NON­REPORTABLE

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION

CRIMINAL APPEAL    NO. 1620 OF 2018 (arising out of S.L.P.(Crl.) No.3383 of 2018)

NAMAN SINGH ALIAS NAMAN PRATAP SINGH AND ANOTHER ....APPELLANT(S)

VERSUS

STATE OF UTTAR PRADESH  AND OTHERS       ...RESPONDENT(S)

O R D E R

NAVIN SINHA, J.

Leave granted.

2. The  appellants  are  aggrieved  by the  denial to  quash the

criminal prosecution against them under Sections 420, 406, 467,

468, 471, 504, 506, 34 IPC in F.I.R. No.22/2018 dated

31.01.2018.

3. Learned counsel for the appellants submits that no

objection certificate has been obtained from the Chatrapati

Sahuji Maharaj University, Kanpur for establishment of the

three­year Law course.   Affiliation has also been granted by the

1

University.   The appellants have also deposited a sum of

Rs.3,50,000/­ with the Bar Council of India and await

permission from it for starting the law course.   The question of

any fraudulent misrepresentation by the appellants, persuading

students to take admission in an unauthorised institution simply

does not arise.   Several students have taken admission in full

awareness of the existent facts  with no grievances and have

sworn affidavits to that effect.

4. Learned counsel for the respondents submits that the

appellants  by  misrepresentation  and cheating  have  persuaded

respondent no.4 and others to take admission in an

unrecognised institution. There are several students who are

aggrieved.   In  any  event, such  enquiries  cannot  be  held in  a

quashing application by examining the defence of the appellants.

The impugned order merits no interference.

5. We have considered the submissions on behalf of the parties

and  are satisfied that the  application  deserves to  be allowed,

though on different grounds.   Respondent no.4 lodged a

complaint with the Sub­Divisional Magistrate, Unnao on

31.01.2018 that she had been duped into taking admission in an

2

unrecognised institution.   The Sub­Divisional  Magistrate, the

very same day, without furthermore, directed the police to

register  a first information report.  The  only  question for  our

consideration is whether the Sub­Divisional Magistrate was

competent to do so, and whether such an F.I.R. can be said to

have  been registered  in accordance with  the Code of  Criminal

Procedure,1973 (hereinafter referred to as ‘the Code’).  

6. Section 154 of the Code provides for registration of a first

information report at the instance of an informant, reduced into

writing and signed by the person giving it.   Section 154(3)

stipulates that in the event of a refusal on part of  an officer in

charge of a police station to record such information, it may be

sent in writing and by post to the Superintendent of Police who

will direct investigation into the same.

7.  Section 190 of the Code provides for taking of cognizance by

a  Magistrate either on a complaint or upon a police report.

Similarly, Section 156(3) provides that any Magistrate empowered

under Section 190 may order such an investigation, and which

also includes the power to direct the lodgement of an F.I.R.  The

Code in Section 200 provides for lodging of a complaint before the

3

Magistrate, who after examination of the complainant and

witnesses, if any, can take cognizance.

8. It is therefore apparent that in the scheme of the Code, an

Executive Magistrate has no role to play in directing the police to

register an F.I.R. on basis of a private complaint lodged before

him. If a complaint is lodged  before the  Executive  Magistrate

regarding an issue over which he has administrative jurisdiction,

and the Magistrate proceeds to hold an administrative inquiry, it

may be possible for him to lodge an F.I.R. himself in the matter.

In such a case, entirely different considerations would arise.   A

reading of the F.I.R.  reveals  that  the police  has registered the

F.I.R on directions of the Sub­Divisional Magistrate which was

clearly impermissible in the law.   The Sub­Divisional Magistrate

does not exercise powers under Section 156(3) of the Code. The

very institution of the F.I.R. in the manner done is contrary to the

law and without jurisdiction.

9. Nothing prevented respondent no.4 from lodging an F.I.R.

herself before the police under Section 154 of the Code or

proceeding under Section 154(3) if circumstances so warranted.

Alternately the respondent could have  moved the  Magistrate

4

concerned under Section 156(3) of the Code in the event of the

refusal of  the police to act.   Remedy was also available to the

respondent by filing a complaint under Section 200 of the Code

before the jurisdictional Magistrate.

10. In view of the scheme of the Code as discussed, we have

purposely refrained from going into the merits of the case so as

not to prejudice  either parties and  also keeping in  mind the

nature of the jurisdiction under Section 482 of the Code.   Any

application by respondent no.4 hitherto under the Code will

therefore have to be considered by the appropriate authority or

forum in accordance with law.   For the reasons discussed, the

impugned order is held to be unsustainable and is set aside.  The

First  Information Report therefore also stands quashed for the

reasons discussed, but with liberty as aforesaid.

11. The appeal is allowed.

…………...................J. [R.F. NARIMAN]

…………...................J. [NAVIN SINHA]

NEW DELHI DECEMBER 13, 2018

5