REPORTABLE

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA

CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION

CIVIL APPEAL NOS. 10429-10430 of 2017 (ARISING OUT OF SLP (C) NOS. 2354-2355 OF 2017)

NARENDRA & ORS. .....APPELLANT(S)

VERSUS

STATE OF UTTAR PRADESH & ORS. .....RESPONDENT(S)

J U D G M E N T

A.K. SIKRI, J.

A  very  limited,  but  pertinent,  question  of  law  arises  for

consideration  in  these  appeals.   Land  of  the  appellants  was

acquired by the Government of  Uttar  Pradesh vide Notification

dated  12th September,  1986  issued  under  Section  4(1)  of  the

Land Acquisition Act, 1894 (hereinafter referred to as the ‘Act’).  It

was followed by the declaration dated 24 th February, 1988 issued

under Section 6(1) of the Act.  It may be mentioned that vide the

aforesaid  Notification,  large  tracts  of  land  were  acquired,

belonging to various land owners/villagers of  Village Makanpur

Paragana Loni, Tehsil - Dadri, District Ghaziabad, Uttar Pradesh

for planned development of Vaishali.  After the acquisition of this

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land,  it  was handed over  to  Ghaziabad Development  Authority

(for short, ‘GDA’) for development.  

2) The award dated 18th January, 1990 was passed by the Special

Land  Acquisition  Officer  determining  the  market  value  of  the

acquired  land  at  the  rate  of  Rs.  50  per  square  yard.   The

appellants as well as other villagers were not satisfied with the

rates so fixed and, therefore, sought the reference under Section

18 of the Act.  Matter was referred to the Additional District Judge,

Ghaziabad for determination of market value of the acquired land.

Reference  court,  vide  its  judgment  and  order  dated  19 th April,

1999, increased the rate of compensation from Rs.50/- per sq.

yards  to  Rs.90/-  per  square yards.   Even this  increase in  the

compensation  was  not  to  the  satisfaction  of  the  land  owners.

Various appeals came to be filed.   Appeals were also filed by

these appellants claiming that the compensation be enhanced to

Rs.  115/-  per  square  yards.   Some  of  the  other  land  owners

whose  lands  were  acquired,  however,  had  claimed  higher

compensation.   The first  batch of  appeals  filed  by others  was

decided by the High Court  by judgment  dated 13th November,

2014.  The High Court found merit in those appeals and fixed the

compensation at the rate of Rs.297/- per square yards.  When the

appeals of the appellants herein came up for hearing before the

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High Court, the High Court took note of its earlier judgment and

accepted the fact that the land of the appellants was acquired by

the  same  Notification  vide  which  land  of  others  was  acquired

wherein the High Court  had awarded the compensation at  the

rate of  Rs.297/-  per square yards.   Notwithstanding the same,

insofar  as  the  appellants  are  concerned,  the  High  Court  has

limited the compensation to Rs.115/- per square yards because of

the reasoning that the appellant had demanded compensation at

that  rate  only  and  had  paid  the  court  fees  also  accordingly.

Therefore,  opined  the  High  Court,  it  was  difficult  to  allow

compensation  at  a  rate  higher  than  the  rate  claimed  by  the

appellants.   

3) In this backdrop, the question that falls for consideration is as to

whether  the  High  Court  was  precluded  from  granting

compensation at the rate of Rs.297/- per square yards which was

the rate of compensation awarded to other farmers of the said

village whose lands were acquired under the same Notification

and were similarly situated.

4) Before  proceeding  to  discuss  the  aforesaid  question,  we  may

mention  that  insofar  as  the  order  of  the  High  Court  fixing

compensation  at  the  rate  of  Rs.297/-  per  square  yards  is

concerned, special leave petition was filed by the GDA which was

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dismissed by this Court.  Review thereof was sought which was

also dismissed.  Even the curative petition filed by the GDA came

to  be  dismissed.   Thus,  the  order  of  the  High  Court  granting

compensation at the rate of Rs.297/- per square yards in respect

of these acquisition proceedings has attained finality.   

