgment  dated

12.5.2016.  The same is reproduced below:

“46. Coming  to  the  case  in  hand,  the  number  of  students  involved  is relatively  huge.  (They  are  the  beneficiaries  of  a  tampered  examination process.   The  tampering  took  place  systematically  and  repeatedly  for  a number  of  years  virtually  destroying  the  credibility  of  the  examination

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process.   It  deprived  a  number  of  other  more  deserving  students  from securing  admissions  to  the  medical  colleges).  In  view  of  the  conclusion recorded  by  me  earlier  that  neither  the  procedure  adopted  by  the respondents  nor  the  evidence  relied  upon  by  the  respondents  for  taking impugned action against the appellants could be characterised as illegal, is it permissible  for  this  Court  to  interfere  with  the  impugned  action  of  the respondents either on the ground that there is a considerable time lapse or that such action would have ruinous effect on the lives and careers of the appellants? and therefore, inequitable, is a troubling question.”

It  was submitted, on the basis of  the observations extracted above, that the

Hon’ble Presiding Judge (of the ‘former Division Bench’), was conscious of the

ruinous effect on the lives and careers of the appellants, and therefore, felt the

necessity of rendering justice to the appellants, by taking recourse to the power

vested in this Court, under Article 142 of the Constitution.

27. Last of all, it was the submission of learned counsel for the appellants,

that  the  Hon’ble  Presiding  Judge,  in  his  order  dated  12.5.2016,  was  also

conscious of the fact, that most of the appellants may well have been juvenile,

and as such, could not have been blamed for the role attributed to them, in the

process of having gained wrongful admission, to the MBBS course.  This aspect

of the matter was noticed in paragraph 55 of the judgment dated 12.5.2016,

wherein the Hon’ble Presiding Judge observed as under:

“55. Another important consideration in the context is that most of (if not all)  the  appellants,  whatever  be  their  respective  role,  if  any,  in  the tampering  of  the  examination  process,  must  have  been  ‘juveniles’  as defined under the Juvenile Justice Act.  They cannot be subjected to any ‘punishment’ prescribed under the criminal law even if they are not only the  beneficiaries  of  the  tampered  examination  process  but  also  the perpetrators of the various acts which constitute offences contaminating the examination process.”  

Taking note of the observations extracted above, according to learned counsel, it

would not be incorrect to suggest, that the Hon’ble Presiding Judge, felt  the

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necessity  of  taking  recourse  to  Article  142,  and thereby,  the  compulsion  to

render complete justice to the appellants.   

28. Mr. Shyam Divan, learned senior counsel canvassed, that it was essential

for us,  to take into  consideration all  the aspects,  referred to  above.   It  was

submitted, that each one of the aforesaid aspects, must be deemed to have been

consciously taken into consideration,  by the Hon’ble Presiding Judge (of  the

‘former Division Bench’),  for  eventually  taking recourse to Article  142 of  the

Constitution,  to  render  complete  justice  to  the  appellants.   These  reasons,

according  to  learned  counsel,  should  be  read  in  conjunction  with  the

submissions advanced at the hands of Mr. R. Venkataramani, Senior Advocate,

wherein the emphasis laid on was, that the appellants had gained “knowledge”,

which could not be transferred/transposed to those who may have been better

claimants for admission, to the MBBS course, than the appellants.   

29. All  put  together,  learned  counsel  for  the  appellants,  endeavoured  to

demonstrate  an  absolute  justification  for  the  exercise  of  jurisdiction  at  the

hands of the Hon’ble Presiding Judge, vested in this Court under Article 142  of

the Constitution.  Learned counsel accordingly beseeched this Court repeatedly,

to  give  expression  to  each  and  every  facet  of  the  understanding  of  the

proposition, at the hands of the Hon’ble Presiding Judge (of the ‘former Division

Bench’), and to uphold the order passed by him, in favour of the appellants.

30. Mr. Sidharth Luthra, Senior Advocate, represented the appellants in Civil

Appeal Nos. 1729, 1761-1768, 1813-1814 and 1838 of 2016.  At the outset, it

was submitted, that the appellants in the above mentioned civil appeals, were

seeking directions in terms of Article 142 of the Constitution, which provides

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plenary powers to this Court, whereby, this Court can pass such orders, as may

be necessary for doing complete justice.  It was submitted, that in the instant

case,  the  instant  prayer  was  also  being  made  by  keeping  the  larger  public

interest in mind.  Learned counsel, adverted to the divergent views expressed by

the members of  the ‘former Division Bench’  (through their  respective orders,

dated 12.5.2016) with respect to the exercise of the above power.  Referring to

the order passed by the Hon’ble Presiding Judge (of the ‘former Division Bench’),

our attention was drawn to the following view expressed by him:

“Society  must  receive  some  compensation  from  the  wrongdoers. Compensation need not be monetary and in the instant case it should not be. In  my  view,  it  would  serve  the  larger  public  interests,  by  making  the appellants  serve  the  nation  for  a  period  of  five  years  as  and  when they become qualified doctors, without any regular salary and attendant benefits of service under the State, nor any claim for absorption into the service of the State subject of course to the payment of some allowance (either in cash or kind) for their survival. I would prefer them serving the Indian Armed Forces subject  to  such  conditions  and  disciplines  to  which  the  armed  forces normally  subject  their  regular  medical  corps.  I  would  prefer  that  the appellants be handed over the certificates of their medical degrees only after they complete the abovementioned five years. The abovementioned exercise would  require  the  ascertainment  of  the  views  of  Ministry  of  Defence, Government of India, and passing of further appropriate orders by this Court thereafter.  In  view of  the  disagreement  of  views  in  this  regard,  I  am not proposing such an exercise.”

Thereupon, our attention was drawn to the order of  the Hon’ble Companion

Judge (of the ‘former Division Bench’), who expressed his views as under:

“123. Applying the aforesaid law to the facts of the case at hand, I find that the appellants are not entitled to claim any equitable relief on the ground that they have almost completed their course during the interregnum period and hence no action on the basis of their PMT Examination results is called for.  

*** *** *** 126.  In  these  circumstances,  the  State  may  consider  permitting  the appellants  and  other  candidates  alike  the  appellants  to  appear  in  the competitive  examination  whenever  it  is  held  and  consider  granting  age relaxation to those candidates who have crossed the age-limit, if prescribed.

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Such liberty, if granted, would not cause any prejudice to any one and at the same time would do substantial justice to all such candidates as was done in Bihar School Examination (supra).  Beyond this, in my view, the appellants are not entitled to claim any indulgence.”

31. Learned  counsel,  to  support  the  cause  of  the  appellants,  drew  our

attention  to  the  year  of  admission  and  status  of  the  appellants.   It  was

submitted, that the appellant in Civil Appeal No.1729 of 2016 had completed

her medical courses by clearing all  four professional examinations, while the

appellants in Civil  Appeal  Nos.  1767-1768 of  2016,  1813-1814 and 1838 of

2016 had cleared the second/third professional examinations, under orders of

the High Court and/or this Court.  Their academic record in school (class X and

XII results),  was also highlighted to demonstrate,  that they were meritorious

students.  It was also pointed out, that none of these appellants were named in

any  First  Information  Report,  nor  were  they  ever  subjected  to  any  criminal

investigation/prosecution, as on date.  It  was further pointed out,  that their

admissions were cancelled, not on finding of any overt act being proved on their

part, but based on conclusions recorded by the Expert Computer Committee

constituted by Vypam, which had evolved a formula to examine, whether the

candidates sitting in pairs, had adopted unfair means, during their Pre-Medical

Test.  It was submitted, that the conclusions drawn against the appellants, was

based on a general analysis, and not, on any individual determination of guilt.

32. Learned counsel pointed out, that in a report prepared by the Ministry of

Health and Family Welfare, Government of India, it had been concluded, that

there was an acute shortage of medical professionals (medical doctors) in India,

specially  at  the  primary  care  level,  both in  the  government  and the  private

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34. It  was  submitted,  that  many  of  the  appellants  may  have  crossed  the

maximum age limit for entry to any other graduate course, and may not be able

to undertake another course of education.  To permit them, as proposed by the

Hon’ble Companion Judge, to retake the examination, after having completed

years of medical education, would put them at an extremely disadvantageous

position.  It was submitted, that such action, would not further public interest.

Even though it was acknowledged, that the same would act as a deterrent, on

account of years of academic career lost.  Learned counsel also highlighted, that

most of the appellants were juvenile, at the relevant time.  It was submitted,

that the utilitarian principle, commended the use of the appellants’ education

and training, for the public policy of promoting healthcare.  It was submitted,

that  the  principle  that  “fraud  vitiates  everything”,  should  not  be  allowed  to

trounce, the cause of public good.  Further, if  the undertaking as given was

considered, and accepted, that itself would act as a deterrent, for other students

in future.  The undertakings given by these appellants is extracted below:

“The Appellants would serve in Government Hospitals/Government Health Centers on an undertaking or on a bond for 10 years period or any higher period as may be directed by this Court. And/Or The Appellants would serve in rural areas and rural health centers on an undertaking or on a bond for 10 years period or any higher period as may be directed by this Court. And/Or The  Appellants  would  serve  in  medical  centers  of  National  Rural  Health Mission for 10 years period or any higher period as may be directed by this Court. Note  I:  Based  on  the  directions  as  may  be  issued,  the  Appellants  could undertake  to  serve  in  Madhya  Pradesh  or  such  other  place  as  may  be directed by this Court. Note  II:  The  effect  of  directing  the  Appellants  to  serve  in  Government hospitals  for the rest of  their  professional  career would have the effect of entitling the Appellants to be considered as Government Servants and would

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entitle  them to  dues payable  to  government servants  including protection accorded to government servants and hence they could be put to bonds for the period specified. B. Alternatively, the Appellants can do community service for a 2 year period under the aegis of the State Social Welfare Department followed by medical service as per Para A above. C.  The  Appellants  can  teach  at  Government  Schools  for  a  2  year  period followed by medical service as per Para A above. D. Quantum of compensation per candidate may be fixed at Rs.10 lakhs or as directed to  be deposited in the Chief  Minister’s  Welfare Fund or State Treasury within a prescribed time period [Refer State v. Sanjeev Nanda (2012) 8 SCC 450]. E. Additionally, a percentage of the yearly income of the Appellants could be deposited in the Chief Minister’s Welfare Fund or State Treasury for such period as may be prescribed by this Court.”

