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                            NON-REPORTABLE

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA

CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION

CIVIL APPEAL NO. 4307  OF 2012 (arising out of SLP (C) No.15051 of 2011)

Narinderjit Singh   … Appellant

versus

North Star Estate Promoters Limited … Respondent

WITH

CIVIL APPEAL NO. 4306  OF 2012 (arising out of SLP (C) No.15730 of 2011)

J U D G M E N T

G.S. SINGHVI, J.

1. Leave granted.

2. Having failed to convince the learned Single Judge of the Punjab and  

Haryana High Court to reverse the judgment and decree passed by the lower  

appellate  Court  for  specific  performance  of  Agreement  for  Sale  dated  

22.10.1996  executed  by  his  father-cum-General  Power  of  Attorney  Col.  

Gurcharan Singh in favour of the respondent and to review the judgment passed  

in the second appeal,  the appellant has filed these appeals.   For the sake of  

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convenience, the parties shall hereinafter be referred to as the appellant and the  

respondent.

3. The respondent filed suit for possession by way of specific performance  

of  the  agreement  for  sale  impleading  the  appellant  and  his  father  as  the  

defendants.  The case set up by the respondent was that at the time of execution  

of  agreement,  its  authorised  representative  had  paid  Rs.1,00,000;  that  on  

22.11.1996, Rs.9,00,000 were offered to the appellant’s father but he avoided to  

accept  the  amount  despite  telephonic  message  and  phonogram  sent  on  

23.11.1996 and personal visit to his office and residence.  It was further pleaded  

that even though the respondent was always ready and willing and is still ready  

and willing to  perform its  part  of  the  agreement,  the appellant  intentionally  

committed breach of the terms and conditions thereof and failed to perform his  

obligation by not extending cooperation in obtaining colonization licence from  

Punjab Urban Development Authority and ITC Certificate under Section 34-A  

of the Income Tax Act.

4. In the joint written statement filed by the appellant and his father, the  

locus standi of the respondent to file the suit was questioned on the premise that  

it had been incorporated on 1.11.1996, i.e. after execution of the agreement.  On  

merits, it was pleaded that the appellant’s father, who was about 88 years old  

and was sick had not executed the agreement and the same was a fictitious  

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document prepared by the respondent in collusion with Col. Gurcharan Singh  

and Vijay Bhardwaj.  The appellant and his father denied the receipt of the  

earnest money and the offer allegedly made by the respondent’s representative  

to pay Rs.9 lacs.

5.On the pleadings of the parties, the trial Court framed the following issues:

“1. Whether plaintiff is entitled for decree for possession by  way of specific performance of agreement to sell dated  22.10.1996? OPP.

2.     Whether plaintiffs are not entitled to relief claimed for?  OPD.

3.     Relief”               

6. After considering the evidence produced by the parties, the trial Court  

recorded the following findings:   

(i) the respondent has succeeded in proving execution of the Agreement for  

Sale.

(ii)   the appellant  and his  father  could not  prove that  the Agreement was a  

forged and fabricated document.   

(iii) the respondent succeeded in proving that  its  representative had paid a  

sum of Rs.1,00,000 as earnest money and offered to pay Rs.9,00,000 which  

defendant No.2 did not accept.   

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(iv) that  the  plaintiff  was  ready  and  willing  to  perform  its  part  of  the  

agreement.

However, the trial Court declined the relief of specific performance by  

observing that the price of the land had considerably increased and it would be  

unfair to compel the appellant to execute the sale deed at the rate agreed to by  

the  parties.   For  arriving at  this  conclusion,  the  trial  Court  relied  upon the  

judgments of this Court in Sargunam (Dead) by L.R. v. Chidambaram (2005) 1  

SCC 162 and Janardhanam Prasad v. Ramdas (2007) 15 SCC 174 and of the  

Division Bench of  the  Punjab and Haryana High Court  in  Mohan Singh v.  

Kulwinder  Singh  2006  (2)  P.L.J.  748  and  of  the  Allahabad  High  Court  in  

Ramawati Devi v. Idris Ahmad 2008 (2) Civil Court Cases 332.  The trial Court  

finally held that the respondent is entitled to refund of the earnest money with  

interest at the rate of 12% per annum.