5) After hearing the counsel for the parties, we are of the opinion

that the issue has already been settled by this Court in  Ashok

Kumar and Another vs. State of Haryana1 wherein it is held that

it  is the duty of the Court to award just and fair  compensation

taking  into  consideration  true  market  value  and  other  relevant

factors, irrespective of claim made by the land owner and there is

no  cap  on  the  maximum  rate  of  compensation  that  can  be

awarded  by  the  court  and  the  courts  are  not  restricted  to

awarding only that  amount  that  has been claimed by the land

owners/applicants  in  their  application  before  it.   The  relevant

paras of this judgment is quoted as under:

“6. Prior to amendment Act 68 of 1984, the amount of compensation that could be awarded by the Court was limited to the amount claimed by the applicant. Section 25 read as under-

Section 25. Rules as to amount of compensation-(1) When  the  applicant  has  made  a  claim  to compensation,  pursuant  to  any  notice  given  Under Section 9,  the amount  awarded to him by the court shall  not  exceed the amount  so claimed or  be less

1   (2016) 4 SCC 544

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than  the  amount  awarded  by  the  Collector  Under Section 11.

(2)  When  the  applicant  has  refused  to  make  such claim or has omitted without sufficient reason (to be allowed by the Judge) to make such claim, the amount awarded  by  the  court  shall  in  no  case  exceed  the amount awarded by the Collector.

(3)  When  the  applicant  has  omitted  for  a  sufficient reason (to  be  allowed by the  Judge)  to  make such claim, the amount awarded to him by the court shall not  be  less  than,  and  may  exceed,  the  amount awarded by the Collector.

The amended Section 25 reads as under:

“Section  25.  Amount  of  compensation awarded by Court not to be lower than the amount  awarded  by  the  Collector-  The amount  of  compensation  awarded  by  the Court  shall  not  be  less  than  the  amount awarded by the Collector under Section 11.”

The amendment has come into effect on 24.09.1984.

7.  The  pre-amended  provision  put  a  cap  on  the maximum; the compensation by court should not be beyond the amount claimed. The amendment in 1984, on  the  contrary,  put  a  cap  on  the  minimum; compensation cannot be less that what was awarded by  the  Land  Acquisition  Collector.  The  cap  on maximum having been expressly omitted, and the cap that  is  put  is  only  on  minimum,  it  is  clear  that  the amount of compensation that a court can award is no longer  restricted  to  the  amount  claimed  by  the applicant. It is the duty of the Court to award just and fair  compensation  taking  into  consideration  the  true market value and other relevant factors, irrespective of the claim made by the owner.

8. xxx xxx xxx

9.  In  Bhag  Singh  and  Ors.  v.  Union  Territory  of Chandigarh [(1985) 3 SCC 737], this Court held that there may be situations where the amount higher than

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claimed may be awarded to the claimant. The Court observed-

“3. ...  It must be remembered that this was not  a  dispute  between  two  private  citizens where it would be quite just and legitimate to confine  the  claimant  to  the  claim made by him and not to award him any higher amount than that claimed though even in such a case there  may  be  situations  where  an  amount higher than that claimed can be awarded to the  claimant  as  for  instance  where  an amount is claimed as due at the foot of an account.  Here  was  a  claim  made  by  the Appellants against the State Government for compensation  for  acquisition  of  their  land and under the law, the State was bound to pay to the Appellants compensation on the basis  of  the  market  value  of  the  land acquired and if according to the judgments of the  learned  single  Judge  and  the  Division Bench, the market value of the land acquired was higher than that  awarded by the Land Acquisition Collector or the Additional District Judge, there is no reason why the Appellants should  have  been  denied  the  benefit  of payment of the market value so determined. To deny this benefit to the Appellants would tantamount  to  permitting  the  State Government  to  acquire  the  land  of  the Appellants on payment of less than the true market value. There may be cases where, as for  instance,  under'  agrarian  reform legislation,  the  holder  of  land  may, legitimately, as a matter of social justice with a view to eliminating concentration of land in the  hands  of  a  few and  bringing  about  its equitable  distribution,  be  deprived  of  land which  is  not  being  personally  cultivated  by him or which is in excess of the ceiling area with  payment  of  little  compensation  or  no compensation  at  all,  but  where  land  is acquired  under  the  Land  Acquisition  Act, 1894, it would not be fair and just to deprive the holder of his land without payment of the true market value when the law, in so many terms,  declares that  he  shall  be paid  such

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market value....

