REPORTABLE

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION

CIVIL APPEAL NO.     1458      OF 2012   (SPECIAL LEAVE PETITION (C) NO. 5921 OF 2007)

NAND KUMAR VERMA             ... APPELLANT

VERSUS

STATE OF JHARKHAND & ORS.    ...RESPONDENTS  

O R D E R

1. Leave granted.

2. This appeal is directed against the judgment and order passed by the  

High Court  of  Jharkhand at  Ranchi  in  Writ  Petition  No.2856 of  

2002 and Writ Petition No.1620 of 2003 dated 11.07.2006.  By the  

impugned judgment and order,  the  High Court  has sustained  the  

order of reversion and the order of compulsory retirement passed  

against the appellant.

3. At the outset, we intend to observe that the Judicial Officers are part  

and parcel of this institution.  They should be respected and their  

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career  should  be  carefully  protected.  But  in  the  present  case,  it  

appears  to us,  after  going through the records  that  the  appellant,  

who was serving as a Judicial Officer, has been treated with scant  

respect by the High Court.  Be that as it may.

4. The appellant  was  initially  appointed  as  Munsif  (now known as  

Civil  Judge,  Junior  Division)  in  the  Bihar  Subordinate  Judicial  

Service in the year 1975 and his services were confirmed as Munsif  

in the year 1980. Subsequently, in the year 1986, he was promoted  

to  the  rank  of  Sub-Judge  (Civil  Judge,  Senior  Division)  and  

confirmed on the same rank w.e.f. 19.01.1988.  In the year 1987, the  

appellant  was  made  Sub-Judge-cum-Addl.  Chief  Judicial  

Magistrate. Thereafter, in November 1989, he was posted as Chief  

Judicial Magistrate by the Patna High Court vide Notification dated  

5.11.1989. While he was working as a Chief Judicial Magistrate at  

Gopalganj, an inspection was made by the portfolio Judge and on  

noticing  certain  omissions  and  commissions  in  granting  bail  in  

certain cases by the appellant, certain adverse remarks were made  

against him in the note made on 09.03.1994.  Further, the appellant  

had  also  passed  an  Order  dated  10.2.1994  granting  bail  to  one  

person  accused  of  offences  punishable  under  Section  302 of  the  

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I.P.C.  in  Mohammadpur  Police  Station  case  no.  90/93.  This  was  

taken as an exception by the learned District Judge and also by the  

High  Court  while  deciding  the  Criminal  Miscellaneous  Petition  

No.11327/1994.  The  High  Court  of  Patna  vide  Order  dated  

12.09.1994 in  Cr.  Misc.  No.  11327 of  1994,  whilst  commenting  

adversely against the appellant, had observed that the appellant had  

granted  bail  in  the  said  matter  on  extraneous  consideration  and  

further directed the matter to be placed before the Hon’ble Chief  

Justice of the High Court for taking necessary action.

5. In view of the abovementioned adverse comments passed against  

the appellant, he was directed to offer his explanation if any, by the  

High Court. In this regard, the appellant had offered his explanation,  

firstly,  on 7.5.1994 for  strictures  passed by the  Inspecting  Judge  

and; secondly on 21.12.1994 for adverse remarks made by the High  

Court dated 12.09.1994 in Cr. Misc. No. 11327 of 1994.

6. The  explanation  so  offered  on  7.5.1994  was  placed  before  the  

Standing Committee of the High Court on 17.11.1994. In regard to  

this explanation, the Standing Committee further sought explanation  

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from  the  appellant  for  using  objectionable  language  against  the  

Inspecting Judge and directed him to appear before it  in its  next  

meeting.  

7. Accordingly,  the  appellant  appeared  on 1.12.1994 and 2.12.1994  

and had promptly stated that he was apologetic for the impertinent  

language used in the explanation.  The Standing Committee,  after  

accepting the unconditional apology offered by the appellant, had  

condoned  his  lapses  and  had  transferred  him from Gopalganj  to  

Samastipur.

