REPORTABLE

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION

 CRIMINAL APPEAL NO. 2184 OF 2011   (Arising out of S.L.P. (Crl.) No. 2156 of 2011)

Narinder Singh Arora                  ………….. Appellant

versus

State (Govt. of NCT of Delhi) and Ors.                     ………..Respondents

O R D E R

H.L. Dattu, J.

Leave granted.

1) The present appeal, by way of special leave, is directed  

against   the Judgement  and Order dated  01.09.2010  of the  

High Court  of  Delhi  in  Criminal  Revision  No.  555 of  2003  

whereby the High Court  has  dismissed the revision  petition  

preferred by the appellant against the Judgment and Order dated  

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22.03.2003  passed  by  Learned  Additional  Sessions  Judge  in  

Sessions Case No. 104 of 2001.

2) Since we intend to remand the matter to the  

High Court for fresh disposal, it is not necessary to go into the  

factual matrix.  Suffice to state that the appellant had filed a  

complaint against the respondents dated 24.11.1988 which was  

registered as FIR No. 393 of 1988 at P.S.- Srinivaspuri, New  

Delhi.  Subsequently,  the  charges  were  framed  against  the  

respondents under Sections 498-A, 304-B read with Section-34  

and  Section  302  of  the  IPC  by  Shri.  Prithvi  Raj,  learned  

Additional  District  &  Sessions  Judge  dated  15.05.1995.  

Thereafter,  the  case  was  listed  before  Shri.  S.N.  Dhingra,  

Additional  Sessions  Judge for  the trial,  however,  the learned  

Judge had recused from hearing the matter for personal reasons  

vide  Order  dated  25.09.2000.  The  said  Order  is  extracted  

below:

“25-09-2000

Present:- Spl. P.P. for the State              

All the accused on bail.

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For personal reason I do not want to try this case. The   case be sent to Ld. Sessions Judge, Delhi for marking it   to some other court.  

Put up on 11-10-2000 to find out to which court case   has been allocated.

A.S.J. New Delhi 25-09-2000”

3) Accordingly, the case was withdrawn from the Court of Shri.  

S.N. Dhingra, Additional Sessions Judge and transferred to the  

Court of Shri. S.M. Chopra, Additional Sessions Judge vide the  

Order dated 29.09.2000 of the Sessions Judge. Eventually the  

accused  respondents  were  tried  and acquitted  vide  Judgment  

and Order dated 22.03.2003 passed by            Ms. Manju Goel,  

Additional Sessions Judge. Being aggrieved by the Judgment  

and Order, the appellant preferred a revision petition before the  

High  Court.   The  same  was  dismissed  vide impugned  final  

Judgment and Order dated 01.09.2010 passed by learned Judge,  

Shri. Justice S.N. Dhingra.  

4) It is apparent that the fact of earlier recusal of the case at  

the trial by learned Shri Justice S.N. Dhingra himself,  was not  

brought to his notice in the revision petition before the High  

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Court  by  either  of  the  parties  to  the  case.  Therefore,   Shri  

Justice  S.N.  Dhingra,  owing  to  inadvertence  regarding  his  

earlier  recusal,  has  dismissed  the  revision  petition  by  the  

impugned Judgment.  In our opinion, the impugned Judgment,  

passed by Shri Justice S.N. Dhigra subsequent to his recusal  

at  trial  stage for  personal  reasons,  is  against  the principle of  

natural justice and fair trial.  

