REPORTABLE IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION

CIVIL APPEAL NO.3744 OF 2005

New India Assurance Company Ltd.            … Appellant

Versus

Yadu Sambhaji More & Ors.           … Respondents

J U D G M E N T

AFTAB ALAM, J.

1. This is an appeal under Article 133 of the Constitution of India read  

with Order XV Rule 1 of the Supreme Court Rules,1966 on a certificate  

granted  by  the  Bombay  High  Court  under  Article  134A(b)  of  the  

Constitution. The appellant is the insurance company and it seeks to assail  

the judgment and order passed by the High Court in an appeal from a motor  

accident claim case. In order to properly appreciate the issue in regard to  

which the High Court has granted the certificate to appeal, it would be useful  

to take note of some basic facts of the case.

2. In  the  early  hours  of  October  29,  1987  a  petrol  tanker  bearing  

registration no.MXL7461, was proceeding on National Highway 4, coming  

from the Pune side and going towards Bangalore. As it reached near village  

Kavathe, in the district of Satara, Maharashtra, a truck, bearing registration  

no.MEH4197, laden with onions, was coming from the opposite direction.  

At the point where the two vehicles crossed each other, there was a pile of  

rubble on the left side of the road. As the two vehicles crossed each other,  

the rear right side of the petrol tanker was hit by the rear left side of the  

truck. As a result of the impact, the petrol tanker was thrown off the road  

and it came to rest on its left side/ cleaner’s side on the kutcha ground, about  

5 feet below the road. As a result of the collision and the falling down of the  

petrol tanker on its side, petrol started leaking from the tanker. The tanker  

driver was unable to stop the leak even though he tried to tighten the lid. The  

accident  took place at  around 3:15am. Shortly  after  the accident,  another  

tanker, coming from the Bombay side passed by. In that tanker, apart from  

the driver,  there was also an officer of the Indian Oil Company. Both of  

them assured the driver of the fallen down tanker that they would report the  

accident at the police station and asked him to wait near the place of the  

accident.  Later on, yet another tanker from Sangli arrived at the spot and  

then the cleaner of the ill-fated tanker and the owner of the Sangli tanker  

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together  went  to  village  Kavathe  in  search  of  a  telephone  to  inform the  

tanker owner about the accident. After they came back from the village all of  

them, the driver and the cleaner of the tanker that had met with accident and  

the  owner,  the  driver  and the  cleaner  of  the  tanker  coming from Sangli  

waited near the accident site. At daybreak, the local people started collecting  

near the fallen down tanker and some of them brought cans and tried to  

collect the petrol leaking out from the tanker. The driver of the tanker tried  

to stop them from collecting petrol or even going near the tanker, explaining  

to  them that  doing so  would  be risky  and dangerous.  No one,  however,  

listened to him and he was even manhandled. In the melee, the petrol caught  

fire and there was a big explosion in which 46 persons lost their lives.  

3. The heirs and legal representatives of those people who died at the  

accident site filed claim petitions for compensation under section 110A of  

the Motor Vehicles Act, 1939 before the MACT, Satara, against the owner  

of the petrol tanker and its insurer, the present appellant. In all the cases,  

claims were also made for payment of Rs.15,000/- as no fault compensation  

under section 92A of the Act. The owner of the tanker and the insurer (the  

respondents before the Tribunal) contested the claim petitions filed by the  

applicants under section 92A of the Act and questioned the jurisdiction of  

the Claims Tribunal to entertain such petitions on the ground that the fire  

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and the  explosion  causing the  death  of  those  who had assembled  at  the  

accident site could not be said to be an accident arising out of the use of a  

motor  vehicle.  The  Claims  Tribunal  upheld  the  objection  raised  by  the  

insurer and the owner of the petrol tanker, and by a common order dated  

December 2, 1989, dismissed all the claim petitions filed under section 92A  

of the Act on the ground that the fire and the explosion could not be said to  

be  accident  arising  out  of  the  use  of  the  petrol  tanker  and  hence,  the  

provisions of section 92A of the Act were not attracted. The Claims Tribunal  

pointed out that there was a time gap of about 4 hours between the tanker  

meeting with the road accident and the fire and explosion of the tanker and  

there was absolutely no connection between the road accident and the fire  

accident  that  took  place  about  4  hours  later.  The  Claims  Ttribunal  also  