7. The respondent challenged the judgment and decree of the trial Court by  

filing  an  appeal.   The  appellant  and  his  father  did  not  file  appeal  or  cross  

objection to challenge the findings recorded by the trial Court on the issues of  

execution of the agreement and readiness and willingness on the respondent’s  

part to perform its part of the agreement.

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8. The  lower  appellate  Court  independently  analysed  the  pleadings  and  

evidence of the parties and agreed with the trial Court that the respondent had  

succeeded  in  proving  execution  of  the  agreement  and  its  readiness  and  

willingness to pay the balance amount and perform its part of the obligation.  

The  lower  appellate  Court  further  held  that  even  though  the  respondent’s  

representative had offered to pay Rs.9,00,000, defendant No.2 avoided to accept  

the same and deliver possession of the suit property as per clause (5) of the  

agreement for sale.  The lower appellate Court disagreed with the trial Court  

that the respondent is not entitled to decree of specific performance because  

cost  of  the  suit  property  had  increased  and  observed  that  there  was  no  

justification to relieve the appellant of his obligation to execute the sale deed in  

terms of the agreement.

9. The second appeal filed by the appellant was dismissed by the learned  

Single Judge of the Punjab and Haryana High Court who concurred with the  

lower  appellate  Court  that  the  trial  Court  was  not  justified  in  invoking the  

provisions of Section 20 (2) (c) of the Specific Relief Act, 1963 (for short, ‘the  

Act’) for the purpose of declining substantive relief to the respondent.   The  

learned Single Judge relied upon the judgments of this Court in K. Narendra v.  

Riviera Apartments (P) Ltd. (1999) 5 SCC 77, Sargunam (Dead) by LRs. v.  

Chidambaram (supra) 1 SCC 162 and Gobind Ram v. Gian Chand 2000 (7)  

SCC 548, and held that inadequacy of consideration or the fact that the contract  

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is  onerous  to  the  defendant  is  not  sufficient  to  deny  the  relief  of  specific  

performance.   

10. Shri J. L. Gupta, learned senior counsel for the appellant argued that even  

though the finding recorded by the trial Court and the lower appellate Court on  

the issue of readiness and willingness of the respondent was concurrent,  the  

learned Single Judge of the High Court committed serious error by approving  

the same ignoring that the respondent had neither pleaded nor any evidence was  

produced to prove that it had sufficient financial resources to pay the balance  

price.  Learned senior  counsel  emphasised  that  the  respondent  was  not  only  

required to specifically plead but also prove its readiness and willingness to pay  

the balance price and the lower appellate Court was not justified in granting the  

decree of specific performance merely because the respondent had produced  

evidence to show that its representative had offered Rs.9 lacs to the appellant’s  

father.  Shri Gupta further argued that the so called refusal of the appellant’s  

father to receive the amount of Rs.9,00,000 and hand over possession of the suit  

property was inconsequential because the application made by the respondent  

for  grant  of  licence  to  develop residential  colony  had been  rejected  by the  

Punjab Urban Development Authority.   Learned senior counsel submitted that  

the delay of three years in filing of the suit was an important factor which ought  

to  have  been considered by the  High Court  for  restoring  the  judgment  and  

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decree passed by the trial Court.  In support of his arguments, the learned senior  

counsel  relied  upon  the  judgments  of  this  Court  in  K.  S.  Vidyanadam  v.  

Vairavan (1997) 3 SCC 1 and J. P. Builders v. A. Ramadas Rao (2011) 1 SCC  

429.  In the end, Shri Gupta referred to the provisions of the Punjab Apartment  

and Property Regulation Act,  1995 and submitted that  the appellant  did not  

hand over possession of the suit property to the respondent for the purpose of  

development of residential colony because the latter failed to get the requisite  

licence and any violation of the provisions of the Act would have amounted to  

an offence.    