5) It  is  well  settled  law  that  a  person  who  tries  a  cause  

should  be  able  to  deal  with  the  matter  placed  before  him  

objectively, fairly and impartially. No one can act in a judicial  

capacity if his  previous  conduct  gives  ground  for  believing  

that he cannot act with an open mind or impartially. The broad  

principle evolved by this Court is that a person, trying a cause,  

must not only act fairly but must be able to act above suspicion  

of unfairness and bias. In the case of  Manak Lal v.  Dr. Prem  

Chand Singhvi, AIR 1957 SC 425, it was observed:  

“5. … every member of a tribunal that [sits to]   try  issues  in  judicial  or  quasi-judicial   proceedings must be able to act judicially; and   it  is  of  the  essence  of  judicial  decisions  and   judicial  administration that  Judges should be   able to act impartially, objectively and without   

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any bias. In such cases the test is not whether   in  fact  a  bias  has affected the judgment;  the   test always is and must be whether a litigant   could  reasonably  apprehend  that  a  bias   attributable to a member of the tribunal might   have operated against him in the final decision   of the tribunal. It is in this sense that it is often   said that justice must not only be done but must   also appear to be done.”

6) In the case of A.K. Kraipak v. Union of India, (1969)    2  

SCC 262,   this  Court, while discussing the rule of bias, has   

observed:

“15. … At every stage of his participation in the   deliberations of the Selection Board there was a   conflict  between  his  interest  and  duty.  Under   those circumstances it is difficult to believe that   he could have been impartial. The real question   is  not  whether he was biased.  It  is  difficult  to   prove the state of mind of a person.  Therefore   what  we  have  to  see  is  whether  there  is   reasonable  ground  for  believing  that  he  was   likely  to  have  been  biased.  … In  deciding the   question  of  bias  we  have  to  take  into   consideration human probabilities and ordinary   course of human conduct.”

7) In the case of S. Parthasarathi v. State of A.P., (1974)  3  

SCC 459, this Court has applied the “real likelihood” test and  

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restored the decree  of  the  trial  court  which  invalidated   

compulsory retirement of the appellant by way of punishment.  

This Court observed:

“16.  … We  think  that  the  reviewing  authority   must make a determination on the basis of the   whole evidence before it, whether a reasonable   man would in the circumstances infer that there   is real likelihood of bias. The court must look at   the  impression  which  other  people  have.  This   follows from the principle that justice must not   only be done but seen to be done. If right-minded   persons would think that there is real likelihood   of  bias on the part  of  an inquiring officer,  he   must not conduct the enquiry; nevertheless, there   must  be  a  real  likelihood  of  bias.  Surmise  or   conjecture  would  not  be  enough.  There  must   exist circumstances from which reasonable men   would  think  it  probable  or  likely  that  the   inquiring officer will  be prejudiced against the   delinquent. The court will not inquire whether he   was  really  prejudiced.  If  a  reasonable  man   would  think  on  the  basis  of  the  existing   circumstances that he is likely to be prejudiced,   that is sufficient to quash the decision….”

8) In the case  of  G. Sarana (Dr.) v.  University  of  Lucknow,   

(1976) 3 SCC 585, this Court had referred to the judgments of  

A.K. Kraipak v. Union of India (Supra) and S. Parthasarathi  

v. State of A.P. (Supra) and observed:

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“11.  …  the  real  question  is  not  whether  a   member  of  an  administrative  board  while   exercising quasi-judicial powers or discharging   quasi-judicial  functions  was  biased,  for  it  is   difficult to prove the mind of a person. What has   to  be  seen  is  whether  there  is  a  reasonable   ground for believing that he was likely to have   been  biased.  In  deciding  the  question  of  bias,   human  probabilities  and  ordinary  course  of   human  conduct  have  to  be  taken  into   consideration.”

9) In the case of Ranjit Thakur v. Union of India, (1987) 4 SCC   

611, this Court has held:

“15.  …  The  test  of  real  likelihood  of  bias  is   whether  a  reasonable  person,  in  possession  of   relevant information, would have thought that bias   was likely and whether Respondent 4 was likely to   be  disposed  to  decide  the  matter  only  in  a   particular way.

16. It is the essence of a judgment that it is made   after due observance of the judicial process; that   the court or tribunal passing it observes, at least   the  minimal  requirements  of  natural  justice;  is   composed of impartial  persons acting fairly and   without bias and in good faith. A judgment which   is the result  of bias or want of impartiality is a   nullity and the trial ‘coram non judice’.