In this behalf, reliance was placed on the Rafiq Masih case (supra), wherein the

scope of Article 142 of the Constitution and the nature of the power vested in

this Court under the above provisions, was considered.  In the above judgment,

it was pointed out, that it was held as under:

“12. Article 142 of the Constitution of India is supplementary in nature and cannot supplant the substantive provisions, though they are not limited by the substantive provisions in the statute. It is a power that gives preference to  equity  over  law.  It  is  a  justice-oriented  approach as  against  the  strict rigours  of  the  law.  The  directions  issued  by  the  Court  can  normally  be categorised into one, in the nature of moulding of relief and the other, as the declaration of law. “Declaration of law” as contemplated in Article 141 of the Constitution:  is  the  speech express  or  necessarily  implied  by  the  highest court of the land. This Court in Indian Bank v. ABS Marine Products (P) Ltd. (2006) 5 SCC 72, Ram Pravesh Singh v. State of Bihar (2006) 8 SCC 381 and in  State of  U.P. v.  Neeraj  Awasthi (2006) 1 SCC 667,  has expounded the principle and extolled the power of Article 142 of the Constitution of India to new heights by laying down that the directions issued under Article 142 do not constitute a binding precedent unlike Article 141 of the Constitution of India. They are direction issued to do proper justice and exercise of such power, cannot be considered as law laid down by the Supreme Court under Article 141 of the Constitution of India. The Court has compartmentalised and  differentiated  the  relief  in  the  operative  portion  of  the  judgment  by exercise of powers under Article 142 of the Constitution as against the law declared. The directions of the Court under Article 142 of the Constitution, while moulding the relief, that relax the application of law or exempt the case in  hand  from  the  rigour  of  the  law  in  view  of  the  peculiar  facts  and circumstances  do  not  comprise  the  ratio  decidendi  and  therefore  lose  its

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basic premise of making it a binding precedent. This Court on the qui vive has expanded the horizons of Article 142 of the Constitution by keeping it outside the purview of Article 141 of the Constitution and by declaring it a direction of the Court that changes its complexion with the peculiarity in the facts and circumstances of the case.”

35. Even in criminal  law,  it  was pointed out,  that  a  distinction was made

between acts having the same consequences, but done with differing intent, and

different level of culpability.  In Empress v. Idu Beg ILR (1881) 3 All 776, the

Allahabad High Court, it was pointed out, had explained the varying degrees of

culpability in cases of murder, rash and negligent acts, and culpable homicide,

whereupon it was held as under:

“… The category of intentional acts of killing, or of acts of killing committed with the knowledge that death, or injury likely to cause death, will be the most probable result, or with the knowledge that death will be a likely result, is contained in the provisions of ss. 299 and 300 of the Penal Code.  S. 304 creates no offence, but provides the punishment for culpable homicide not amounting to murder, and draws a distinction in the penalty to be inflicted, where, an intention to kill being present, the act would have amounted to murder but for its having fallen within one of the Exceptions to s. 300, and those  cases  in  which  the  crime  is  culpable  homicide  not  amounting  to murder, that is to say, where there is knowledge that death will be a likely result, but intention to cause death or bodily injury likely to cause death is absent.  Putting it shortly, all acts of killing done with the intention to kill, or to inflict bodily injury likely to cause death, or with knowledge, that death must  be  the  most  probable  result,  are  prima  facie  murder,  while  those committed with the knowledge that death will be a likely result are culpable homicide not amounting to murder.  Now it is to be observed that s. 304A, is directed  at  offences  outside  the  range  of  ss.299  and  300,  and  obviously contemplates those cases into which neither intention nor knowledge of the kind  already  mentioned  enters.   For  the  rash  or  negligent  act  which  is declared to be a crime is one “not amounting to culpable homicide,” and it must therefore be taken that intentionally or knowingly inflicted violence, directly  and  willfully  caused,  is  excluded.   S.  304A  does  not  say  every unjustifiable or inexcusable act of killing not hereinbefore mentioned shall be punishable under the provisions of  this section, but it  specifically and in terms limits itself to those rash or negligent acts which cause death but fall short of culpable homicide of either description.”  

36. Mr.  Raju  Ramachandran,  learned  senior  counsel, appearing  for  the

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appellants in Civil Appeal Nos. 1795-1798 of 2016, canvassed their claim, from

a completely different angle.  He acknowledged, that there was unanimity in the

Courts, which had adjudicated upon the controversy (first the High Court, and

thereafter, this Court),  that the appellants were party to a tainted admission

process.  They were admittedly, beneficiaries of such process.  Even though the

appellants  were  not  issued  notices,  and  therefore,  were  not  afforded  an

opportunity to tender any explanation in their defence, it was acknowledged,

that  the  formula  adopted  by  Vyapam,  for  cancelling  the  results  of  the

appellants, was found to be fair, by all Courts.  The determination rendered by

Vyapam,  was  accordingly  upheld.   It  was  contended,  that  the  submissions

advanced  by  him,  were  despite  the  aforestated  acknowledged  factual  (-  and

legal) position.

37. It  was  asserted  by  learned  counsel,  that  admissions  to  academic

institutions  of  higher  learning,  involved  a  cut-throat  competition.   The

admission-competition, according to learned counsel, was maximum in the case

of  medical  institutions.   It  was  submitted,  that  in  the  above  competitive

environment, children of tender years, find themselves pressurized on account

of  the  availability  of  limited  seats.   Not  only  that,  it  was  pointed  out,  that

pressure  in  the  matter  of  admissions,  as  stated  above,  was  also  fuelled  by

parents.   It  was pointed out,  that parents on their own part,  felt  a sense of

personal failure, in case their children were not successful in gaining admission

to  prestigious courses (-or,  in  acclaimed institutions).   And therefore  it  was

highlighted,  that  parents  also  derived  great  pleasure  and  satisfaction,  when

their  wards  gained  admission  to  important  courses,  and/or  in  prestigious

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institutions.  Children as also parents, therefore, strive for societal recognition,

when they  compete  for  admission to  professional  courses.   It  was  therefore

submitted,  that  the  actions  of  the  appellants  in  the  present  controversy,

required to be viewed, by keeping all the above factors in mind.

38. Learned  counsel  also  submitted,  that  the  overwhelming  desire  of

candidates, as well as, the expectation of their parents, had created inroads,

into the system of admission to professional courses, and the admission system

had become rotten.  It was acknowledged, that this has not been the position

only in the recent past, but had been ongoing for many years.  In the present

case, in the first instance, admissions of the year 2013, were annulled.  Based

on the manner in which wrongful admissions were made, during the year 2013,

an inquiry was conducted for  the preceding years,  as well.   This  led to the

cancellation of the admission of the appellants (and others, similarly situated as

them), in respect of admissions during 2008 to 2012.  It was submitted, that the

present controversy,  should be viewed from the aforestated background (and

perspective).

39. It  was  emphasized,  by  learned  counsel,  that  the  appellants  were  not

perpetrators of a fraud.  It was an ongoing fraud, which had been in existence

for many years.  The appellants were merely a willing party to the existing fraud.

Their  willingness  to  seek  benefit  thereof,  was  based  on  a  compelling

atmosphere, including their own ambition. It was submitted, that the appellants

should not be dealt with by using a common brush, which would wipe out their

career(s), on the ground that they were party to a fraud.  It was reiterated, that

the appellants were  innocent.   The appellants,  it  was pointed out,  were  not

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mature  enough,  to  debate  within  their  minds,  the  cause  and effect  of  their

actions.  It was submitted, that all  the appellants (or at least, most of them

were) were juvenile, when they had appeared for the Pre-Medical Test, and even

for this reason, they could not be held responsible for any wrong doing, whether

it emanated from a misrepresentation-simpliciter, or misrepresentation – having

the trappings of fraud.

40. It was submitted, that the Hon’ble Presiding Judge (of the ‘former Division

Bench’), had approached the issue in the right perspective.  It was pointed out,

that the Hon’ble Presiding Judge, not only approved the formula adopted for

short-listing the candidates, who had obtained admissions by manipulating the

process  of  admission,  but  had  also  upheld  the  orders  passed  by  Vyapam,

cancelling the admission of the appellants, to the MBBS course.  And yet, for

societal  benefit,  and  certainly  not  for  the  benefit  of  the  appellants,  invoked

Article  142,  to  uphold  the  validity  of  the  academic  course  (or  part  thereof)

successfully  completed  by  them.   This  invocation  of  Article  142  of  the

Constitution, by the Hon’ble Presiding Judge, it was submitted, not only took

away the trauma from the minds of the young appellants, who had undoubtedly

committed a serious mistake, but had also taken care of a societal need, in the

field  of  professional  medicine.   The  route  adopted  by  the  Hon’ble  Presiding

Judge,  in  preserving  the  academic  career(s) successfully  completed  by  the

appellants, according to learned counsel, was founded on a regime of penance,

to be served by the appellants.  

41. Learned counsel repeatedly emphasized, that his solitary contention was,

that societal benefit was of much greater significance, as compared to individual

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punishment.  It was submitted, that in the manner in which Article 142 has

been  interpreted  by  this  Court,  the  determination  rendered  by  the  Hon’ble

Presiding Judge, should be endorsed by the instant Division Bench, also.  In

order to persuade us to adopt the aforesaid course, reliance was placed on the

Sanjeev Nanda case, (supra), and our attention was drawn to the following:

“Community service for avoiding jail sentence 122. Convicts in various countries, now, voluntarily come forward to serve the community, especially in crimes relating to motor vehicles. Graver the crime,  greater  the  sentence.  But,  serving  the  society  actually  is  not  a punishment in the real sense where the convicts pay back to the community what they owe. Conduct of the convicts will not only be appreciated by the community, it will also give a lot of solace to them, especially in a case where because of one’s action and inaction, human lives have been lost. 123. In the facts and circumstances of the case, where six human lives were lost, we feel, to adopt this method would be good for the society rather than incarcerating the convict further in jail. Further sentence of fine also would compensate at least some of the victims of such road accidents who have died, especially in hit-and-run cases where the owner or driver cannot be traced. We, therefore, order as follows: (1) The accused has to pay an amount of Rs 50 lakhs (Rupees fifty lakhs) to the Union of India within six months, which will  be utilised for providing compensation to the victims of  motor accidents,  where the vehicle owner, driver, etc. could not be traced, like victims of hit-and-run cases. On default, he will have to undergo simple imprisonment for one year. This amount be kept under a different head to be used for the aforesaid purpose only. (2)  The accused would do community service for two years  which will  be arranged by the  Ministry  of  Social  Justice  and Empowerment  within two months. On default, he will have to undergo simple imprisonment for two years.”

Learned counsel whilst placing reliance on the observations in the Sanjiv Nanda

case (supra) submitted, that personal ambition, parental pressure, a corrupted

system which had built inroads over the years (for gaining admission, through

administrative  assistance),  the  juvenility  of  the  appellants,  and  the  societal

benefit, should be assessed wholesomely by this Court, before recording its final

conclusions.