10.  In  Krishi  Utpadan Mandi  Samiti  v. Kanhaiya  Lal [(2000)  7  SCC 756],  this  Court  held  that  under  the amended provisions of Section 25 of the Act, the Court can grant a higher compensation than claimed by the applicant in his pleadings-

11. Further, in Bhimasha v. Special  Land Acquisition Officer and Ors. [(2008) 10 SCC 797], a three-Judge bench reiterated the principle in Bhag Singh (supra) and  rejected  the  contention  that  a  higher compensation  than  claimed  by  the  owner  in  his pleadings cannot be awarded by the Court.....

(Emphasis supplied)”

6) Matter can be looked into from another angle as well, viz., in the

light  of  the  spirit  contained  in  Section  28A of  the  Act.    This

provision reads as under:

“(1)   Wherein  an  award  under  this  Part,  the  Court allows to the applicant any amount of compensation in excess of the amount awarded by the Collector under Section II, the persons interested in all the other land covered  by  the  same  notification  under  Section  4, sub-section  (1)  and  who  are  also  aggrieved  by  the award of the Collector may, notwithstanding that they had not  made an application to  the Collector  under Section  18,  by  written  application  to  the  Collector within three months from the date of the award of the court  require  that  the  amount  of   compensation payable to them may be re-determined on the basis of the  amount  of  compensation  awarded  by  the court......”  

It transpires from the bare reading of the aforesaid provision

that even in the absence of exemplars and other evidence, higher

compensation  can  be  allowed  for  others  whose  land  was

acquired under the same Notification.

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7) The  purpose  and  objective  behind  the  aforesaid  provision  is

salutary in nature.  It is kept in mind that those land owners who

are agriculturist in most of the cases, and whose land is acquired

for  public  purpose  should  get  fair  compensation.  Once  a

particular  rate  of  compensation  is  judicially  determined,  which

becomes a fair compensation, benefit thereof is to be given even

to those who could not approach the court.  It is with this aim the

aforesaid provision is incorporated by the Legislature.  Once we

keep  the  aforesaid  purpose  in  mind,  the  mere  fact  that  the

compensation which was claimed by some of the villagers was at

lesser rate than the compensation which is ultimately determined

to be fair compensation, should not be a ground to deny such

persons appropriate and fair  compensation on the ground that

they claimed compensation at a lesser rate.  In such cases, strict

rule  of  pleadings  are  not  be  made  applicable  and  rendering

substantial  justice  to  the  parties  has  to  be  the  paramount

consideration.   It  is  to  be  kept  in  mind  that  in  the  matter  of

compulsory acquisition of lands by the Government, the villagers

whose land gets acquired are not willing parties.  It was not their

voluntary act to sell of their land.   They were compelled to give

the land to the State for public purpose.  For this purpose, the

consideration  which  is  to  be  paid  to  them is  also  not  of  their

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choice.  On the contrary, as per the scheme of the Act, the rate at

which compensation should be paid to the persons divested of

their  land  is  determined  by  the  Land  Acquisition  Collector.

Scheme  further  provides  that  his  determination  is  subject  to

judicial scrutiny in the form of reference to the District Judge and

appeal to the High Court etc.  In order to ensure that the land

owners are given proper compensation, the Act provides for ‘fair

compensation’.   Once such a fair  compensation is  determined

judicially,  all  land  owners  whose  land  was  taken  away by the

same Notification should  become the beneficiary thereof.   Not

only it is an aspect of good governance, failing to do so would

also amount to discrimination by giving different treatment to the

persons though identically situated.  On technical grounds, like

the one adopted by the High Court in the impugned judgment,

this fair treatment cannot be denied to them.   

8) No doubt the judicial system that prevails is based on adversarial

form of adjudication.  At the same time, recognising the demerits

and limitations of adversarial litigation, elements of social context

adjudication  are  brought  into  the  decision  making  process,

particularly,  when  it  comes  to  administering  justice  to  the

marginalised section of the society.

9) History  demonstrates  that  various  forms  of  conflict  resolution

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have been institutionalized from time to time. Presently, in almost

all civil societies, disputes are resolved through courts, though the

judicial  system  may  be  different  in  different  jurisdictions.

Traditionally, our justice delivery system is adversarial in nature.