11. Shri Dushyant Dave, learned senior counsel for the respondent supported  

the impugned judgment and argued that the High Court did not commit any  

error by dismissing the second appeal and approving the judgment of the lower  

appellate Court which had set aside the trial Court’s verdict on the issue of the  

applicability of Section 20(2)(c) of the Act because the respondent was always  

ready and willing to perform its part of the agreement and the escalation, if any,  

in the price of the land could not, by itself, be made a ground for denying the  

relief  of  specific  performance.   Learned  senior  counsel  submitted  that  the  

finding recorded by the trial Court on the issue of the respondent’s readiness  

and willingness will be deemed to have become final because  the appellant did  

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not challenge the same by filing an appeal against  the judgment of the trial  

Court or cross-objection in the appeal preferred by the respondent.

12. We  have  considered  the  respective  submissions.   A  reading  of  the  

agreement executed by the appellant’s father in favour of the respondent shows  

that he had agreed to sell 51 Bighas 9 Biswas land situated in village Dhakauli,  

Tehsil  Rajpura,  District  Patiala  at  the  rate  of  Rs.14,00,000  per  Killa,  i.e.  4  

Bighas. Clauses 1, 2, 3, 4, 5 and 7 of the Agreement read as under:

“1. That the total sale price of the above said land has been  fixed at Rs.14,00,000/- (Fourteen Lac Only) per Killa i.e. (4-0)  (Bighas).

2. That the said purchaser Company has paid to the  said  Seller  a  sum  of  Rs.1,00,000/-  (Rupees  One  Lac  Only) in cash in the shape of currency Notes as earnest  money  for  which  amount  the  said  Seller  hereby  acknowledges  the  receipt  in  the  presence  of  marginal  witnesses.

3. That the purchaser company will develop the land  for residential colony and the said purchaser company will  pay further advance of Rs.9,00,000/- (Rupees Nine Lac  Only) as part payment on or before 23 rd  Nov., of 1996,  further part payment of Rs. 10,00,000/- (Rupees Ten Lac  Only)  on or  before 24.12.1996, further part  payment  of  Rs.28,00,000/-(Rupees  Twenty  Eight  Lac  Only)  on  or  before 23.4.1997 i.e. equivalent to the registration value  of  two  acres  of  land  and  the  balance  payment  of  Rs.42,00,000/-  (Rupees  Forty  Two  Lac  Only)  will  be  made on or before 23.7.1997 equivalent to the value of  three acres and the final  payment  will  be made to the  Seller on or before 23.10.1997.

4. That the Seller  and purchaser  parties  will  be bound to  execute  one  or  more  sale  deeds  in  favour  of  the  purchaser  

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company or  its  nominees  as  per  schedule mentioned in  para  no.3 without any delay and hesitation and registration will be  made from one end of the land in continuous manner and the  earnest  money  and  part  payment  of  Rs.20,00,000/-(Rupees  Twenty Lac Only) will  be adjusted in the last  and final  sale  deeds. The Seller party will present personally for execution of  sale deed in favour of the nominees in the office of Joint Sub  Registrar, Dera Bassi as per time and date fixed between both  the parties.

5. That  the  said  Seller  will  handover  the vacant  physical  possession  of  the  said  land  for  the  purpose  of  development  activities  to  the  purchaser  company  at  the  time  of  after  receiving the part payment of Rs.9,00,000/-(Rupees Nine Lac  Only).

6. xx xx xx xx

7. That  the  Seller  party  will  fully  cooperate  with  the  purchaser company to apply and obtain the colonization  licence from the PUDA, Chandigarh. The Seller party will  give a Special Power of Attorney for this purpose to the  nominee of the company.”