observed that the local people were trying to steal  petrol  from the petrol  

tanker and the fire and the explosion were the result of their attempt to steal  

the petrol leaking out from the tanker. In other words, it was the people who  

had assembled at the accident site and some of whom eventually died as a  

result of it who were responsible for causing the fire and explosion accident  

and the later accident had no causal connection with the earlier road accident  

of the tanker. The fire and the explosion could not be said to be an accident  

arising out of the use of the tanker. Against the order of the Claims Tribunal  

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passed on December 2, 1989, appeals were filed before the High Court. One  

such appeal was filed by Vatschala Uttam More, whose son Deepak Uttam  

More was one of the persons who died as a result of injuries caused by the  

fire and explosion of the petrol tanker. A learned single judge of the High  

Court allowed the appeal and by judgment dated February 5, 1990, reversed  

the order passed by the Claims Tribunal. Against the decision of the single  

judge,  the  owner  of  the petrol  tanker  and the insurance company filed a  

Letters Patent Appeal which was dismissed by a division bench of the High  

Court by judgment dated August 16, 1990.  

4. The  owner  of  the  petrol  tanker  and  the  insurance  company  then  

brought the matter to this court in SLP no.14822 of 1990 challenging the  

judgment and order of the High Court passed on August 16, 1990. The SLP  

was dismissed by this court by judgment and order passed on July 17, 1991.  

In this  judgment,  reported as  Shivaji  Dayanu Patil  & Anr.  vs.  Vatschala  

Uttam More, (1991) 3 SCC 530 the Court considered at length, the questions  

whether the fire and explosion of the petrol tanker in which Deepak Uttam  

More lost his life could be said to have resulted from an accident arising out  

of the use of a motor vehicle, namely the petrol tanker. The court answered  

the question in the affirmative, that is to say, in favor of the claimant and  

against the insurer.  

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5. The judgment of this Court, thus, put an end to the objections raised  

by the owner and the insurer of the petrol tanker against the claim of no fault  

compensation by and/or on behalf of the victims of the fire and explosion  

accident.

6. But next came the turn of the main applications filed under section  

110A of the Act. There were altogether 44 claim applications in which, case  

no.168 of 1988 was treated as the lead case. In the main claim cases too, the  

owner and the insurer of the tanker inter alia raised the same objections as  

taken  earlier  against  the  claim of  no  fault  compensation.  In  view of  the  

pleadings of the parties,  the Claims Tribunal framed five issues in which  

issue no.3, being relevant for the present, was as follows:

“3. Whether sustaining of injuries was (sic) arising out of use of  the petrol tanker and was the result of negligence on the part of  the petrol tanker driver?”

7.  On  the  basis  of  the  evidences  led  before  it,  the  Claims  Tribunal  

answered the issue in the negative and as a consequence dismissed all the  

claim cases by its judgment and order dated July 31, 1997.  

8. Against the judgment and order passed by the Claims Tribunal, the  

applicant  of MACP no.168 of 1988, preferred an appeal before the High  

Court  (being  First  Appeal  no.149  of  1999).  (The  other  claimants  whose  

claims were similarly dismissed by the Claims Tribunal are also said to have  

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preferred their respective appeals before the High Court which are pending  

awaiting the result of the present appeal before this Court).

9. Before the High Court it  was contended on behalf of the claimants  

that the question whether the death of the victims resulted from an accident  

arising out of the use of the petrol tanker was concluded by the decision of  

this Court in Shivaji Dayanu Patil and any finding recorded by the Claims  

Tribunal contrary to the decision of this Court was completely illegal and  

untenable. On the other hand, on behalf of the insurer and the owner of the  

petrol tanker, it was argued that the decision of this Court in Shivaji Dayanu  

Patil was rendered on a claim for no-fault compensation under section 92A  

of the Act. It was, thus, a judgment against an interlocutory order, before any  

evidences were recorded in the proceeding and, therefore,  the decision in  

Shivaji  Dayanu Patil cannot  be taken as  binding and it  was open to the  

Claims Tribunal or the High Court to come to a different finding on the basis  

of the evidences adduced in course of the main proceeding. It was further  

argued, on behalf of the insurer and the owner of the petrol tanker that an  

order under section 92A is, in nature, an interim order that is passed without  

following the formal procedure of recording evidence. The decision of this  

Court  in  Shivaji  Dayanu  Patil had  not  decided  the  issue  finally  and  

conclusively and, hence, the claimants could not draw any benefit from it in  

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the main proceeding under section 110A of the Act based on the principle of  

fault  or  negligence of  the driver  of  the  vehicle.  The High Court  did  not  

accept the arguments advanced on behalf of the owner and the insurer of the  

petrol tanker, but agreed with the claimants that the decision of this Court in  

Shivaji  Dayanu  Patil was  conclusive  on  the  issue  that  the  death  of  the  

victim, caused by the fire and explosion of the petrol tanker, had resulted  

from an accident arising out of the use of the motor vehicle, namely, the  

petrol tanker and it was not open to the Claims Tribunal to take a contrary  

view. It, accordingly, allowed the appeal and by judgment and order dated  

March 24, 2005, set aside the judgment of the Claims Tribunal and allowed  

the claim petition with costs.  