8. The case of the appellant was also considered for promotion from  

Sub-Judge to the Additional District Judge among 16 Sub-Judges by  

the Standing Committee in its meeting dated 3.2.1995 and the same  

came  to  be  deferred  because  of  the  pendency  of  the  inquiry  

proceedings against him.

9. In the second explanation offered by the appellant dated 21.12.1994  

he had, specifically, adverted to the allegations made for granting  

bail  indiscriminately  even  in  cases  of  heinous  crimes.  The  said  

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explanation was placed before the Standing Committee of the High  

Court  for  its  consideration  in  its  meeting  dated  5.1.1995  as  an  

Additional  Agenda which was duly accepted by the High Court.  

Thereafter,  the  same  was  communicated to the  appellant  by  the  

Registrar General of the High Court vide his order dated 1.2.1995.

10. After accepting the explanations offered, the High Court was still  

under the impression that the Judicial Officer should not be left in  

peace.  Therefore, it appears to us, that the Standing Committee of  

the  High  Court  in  its  meeting  dated  11.08.1995  directed  the  

initiation of the departmental proceedings against the appellant by  

framing the Articles  of Charges.  Accordingly, the appellant was  

served  Articles  of  Charges  dated  13.12.1995  containing  two  

charges and was also asked to show cause within one month. Both  

the  charges  relate  to  the  granting  of  bail  indiscriminately  in  

Mohammadpur  Police  Station  Case  No.  90/93,  by the  appellant  

while  he  was  discharging  his  functions  as  Chief  Judicial  

Magistrate. Pursuant to the Show Cause, the appellant had replied  

in detail on 16.01.1996 that his explanation on the said charges has  

already been accepted by the High Court. However, the High Court  

through the District Judge, Samastipur had served a notice dated  

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03.04.1996 to the appellant for initiating departmental proceedings  

against  him  on  the  basis  of  Articles  of  Charges.  

The appellant had submitted his reply statement dated 11.06.1996  

and 22.06.1996 wherein he had specifically contended that on the  

same set  of  charges,  he  had already  offered  his  explanation  on  

21.12.1994  and  the  same  was  placed  before  the  Standing  

Committee consisting of Hon'ble the Chief Justice and also other  

learned Judges of the High Court in its meeting dated 5.1.1995 and  

wherein they have accepted his explanation.  But the explanation  

so offered was not accepted by the Enquiry Officer, therefore, he  

proceeded with the Enquiry proceedings.

11. After recording the evidence of the witnesses and the documents  

produced by them, the Enquiry Officer had submitted a report to the  

disciplinary authority, namely, the High Court on 19.07.1996.In the  

Enquiry Report, the Enquiry Officer was of the view that both the  

charges  alleged  against  the  appellant  are  proved  beyond  all  

reasonable doubt.

12. Based  on  the  report  of  the  Enquiry  Officer,  the  disciplinary  

authority, viz. the High Court, took a decision to compulsorily retire  

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appellant from service in its administrative jurisdiction and acting  

on  the  recommendation  made  by  the  High  Court,  a  formal  

notification dated 20.04.1998 came to be issued by the personnel  

department, Government of Bihar, reverting the appellant from the  

rank of Sub-Judge (Civil Judge, Senior Division) to the lower post  

of Munsif (Civil Judge, Junior Division).

13. Aggrieved  by  the  said  order,  the  appellant  had  approached  this  

Court in Writ Petition (S) No.547 of 1999 under Article 32 of the  

Constitution of India.

14. This Court, while admitting the petition, had issued notices to the  

respondents therein.

15. At this stage, one more factor which requires to be noticed by us is  

that during pendency of the said Writ Petition, in the month of May,  

2001, due to bifurcation of the State  of Bihar,  the appellant  was  

allotted  to  the  State  of  Jharkhand  and  was  posted  as  Judicial  

Magistrate (First Class) at Koderma vide Order dated 21.04.2001.  