13. The question whether the respondent was ready and willing to perform its  

part of the agreement is required to be decided in the light of the pleadings of  

the parties, evidence produced by them and their conduct. In paragraph 5 of the  

plaint, the respondent categorically pleaded that it was always ready and willing  

and  is  still  ready  and  willing  to  perform  its  part  of  the  contract  and  on  

22.11.1996 Rs.  9,00,000/- had been offered to the appellant’s father but the  

latter  refused  to  accept  the  amount.  The  thrust  of  the  case  set  up  by  the  

appellant was that his father had neither executed the agreement nor received  

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the earnest money.  According to him, the agreement was an end product of  

criminal  conspiracy  hatched  by the  respondent  with  the  help  of  Col.  Harjit  

Singh and Vijay Bhardwaj for defrauding him.  The appellant also pleaded that  

the  agreement  relied  upon  by  the  respondent  was  a  fake  and  fabricated  

document.  In reply to the averments contained in para 5 of the plaint that the  

respondent  was  always  ready  and  willing  and  is  still  ready  and  willing  to  

perform its part of the contract, the following statement was made in the written  

statement:

“5. Para no.5 of the plaint is wrong and therefore denied.  The  question of readiness and willingness on the part of the defendants  does not arise at all.  Question of receiving of Rs. nine lac also  does not arise at all.”

14. The trial Court comprehensively analysed the pleadings and evidence of  

the parties and held that the respondent has succeeded in proving execution of  

the agreement by the appellant’s father and receipt of Rs.1,00,000/- by him. The  

trial Court then considered the question whether the respondent was ready and  

willing to pay the balance price and observed:

“……………Perusal  of  the  terms  and  conditions  of  the  agreement to sell in question reveals that the plaintiff had to  pay an amount of Rs.9 lacs as part payment amount on or  before  23.11.1996  and  the  defendant  No.2  in  turn  was  schedule to deliver  the vacant  physical  possession of  the  property  in  dispute to  the plaintiff  i.e.  on 23.11.1996.  The  specific stand taken by the plaintiff is that he remained ready  with  the  said  amount  of  Rs.9  lacs  to  be  paid  to  the  

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defendants on 23.11.1996,  but,  the defendants refused to  accept the said amount on pretext or the other. The plaintiff  sent  a telephonic message through STD to the defendant  No.2 besides sending the other phonogram message to the  defendant  No.2  on  the  same  day  at  11.00  a.m.  More  significantly, the plaintiff  had prepared a draft of Rs.9 lacs  bearing  No.BC/F322341  dated  23.11.1996  in  this  regard.  Had the plaintiff not been having ready cash amount of Rs.9  lacs and not ready and willing to pay the amount of Rs.9 lacs  to the defendants, then, he would have prepared the said  draft. Rather, defendants have denied the execution of any  such agreement dated 22.10.1996 and therefore, defendants  cannot take the plea that plaintiff never offered an amount of  Rs.9 lacs. The defendants are also estopped from taking the  plea that plaintiff  was not ready and willing to perform his  part  of  the contract  and that  the plaintiff  did not  have the  capacity  to  make the payment  when the defendants have  denied the very execution of the agreement in question. It  may  be  pertinent  to  mention  here  that  plaintiff  had  also  served  a  legal  notice  upon  the  defendants  through  his  counsel  Sh.G.K.Verma,  Advocate  on  24.11.1996,  but,  the  defendants refused to accept the said notice.  The plaintiff  was scheduled to make further payment on different dates to  the defendants after 23.10.1996, but, since the defendants  have denied the execution of the agreement, therefore, the  question where, the plaintiff was ready with the subsequent  payment of Rs.10 lacs, Rs.18 lacs and Rs.42 lacs to be paid  on subsequent  dates becomes meaningless  and loses its  significance. DW1 Narinderjit Singh has himself stated that  document was forged and fabricated, but, he has failed to  prove  this  averment  on  record.  Although,  the  defendants  have  examined  an  expert  witness  namely  DW3 Navdeep  Gupta,  who  has  stated  that  agreement  to  sell  dated  22.10.1996 did not contain the signatures of defendant No.2  Gurcharan Singh, but, his testimony cannot be given much  weightage  in  the  wake  of  the  positive  oral  as  well  as  documentary  evidence  led  by  the  plaintiff.  Rather,  the  plaintiff has also examined PW6 Jassy Anand, Finger Prints  and Handwriting Expert, who has specifically stated on oath  before the Court that in the present case, she has examined  the disputed signatures of defendant No.2 on the agreement  