Of late, capabilities and method of this adversarial justice system

are questioned and a feeling of disillusionment and frustration is

witnessed among the people.  After  all,  what  is  the purpose of

having a judicial mechanism – it is to advance justice.  Warren

Burger once said:

“The obligation of the legal profession is… to serve as healers of human conflict…(we) should provide mechanisms  that  can  produce  an  acceptable result  in  shortest  possible  time,  with  the  least possible expense and with a minimum of stress on the participants.  That is what justice is all about.”

 10) Prof. (Dr.) N.R. Madhava Menon explains the meaning and

contour of social justice adjudication as the application of equality

jurisprudence evolved by the Parliament and the Supreme Court

in  myriad  situations  presented  before  courts  where  unequal

parties are pitted in adversarial proceedings and where courts are

called  upon  to  dispense  equal  justice.  Apart  from  the

socio-economic  inequalities  accentuating  the  disabilities  of  the

poor in an unequal fight, the adversarial process itself operates to

the disadvantage of the weaker party.  In such a situation, the

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Court has to be not only sensitive to the inequalities of parties

involved but  also positively  inclined  to  the  weaker  party  if  the

imbalance  were  not  to  result  in  miscarriage  of  justice.   The

Courts,  in  such  situations,  generally  invoke  the  principle  of

fairness and equality which are essential for dispensing justice.

Purposive interpretation is given to subserve the ends of justice

particularly  when the  cases  of  vulnerable  groups  are  decided.

The Court has to keep in mind the ‘problem solving approach’ by

adopting therapeutic approaches to the maximum extent the law

permits  rather  than ‘just  deciding’  cases,  thereby bridging the

gap between law and life, between law and justice.  The notion of

access to justice is to be taken in a broader sense.  The objective

is to render justice to the needy and that means fair solutions to

the conflict thereby providing real access to ‘justice’.

11) Justice  is  a  core  value  of  any judicial  system.   It  is  the

ultimate aim in the decision making process.  In post-traditional

liberal democratic theories of justice, the background assumption

is that  all  humans have equal value and should,  therefore,  be

treated as equal, as well as by equal laws.  This can be described

as ‘Reflective Equilibrium’.  The method of Reflective Equilibrium

was first  introduced by  Nelson Goodman in  ‘Fact,  Fiction and

Forecast’ (1955).  However, it is John Rawls who elaborated this

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method of  Reflective Equilibrium  by introducing the concept  of

‘Justice  as  Fairness’.  While  on  the  one  hand,  we  have  the

doctrine of ‘justice as fairness’,  as propounded by  John Rawls

and elaborated  by various jurists thereafter  in the field of law

and political philosophy, we also have the notion of  ‘Distributive

Justice’ propounded by Hume which aims at achieving a society

producing  maximum  happiness  or  net  satisfaction.  When  we

combine Rawls’s notion of ‘Justice as Fairness’ with the notions

of ‘Distributive Justice’,  to which Noble Laureate Prof.  Amartya

Sen  has  also  subscribed,  we  get  jurisprudential  basis  for

achieving just results for doing justice to the weaker section of the

society.

12) From the human rights perspective,  persons belonging to

the weaker sections are disadvantaged people who are unable to

acquire and use their rights because of poverty, social or other

constraints.  They are  not  in  a  position  to  approach  the  courts

even  when  their  rights  are  violated;  they  are  victimized  or

deprived  of  their  legitimate  due.  Here  lies  the  importance  of

access  to  justice  for  socially  and  economically  disadvantaged

people. When such people are denied the basic right of survival

and  access  to  justice,  it  further  aggravates  their  poverty.

Therefore, even in order to eliminate poverty, access to justice to

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the  poor  sections  of  the  society  becomes  imperative.   In  the

instant case, it is the poverty which compelled the appellants to

restrict the claim to Rs.115/- per sq. yard, as they were not in a

position to pay the court fee on a higher amount.   

13) It is the aforesaid weighty consideration which justify award

of  compensation  to  the  appellants  at  the  rate  of  Rs.297/-  per

square yards. Though, the aforesaid reasons are enough to allow

the appeals, in the present case, there is yet another additional

circumstance which justifies this outcome.