Accordingly,  the  appellant  had  joined  his  services  under  new  

regime on 5.5.2001. While working as Judicial Magistrate, on the  

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recommendation made by the Full Court of Jharkhand High Court,  

the  State  Government  has  issued  notification  dated  17.07.2001  

compulsorily  retiring  appellant  from service.  The  said  order  was  

served on the appellant on 26.7.2001. This decision was taken by  

the  High  Court  on  the  basis  of  appellant’s  Annual  Character  

Roll/Annual  Confidential  Report  (hereinafter  referred  to  as  “the  

A.C.R.”) pertaining to past service which includes the A.C.R.’s of  

the selective period of the service.  

16. Aggrieved by the  aforesaid  order  of  compulsory retirement  from  

service,  the appellant  had approached this  Court  in Writ  Petition  

No.5 of 2002. This Court, however, dismissed the W.P. No. 5 of  

2002 vide Order dated 18.01.2002 with liberty to avail alternative  

remedy under Article 226 of the Constitution of India. Accordingly,  

the appellant filed a Writ Petition no. 2856 of 2002 under Article  

226 before the Jharkhand High Court.

17. The respondents herein had brought to the notice of this Court in  

Writ Petition (C) No.547 of 1999 that the appellant had retired from  

service  and  therefore,  this  Court  transferred  the  pending  

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proceedings in W.P.(C) NO.547/1999 to the Jharkhand High Court  

for  its  consideration  and  decision.  On  transfer,  the  same  was  

registered as W.P. No. (S) 1620 of 2003 before the High Court.

18. By the impugned judgment, the High Court has rejected both the  

writ petitions filed by the appellant.  That is how the appellant is  

before us in this Civil Appeal.

19. Learned  counsel  for  the  appellant  submitted  that  the  order  of  

reversion,  whereby  the  appellant  was  reverted  from  the  post  of  

Chief  Judicial  Magistrate  to  that  of  Munsif  (Civil  Judge,  Junior  

Division) is smacked with arbitrariness and contrary to the norms of  

service  law  jurisprudence  and  therefore,  is  bad  in  law.  While  

elaborating his submission, the learned counsel would contend that  

the High Court, having accepted his explanation to the Show Cause  

Notice issued to explain the notings made by the Inspecting Judge  

in  Criminal  Miscellaneous  Petition  No.10327 of  1994,  could not  

have initiated departmental proceedings against the appellant.  This,  

the  learned  counsel  would  contend,  would  amount  to  double  

jeopardy.

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20. Per contra, learned counsel for the respondents would submit that  

the explanation was accepted by the Standing Committee only with  

regard to the impertinent language used by the appellant  and not  

with regard to the allegations of granting of bail/provisional bail to  

the accused persons even in heinous crimes.  Therefore, he submits  

that the High Court was justified in initiating departmental inquiry  

proceedings  against  the  appellant  for  the  charges  alleged  in  the  

charge memo.

21. Learned  counsel  for  the  appellant,  insofar  as  his  compulsory  

retirement  from  service  is  concerned,  submits  that  the  adverse  

remarks that were taken into consideration by the High Court while  

terminating the services of the appellant, were never communicated  

to  him and secondly,  he  would  submit  that  the  High Court  was  

selective  in  taking into consideration the  ACR’s of  the  appellant  

from the date of his entry into service till the date of his retirement.   

He further submits that the High Court, while recording the entries  

made in the ACR’s in the impugned judgment, has not made the  

correct reflection of the actual contents of the ACR’s which are in  

the records.  In support of that contention, the learned counsel has  

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invited our attention to the additional affidavit filed before the High  

Court as well in these proceedings.

22. In reply to  the  submissions  made by the learned counsel  for  the  

appellant, the learned counsel for the High Court submits that in the  

Writ  Petition,  filed  by  the  appellant,  he  had  not  specifically  

contended  that  the  adverse  remarks  which  were  entered  in  the  

ACR’s were not  communicated  to  him.  Even otherwise,  learned  

counsel  would  contend  that  the  entire  service  profile  of  the  

appellant while in service was not above board and therefore, the  

High Court was justified in recommending the case of the appellant  

to the State Government for compulsory retirement from service.   