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in question with the standard signatures and he was of the  opinion that signatures of Col. Gurcharan Singh, defendant  No.2 tallied with the disputed signatures of Col. Gurcharan  Singh, defendant No.2 on the agreement in question which  means that signatures on the disputed agreement and the  signatures on     the authentic documents were done by one    and the same person. ………………………………. So,  the  agreement  in  question  dated  22.10.1996  EX.PW3/A  duly  stands proved in accordance with provisions of law. It stands  sufficiently proved on record that defendants on 22.10.1996  had executed an agreement to sell in favour of the plaintiff  after  receiving  earnest  amount  of  Rs.one  lacs  from  the  plaintiff in the presence of marginal witnesses.”

(emphasis supplied)

15. The appellant did not question the aforesaid findings of the trial Court by  

filing an appeal. Not only this, he did not file cross-objection in the appeal filed  

by the respondent.  Therefore, the lower appellate Court  was not required to  

consider  whether  execution  of  the  agreement  for  sale  has  been  proved  and  

whether respondent was ready and willing to perform its part of the agreement,  

but it considered both the questions and observed:

“The  learned  trial  Court  has  specifically  held  that  due  execution of the agreement in question has been proved and  there is no defect in the findings recorded by the learned trial  Court in this regard. The version of the appellant/plaintiff in  this regard has been proved by PW3 Vijay Bhardwaj who is  marginal  witness of  the agreement  in  question.  So far  as  readiness  and  willingness  on  the  part  of  the  appellant/plaintiff  to  perform its  contract  is  concerned,  the  learned  trial  Court  has  recorded  findings  in  favour  of  the  appellant/plaintiff and the said findings are based on proper  appreciation  of  evidence.  The  evidence  produced  by  the  appellant/plaintiff   shows that the appellant/ plaintiff had got  issued a demand draft  of  Rs.9,00,000/-  on 23.11.1996 for  

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payment of the said amount to the defendants/respondents  but  they  did  not  receive  the  said  amount.  The  appellant/  plaintiff had sent message and also phonogram Ex.PW3/1 to  the  defendants/respondents  on  23.11.1996  vide  receipt  ex.PW3/H.  Even  a  notice  Ex.PW3/D  was  sent  to  the  defendants/respondents  through  courier  vide  receipt  Ex.PW3/C and even a  legal  notice  had  been sent  to  the  defendants/respondents by the appellant/plaintiff through its  counsel.  Further the statement of  M.K.Jain Director  of  the  appellant/plaintiff in this regard finds corroboration from the  testimony  of  Vijay  Bhardwaj.  On  the  other  hand,  the  defendants/respondents  have  denied  the  agreement  in  question and it  is not their plea that appellant/plaintiff  was  not  ready and willing to perform its  contract.  Under  these  circumstances,  the  evidence  produced  by  the  appellant/plaintiff to prove their readiness and willingness to  perform their part of contract can be accepted without any  hesitation and in this regard I find support from the judgment  of Hon'ble Punjab and Haryana High Court in Santa Singh  Vs.  Binder  Singh  and Ors  2006(4)  Civil  Court  Cases-608  wherein it was held as under:-

"Since the case of the defendant is that of one of  denial, therefore, the statement of the plaintiff that  he was ready and willing to perform his part of the  contract  is  sufficient  to  infer  that  plaintiffs  were  ready and willing to perform their part of contract. It  was  a meager  amount  of  Rs.2000/-  alone  which  was required to be paid at the time of registration of  the sale deed. The substantial amount was paid at  the time of execution of the agreement. More than  Rs.12000/- was kept for payment to the mortgagee.  Therefore,  the  argument  raised  by  the  learned  counsel for the appellant that the plaintiffs have led  evidence  to  prove  his  ready  and  willingness  to  perform the contract is not tenable.”