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42. Ms.  Indu  Malhotra,  learned  senior  counsel,  representing  some  of  the

appellants, adopted the submissions advanced by her learned colleagues.  In

addition,  learned  counsel  illustratively  explained,  by  inviting  the  Court’s

attention to the factual position relating to some of the individual appellants,

that the parameters adopted by Vyapam, to determine the culpability of  the

concerned  students,  could  not  conclusively  justify  the  guilt  of  some  of  the

appellants.   

43. It  was  submitted,  that  some  of  the  appellants  had  a  commendable

academic record, during their school education.  And therefore, it would not be

right, to assume that the appellants would not have been in a position, on their

own  merit,  to  gain  admission  to  the  MBBS  course.   It  was  emphatically

highlighted, that the conclusion drawn by Vyapam, against the appellants, was

based on a generalized formula, which could not be assumed to be correct, with

reference to all the appellants.  But then, it was also contended, that even if the

formula was assumed to  be correct,  the findings recorded by Vyapam, were

clearly  incorrect  in  respect  of  some  of  the  parameters  (incorporated  in  the

formula), with reference to some of the appellants.  In this behalf, it may be

acknowledged, that learned counsel was at pains to highlight, some illustrative

instances, with reference to some of those whose admissions were cancelled by

Vyapam.

44. We find no reason or cause, to delineate the facts relating to some of the

individual appellants, brought to our notice.  This, because the ‘former Division

Bench’, through their separate orders dated 12.5.2016, and their subsequent

order dated 30.8.2016, affirmed the recording of a concurrent opinion, that the

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examination process for the years 2008 to 2012, was vitiated with reference to

the  appellants,  and others.   Both  Hon’ble  Judges  comprising  of  the  ‘former

Division Bench’ held, that the appellants herein were beneficiaries of a vitiated

process.  In the above view of the matter, we would restrain ourselves, from a

re-appreciation  of  a  finding  concurrently  recorded  by  the  ‘former  Division

Bench’, despite the submissions, emphatically advanced.  We have placed on

record (in paragraph 4 hereinabove), the observations recorded by the ‘former

Division Bench’ in its order dated 30.8.2016.  We record our concurrence, with

the said observations.  Needless to mention, that by passing our order dated

28.7.2016,  seeking a clarification from the ‘former Division Bench’,  we were

successful in saving a number of  days of  precious time of  the Court,  which

would have otherwise been utilized, in hearing and determining, the submission

canvassed  on  behalf  of  the  appellants,  founded  on  Article  145(5)  of  the

Constitution.  In fact, that was the precise reason (recorded in our order, dated

28.7.2016), for which the clarification was sought.

45. Mr.  Purushaindra  Kaurav,  learned  counsel  appearing  for  the  M.P.

Professional Examination Board (Vyapam), drew our attention to the sequence

of facts which eventually culminated in the cancellation of the results of the

appellants  (to  the  professional  MBBS course).   It  was  pointed  out,  that  on

6.7.2013, the Crime Branch of Indore, received information, that around twenty

students from outside States (outside the State of Madhya Pradesh) like U.P.,

Bihar etc., had appeared in the Pre-Medical Test, with a fake identity, just to

facilitate other students (as the appellants herein), to gain higher marks.  It was

submitted, that these outside students, were not themselves desirous, of gaining

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admission to the MBBS course.  Their object was only to help the appellants,

and  others  similarly  situated.   Based  on  the  above  information,  the  Crime

Branch, Indore, conducted a raid.  During the course of the raid, 20 students

with  suspicious  identity  were  detected.   Crime  Case  No.539/2013  was

accordingly registered on 7.7.2013, at Rajendra Nagar Police Station, Indore.

46. Arrests  of  the  accused in  Crime No.539/2013 were  made on 7.7.2013

itself.  Based on the information furnished by those arrested, it emerged that a

racket/scam supported by private doctors (as well as, other individuals), was

operating.  The main accused were identified as Sanjiv Shiplkar, Jagdish Sagar,

Tarang Sharma, Bharat Mishra, etc.. After the arrest of the above persons, it

became  known,  that  Vyapam’s  officials  were  also  involved.   The  names  of

Vyapam  officials  involved  were  –  Pankaj  Trivedi  (Controller/Director),  Nitin

Mohindra, (Principal System Analyst), Ajay Kumar Sen (Senior System Analyst),

Chandrakant Mishra (Assistant  Programmer)  etc..   All  the aforesaid Vyapam

officials were also arrested, between July and September 2013.

47. It was submitted, that the investigation of Crime Case No.539/2013 was

handed over to a Special Task Force, which recovered incriminating data, from a

computer hard disc.  The information derived from the hard disc, led to the

registration of other crime cases, pertaining to the examinations conducted by

Vyapam, for admission to academic courses.  Seeing the gravity and extent of

the criminality, and the highly placed persons involved, the investigation came

to be entrusted to the Central Bureau of Investigation (CBI).

48. It  was  pointed  out,  that  after  conducting  a  detailed  inquiry,  in  the

Pre-Medical  Examination  2013,  Vyapam  cancelled  the  results  of  415,

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candidates.  This was done through two orders, dated 9.10.2013 and 6.12.2013

(345 candidates by the former, and 70 candidates by the latter).  The aforesaid

orders cancelling the results of 415 candidates, were assailed by the aggrieved

candidates, through Writ Petition No. 20342/2013 (Pratibha Singh v. State of

Madhya Pradesh),  and other  connected matters.   All  the  writ  petitions were

dismissed by the High Court, on 11.4.2014.  The High Court upheld the orders

dated 9.10.2013 and 6.12.2013 (cancelling the candidature of 415 candidates).

It was pointed out, that the order passed by the High Court on 11.4.2014, was

assailed before this Court,  through SLP(C) Nos. 13629-13630 of  2014 (Pooja

Yadav v. State of M.P.), and 16257 of 2014 (Sumit Sinha v. State of M.P.). This

Court dismissed the former special leave petitions on 19.5.2014, and the latter

on 8.8.2014.  It was therefore contended, that on a controversy identical to the

one  in  hand,  this  Court  has  already  concluded  the  matter,  against  the

appellants.

49. Having carried out a similar exercise, it was pointed out, with reference to

admissions to the MBBS course, during the years 2008 to 2012, Vyapam had

passed similar  orders (cancelling the candidature of  students),  on 15.4.2014

and 9.5.2014.  Writ Petition No.1918 of 2014 (Nitu Singh Markam v. State of

M.P.) and connected matters, were yet again, dismissed by the High Court of

Madhya Pradesh, on 24.9.2014.  It is therefore apparent, according to learned

counsel, that the challenge raised by the candidates who had gained admission

during the period 2008 to 2012, was not accepted by the High Court, for exactly

the  same  reasons,  as  were  recorded  by  the  High  Court,  for  upholding  the

cancellation orders pertaining to admissions made during 2013.  

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50. The above order dated 24.9.2014 was assailed by the appellants herein,

wherein the members of the ‘former Division Bench’, passed separate orders on

12.5.2016, details whereof have already been recorded hereinabove.

51. For the reason, that the appellants had not gained admission to the MBBS

course,  on their  own merit,  it  was contended by learned counsel,  that  they

would not enjoy the trust of the society, as they would always carry a stigma of

having  obtained  their  qualifications  by  deceit  and  fraud.   It  was  pointedly

asserted, that on account of the trust deficit between the appellants, and their

likely patients, a feeling of faith and confidence would never be entertained by

their patients, however brilliant or outstanding the appellants may actually be.

It was submitted, that the candidature of 634 students, admitted to the MBBS

course during the years 2008 to 2012, had been cancelled.  Out of the students

whose candidature was cancelled, the appellants before this Court numbered

only 139.  It was clarified, that out of the 634 students, whose candidatures

were cancelled, only 268 candidates had actually taken admission to the MBBS

course.  Based on the aforesaid data, it was submitted, that a large number of

students, whose admission to the MBBS course had been cancelled, had already

accepted the decision of Vyapam and/or of the High Court, gracefully.  It was

pointed out,  that for the few appellants who have been agitating their  claim

before this Court, it would be unjust and improper to invoke the jurisdiction

vested with this Court, under Article 142 of the Constitution.

52. Premised on the factual position narrated above, it was submitted, that all

kinds  of  manipulation  and  fraud  were  adopted  by  the  appellants,  to  gain

admission to the MBBS course.  It was asserted, that this was not a simple case

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of mass copying.  It was submitted, that the instant case constituted a deep

rooted conspiracy involving parents, students, government officials, racketeers

and various middle-men.  The instant scam, it was pointed out, was going on for

years together, which had resulted in tarnishing the good name and veracity of

Vyapam.  It  was submitted,  that  the need of  the hour  was,  to  assuage the

reputation of  Vyapam, by dealing with those involved,  and the beneficiaries,

with a strong hand.  It was pleaded, that Article 142 of the Constitution, needed

to be invoked, towards that end.   

53. Learned  counsel  representing  Vyapam,  highlighted,  persons  similarly

situated as the appellants, who were admitted to the MBBS course during the

year 2013, were not allowed any equitable relief, as is presently claimed by the

appellants.  After the dismissal of the challenge raised by them, by the High

Court, this Court also unequivocally rejected their claims (on 19.5.2015 and

8.8.2014).  It was submitted, that it was not open to the appellants, to seek a

relief, which was not granted to others, similarly situated.   

54. It  was also pointed out,  by learned counsel  representing Vyapam, that

criminal  cases  had  also  been  initiated  against  a  number  of  appellants,  for

having adopted fraudulent means, to gain admission to the MBBS course.  It

was  submitted,  that  as  against  the  remaining  appellants,  investigation  was

ongoing, and as soon as the same would be completed, criminal proceedings

would be initiated against them, as well.  It was asserted, that the actions of the

appellants,  and  of  those  with  whose  connivance  they  gained  entry  into  the

MBBS course, constituted a scam.  In such circumstances, there could be no

question of considering, any contention advanced on behalf of the appellants,

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which  would  validate  any  acquisition  based  on  fraud  and  deceit.   This,

according  to  learned  counsel,  would  amount  to  giving  premium  to  the

appellants, for their wrongful actions.   

55. It was also submitted by learned counsel representing Vyapam, that such

an  attempt  at  the  hands  of  this  Court,  would  demoralise  meritorious

candidates.  Such relief to the appellants, as has been accorded by the Hon’ble

Presiding  Judge  (of  the  ‘former  Division  Bench’),  would  encourage  all  and

sundry,  to  gain  admission  in  future  as  well,  by  adopting  malpractice  of  all

kinds.  In the instant view of the matter, it was submitted, that benevolence

shown to the appellants, would not be in the larger public interest.   