10. Though, having held against the insurer, the High Court, on a prayer  

made before it,  granted certificate  to appeal  to this Court by order  dated  

April 28, 2005, in the following terms:

“1.  Heard  advocates  for  the  appellant  and  respondents.  The  issue involved that is for the purpose of this leave to go to the  Supreme  Court  is,  whether  the  order  of  the  Supreme  Court  under section 92A was for all purposes an interim order or it  concluded and decided the question as to whether the vehicle  i.e. the tanker was in use when exploded. Though, I have held  against  the  respondents,  looking  to  the  question  involved,  certificate  as  prayed,  is  granted.  No  stay  to  the  order  of  payment. Certified copy expedited.”

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11. Mr.  Ramesh  Chandra  Mishra  appearing  on  behalf  of  the  appellant  

advanced the same arguments before us as were advanced before the High  

Court in support of the judgment passed by the Claims Tribunal. Learned  

counsel submitted that the decision of this Court in Shivaji Dayanu Patil was  

rendered on an application under section 92A of the Act and, therefore, any  

finding  recorded  in  that  decision  would  not  be  binding  on  the  Claims  

Tribunal in the main proceeding under section 110A of the Act that was to  

be decided on the basis of the evidences adduced before the Tribunal.

12. On hearing Mr. Atul Nanda, the amicus curiae and Mr. Ashok Kumar  

Singh,  counsel  appearing  on  behalf  of  the  respondent,  we are  unable  to  

accept the submissions made by Mr. Ramesh Chandra Mishra and we are in  

complete agreement with the view taken by the High Court.  

13. In a given case, on the basis of the evidences later on adduced before  

it in the main proceeding under section 110A of the Act, it may be possible  

for the Claims Tribunal to arrive at a finding at variance with the finding  

recorded  by a  superior  court  on  the  same issue  on  an  application  under  

section 92A of the Act. But the variant finding by the tribunal must be based  

on some material facts coming to light from the evidences led before it that  

were  not  available  before  the  superior  court  while  dealing  with  the  

proceeding under section 92A of the Act. In this case, however, as correctly  

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noted by the High Court, the position is entirely different. It is true that the  

case  Shivaji Dayanu Patil arose from the claim for no-fault compensation  

under section 92A but all the material facts were already before the court  

and all the contentions being raised now were considered at length by this  

Court  in  that  case.  In  Shivaji  Dayanu  Patil the  Court  took  note  of  the  

relevant facts in paragraphs 2 and 3 of the judgment. In paragraph 4 of the  

judgment,  the Court  noted the three limbs of  argument  advanced by Mr.  

G.L. Sanghi, learned counsel appearing for the owner of the petrol tanker in  

support of the plea that the explosion and fire in the petrol tanker could not  

be said to be an accident arising out of the use of a motor vehicle. Paragraph  

4 of the judgment reads as under:

“4.  Shri  G.L.  Sanghi,  the  learned  Counsel  appearing  for  the  petitioners, has urged that in the instant case, it cannot be said  that the explosion and fire in the petrol tanker which occurred at  about  7.15  A.M.,  i.e.,  nearly  four  and  half  hours  after  the  collision involving the petrol tanker and the other truck, was an  accident arising out of the use of a motor vehicle and therefore,  the  claim  petition  filed  by  the  respondent  could  not  be  entertained  under  Section  92-A  of  the  Act.  Shri  Sanghi  has  made a three-fold submission in this regard. In the first place,  he has submitted that the petrol tanker was not a motor vehicle  as  defined in Section 2(18)  of  the  Act at  the time when the  explosion and fire took place because at  that  time the petrol  tanker was lying turtle and was not capable of movement on the  road. The second submission of Shri Sanghi is that since before  the explosion and fire the petrol tanker was lying immobile it  could not be said that the petrol tanker, even if it be assumed  that it was a motor vehicle, was in use as a motor vehicle at the  time of the explosion and fire. Thirdly, it has been submitted by  

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Shri Sanghi that even if it is found that the petrol tanker was in  use as a motor vehicle at  the time of the explosion and fire,  there was no causal  relationship  between the collision which  took place between the petrol tanker and the truck at about 3  A.M. and the explosion and fire in the petrol tanker which took  place about four and half hours later and it cannot, therefore, be  said that explosion and fire in the petrol tanker was an accident  arising out of the use of a motor vehicle.”