17. As to the tests of the likelihood of bias what is   relevant is the reasonableness of the apprehension   in that regard in the mind of the party. The proper   approach for the Judge is not to look at his own   mind and ask  himself,  however,  honestly,  ‘Am I   

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biased?’;  but  to  look  at  the  mind  of  the  party   before him.”

10) In the case of Secy. to Govt., Transport Deptt. v. Munuswamy  

Mudaliar,  (1988) Supp. SCC 651, this Court considered the  

question as to  whether a  party to  the arbitration agreement  

could seek change of an agreed arbitrator on the ground that  

being  an  employee  of  the  State  Government,  the  arbitrator  

will  not  be  able  to  decide  the  dispute  without  bias.  While  

reversing  the  judgment  of  the  High  Court,  which  had  

confirmed  the order  of  the learned Judge,  City  Civil  Court  

directing the appointment of another person as an arbitrator,  

this Court observed:

“12.  Reasonable  apprehension  of  bias  in  the   mind of a reasonable man can be a ground for   removal  of  the  arbitrator.  A  predisposition  to   decide for or against one party, without proper   regard to the true merits of the dispute is bias.   There must be reasonable apprehension of that   predisposition.  The  reasonable  apprehension  must  be  based  on  cogent  materials.  See the  observations  of  Mustill  and Boyd,  Commercial   Arbitration, 1982 Edn., p. 214.  Halsbury’s   Laws  of  England,  4th  Edn.,  Vol.  2,  para  551,   p.282 describe that the test for bias is whether a   reasonable intelligent man, fully apprised of all   the  circumstances,  would  feel  a  serious   apprehension of bias.”(emphasis supplied)

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11) In the case of R. v. Camborne JJ, ex p Pearce, (1955) 1 QB  

41, the Divisional Court of the Queen’s Bench Division, after   

reviewing  a  large  number  of  authorities  including  R. v.   

Sussex JJ, ex p McCarthy ( Supra) held:  

“In the judgment of this Court the right test is   that prescribed by Blackburn, J., namely, that to   disqualify a person from acting in a judicial or   quasi-judicial  capacity  upon  the  ground  of   interest (other than pecuniary or proprietary) in   the  subject-matter  of  the  proceeding,  a  real   likelihood of bias must be shown. This Court is   further of opinion that a real likelihood of bias   must  be  made  to  appear  not  only  from  the   materials  in  fact  ascertained  by  the  party   complaining, but from such further facts as he   might  readily  have  ascertained  and  easily   verified in the course of his inquiries.

12) In the case of  R. v.  Gough,  (1993) 2 All ER 724 (HL), the  

House of Lords while applying the “real likelihood” test, by  

using the expression “real danger”, has observed thus:  

“… In my opinion, if, in the circumstances of the   case (as ascertained by the court), it appears that   there was a real likelihood, in the sense of a real   possibility, of bias on the part of a justice or other   member  of  an  inferior  tribunal,  justice  requires   

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that the decision should not be allowed to stand. I   am by  no means  persuaded  that,  in  its  original   form,  the  real  likelihood  test  required  that  any   more  rigorous  criterion  should  be  applied.   Furthermore the test as so stated gives sufficient   effect, in cases of apparent bias, to the principle   that  justice  must  manifestly  be seen to be done,   and  it  is  unnecessary,  in  my  opinion,  to  have   recourse  to  a  test  based  on  mere  suspicion,  or   even reasonable suspicion, for that purpose.”

13) In view of the aforesaid facts and reasons, we set  

aside the impugned Judgment and Order dated 01.09.2010 of  

the  High  Court  in  Criminal  Revision  No.555  of  2003  and  

remand the matter to the High Court for fresh disposal of the  

revision petition filed by the appellant in accordance with law.  

We clarify  that  we have  not  expressed  any opinion on the  

merits of the case.  Ordered accordingly.

..................................................J.                              [ H. L. DATTU ]

…………………………………J.                              [ CHANDRAMAULI KR. PRASAD ]

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New Delhi, December 05, 2011.  

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