56. On behalf of Vyapam, it was also asserted, that the appellants were mostly

juvenile at the time when they gained entry into the MBBS course.  As such, it

was pointed out, that they were still young and could turn a fresh leaf in their

life by working hard, so as to re-achieve the benefits of their individual merit.  It

was submitted, that such of the appellants who had  faith in themselves, would

not lag behind.  It was pointed out, that the appellants and others similarly

situated, may well be granted the relief of competing in the Pre-Medical Test, by

relaxation of their age and qualification, in exercise of the power vested in this

Court under Article 142.  It  was submitted, that the appellants deserved no

more.

57. It was also asserted, on behalf of Vyapam, that the fact that the appellants

had undergone the entire MBBS course, or a substantial part thereof, should

not  weigh  with  this  Court,  as  a  determinative  factor  whether  or  not  the

appellants, were entitled to any sympathetic consideration.  It was submitted,

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that the delayed action against the appellants was based on the fact, that the

instant scam remained a guarded secret, which came out for the first time, on

account of the information received by the Crime Branch of Indore, on 6.7.2013.

As already noticed hereinabove, in the first instance, investigations were limited

to the admission to the MBBS course,  on the basis of  the Pre-Medical Test,

conducted in the year 2013.  Only when it was realized, that there had been an

ongoing racket,  for  admission to  the MBBS course,  the investigating agency

widened the scope of  inquiry,  leading to the discovery of  adoption of  similar

unfair  means,  in  the  matter  of  admissions,  even  during  the  years  2008  to

20012.  As a matter of overall consideration, it was submitted, that keeping in

mind the maxim “fraud vitiates everything”, no benefit could be claimed by the

appellants, on the basis of any statutory rights, including the law of limitation.

It  was  therefore  asserted,  that  it  would  not  be  proper,  in  the  facts  and

circumstances of  the instant case,  to exercise the jurisdiction vested in this

Court  under  Article  142  of  the  Constitution,  to  extend  any  benefit  to  the

appellants.

58(i). Learned counsel representing Vyapam placed reliance on Vinod Bhandari

v.  State  of  Madhya  Pradesh,  (2015)  11  SCC  502.   The  instant  judgment

pertained to an application filed by an accused in the Vyapam scam, seeking

bail.  Bail having been declined to him by the High Court, he approached this

Court.   This  Court  noticing  the  fact,  that  the  appellant  was  the  Managing

Director  of  Shri  Aurobindo  Institute  of  Medical  Sciences,  Indore,  and  that,

crores  of  rupees  were  collected,  to  help  undeserving  students  to  pass  the

entrance examination to the MBBS course, arrived at the conclusion, that an

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offence of a high magnitude, leading to illegal admissions to large number of

undeserving candidates, by corrupt means, undermined the trust of the people,

and the integrity of the medical profession itself.  In the aforesaid view of the

matter, this Court also declined the prayer for bail.

(ii). Reliance was also placed on Mridul Dhar v. Union of India, (2005) 2 SCC

65.   The  instant  case  also  related  to  admission  to  the  MBBS course.   The

seriousness of the process of admission was noticed by this Court in paragraph

7 of the above judgment, which is extracted below:

“7. It is a matter of anguish that despite various decisions of this Court and laying down of a time schedule for completion of admission process, the time schedule has not been adhered to at various stages by various authorities resulting  in  otherwise  avoidable  discontentment  and  hardship  to  the candidates. The observance of the time schedule is paramount for effective utilisation to all-India quota of medical and dental seats. The denial of a seat in  the  college  of  choice  on  the  basis  of  one’s  merit  position  leads  to frustration and results in injustice to the young students. The admission to a professional course based on merit position is paramount for the career of a student. The omission and commission in respect of admissions this year, as is  evident  from  the  orders  aforenoted,  adversely  affected  the  career  of meritorious students in their not getting admission in the college of  their choice. Any frustration and feeling of injustice at an impressionable age at which the students compete in all-India competition is neither desirable from the point of view of either the young students nor for the country’s future. We are concerned with the career of those bright candidates who compete in a tough all-India competition. In this background, it is necessary to examine the acts of omission and commission at various levels, the suggestions that have  been  made  and  submissions  put  forth,  to  consider  the  issuance  of directions  for  streamlining  admissions  from  the  next  academic  year  in MBBS/BDS courses.”

Based  on  the  aforesaid  observations,  it  was  contended,  that  unlike  the

submissions advanced at the behest of the appellants, it was also necessary to

keep in mind, the effect of  regularization of  a tainted admission process,  on

those who had been deprived of admission, despite their merit.   

(iii) Reliance was also placed on Gurdeep Singh v. State of J&K, 1995 Supp (1)

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SCC 188.   The  instant  case,  also  pertained  to  admission  to  MBBS course,

wherein this Court observed, as under:

“11. In the result, we find that the denial of the seat to the appellant in the sports category, cannot be justified. As Respondent 6 was not eligible, there was no question of  a tie.  Appellant should now be given the seat.  By an earlier interlocutory order, a seat had been directed to be kept vacant for appellant’s benefit in the event of his success. We direct the authorities to admit appellant to the course within two weeks from today. We therefore, allow this appeal,  set aside the order dated August 10, 1992 of  the High Court and grant the reliefs claimed in the writ petition. 12. What remains to be considered is whether the selection of Respondent 6 should be quashed. We are afraid, unduly lenient view of the courts on the basis of human consideration in regard to such excesses on the part of the authorities, has served to create an impression that even where an advantage is secured by stratagem and trickery, it could be rationalised in courts of law. Courts do and should take human and sympathetic view of matters. That is the very essence of justice. But considerations of judicial policy also dictate that  a  tendency of  this  kind where  advantage gained by illegal  means is permitted to be retained will jeopardise the purity of selection process itself; engender  cynical  disrespect  towards  the  judicial  process  and  in  the  last analysis  embolden  errant  authorities  and  candidates  into  a  sense  of complacency and impunity  that  gains  achieved  by such wrongs  could  be retained by an appeal to the sympathy of the court. Such instances reduce the  jurisdiction  and  discretion  of  courts  into  private  benevolence.  This tendency should be stopped.  The selection of  Respondent 6 in the sports category was, on the material placed before us, thoroughly unjustified. He was not eligible in the sports category. He would not be entitled on the basis of his marks, to a seat in general merit category. Attribution of eligibility long after the selection process was over, in our opinion, is misuse of power. While we have sympathy for the predicament of Respondent 6, it should not lose sight of the fact that the situation is the result of his own making. We think in order to uphold the purity of academic processes, we should quash the selection  and  admission  of  Respondent  6.  We  do  so,  though,  however, reluctantly.”

Based on the aforesaid observations, it was contended, that this Court clearly

and unequivocally arrived at the conclusion, that there should be no judicial

sympathy, to the advantage of persons, who secured admission by stratagem

and trickery.  It was accordingly submitted, that any act of bestowing legality on

admissions  acquired  through  such  a  selection  process,  would  constitute  a

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misuse of power vested in this Court under Article 142 of the Constitution.

(iv) Reliance was also placed on Tanvi Sarwal v. Central Board of Secondary

Education, (2015) 6 SCC 573.  This case also pertained to admission, to the

MBBS course.  Herein, question papers were leaked and large scale cheating

and malpractices were adopted.  Such fraudulent admissions, were aided by an

organised  gang,  for  monetary  consideration.   Learned  counsel  for  Vyapam

therefore asserted, that the conclusions drawn in the cited case were of extreme

relevance, to the present controversy, herein also, similar allegations had been

established.  From the above judgment, learned counsel, placed reliance on the

following observations:

“18. As has been noticed hereinabove, the disclosures in the investigation suggest that the benefit of answer key has been availed by several candidates taking  the  examination,  by  illegal  means.  Though  as  on  date,  44  such candidates have been identified, having regard to the modus operandi put in place, the numbers of cellphones and other devices used, it is not unlikely that many more candidates have availed such undue advantage, being a part of the overall design and in the process have been unduly benefited qua the other students who had made sincere and genuine endeavours to solve the answer paper on the basis of their devoted preparation and hard labour. In view of  the widespread network,  that  has operated,  as  the status reports disclose  and  the  admission  of  the  persons  arrested  including  some beneficiary  candidates,  we  are  of  the  opinion,  in  view  of  the  strong possibilities  of  identification of  other  candidates  as  well  involved  in  such malpractices,  that  the  examination  has  become  a  suspect.  As  it  is,  the system of examination pursued over the decades, has been accepted by all who  are  rational,  responsible  and  sensible,  to  be  an  accredited  one,  for comparative evaluation of the merit and worth of candidates vying for higher academic  pursuits.  It  is  thus  necessary,  for  all  the  role  players  in  the process, to secure and sustain the confidence of the public in general and the student  fraternity  in  particular  in  the  system  by  its  unquestionable trustworthiness.  Such  a  system  is  endorsed  because  of  its  credibility informed with guarantee of fairness, transparency, authenticity and sanctity. There cannot be any compromise with these imperatives at any cost. 19. Segregation only of the already 44 identified candidates stated to be the beneficiaries of the unprincipled manoeuvre by withholding their results for the time being, in our comprehension cannot be the solution to the problem that  confronts  all  of  us.  Not  only  thereby,  if  the  process  is  allowed  to

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advance, it would be pushed to a vortex of litigation pertaining thereto in the foreseeable future, the prospects of the candidates would not only remain uncertain and tentative, they would also remain plagued with the prolonged anguish and anxiety if involved in the ordeal of court cases. Acting on this option, would in our estimate, amount to driving knowingly the students, who are not at fault, to an uncertain future with their academic career in jeopardy on many counts. Further, there would also be a lurking possibility of  unidentified beneficiary candidates stealing a march over them, on the basis of the advantages availed by them through the underhand dealings as revealed. Having regard to the fact, that the course involved with time would yield the future generations of doctors of the country, who would be in charge of public health, their inherent merit to qualify for taking the course can by no means be compromised.”

Based on the above observations, it was submitted, that in matters pertaining to

fraudulent admissions, the consistent course adopted by this Court has been, to

ensure the purity of the process, and not to extend any benefit to undeserving

candidates.