14. After  having  considered  each  of  the  3  limbs  of  Mr.  Sanghi’s  

arguments and having rejected all of them, the Court, in paragraph 37 of the  

judgment, held and observed as follows:

“37. Was the accident involving explosion and fire in the petrol  tanker connected with the use of tanker as a motor vehicle? In  our view, in the facts and circumstances of the present case, this  question must be answered in the affirmative. The High Court  has found that the tanker in question was carrying petrol which  is  a  highly  combustible  and  volatile  material  and  after  the  collision with the other motor vehicle the tanker had fallen on  one of  its  sides on the sloping ground resulting in escape of  highly  inflammable  petrol  and  that  there  was  grave  risk  of  explosion and fire from the petrol coming out of the tanker. In  the light of the aforesaid circumstances the learned Judges of  the  High  Court  have  rightly  concluded  that  the  collision  between the tanker and the other vehicle which had occurred  earlier  and  the  escape  of  petrol  from  the  tanker  which  ultimately  resulted  in  the  explosion  and  fire  were  not  unconnected but related events and merely because there was  interval of about four to four and half hours between the said  collision and the explosion and fire in the tanker, it cannot be  necessarily inferred that there was no causal relation between  explosion and fire. In the circumstances, it must be held that the  explosion  and  fire  resulting  in  the  injuries  which  led  to  the  death of Deepak Uttam More was due to an accident arising out  of the use of the motor vehicle viz. the petrol tanker No. MKL  7461.”

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15. We have  examined  the  evidences  of  the  OWs adduced  before  the  

Claims Tribunal, in particular the depositions of Shivaji Patil, the owner of  

the petrol tanker, who examined himself as OW1 and Dhondirama Mali, the  

driver of the ill-fated petrol tanker who was examined as OW2.  We have  

also gone through the judgment  of  the  Tribunal.  In the  evidences  of  the  

OWs, there was no new material fact that wasn’t already before this Court in  

Shivaji Dayanu Patil. And on the basis of the evidences led by the opposite  

party, no new points were raised before the Claims Tribunal, that can be said  

to have not been raised before this Court in Shivaji Dayanu Patil. The High  

Court was, therefore, perfectly justified in observing in paragraph 26 of the  

judgment coming under appeal as follows:

“… But whether the vehicle was in use or not was a question  before the Supreme Court and even after evidence that aspect  has  not  changed.  Time  at  which  the  accident  occurred,  viz.  catching  the  fire  by  the  petrol  has  remained  the  same.  The  circumstances  preceding  this  particular  point  have  also  remained the same. The manner in which the petrol tanker came  near the spot and how it was hit by a vehicle or truck coming  from  opposite  direction  also  remained  the  same  even  after  evidence  and  therefore  when  facts  which  were  before  the  Supreme Court have not at all changed inspite of the full trial  and evidence,  the  judgment  of  the  Supreme Court  has  to  be  accepted and taken as a concluded judgment so far as the issue  as to whether the vehicle was “in use” or “arising out of the use  of  the  motor  vehicle”,  fully  and  concluding.  Secondly,  questions  before  the  Supreme  Court  was  about  the  interpretation  of  the  words  “arising  out  of  use  of  motor  vehicle”. The situation namely occurring explosion to the petrol  

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tanker  has  not  changed  so  far  as  this  particular  aspect  is  concerned….”

16. In light of the discussions made above, it must be held that in the facts  

and  circumstances  of  the  present  case,  the  decision  rendered  in  Shivaji   

Dayanu Patil was completely binding on the Claims Tribunal and it was not  

open to the Claims Tribunal to come to any finding inconsistent with the  

aforesaid  decision  of  this  Court.  The  issue framed  by the  High Court  is  

answered accordingly. There is no merit in the appeal and it is, accordingly,  

dismissed with costs.

.……….……...................J.                                                     (AFTAB ALAM)          

………..……...................J.                                                   (R.M. LODHA)         

New Delhi January 7, 2011.

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