23. The issues that would fall for our consideration and decision in this  

appeal are:  Whether the High Court was justified in passing the  

order dated 21.4.1998 in reverting the appellant from the post of  

Chief Judicial Magistrate to the rank of Munsif (Civil Judge, Junior  

Division); and Whether the High Court was justified in passing the  

order of compulsorily retiring the appellant from service in public  

interest.

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24. To answer the first issue, we may have to notice the observations  

made by the learned Inspecting Judge in Criminal Miscellaneous  

Petition No.11327 of 1994.  The same is extracted :-

“In the present case, as stated above, the grant of bail by the Chief  

Judicial  Magistrate  itself  was  against  the  statutory  provision  

contained in section 437 of the Code as the materials on the record  

clearly show that there was reasonable ground for believing that  

the petitioner has been guilty of an offence punishable with death  

or  imprisonment  for  life.  The  grant  of  bail  itself  was  not  

permissible in law and virtually the Chief Judicial Magistrate has  

surrendered his judicial discretion to some other consideration.  

25. In pursuance to certain directions issued in the aforesaid Criminal  

Miscellaneous  Petition,  the  High  Court  had  called  for  the  

explanation from the appellant.  Pursuant to the direction so issued,  

the appellant had offered his explanation.  The Standing Committee  

of the High Court had directed the appellant to appear before it.   

Before  the  Standing  Committee,  the  appellant  had  expressed  his  

unconditional apology and the same was accepted by the Standing  

Committee and the Standing Committee had observed in its noting  

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that the case has been closed against the appellant and the same was  

informed to the appellant also.

26. By yet another explanation, the appellant had justified his action in  

granting bail.  This explanation offered by him was also accepted by  

the High Court and the same was communicated to the appellant by  

the Registrar General of the High Court in which specific reference  

is  made  to  the  explanation  offered  by  the  appellant  in  his  reply  

dated 21.12.1994.

27. After accepting his explanation, the High Court was still of the view  

that  disciplinary  proceedings  requires  to  be  initiated  against  the  

appellant for his alleged omission and commission of granting bail  

indiscriminately even in  heinous  crimes.  The  Charge Memo was  

replied by the appellant and in that he had, specifically, contended  

that the Standing Committee of the High Court, after accepting the  

explanation, had informed him that his explanation is accepted and  

all the allegations made against him are closed.  This aspect of the  

matter, though noticed by the Inquiry Officer, he does not give any  

finding.  He, however, has observed that the charges alleged against  

the appellant are proved.  Based on this, the High Court has passed  

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the order of reversion whereby the appellant was reverted from the  

post of Chief Judicial Magistrate to that of Munsif and the same was  

notified  by  the  State  Government  also.  In  our  opinion,  having  

accepted the explanations and having communicated the same to the  

appellant,  the  High  Court  could  not  have  proceeded  to  pass  the  

order  of  initiating  departmental  proceedings  and  reverting  the  

appellant from the post of Chief Judicial Magistrate to the post of  

Munsif.  On General Principles, there can be only one enquiry in  

respect of a charge for a particular misconduct and that is also what  

the  rules  usually  provide.   If,  for  some  technical  or  other  good  

ground, procedural or otherwise, the first enquiry or punishment or  

exoneration is found bad in law, there is no principle that a second  

enquiry cannot be initiated.  Therefore, when a completed enquiry  

proceedings is set aside by a competent forum on a technical or on  

the ground of procedural infirmity, fresh proceedings on the same  

charges is  permissible.   In the present  case,  a  charge memo was  

issued and served on the appellant.  A reading of the charge memo  

does not contain any reference to the proceedings of the Standing  

Committee  at  all.   It  is  also not  found as  to  whether  the  earlier  

proceedings  has  been  revived  in  accordance  with  the  procedure  

prescribed.  In fact, after receipt of the charge memo, the appellant,  

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in  his  reply  statement,  had  brought  to  the  notice  of  the  enquiry  