(v) Reliance was then placed on Abhyudya Sanstha v. Union of India, (2011) 6

SCC 145.  This case also pertained to adoption of a tainted process of admission

to  educational  courses,  wherein  the  institute  (and  not  the  students),  had

approached this Court.   Learned counsel,  drew the Court’s  attention, to the

following observations:

“22. The  question  which  remains  to  be  considered  is  whether  the  Court should  direct  regularisation  of  the  admission  of  the  students,  who  were allotted  to  the  appellants  by  the  State  Government,  etc.  pursuant  to  the directions given by this Court. Although, in the absence of cogent material, it is not possible to record a finding that the students were party to the patently wrong and misleading statement made by the appellants, the Court cannot overlook the fact that none of the appellants has been granted recognition by WRC, Bhopal and in view of the prohibition contained in Section 17-A of the Act read with Regulation 8(12), the appellants could not have admitted any student. However, with a view to make business and earn profit in the name of education, the appellants successfully manipulated the judicial process for allocation of  the students.  Therefore,  there  is  no valid  ground much less justification to confer legitimacy upon the admission made by the appellants in a clandestine manner. Any such order by the Court will be detrimental to the  national  interest.  The  students  who  may  have  taken  admission  and

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completed  the  course  from  an  institution,  which  had  not  been  granted recognition, will not be able to impart value based education to the future generation of the country. Rather, they may train young minds as to how one can succeed in life by manipulations. Therefore, we do not consider it proper to issue direction for regularising the admissions made by the appellants on the strength of the interim orders passed by this Court. 23. In  the  result,  the  appeals  are  dismissed.  Each  of  the  appellants  is saddled  with  costs  of  Rs.  2  lakhs,  which  shall  be  deposited  with  the Maharashtra State Legal Services Authority within a period of three months. If the needful is not done, the Secretary, Maharashtra State Legal Services Authority shall be entitled to recover the amount of cost as arrears of land revenue. 24. We also declare that none of the students, who had taken admission on the basis of allotment made by the State Government, etc. shall be eligible for the award of degree, etc. by the affiliating body. If the degree has already been awarded to any such student, the same shall not be treated valid for any purpose whatsoever. WRC, Bhopal shall publish a list of the students, who were admitted by the appellants pursuant to the interim orders passed by this Court and forward the same to the Education Department of  the Government  of  Maharashtra,  which  shall  circulate  the  same  to  all government and aided institutions so that they may not employ the holders of such degrees.”

Based on the aforesaid observations, it was submitted, that this Court in the

above judgment consciously refused to regularize the admission of  students.

Not only that, this Court declared that the students admitted to the course by

manipulation, would not be entitled to be awarded degrees, etc. by the affiliating

body.  Even if such a degree had already been awarded, the same was to be

treated as invalid for all purposes.

(vi) Learned  counsel  briefly  invited  our  attention  to  Director  (Studies),  Dr.

Ambedkar Institute of Hotel Management, Nutrition and Catering Technology,

Chandigarh v. Vaibhav Singh Chauhan (2009) 1 SCC 59, and highlighted the

following observations recorded therein:

“12. The learned Single Judge in the interim order has then emphasised on the  fact  that  the  respondent  had  apologised  and  had  confessed  to  the possession of the chit. In our opinion this again is a misplaced sympathy. We

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are  of  the  firm  opinion  that  in  academic  matters  there  should  be  strict discipline and malpractices should be severely punished. If our country is to progress  we  must  maintain  high educational  standards,  and  this  is  only possible  if  malpractices  in  examinations  in  educational  institutions  are curbed with an iron hand.”

Learned counsel having referred to the above observations, emphasized, that

there  could  be  no  leniency  for  manipulations  in  dealing  with  the  matter  of

admissions.

(vii) Last of all, learned counsel placed reliance on Kerala Solvent Extractions

Ltd. v. A. Unnikrishnan, (2006) 13 SCC 619, so as to emphasise on the words of

caution, expressed by a three-Judge Division Bench of this Court, wherein it

observed as under:

“9. Shri Vaidyanathan, learned Senior Counsel for the appellant, submitted, in our opinion not without justification, that the Labour Court’s reasoning bordered  on  perversity  and  such  unreasoned,  undue  liberalism  and misplaced sympathy would subvert all discipline in the administration. He stated that the management will have no answer to the claims of similarly disqualified candidates which might have come to be rejected.  Those who stated  the  truth  would  be  said  to  be  at  a  disadvantage  and  those  who suppressed it stood to gain. He further submitted that this laxity of judicial reasoning will imperceptibly introduce slackness and unpredictability in the legal  process and,  in  the final  analysis,  corrode legitimacy of  the judicial process. 10. We are inclined to agree with these submissions. In recent times, there is an increasing evidence of this, perhaps well meant but wholly unsustainable tendency towards a denudation of the legitimacy of judicial reasoning and process.  The reliefs granted by the courts must be seen to be logical and tenable within the framework of the law and should not incur and justify the criticism  that  the  jurisdiction  of  the  courts  tends  to  degenerate  into misplaced sympathy, generosity and private benevolence. It  is essential  to maintain  the  integrity  of  legal  reasoning  and  the  legitimacy  of  the conclusions.  They must emanate logically  from the legal  findings and the judicial  results  must  be  seen  to  be  principled  and  supportable  on  those findings. Expansive judicial mood of mistaken and misplaced compassion at the expense of the legitimacy of the process will eventually lead to mutually irreconcilable  situations  and  denude  the  judicial  process  of  its  dignity, authority, predictability and respectability.”

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Relying  on  the  above  observations,  it  was  contended,  that  legitimizing

“knowledge”, which had been obtained by unfair means, would be perceived as

an exercise of sympathy towards actions of fraud, and would have the effect of

eroding the integrity of the judicial process.

59. We have given our thoughtful consideration, to the submissions advanced

on behalf  of the rival parties.   Before we deal with the contentions, we may

record, that there is logic and legitimacy, in the submissions advanced, on both

sides.  But only one out of them, can be accepted.  The one which has to be

accepted, should be based on legality, supported by reasons.  Our consideration

and reasons, are as follows.

60. During the course of hearing, learned counsel were asked to assist this

Court, on the likely public perception, in case this Court decided to exercise its

jurisdiction, in favour of the appellants, under Article 142.  In response, it was

pointed  out,  that  public  perception  could  never  be  homogenous.   It  was

submitted, that public perception had inevitably to be heterogeneous, as the

society itself was heterogeneous.  According to learned counsel, perception of

the public, would depend on the section of the society, to which the query was

addressed.   Each section of  the  public,  could  have  a  different  view,  on the

matter.   This  assertion  made  by  learned  counsel,  was  sought  to  be

substantiated,  by  placing  reliance  on  E.M.  Sankaran  Namboodripad  v.  T.

Narayanan Nambiar, (1970) 2 SCC 325, and People’s Union for Civil Liberties v.

Union of India, (2005) 5 SCC 363.

61. In view of the position expressed by this Court, in the above judgments, it

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was submitted, that public perception should not be allowed to weigh so heavy,

in the mind of a Court, as would prevent it, from rendering complete justice.

According to learned counsel, taking into consideration public perception, would

render effectuating justice, extremely difficult.  It was pointed out, that by sheer

experience gained by Judges, they were fully equipped, to determine at their

own, whether or not, the facts of a case, required to be dealt with differently,

under Article 142 – so as to render complete justice.  

62. It was also the contention of learned counsel, that public perception, was

usually not based, on a complete data, of the dispute.  And, unless the public

was provided with the complete facts, and was required to consciously take a

call on the matter, the perception entertained by the public, would be fanciful

and imaginative, and it would be full of deficiencies and inadequacies, and it

may also be, an opinion based on lack of rightful understanding.   

63. We  are  of  the  view,  that  public  perception,  despite  being  of  utmost

significance, cannot be sought, except after an onerous exercise.  And that, any

opinion,  without  the  benefit  of  the  entire  sequence  of  facts,  may  not  be  a

dependable hypothesis.  It is also true, that disseminating full facts, for seeking

public opinion, would be an immeasurably daunting task.  An endeavour, which

was unlikely to yield any reasoned response, based on logic and rationale.  We

are accordingly of the view, that the suggestion of learned counsel, needs to be

respected, and we should attempt a consideration, at our own, based on our

experience and training, in adjudicating disputes of unlimited variety … and of

inestimable proportions.  Our determination, is as follows.  

64. During the course of hearing, it  could not be seriously disputed at the

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hands of learned counsel for the appellants, that the appellants’ admission to

the MBBS course, was based on established deception and manipulation.  All

the same, we will expressly deal with the instant aspect of the matter, and the

extent of the appellants’ involvement, in the following paragraph.  It was also

not disputed at the hands of learned counsel, that the cause and effect of fraud,

was determined by the Court of  Appeal,  in Lazarus Estates,  Ltd. v.  Beasley,

(1956) 1 All E.R.341.  The consequences of fraud, as determined by the Court of

Appeal (in the above judgment), have been repeatedly approved, by this Court.

In the above judgment Denning, L.J., had observed as under:

“We are in this case concerned only with this point: Can the declaration be challenged on the ground that it was false and fraudulent?  It can clearly be challenged in the criminal  courts.   The landlord can be taken before the magistrate and fined £30 (see Sch. 2, para. 6) or he can be prosecuted on indictment, and (if he is an individual) sent to prison (see s. 5 of the Perjury Act, 1911).  The landlords argued before us that the declaration could not be challenged in the civil courts at all, even though it was false and fraudulent, and that the landlords can recover and keep the increased rent even though it was obtained by fraud.  If this argument is correct, the landlords would profit greatly from their fraud.  The increase in rent would pay the fine many times over.  I cannot accede to this argument for a moment.  No court in this land will  allow a person to keep an advantage which he has obtained by fraud.  No judgment of a court, no order of a Minister, can be allowed to stand if it has been obtained by fraud.  Fraud unravels everything.  The court is careful not to find fraud unless it is distinctly pleaded and proved; but once  it  is  proved  it  vitiates  judgments,  contracts  and  all  transactions whatsoever; see, as to deeds, Collins v. Blantern (2) (1767) (2 Wils. K.B. 342), as to judgments, Duchess of Kingston’s Case (3) (1776) (1 Leach 146), and, as to contracts, Master v. Miller (4) (1791) (4 Term Rep. 320).  So here I am of opinion that, if this declaration is proved to have been false and fraudulent, it is a nullity and void and the landlords cannot recover any increase of rent by virtue of it.”  

We  need  to  say  no  more,  in  the  manner  how  fraud  has  to  be  dealt  with,

whenever it is established.  However, stated simply, nothing … nothing … and

nothing, obtained by fraud, can be sustained, as fraud unravels everything.  The

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question  which  arises  for  consideration  is,  whether  the  consequence  of

established fraud, as repeatedly declared by this Court, can be ignored, to do

complete justice in a matter,  in exercise of  jurisdiction vested in this Court,

under Article 142 of the Constitution.  And also, whether the consequences of

fraud, can be overlooked in the facts and circumstances of this case, in order to

render complete justice to the appellants.