16. The  learned  Single  Judge  also  considered  the  issue  of  readiness  and  

willingness of the respondent to perform its part of the agreement and observed:

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“The  factum  of  readiness  and  willingness  to  perform  the  plaintiff’s  part  of  the  contract  is  to  be  adjudged  with  the  conduct of the parties and the attending circumstances.  In the  present case, it may be noticed that according to the terms and  conditions  of  the  agreement  in  question,  the  plaintiff- respondent  was  to  make  a  payment  of  Rs.9,00,000/-  to  the  appellant  on  23.11.1996  and  on  receipt  of  the  aforesaid  payment, the appellant was to allow the plaintiff-respondent to  carry  out  the  development  activities.   However,  it  has  been  established on record that the appellant refused to receive the  aforesaid amount of Rs.9,00,000/- on 23.11.1996.  There is no  evidence on record that the appellant ever allowed the plaintiff- respondent  to carry out  development activities  in the land in  question.   Thus,  thereafter,  there  was  no  occasion  for  the  plaintiff-respondent to further perform its part of the contract on  subsequent dates as argued. Still there is no evidence on record  placed  by  the  appellant  to  prove  the  fact  that  the  plaintiff- respondent  was  not  ready  to  get  the  sale  deed  executed  on  subsequent  dates  as  per  the  terms  and  conditions  of  the  agreement in question. There is a distinction between readiness  to perform the contract and willingness to perform the contract.  By  readiness,  may  be  meant  the  capacity  of  the  plaintiff  to  perform the contract  which includes  his  financial  position to  pay the purchase price whereas determining the willingness to  perform his part of the contract, the conduct of the parties has to  be scrutinized.  In the present case, there is no evidence placed  on record to show that the plaintiff-respondent was not having  the  capacity  to  pay  the  purchase  price  for  execution  of  the  subsequent  sale  deeds.  The  plaintiff-respondent  had  demonstrated  his  willingness  to  pay  Rs.9,00,000/-  on  23.11.1996  by  placing  on  record  the  demand  draft  of  Rs.9,00,000/- in favour of the appellant. However, as noticed  above,  since  the  appellant  refused  to  accept  the  same,  the  plaintiff-respondent was prevented from performing its part of  the  agreement  by  offering  money  for  execution  of  the  sale  deeds on subsequent dates.”

17. In our view, the concurrent findings recorded by the trial Court and the  

lower  appellate  Court  on  the  issues  of  execution  of  the  agreement  by  the  

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appellant’s father and the respondent’s readiness and willingness to perform its  

part of the agreement were based on correct evaluation of the pleadings and  

evidence of the parties and the learned Single Judge of the High Court did not  

commit  any error  by  refusing to  upset  those  findings.  The argument  of  the  

learned senior counsel for the appellant that in the absence of specific pleading  

about continued readiness and willingness of the respondent to perform its part  

of the agreement and availability of funds necessary for payment of the sale  

consideration,  the  High  Court  should  have  set  aside  the  concurrent  finding  

recorded by the Courts below sounds attractive but on a careful scrutiny of the  

record  we  do  not  find  any  valid  ground  to  entertain  the  same.    In  R.C.  

Chandiok v. Chuni Lal Sabharwal (1970) 3 SCC 140, this Court observed that  

“readiness and willingness cannot be treated as a straitjacket formula and the  

issue has to be decided keeping in view the facts and circumstances relevant to  

the  intention  and  conduct  of  the  party  concerned”.  The  same  view  was  

reiterated  in  D'Souza  v.  Shondrilo  Naidu,  (2004)  6  SCC  649.   In  N.P.  

Thirugnanam v. R. Jagan Mohan Rao (Dr) (1995) 5 SCC 115, the Court found  

that  the  appellant  was  dabbling  in  real  estate  transaction  without  means  to  

purchase the property and observed:

“Section 16(c) of the Act envisages that plaintiff must plead  and prove that he had performed or has always been ready  and  willing  to  perform the  essential  terms of  the  contract  which are to be performed by him, other than those terms  the performance of which has been prevented or waived by  