officer that on the same set of charges, a notice had been issued  

earlier  and after  receipt  of  his  explanation  dated 21.12.1994,  the  

Standing Committee,  after  accepting his explanation had dropped  

the entire proceedings and the same had been communicated to him  

by  the  Registrar  General  of  the  High  Court  by  his  letter  dated  

02.02.1995.  In spite of his explanation in the reply statement filed,  

the enquiry officer has proceeded with the enquiry proceedings and  

after completion of the same, has submitted his report which has  

been  accepted  by  the  disciplinary  authority.   Therefore,  in  these  

circumstances,  there  is  no  justification  for  conducting  a  second  

enquiry  on  the  very  charges,  which  have  been  dropped  earlier.  

Even through the principles of double jeopardy is not applicable, the  

law  permits  only  disciplinary  proceedings  and  not  harassment.  

Allowing such practice is not in the interest of public service.  In the  

circumstance, we cannot sustain the impugned order reverting the  

appellant to the lower post.   

28. We now proceed to consider the second order passed by the High  

Court  for  recommending  the  case  of  the  appellant  to  the  State  

Government  to  accept  and  issue  appropriate  notification  to  

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compulsorily retire the appellant from Judicial Service.  It is now  

well settled that the object of compulsory retirement from service is  

to weed out the dead wood in order to maintain a high standard of  

efficiency and honesty and to keep the judicial service unpolluted.  

Keeping this object in view, the contention of the appellant has to  

be  appreciated  on  the  basis  of  the  settled  law on  the  subject  of  

Compulsory  retirement.  In  Baikuntha Nath Das v.  Chief  District   

Medical Officer, (1992) 2 SCC 299, three Judge Bench of this Court  

has laid  down the principles  regarding the Order  of  Compulsory  

retirement in public interest :  

34. The following principles emerge from  the above discussion:

(i) An order of compulsory retirement  is not a punishment. It implies no stigma  nor any suggestion of misbehaviour.

(ii)The order has to be passed by the  government on forming the opinion that it  is  in  the  public  interest  to  retire  a  government servant compulsorily. The order  is passed on the subjective satisfaction  of the government.

(iii) Principles of natural justice  have no place in the context of an order  of  compulsory  retirement.  This  does  not  mean  that  judicial  scrutiny  is  excluded  altogether.  While the High Court or this  Court would not examine the matter as an  appellate  court,  they  may  interfere  if  they  are  satisfied  that  the  order  is  passed  (  a  )  mala  fide  or  (  b  )  that  it  is    

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based  on  no  evidence  or  (  c  )  that  it  is    arbitrary  —  in  the  sense  that  no  reasonable person would form the requisite  opinion on the given material; in short,  if it is found to be a perverse order.

(iv)The  government  (or  the  Review  Committee, as the case may be) shall have  to consider the entire record of service  before taking a decision in the matter —  of  course  attaching  more  importance  to  record of and performance during the later  years.  The  record  to  be  so  considered  would naturally include the entries in the  confidential records/character rolls, both  favourable  and  adverse.  If  a  government  servant  is  promoted  to  a  higher  post  notwithstanding the adverse remarks, such  remarks lose their sting, more so, if the  promotion is based upon merit (selection)  and not upon seniority.

(v) An order of compulsory retirement  is  not  liable  to  be  quashed  by  a  Court  merely on the showing that while passing  it  uncommunicated  adverse  remarks  were  also  taken  into  consideration.  That  circumstance by itself cannot be a basis  for interference. Interference  is  permissible  only  on  the  grounds  mentioned  in  (iii)  above.  This  aspect has been discussed in paras 30 to  32 above.