65(i). Learned  counsel  for  the  appellants,  attempted  to  persuade  us  very

strongly, to overcome the law declared by this Court, on the issue of established

fraud.  Is it possible to accept such a contention? If the appellants’ involvement

is  not  serious,  it  may well  be possible  to  accept  the contention.   Therefore,

before we deal with the submissions canvassed, it is important to understand,

the extent and proportion of the shenanigans of the appellants.  It is not in

dispute, that none of the appellants would have been admitted to the MBBS

course, as their merit position in the Pre-Medical Test, was not as a result of

their own efforts, but was based on extraneous assistance.  The appellants were

helped  in  answering  the  questions  in  the  Pre-Medical  Test,  by  meritorious

candidates.  The  manipulation  by  which  the  appellants  obtained  admission

involved, not only a breach in the computer system, whereby roll numbers were

allotted  to  the  appellants,  to  effectuate  their  plans.  It  also  involved  the

procurement  of  meritorious  candidates/persons,  who  would  assist  them,  in

answering the questions (in the Pre-Medical Test).  The appellants’ position, next

to  the  concerned  helper,  at  the  examination,  was  also  based  on  further

computer interpolations. Not only were the seating plans distorted for achieving

the  purpose,  even  the  institutions  where  the  appellants  were  to  take  the

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Pre-Medical  Test,  were arranged in a manner,  as would suit  the appellants,

again  by  a  similar  process  of  computer  falsification.   This  could  only  be

effectuated, by a corrupted administrative machinery.  Whether, the nefarious

and crooked administrative involvement, was an inside activity, or an outside

pursuit, is inconsequential.  All in all, the entire scheme of events, can well be

described as a scam … a racket of sorts.  The appellants or their parents, would

obviously have had to pay large amounts of money, to the Vyapam authorities.

The appellants’ admission to the MBBS course, was therefore clearly based on a

well orchestrated plan, which we can safely conclude, as based on established

fraud.   

(ii). The challenge raised by the appellants, had failed before the High Court,

because  the  High  Court  had  arrived  at  the  conclusion,  that  the  appellants’

admission to the MBBS course was vitiated.  The order of the High Court was

assailed before this Court.  Both Hon’ble Judges, of the ‘former Division Bench’,

wrote separate orders.  Both affirmed the conclusion drawn by the High Court,

through their  separate  orders  dated  12.5.2016.   On a  reference  by  us,  the

‘former Division Bench’, passed a common order on 30.8.2016, affirming, “…

Both of us recorded a concurrent opinion that the examination process in issue

in these appeals, conducted by Vyapam for the years 2008 to 2012 was vitiated

with  reference  to  the  appellants  before  this  Court  and  few  others.  We  also

agreed upon the conclusion that the appellants herein are the beneficiaries of

such vitiated process...”  The fact that the appellants had gained admission to

the MBBS course, through a vitiated process has attained finality.   

(iii). The controversy in the present case, does not relate to a singular academic

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session.  Whether or not,  this vitiated process of obtaining admission to the

MBBS course,  was  adopted  during the year  2007,  and prior  thereto,  is  not

known.   Because,  MBBS  admissions  prior  to  2008,  were  not  investigated.

Investigation was initiated in the first instance, with reference to admissions, for

the year 2013.  Thereafter, investigation was extended to those, who had gained

admission to the MBBS course during the years 2008 to 2012.  Investigation

revealed, a well thought out, unethical plan, involving administrative support,

during six consecutive academic sessions … from 2008 to 2013.  Vyapam was

certain, about the system having been manipulated, at the hands of at least 634

candidates (during the years 2008 to 2012 itself).  There may well have been

others, but no action was taken against them,  as their cases fell beyond the

realm of suspicion (on the parameters approved and adopted by Vyapam).   

(iv). This Court, while dealing with admissions during the years 2008 to 2012,

followed the earlier judgment, wherein admissions to the MBBS course during

the year 2013, were annulled.  The High Court in all the matters, consistently

upheld, the cancellation orders passed by Vyapam.  This Court also reiterated,

the validity of the orders passed by the High Court, and thereby, upheld the

Vyapam orders.   In  the above view of  the matter,  the factual  and the legal

position, with reference to the admission of the appellants, to the MBBS course

being vitiated, has attained finality.   The fact that the appellants, had gained

admission to the MBBS course, by established fraud, does not (as it indeed,

cannot) require any further consideration.   

(v). In view of the sequence of facts narrated above, it is not possible for us to

accept, that the deception and deceit, adopted by the appellants, was a simple

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affair,  which can be overlooked.   In fact,  admission of  the appellants to the

MBBS course, was the outcome of a well orchestrated strategy of deceit and

deception.  And therefore, it is not possible to accept, that the involvement of

the  appellants  was  not  serious.   In  fact,  it  was  indeed the  most  grave  and

extreme, as discussed above.  

(vi). In the above view of the matter, it is not possible for us, to overlook the

consequences of the declared legal position, with reference to the consequence

of fraud, on the ground that the involvement of the appellants in the acts of

fraud, was not serious.

66. We shall now examine the other submissions advanced on behalf of the

appellants, to determine whether or not, the jurisdiction vested in this Court,

under Article 142, can be invoked, in this matter. Our  instant  consideration,

i.e., whether to invoke (in the appellants’ favour) Article 142 of the Constitution,

or not, must obviously proceed on the position expressed by the two Hon’ble

Judges (of  the ‘former Division Bench’),  through their  separate  orders  dated

12.5.2016, and by their common order dated 30.8.2016, that the admission of

the appellants to the MBBS course, had been gained, through a vitiated process.

And also,  on the basis  of  the conclusions recorded by us  in paragraph 65,

hereinabove.

67. We may first examine, whether the appellants can seek relief, from this

Court,  under  Article  142  of  the  Constitution,  as  the  provision  is  generally

perceived.  In the Union Carbide case (supra), while dealing with the scope of

Article 142 of the Constitution, this Court felt, that the jurisdiction of this Court

under the above provision, extended inter alia to deal “… with any extraordinary

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situation in the larger interest of administration of justice and from preventing

manifest  injustice  being  done  …”.   The  two  important  parameters  for

consideration are, “larger interest of administration of justice”, and “preventing

manifest injustice”.  The facts and circumstances of the present case, as have

been debated  and discussed at  great  length,  do not  reveal  the  existence,  of

either of the aforesaid factors.  With Vyapam having cancelled the appellants’

admission to the MBBS course, and with the above orders having been upheld

by the High Court, as well as, by this Court, can it be said that the cancellation

orders were unjust?  No, not at all.  If the admission of the appellants to the

MBBS course, was improper, the cancellation orders, were obviously proper.  If

we  restore  the  academic  benefits  of  the  appellants,  arising  out  of  their

admission  –  cancelled  by  Vyapam,  the  cancellation  orders  would  be  set  at

naught.  That, would undo, the Vyapam orders, upheld by the High Court and

this Court.  And this, we are satisfied, would not serve the “larger interest of

administration of  justice”.   On the  contrary,  such an initiative  would  cause

“manifest  injustice”.  It  is  therefore  not  possible  for  us  to  accept,  that  it  is

possible  in  the  facts  of  the  present  case,  to  invoke  Article  142  of  the

Constitution – in the larger interest of the administration of justice.  It is also

not possible for us to accept, that any manifest injustice would be done to the

appellants,  if  their  admissions are cancelled.   In  our considered view,  to do

justice in the matter, the order passed by Vypam must be upheld, without any

further  modification  or  alteration.   Needless  to  mention,  that  the  instant

consideration, does not take into account, the different submissions advanced

on behalf of the appellants.  We will now endeavour to deal with the remaining

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submissions, which according to learned counsel, would persuade this Court, to

override the straitjacket examination of the matter, dealt with in the manner,

recorded hereinabove.

68. We  shall  now  consider  the  submission,  founded  on  the  interpretation

placed by Mr. Fali S. Nariman (see paragraph 16, and onwards), on Article 142

of  the  Constitution.   If  the  instant  contention  is  acceptable,  then  surely,

according to learned counsel, it would be possible to overlook the consequences

of fraud (refer to, paragraph 64, hereinabove), in case sufficient justification was

shown, for taking a different course, for doing complete justice.  Mr. Nariman’s

suggestion, that the Supreme Court must be “trusted”, and that, this Court can

even ignore statutory law, in the overriding interest of doing complete justice,

under Article 142 of the Constitution, has been put forth for our consideration.

The  said  view,  was  sought  to  be  extended,  by  learned  counsel,  even  to  a

declared  pronouncement  of  law  under  Article  141  of  the  Constitution  (in

addition to statutory law).  Accepting the proposition canvassed, we are sure,

would substantially enhance the authority of this Court.  And for that reason,

the  hypothesis  of  Mr.  Nariman  is  extremely  attractive.  It  is,  however,  not

possible for us to ignore the decision of a Constitution Bench of this Court, in

Supreme  Court  Bar  Association  v.  Union  of  India,  (1998)  4  SCC  409.  The

projection of Mr. Fali S. Nariman, that this Court had virtually denuded itself of

its constitutional power, to do complete justice, through the above judgment, is

an expression of his opinion, which we respect.  We are indeed bound, by the

declaration of the Constitution Bench.  In terms of the above judgment, with

which we express our unequivocal concurrence, it is not possible to accept, that

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the  words  “complete  justice”  used  in  Article  142 of  the  Constitution,  would

include the power,  to disregard even statutory provisions, and/or a declared

pronouncement of law under Article 141 of the Constitution, even in exceptional

circumstances. Undoubtedly, the proposition can certainly be acceptable to a

very  limited  extent,  –  to  the  extent  of  self-aggrandizement.   The  “trust”  Mr.

Nariman reposes in this Court, is indeed heartening and reassuring.  But then,

Mr. Nariman, and a number of other outstanding legal practitioners like him,

undeniably have the brilliance to mould the best of minds.  And thereby, to

persuade a Court, to accept their sense of reasoning, so as to override statutory

law and/or a declared pronouncement of law.  It is this, which every Court,

should consciously keep out of its reach. In our considered view, the hypothesis

- that the Supreme Court can do justice as it perceives, even when contrary to

statute  (and,  declared  pronouncement  of  law),  should  never  as  a  rule,  be

entertained by any Court/Judge, however high or noble.  Can it be overlooked,

that legislation is enacted, only with the object of societal  good, and only in

support of  societal  causes?  Legislation, always flows from reason and logic.