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the defendant. The continuous readiness and willingness on  the part of the plaintiff is a condition precedent to grant the  relief of specific performance. This circumstance is material  and relevant and is required to be considered by the court  while granting or refusing to grant the relief. If  the plaintiff  fails  to  either  aver  or  prove  the  same,  he  must  fail.  To  adjudge whether the plaintiff is ready and willing to perform  his  part  of  the  contract,  the  court  must  take  into  consideration  the  conduct  of  the  plaintiff  prior  and  subsequent to the filing of the suit along with other attending  circumstances. The amount of consideration which he has to  pay  to  the  defendant  must  of  necessity  be  proved  to  be  available. Right from the date of the execution till date of the  decree he must prove that he is ready and has always been  willing  to  perform his  part  of  the  contract.  As  stated,  the  factum of his readiness and willingness to perform his part of  the contract is to be adjudged with reference to the conduct  of the party and the attending circumstances. The court may  infer from the facts and circumstances whether the plaintiff  was ready and was always ready and willing to perform his  part of the contract.”

18. In  J.  P.  Builders  v.  A.  Ramadas  Rao  (supra),  the  Court  has  merely  

reiterated the principles already laid down and no new proposition has been laid  

down which may help the cause of the appellant.  

19. It is significant to note that the appellant and his father had set up the  

case of total denial. They repeatedly pleaded that the agreement for sale was a  

fictitious document and the respondent had fabricated the same in connivance  

with Col. Harjit Singh and Vijay Bhardwaj. However, no evidence was adduced  

by the appellant to substantiate his assertion. That apart, he did not challenge  

the finding recorded by the trial Court on the issue of readiness and willingness  

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of the respondent to perform its part of the agreement. Therefore, we do not  

find any valid ground much less justification for exercise of power by this Court  

under Article 136 of the Constitution of India to interfere with the judgment of  

the lower appellate Court which was approved by the High Court.  

20. We  are  also  inclined  to  agree  with  the  lower  appellate  Court  that  

escalation in the price of the land cannot, by itself, be a ground for denying  

relief of specific performance.  In K. Narendra v. Riviera Apartments (P) Ltd.  

(supra),  this  Court  interpreted  Section  20  of  the  Act  and  laid  down  the  

following propositions:

“Section  20  of  the  Specific  Relief  Act,  1963  provides  that  the  jurisdiction to decree specific performance is discretionary and the  court is not bound to grant such relief merely because it is lawful  to do so; the discretion of the court is not arbitrary but sound and  reasonable, guided by judicial principles and capable of correction  by a court of appeal. Performance of the contract involving some  hardship on the  defendant  which he did not  foresee  while  non- performance involving no such hardship on the plaintiff, is one of  the  circumstances  in  which  the  court  may  properly  exercise  discretion  not  to  decree  specific  performance.  The  doctrine  of  comparative hardship has been thus statutorily recognized in India.  However, mere inadequacy of consideration or the mere fact that  the  contract  is  onerous  to  the  defendant  or  improvident  in  its  nature, shall not constitute an unfair advantage to the plaintiff over  the defendant or unforeseeable hardship on the defendant.”

(emphasis supplied)

21.  In  the  present  case,  the  appellant  had  neither  pleaded  hardship  nor  

produced any evidence  to  show that  it  will  be  inequitable  to  order  specific  

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performance  of  the  agreement.   Rather,  the  important  plea  taken  by  the  

appellant was that the agreement was fictitious and fabricated and his father had  

neither executed the same nor received the earnest money and, as mentioned  

above, all the Courts have found this plea to be wholly untenable.

22. In the result, the appeals are dismissed and the following directions are  

given:

i) Within three months from today the respondent  

shall pay Rs.5 crores to the appellant. This direction is being given  

keeping  in  view  the  statement  made  by  Shri  Dushyant  Dave,  

learned senior counsel for the respondent on 03.05.2012 that his  

client would be willing to pay Rs.5 crores in all to the appellant as  

the price of the land.  

ii) Within  next  three  months  the  appellant  shall  

execute and get the sale deed registered in favour of the respondent  

and hand over possession of the suit property.  

…..……….....……..….………………….…J.                       [G.S. SINGHVI]

..…………..………..….………………….…J.   [SUDHANSU JYOTI MUKHOPADHAYA] New Delhi, May 08, 2012.

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