29. In Madan Mohan Choudhary v. State of Bihar, (1999) 3 SCC 396,  

this Court was considering the order of compulsory retirement of  

the appellant, who was a Member of the Superior Judicial Service in  

the State of Bihar. On a writ petition filed by the appellant in the  

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High Court, challenging his order of compulsory retirement by the  

Full Court of the High Court, the High Court on the judicial side  

refused to interfere and dismissed the petition. The appellant came  

in appeal before this Court. This Court found that while on various  

earlier occasions remarks were given by the High Court but there  

were no entries in the character roll of the appellant for the years  

1991-92,  1992-93 and 1993-94.  The entries  for  these  years  were  

recorded  at  one  time  simultaneously  and  the  appellant  was  

categorized as ‘C’ Grade officer. The date on which these entries  

were made was not indicated either in the original record or in the  

counter-affidavit filed by the respondent. These were communicated  

to  the  appellant  on 29-11-1996 and were  considered  by the  Full  

Court on 30-11-1996. It was clear that these entries were recorded  

at a stage when the Standing Committee had already made up its  

mind  to  compulsorily  retire  the  appellant  from service  as  it  had  

directed the office on 6-11-1996 to put up a note for compulsory  

retirement of the appellant. This Court held that it was a case where  

there was no material on the basis of which an opinion could have  

been reasonably formed that it  would be in the public interest  to  

retire the appellant from service prematurely. This Court was of the  

opinion  that  the  entries  recorded  “at  one  go”  for  three  years,  

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namely,  1991-92,  1992-93  and  1993-94  could  hardly  have  been  

taken  into  consideration.  The  Court  then  referred  to  its  earlier  

decision in Registrar, High Court of Madras v. R. Rajiah, (1988) 3  

SCC  211, where  this  Court  said  that  the  High  Court  in  its  

administrative jurisdiction has the power to recommend compulsory  

retirement of the Member of the judicial service in accordance with  

the rules framed in that regard but it cannot act arbitrarily and there  

has to be material to come to a decision to compulsorily retire the  

officer. In  that  case  it  was  also  pointed  out  that  the  High Court  

while exercising its power of control over the subordinate judiciary  

is  under  a  constitutional  obligation  to  guide  and  protect  judicial  

officers  from  being  harassed  or  annoyed  by  trifling  complaints  

relating to judicial orders so that the officers may discharge their  

duties  honestly  and  independently;  unconcerned  by  the  ill-

conceived or motivated complaints made by unscrupulous lawyers  

and litigants.

30. We are  conscious  of  the  fact  that  there  is  very limited scope of  

judicial  review of an order of premature retirement  from service.  

As observed by this Court in Rajiah’s case (supra) that when the  

High Court takes the view that an order of compulsory retirement  

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should  be  made  against  a  member  of  the  Judicial  Service,  the  

adequacy  or  sufficiency  of  such  materials  cannot  be  questioned,  

unless  the  materials  are  absolutely  irrelevant  to  the  purpose  of  

compulsory  retirement.   We  also  add  that  when  an  order  of  

compulsory retirement is challenged in a court of law, the Court has  

the right to examine whether some ground or material germane to  

the issue exists or not. Although, the Court is not interested in the  

sufficiency  of  the  material  upon  which  the  order  of  compulsory  

retirement rests.   

31. This Court in  High Court of Punjab & Haryana v. Ishwar Chand  

Jain, (1999) 4 SCC 579, has discussed the purpose, importance and  

effect  of  the  remarks  made  during  inspection  which  ultimately  

become the part of the ACR of the concerned Judicial officer. This  

Court has observed thus:  

32. Since late this Court is watching  the spectre of either judicial officers  or the High Courts coming to this Court  when  there  is  an  order  prematurely  retiring  a  judicial  officer.  Under  Article 235 of the Constitution the High  Court  exercises  complete  control  over  subordinate  courts  which  include  District  Courts.  Inspection  of  the  subordinate courts is one of the most  