Debates and deliberations in Parliament, leading to a valid legislation, represent

the will of the majority.  That will and determination, must be equally “trusted”,

as much as the “trust” which is reposed in a Court.  Any legislation, which does

not satisfy the above parameters, would per se be arbitrary, and would be open

to being declared as constitutionally invalid.  In such a situation, the legislation

itself would be struck down.  It is difficult, to visualize a situation, wherein a

valid  legislation,  would  render  injustice  to  the  parties,  or  would  lead  to  a

situation  of  incomplete  justice  –  for  one  or  the  other  party.  Imagination,

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perception and comprehension, of future events, have inherent limitations.  We

would therefore refrain ourselves, from saying anything beyond what we have.

At  the  cost  of  repetition,  we  would  reiterate,  that  such  a  situation,  as  is

contemplated by Mr. Nariman, does not seem to be possible.  We would however

not like to close the window, for such thought and consideration. We would

rather leave it to the conscience of the concerned Court, to deal with such an

exceptional  situation,  if  it  ever  arises.   In  our  view,  in  the  facts  and

circumstances of the present case, the cause of the appellants, is not furthered,

even by the approach suggested by relying on the hypothesis of Mr. Nariman.

We  can  only  conclude  by  observing,  that  keeping  in  mind  the  conscious

involvement  of  the appellants  in  gaining admission to  the MBBS course,  by

means of a fraudulent stratagem of trickery, it is not possible for us to ignore or

overlook, the declaration of law with reference to fraud.  Nothing obtained by

fraud, can be sustained.  This declared proposition of law, must apply to the

case of the appellants, as well.  This is the outcome of the “trust” reposed in this

Court, as being fully equipped, to determine at its own, when Article 142 of the

Constitution can be invoked to render complete justice, and when it cannot be

so invoked.

69. One of  the contentions advanced by learned counsel for the appellants

also  was,  that  the  appellants  had  acquired  “knowledge”  while  pursuing  the

MBBS course.   It  was pointed out,  that even in the present age of  scientific

development, it was not possible to transfer “knowledge” (intellectual property)

acquired  by  the  appellants,  to  those  who  may  have  been  the  rightful

beneficiaries thereof.  It was submitted, that besides the individual loss, which

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the appellants would suffer, the nation would suffer a societal and monetary

loss,  if  their  admission to the MBBS course,  was not  preserved.   A detailed

reference, in this behalf, was made to the vacancies of medical doctors in the

State  of  Madhya  Pradesh,  at  all  levels  of  health  care.   To  demonstrate

authenticity,  findings  recorded  by  the  World  Health  Organisation,  were  also

brought to  our notice (see paragraph 32 hereinabove).   Based on the above

factual position, it was submitted, that in extending relief to the appellants, this

Court  would  be  extending  relief  to  the  society,  and  would  be  allowing  the

appellants  to  serve  humanity.   It  was  submitted,  that  in  case  this  Court

exercised its jurisdiction in favour of the appellants (under Article 142 of the

Constitution), there would be societal gains, as the appellants would apply their

“knowledge”,  to serve humanity.  It  was therefore pleaded, that the facts and

circumstances of the present case, constituted a good ground, to preserve the

“knowledge”, acquired by the appellants.  It was also pointed out, that if the

suggested course was adopted, no one would suffer any loss.  Having given our

thoughtful  consideration to  the  above  submission,  we  are  of  the  considered

view, that conferring rights or benefits on the appellants, who had consciously

participated  in  a  well  thought  of,  and  meticulously  orchestrated  plan,  to

circumvent well laid down norms, for gaining admission to the MBBS course,

would  amount  to  espousing  the  cause  of  ‘the  unfair’.   It  would  seem like,

allowing a thief to retain the stolen property.  It would seem as if, the Court was

not  supportive of  the cause of  those who had adopted and followed rightful

means.  Such a course, would cause people to question the credibility, of the

justice  delivery  system  itself.   The  exercise  of  jurisdiction  in  the  manner

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suggested on behalf of the appellants, would surely depict, the Court’s support

in favour of  the sacrilegious.   It  would also compromise the integrity  of  the

academic community.  We are of the view, that in the name of doing complete

justice, it is not possible for this Court to support the vitiated actions of the

appellants, through which they gained admission to the MBBS course.   

70. Irrespective of what has been debated and concluded hereinabove, we are

of the view, that there cannot be any defined parameters, within the framework

whereof,  this  Court  would  exercise  jurisdiction  under  Article  142  of  the

Constitution.  The complexity of administration, and of human affairs, would

give room for the exercise of the power vested in this Court under Article 142, in

a situation where clear injustice appears to have been caused, to any party to a

lis.  In the absence of any legislation to the contrary, it would be open to this

Court, to remedy the situation.  The appellants submitted, that they fell in this

category,  namely,  that  there  was  no  legislative  provision,  to  deal  with

admissions to  academic institutions,  involving juveniles,  who had innocently

breached legal norms, and had strayed into forbidden territory.  The appellants

urged, that they should not be identified, as a part of the syndicate, engaged in

manipulating their admissions, even though they were the beneficiaries thereof.

It was submitted, that the appellants were young, and not mature enough to

understand the consequences of  their  actions.   It  was pointed out,  that  the

appellants were students engaged in the pursuit of education.  The appellants

asserted, on the basis of their past academic record, and on the strength of their

performance in the MBBS course itself,  that they could very well  have been

successful in gaining entry into the MBBS course, on their own merit, had they

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not chosen to seek the assistance of the syndicate.  That, they had done so,

because of their lack of understanding, of the ways of the world, should not be

overlooked, while dealing with the relief being sought.  It was submitted, that

the  consequence  of  affirmation  of  the  Vyapam order(s)  and  its  implications,

would expose them to such hardship, as they did not deserve.  It was pointed

out,  that  having  gained  entry  into  medical  institutions,  they  had  spent  a

number of years of their lives, in academic pursuit.  They had also spent their

parents’, hard earned money.  It was submitted, that all that the appellants had

achieved, should not be allowed to go waste.  Specially because, there would be

no gainer.  It was contended, that it needed to be seriously considered, whether

or not, they were entitled to retain and use the “knowledge” acquired by them,

for their own benefit, and for the benefit of the society at large.  During the

course of  hearing,  learned counsel  for the appellants  pleaded for  differential

action.   It  was submitted,  that  all  the  appellants,  were  at  a very important

crossroad of life, and were under immense pressure, both parental and societal,

at  the  relevant  time,  when  they  strayed  into  forbidden  territory.   In  these

circumstances, it was contended, that they may not be dealt with so harshly, as

would scar their fragile minds.  Or, would leave them with no future.   

71. Having  given  our  thoughtful  consideration  to  the  issues  canvassed  on

behalf of the appellants, as has been narrated in the foregoing paragraph, we

have  no  hesitation  to  state,  that  all  these  submissions  deserve  an  outright

rejection.  Even in situations where a juvenile indulges in crime, he has to face

trial,  and is  subjected  to  the  postulated  statutory  consequences.   Law,  has

consequences.   And  the  consequences  of  law  brook  no  exception.   The

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appellants in this case, irrespective of their age, were conscious  of the regular

process of admission.  They breached the same by devious means.  They must

therefore, suffer the consequences of their actions.  It is not the first time, that

admissions obtained by deceitful means, would be cancelled.  This Court has

consistently  annulled,  academic  gains,  arising  out  of  wrongful  admissions.

Acceptance of the prayer made by the appellants on the parameter suggested by

them, would result in overlooking the large number of judgments, on the point.

Adoption of a different course, for the appellants, would trivialize the declared

legal position.  Reference in this behalf, may be made to the judgments relied

upon by learned counsel representing Vyapam.  

72. It is also not possible for us to accept the contention under consideration,

and vehemently canvassed on behalf of the appellants (recorded in paragraph

70 above), for yet another reason.  Because, it is not possible for us to accept,

either  that  the  appellants  were  innocent,  or  that  they  were  immature  in

understanding the consequences of their actions.  Each one of the appellants,

was  aware  of  the  fact,  that  their  admission to  the  MBBS course,  would  be

determined on the basis of their performance in the Pre-Medical Test.  Rather

than appearing in the qualifying test on their own, they chose to seek assistance

of meritorious students, to garner higher marks.  We may not be completely

wrong in our understanding, if we conclude, that the appellants were quite sure,

that they would not be able to gain admission to the MBBS course, on their own

merit.  That is why, they had to strategize their admission to the MBBS course.

We therefore, reject the contention advanced on behalf of the appellants, that

the appellants were meritorious students, and as such, their admission to the

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MBBS course, deserved to be preserved.  If this is where the truth lies (which we

are sure, it does), namely, that the appellants were quite sure that they would

not be able to gain admission to the MBBS course on their own merit, surely the

appellants are not entitled to any equitable consideration.  And, in that view of

the matter,  it  would not  be  proper  to  extend to  the appellants,  relief  under

Article 142 of the Constitution.

73. We  wish  to  attempt,  to  examine  the  matter  from another  perspective.

Even a child, in the very first year of entering primary school, is aware of the

consequences  of  copying,  during  an  examination.   Teachers  supervise

examinations,  to  make  sure,  that  students  do  not  copy.   Children  caught

copying, are dealt with severely. Every child observes this process, year after

year. Can the appellants, who had completed school education, and are on the

verge of entering a professional course, be treated as novices – unaware of the

consequence of copying?  In our considered view, certainly not.  It is therefore

not possible for us, to extend any benefit to the appellants, either on account of

their  juvenility,  or  on account  of  their  alleged  lack  of  understanding  of  the

consequences  of  their  actions.   In  our  considered  view,  the  appellants  had

consciously  sought  the  assistance  of  a  syndicate,  engaged  in  manipulating

admissions to medical institutions.  They were beneficiaries of acts of deceit and

deception. In the above view of the matter, the case of the appellants does not

commend to us, as a matter deserving of any sympathetic consideration.  In our

considered view, the admission of the appellants to the MBBS course, cannot be

legalized (or legitimized), in the name of justice.   

74. We may examine the controversy, from yet another perspective.  Let us

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presume, that the position is equally balanced for the two sides.  Let us attempt

to apply the test of a Court’s conscience, to a situation where on principle, a

Court is not in a position to decide, whether it should, or it should not, exercise

its  discretion in fvour  of  a  party  to  a  lis.   A  situation,  wherein  the  Court’s

conscience commends to it (in a matter, as the one in hand), to exercise its

discretion under Article 142, to preserve the benefit of the appellants’ admission

to the MBBS course; and at the same time, equally commends to it, not to so

exercise its jurisdiction (i.e.,  not to preserve to the appellants, the benefit  of

their admission to the MBBS course), in favour of the appellant.  How should

this Court deal with such a situation?  We are of  the considered view, that

where two options are open to a Court, and both are equally beckoning, it would

be most prudent to choose the one, which is founded on truth and honesty, and

the one which is founded on fair play and legitimacy. Siding with the option

founded on the deceit or fraud, or on favour as opposed to merit, or by avoiding

the postulated due process, would be imprudent.  Judicial conscience must only

support the righteous cause.  If, despite its being righteous, a decision is seen

as causing manifest injustice, the exercise of the power under Article 142 of the

Constitution, would be prudent.  In such situations, an onerous duty is cast on

the Court, to step in, to render complete justice. This is the manner that we

commend, judicial exercise of discretion, under Article 142 of the Constitution.