14) This  Court  in  Civil  Appeal  No.  1506-1517  of  2016  titled

Pardeep Kumar etc. etc. v. NOIDA which pertains to subsequent

acquisition proceeding in the same village Makanpur, but falling

under  NOIDA, had on 16th February, 2016 set  aside the order

passed  by  the  High  Court  of  Judicature  at  Allahabad  and

remanded the matter back to the High Court for reconsideration in

view of the judgments passed by the coordinate benches of the

same High Court in Kashi Ram’s case as well  as other cases.

The High Court,  after  the remand vide its  judgment dated 11th

April, 2016 in First Appeal No. 522 of 2009 titled, Pardeep Kumar

and Others vs. State of U.P. & Anr. awarded the same enhanced

compensation at the rate of Rs. 297/- per sq. Yard even in the

same  case  also.   The  High  Court  while  awarding  the

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compensation at the same rate held:

“27.   Therefore, one of the questions which needs to be examined by us is, can the appellants be denied the same rate of compensation only because the filed by them before the reference court did not disclose the rate which they seek now in terms of the judgment of the High Court in the case of Ghaziabad Development Authority (supra). Kanshi Ram case.

xxx xxx xxx

29.  It is settled law that the compensation under the  Act,  1894  had  to  be  fair  and  just.   Fairness requires  that  all  those  similarly  situated  are  treated similarly.   Technicalities  qua  rate  as  per  exemplars filed  by  poor  farmers,  who  are  illiterate,  has  to  be given only such importance as may not  defeat  their right  of  fair  and  just  compensation  qua  compulsory acquisition of land holdings.

30.   The determination  of  acquisition  at  the  rate  of Rs.297/-  per  square yard  in the case of  Ghaziabad Development Authority (supra)  Kashi Ram  case has therefore, to be taken as the fair rate determined for the land situated in the village Makanpur with regard to the notification issued on 12th September, 1986 as well as under Notification dated 15th March, 1988.”

15) The High Court, in the process, also took aid of Section 28

of the Act.  Thus, even those villagers whose land was acquired

subsequently, are given compensation at the rate of Rs.297/- per

square yards.  Depriving this rate to the appellants herein would

be nothing but travesty of justice.   

16) Simply because the appellants had paid court  fee on the

claim at the rate of Rs.115/- square yards could not be the reason

to deny the compensation at a higher rate.  This could be taken

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care of by directing the appellants to pay the difference in court

fee after calculating the same at the rate of Rs.297/- per square

yards.

17) In  fine,  the judgment  of  the High Court  is  set  aside and

these  appeals  are  allowed  holding  that  appellants  are  also

entitled to compensation at the rate of Rs.297/- per square yards.

The  difference  in  compensation  along  with  other  statutory

benefits  under  the  Act  shall  be  calculated  and  paid  to  the

appellants within a period of three months from today.  It is also

directed that the appellants shall make good in deficiency of court

fee before the High Court.  Appellants shall also be entitled to

costs of these appeals.  

.............................................J. (A.K. SIKRI)

.............................................J. (ASHOK BHUSHAN)

NEW DELHI; SEPTEMBER 11, 2017.

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ITEM NO.1502               COURT NO.5               SECTION III-A

              S U P R E M E  C O U R T  O F  I N D I A                        RECORD OF PROCEEDINGS Civil Appeal  No(s).  10429-10430/2017 NARENDRA  & ORS.                                Appellant(s)                                 VERSUS THE STATE OF UTTAR PRADESH & ORS.               Respondent(s)

Date : 11-09-2017 This matter was called on for pronouncement of judgment today.

For Appellant(s) Mr. Rohit Kumar Singh, AOR                     For Respondent(s) Mr. Rakesh Uttamchandra Upadhyay, AOR                           UPON hearing the counsel the Court made the following                              O R D E R

Hon'ble  Mr.  Justice  A.K.  Sikri  pronounced  the   judgment  of  the  Bench  comprising  His  Lordship  and   Hon'ble Mr. Justice Ashok Bhushan.     

       Appeal is allowed in terms of signed Reportable  Judgment.

 Pending applications, if any, stand disposed of.

  (B.PARVATHI)                    (MALA KUMARI SHARMA) COURT MASTER                        COURT MASTER  

(Signed reportable judgment is placed on the file)   

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