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important functions which the High Court  performs  for  control  over  the  subordinate courts. The object of such  inspection  is  for  the  purpose  of  assessment of the work performed by the  Subordinate  Judge,  his  capability,  integrity  and  competency.  Since  Judges  are human beings and also prone to all  the  human  failings  inspection  provides  an opportunity for pointing out mistakes  so that they are avoided in future and  deficiencies, if any, in the working of  the  subordinate  court,  remedied.  Inspection should act as a catalyst in  inspiring Subordinate Judges to give the  best results. They should feel a sense  of achievement. They need encouragement.  They work under great stress and man the  courts  while  working  under  great  discomfort and hardship. A satisfactory  judicial system depends largely on the  satisfactory  functioning  of  courts  at  the grass-roots level. Remarks recorded  by  the  Inspecting  Judge  are  normally  endorsed by the Full Court and become  part of the annual confidential reports  and are foundations on which the career  of a judicial officer is made or marred.  Inspection  of  a  subordinate  court  is  thus of vital importance. It has to be  both effective and productive. It can be  so only if it is well regulated and is  workman-like. Inspection of subordinate  courts is not a one-day or an hour or a  few minutes' affair. It has to go on all  the year round by monitoring the work of  the  court  by  the  Inspecting  Judge.  A  casual  inspection  can  hardly  be  beneficial to a judicial system. It does  more harm than good.  

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32. It is also well settled that the formation of opinion for compulsory  

retirement is based on the subjective satisfaction of the concerned  

authority but such satisfaction must be based on a valid material. It  

is permissible for the Courts to ascertain whether a valid material  

exists  or  otherwise,  on  which  the  subjective  satisfaction  of  the  

administrative authority is based. In the present matter, what we see  

is  that  the  High  Court,  while  holding  that  the  track  record  and  

service record of the appellant was unsatisfactory, has selectively  

taken into consideration the service record for certain years only  

while making extracts of those contents of the ACR's. There appears  

to be some discrepancy.  We say so for the reason that the appellant  

has produced the copies of the ACR’s which were obtained by him  

from the High Court under the Right to Information Act, 2005 and a  

comparison of  these two would positively  indicate  that  the  High  

Court  has not faithfully extracted the contents of the ACRs. The  

High Court has taken the decision on the basis of selective service  

record  which  includes  the  summarized  ACR’s,  as  quoted  in  the  

impugned judgment, for the selected years. The ACR for the initial  

years:  1975-76  and  1976-77  remarks  him  as  capable  of  

improvement  against  quality  of  work,  the  ACR’s  for  the  years:  

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1982-83, 1983-84 points that his work is unsatisfactory, the ACR’s  

for  the  year:  1984-85,  1987-88  remark his  work  performance  as  

unsatisfactory with bad reputation and quarrelsome attitude, and the  

ACR for the later years: 1993-94 & 1994-95 refers to some private  

complaints and remark that his powers were divested by the High  

Court  and  the  ACR’s  for  the  recent  years:  1997-98  &  1998-99  

points that no defect in judicial work but disposal of cases is poor.  

Whereas,  the  appellant  furnished  certain  Service  records  which  

includes: the ACR recorded by inspecting Judge in the year 1985  

which evaluate the appellant as ‘B’-Satisfactory against  the entry  

“Net result”, further the ACR prepared by the District and Sessions  

Judge, Samastipur for the year 1997-98 assessed him as an officer  

of average merit, maintaining good relationship with bar, staffs and  

colleagues but poor disposal, and the ACR prepared by the District  

and Sessions Judge, Muzaffarpur for the year 1998-99 assessed him  

as  a  good officer  but  poor  disposal. However,  his  poor  disposal  

during this period is justified up to certain extent in the background  

of his involvement in the continuous and unnecessary disciplinary  

proceedings  which was based on the  charges of  granting of  bail  

indiscriminately, even after, the fact that he had been exonerated of  

these  charges  long back  in  the  year  1995  by  the  High Court  at  

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Patna.  The  material  on  which  the  decision  of  the  Compulsory  