By adopting the above course, a Court would feel satisfied, in having exercised

its  discretion,  on the touchstone of  justice  –  the concept  which triggers  the

invocation of Article 142 of the Constitution.   In the facts and circumstances of

the present case, there seems to be absolutely no cause for us to, legitimize the

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admissions of the appellants to the MBBS course, since the same clearly fall in

the imprudent category.  

75. It  was  the  repeated  submission  of  learned  counsel  representing  the

appellants,  that  there  would  be  significant  societal  benefit,  if  the  academic

pursuit of the appellants is legitimized.  During the course of hearing, learned

counsel even went to the extent of suggesting, that individual benefits, that may

be drawn by the appellants, may be drastically curtailed, and their academic

pursuit be regularised, for societal  benefit.   The submission is attractive.   It

needs a considered response. We are of  the considered view, no matter how

extensive the societal gains may be, the jurisdiction conceived of under Article

142 of the Constitution, to do complete justice in a matter, cannot be invoked,

in a situation as the one in hand.  Even the trivialist act of wrong doing, based

on a singular act of fraud, cannot be countenanced, in the name of justice.  The

present case, unfolds a mass fraud.  The course suggested, if accepted, would

not only be imprudent, but would also be irresponsible.  It would encourage

others, to follow the same course.  We must compliment, all the learned counsel

appearing for the appellants, in projecting the claim(s) of the appellants, from all

conceivable angles.  We are however not persuaded to accept the legitimacy of

the same. Truthful conduct, must always remain the hallmark of the rule of law.

No matter the gains, or the losses.  The jurisdiction exercisable by this Court

under Article 142, cannot ever be invoked, to salvage, and legitimize acts of

fraudulent character.  Fraud, cannot be allowed to trounce, on the stratagem of

public good.

76. Besides, the consideration recorded by us, in the foregoing paragraphs, we

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may confess, that we felt persuaded for taking the view that we have, for a very

important reason – national character.  There is a saying – when wealth is lost,

nothing is lost; when health is lost, something is lost; but when character is

lost,  everything  is  lost.   This  is  attributed  to  Billy  Graham,  an  American

clergyman,  born  on  7.1.1918.   One  cannot  be  certain,  about  the  above

attribution,  because  the  same  lesson  has  been  taught  in  India,  since  time

immemorial, by parents and teachers.  The issue in hand, has an infinitely vast

dimension. If we were to keep in mind immediate social or societal gains, the

perspective  of  consideration would  be different.   The  submission canvassed,

needs to be considered in the proper perspective.  We shall venture to derive

home the point by an illustration.  We may well not have won our freedom, if

freedom fighters had not languished in jails … and if valuable lives had not been

sacrificed.  Depending on the situation, even civil liberty or life itself, may be too

trivial  a  sacrifice,  when national  interest  is  involved.   It  all  depends  on the

desired goal. The preamble of the Indian Constitution rests on the foundation of

governance,  on  the  touchstone  of  justice.   The  basic  fundamental  right,  of

equality before law and equal protection of the laws, is extended to citizens and

non-citizens alike, through Article 14 of the Constitution, on the fountainhead

of  fairness.  The  actions  of  the  appellants,  are  founded  on  unacceptable

behaviour, and in complete breach of the rule of law.  Their actions, constitute

acts of deceit, invading into a righteous social order.  National character, in our

considered view, cannot be sacrificed for benefits – individual or societal.  If, we

desire to build a nation, on the touchstone of ethics and character, and if our

determined goal is to build a nation where only the rule of law prevails, then we

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cannot  accept  the  claim of  the  appellants,  for  the  suggested  societal  gains.

Viewed  in  the  aforesaid  perspective,  we  have  no  difficulty  whatsoever,  in

concluding,  in favour of  the rule  of  law.   Such being the position,  it  is  not

possible for us to extend to the appellants, any benefit under Article 142 of the

Constitution.

77(i).   We shall now, last of all, deal with a common submission, advanced at

the hands of most of the learned counsel, representing the appellants.  Actually,

the  instant  submission,  is  of  no  serious  consequence,  because  of  the

conclusions already recorded by us, in the preceding paragraphs.  But then, all

submissions must be considered, and answered.  The instant last submission,

was based on the judgment of this Court, in the Priya Gupta case (supra).  It is

necessary to emphasise, that learned counsel had placed reliance on the above

judgment to contend, that the instant controversy should not be considered as

the first occasion, for this Court to have exercised its jurisdiction under Article

142, to legitimise admissions to the MBBS course.  It was pointed out, that the

facts of the Priya Gupta case would disclose, that admission in the above case,

had  also  not  been  obtained  by  rightful  means.   In  the  Priya  Gupta  case,

admissions  were  gained  by  the  appellants,  through  acts  of  conscious

manipulation.  And yet, this Court had sustained the same, and had legitimized

the  admission  of  the  appellants.   The  appellants  herein,  seek  a  similar

treatment.

(ii)  In the case relied upon, the parents of the appellants were persons wielding

authority.   They  exercised  their  influence,  whereby,  their  wards  gained

admission to the MBBS course.  To achieve their objective, intimation of the

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unfilled seats, was not published. Resultantly, students with higher merit, came

to be overlooked, as they were unaware of the vacancies, and therefore could not

apply for the same.  Wards, having support of officialdom, who could exercise

influence,  were  successful  in  gaining  admission,  surreptitiously.   It  was

therefore pointed out by learned counsel, that even in the Priya Gupta case, the

action of  gaining admission,  was  based on manipulation through fraud and

deception.   And  since  the  position  of  the  case  in  hand,  was  similar,  the

appellants herein, were also entitled to a similar relief.   

(iii) The facts  of  the  cited  case (as  canvassed,  on behalf  of  the  appellants)

reveal, that the appellants in the Priya Gupta case, had occupied free seats, in a

government institution.  After their admission, the appellants had already taken

their  final  examination  (of  the  MBBS  course),  and  had  therefore,  almost

completed the MBBS curriculum.  By the time this Court heard the matter, the

appellants  were  through  with  the  course.  In  the  above  background,  it  was

contended, that this Court considered it just, to legitimize the admission of the

appellants, to the MBBS course.  However, while doing so, the appellants were

required to reimburse the financial benefits gained by them.  In this behalf, it is

necessary  to  record,  that  the appellants  paid a highly  subsidized  fee  at  the

government college, wherein they had manipulated their admission. If they had

been admitted to a private college, they would have had to pay a much higher

fee  -  approximately  one  hundred  times  more.   It  was  submitted,  that  the

appellants were willing to pay whatever costs this Court may impose, and also

willing  to  suffer  any  additional  public/social  service,  as  this  Court  would

consider appropriate.

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(iv) Based on the factual position noticed above, it was simply contended, that

the appellants having already completed the MBBS course (or in any case – a

substantial  part  thereof)  successfully,  they  should  be  protected  in the  same

manner, as the appellants in the Priya Gupta case.  It was pleaded, that the

course  of  studies,  successfully  completed  by  the  appellants,  should  be

legitimized.   

78(i). We have given our thoughtful consideration, to the submission advanced

on behalf of the appellants, by placing reliance on the judgment rendered by

this  Court,  in  the  Priya  Gupta  case  (supra).   In  examining  the  instant

contention,  we  shall  proceed  on  the  assumption,  that  the  admission  of  the

appellants in the cited case, had not been obtained by rightful means, but had

been gained by conscious manipulations.

(ii) It is important to highlight, that in the adjudication of the Priya Gupta

case (supra), this Court was conscious of the fact, that the appellants would

have, in any case, obtained admission to the same course, on their own merit –

but in a private college.  The admission of the appellants in the cited case, to the

MBBS course,  was therefore rightful.   Their admission to the MBBS course,

could not have been interfered with, and was accordingly, not interfered with.

The wrong committed by their manipulation was, that they moved from a costly

seat in a private college, to a cheaper option in a government college.

(iii) To do complete justice between the parties, within the ambit of Article 142,

this Court in the Priya Gupta case, permitted the appellants, to complete their

professional courses, in the institutions where they had gained admission “…

subject to the condition each one of  them pay a sum of Rs. 5 lakhs to the

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Jagdalpur  College,  which  amount  shall  be  utilized  for  developing  the

infrastructure in the Jagdalpur College …”.   The instant course was adopted,

because that would negate the wrongful gain acquired by the appellants (in the

cited case), through their acts of conscious manipulation.  The appellants would

have had to pay a much higher fee, if they had taken admission in a private

college, in terms of their merit position.  They were beneficiaries (on the basis of

their manipulations), only to the extent, that they had paid a much lower fee, by

gaining admission to a government college.

(iv) Having  had  an  insight  to  the  factual  position  noticed  above,  it  is  not

possible for us to  accept,  that  the ground on the basis of  which this Court

preserved the admission of the appellants, in the Priya Gupta case (supra), can

be extended to the appellants herein.  In the Priya Gupta case, the appellants

would have got admission to the MBBS course, on the basis of their own merit

position, in any case.  The instant distinguishing feature, sets the two matters

apart.   Actually,  we  have  by  our  determination,  fully  adopted  the  position

expressed in the Priya Gupta case, inasmuch as, we have also not allowed the

appellants  to  retain  the  benefit  of,  whatever  was  obtained  by  their

interpolations, and was not their legitimate due.  That is exactly what this Court

had done, in the Priya Gupta case.     

79. For  the  reasons  recorded hereinabove,  we  respectfully  concur  with  the

judgment dated 12.5.2016, rendered by the Hon’ble Companion Judge (of the

‘former Division Bench’).  In the facts and circumstances of the case in hand, it

would not be proper to legitimize the admission of the appellants, to the MBBS

course, in exercise of the jurisdiction vested in this Court under Article 142 of

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the  Constitution.   We  therefore,  hereby,  decline  the  above  prayer  made,  on

behalf of the appellants.

……………………………CJI. (Jagdish Singh Khehar)

………………………………J. (Kurian Joseph)

………………………………J. (Arun Mishra)

Note: Emphases supplied in all the quotations extracted above, are ours.

New Delhi; February 13, 2017.

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