retirement  was  based,  as  extracted  by  the  High  Court  in  the  

impugned judgment, and material furnished by the appellant would  

reflect  that  totality  of  relevant  materials  were  not  considered  or  

completely  ignored  by  the  High  Court.  This  leads  to  only  one  

conclusion that the subjective satisfaction of the High Court was not  

based  on  the  sufficient  or  relevant  material.  In  this  view of  the  

matter, we cannot say that the service record of the appellant was  

unsatisfactory  which  would  warrant  premature  retirement  from  

service.  Therefore, there was no justification to retire the appellant  

compulsorily  from service. In  Swami  Saran  Saksena  v.  State  of   

U.P.,  (1980)  1  SCC  12,  this  Court  has  quashed  the  order  of  

Compulsory  retirement  of  the  appellant,  therein,  in  the  public  

interest,  which  was  found  to  be  in  sharp  contradiction  with  his  

recent service performance and record. This Court observed:  

3.  Ordinarily,  the  Court  does  not  interfere  with  the  judgment  of  the  relevant authority on the point whether it  is in the public interest to compulsorily  retire a government servant. And we have  been  even  more  reluctant  to  reach  the  conclusion  we  have,  when  the  impugned  order of compulsory retirement was made on  the  recommendation  of  the  High  Court  itself. But on the material before us we  

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are  unable  to  reconcile  the  apparent  contradiction  that  although  for  the  purpose of crossing the second efficiency  bar the appellant was considered to have  worked  with  distinct  ability  and  with  integrity  beyond  question,  yet  within  a  few  months  thereafter  he  was  found  so  unfit as to deserve compulsory retirement.  The  entries  in  between  in  the  records  pertaining  to  the  appellant  need  to  be  examined  and  appraised  in  that  context.  There is no evidence to show that suddenly  there  was  such  deterioration  in  the  quality  of  the  appellant's  work  or  integrity  that  he  deserved  to  be  compulsorily  retired.  For  all  these  reasons, we are of opinion that the order  of  compulsory  retirement  should  be  quashed. The appellant will be deemed to  have continued in service on the date of  the impugned order.

33. Moreover,  the District and Sessions Judge have the opportunity to  

watch  the  functioning  of  the  appellant  from close  quarters,  who  

have  reported  favourably  regarding  the  appellant’s  overall  

performance  except  about  his  disposal,  in  the  appellant’s  recent  

ACR for the year 1997-98 and 1998-99. In view of this, the greater  

importance is to be given to the opinion or remarks made by the  

immediate superior officer as to the functioning of the concerned  

judicial officer for the purpose of his compulsory retirement. The  

immediate superior is better placed to observe, analyse, scrutinize  

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from close quarters and then, to comment upon his working, overall  

efficiency, and reputation. In Nawal Singh v. State of U.P., (2003) 8  

SCC 117, this Court has observed thus:

12. … In the present-day system, reliance is required to be  placed  on  the  opinion  of  the  higher  officer  who  had  the  opportunity  to  watch  the  performance  of  the  officer   concerned from close quarters and formation of his opinion   with regard to the overall reputation enjoyed by the officer   concerned would be the basis.

34. In view of the above discussion, we are of the opinion that the High  

Court was not justified in sustaining the orders passed by the Full  

Court of the same High Court.  Accordingly, we allow this appeal,  

set aside the orders passed by the High Court. Since the appellant  

has retired from service on attaining the age of superannuation, he is  

entitled to all the monetary benefits from the date of his notional  

posting  as  C.J.M.  till  his  notional  retirement  from  service  on  

attaining the age of superannuation, as expeditiously as possible, at  

any rate, within four months from the date of receipt of a copy of  

this order.

Ordered accordingly.  

......................................J.       (H.L. DATTU)   

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......................................J.      (ANIL R. DAVE)

NEW DELHI; FEBRUARY 01, 2012  

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