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NON-REPORTABLE  

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA

CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION

CRIMINAL APPEAL NO.1424 OF 2003

Nallabothu Ramulu @  Seetharamaiah & Ors. …

Appellants

Vs.

State of Andhra Pradesh …        Respondents

WITH CRIMINAL APPEAL NO.15 OF 2004

Chalamala Veeraiah & Anr. …         Appellants

Vs.

State of Andhra Pradesh …        Respondents

J U D G M E N T

(SMT.) RANJANA PRAKASH DESAI, J.

1. Both these appeals are directed against judgment and  

order dated 24/07/2003 passed by the High Court of Andhra

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Pradesh in Criminal Appeal No.921 of 2000 and, hence, they  

are being disposed of by this common judgment.  

2. The  appellants  were  charged  and  tried  by  the  IInd  

Additional Sessions Judge, Guntur in Sessions Case No.967 of  

1994  inter alia for offences under Sections 147, 148, 324,  

307, 302 read with Section 149 of the IPC.  Learned Sessions  

Judge  by  judgment  dated  11/2/2000  acquitted  all  the  

accused.   The State of  Andhra Pradesh carried an appeal  

from the said order to the High Court of Andhra Pradesh.  By  

the  impugned judgment  and order  dated  24/07/2003,  the  

High Court set aside the order of acquittal and convicted the  

appellants  in  Criminal  Appeal  No.1424  of  2003  viz.  A1-

Nallabothu,  A3-Rayidi  Brahmaiah,  A4-Rayidi  Purnaiah,  A11-

Nallabothu  Sreenivasa  Rao,  A14-Rayidi  Kotiah,  A15-Rayidi  

Veera  Mallaiah,  A16-Mupalla  Ramaiah,  A21-Rayidi  Lingiah,  

A23-Rayidi  Sreenivasarao,  A24-Duggineni  Peraiah,  A25-

Mannem Hanumantha  Rao,  A27-Rayidi  Ramarao  and  A29-

Rayidi Venkateswarlu, under Section 302 of the Indian Penal  

Code  (“the  IPC”)  and  sentenced  each  one  of  them  to  

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undergo rigorous imprisonment for life.  In addition, Accused  

No.3 and Accused No.4 were convicted under Section 324 of  

the IPC and sentenced to undergo rigorous imprisonment for  

three  years  each.   Accused  No.25  was  convicted  under  

Section 324 of the IPC and also under Section 324 read with  

Section 149 of the IPC and sentenced to undergo rigorous  

imprisonment for one year on each count.  The appellants in  

Criminal Appeal No.15 of 2004 viz. A38-Chalamala Veeraiah  

and  A39-Chalamala  Subbarao  were,  however,  convicted  

under  Section  324  read  with  Section  149  of  the  IPC  and  

sentenced  to  suffer  rigorous  imprisonment  for  one  year  

each.   The  appellants  in  both  the  appeals  were  also  

convicted under  Section 148 of  the IPC and sentenced to  

undergo  rigorous  imprisonment  for  one  year  each.  The  

substantive  sentences  were  ordered  to  run  concurrently.  

Being  aggrieved  by  their  conviction  and  sentence,  the  

appellants  have approached this  Court.    For  the sake of  

convenience,  we  shall  refer  to  the  accused  and  the  

prosecution witnesses as per the numbers assigned to them  

by the trial court.   

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3. Tondepi  village  is  a  faction-ridden  village  within  the  

limits of Muppala Police Station.  There were two groups in  

the  village,  against  whom,  cases  and  counter-cases  were  

pending.   There  were  land  disputes  between  A28-Rayidi  

Anjaiah and his father Rayidi Venkatappaiah.  One group was  

supporting  A28-Rayidi  Anjaiah  and  the  other  group  was  

supporting his father.   

4. On 16/3/1993, at about 1.30 p.m., some of the accused  

abducted  PW-19  V.  Seshagiri  Rao  and  tried  to  kill  him.  

However, due to the timely intervention of the police, he was  

saved  and  admitted  in  the  Government  Hospital,  

Settenapalli.  In this connection, the police registered a case  

being  Crime  No.5  of  1993  for  offences  punishable  under  

Sections 147, 148, 323, 324, 364 and 307 read with Section  

149 of the IPC against some of the accused in this case.  As  

they  were  unsuccessful  in  their  attempt  to  kill  PW-19  V.  

Seshagiri  Rao,  they  armed  with  iron  rods,  axes,  spears,  

sticks  and  bombs  waylaid  in  Dammalapadu  Donka  and  

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formed  themselves  into  an  unlawful  assembly  with  a  

common  object  of  killing  the  persons  belonging  to  

Nallabothu  Venkaiah  group.   After  admitting  PW-19  V.  

Seshagiri  Rao,  in  the  Hospital  at  Sattenapally,  Challa  

Singaiah and Rachankonda Chanchiah and PW-1 to PW-10  

and some others were returning to their village in a tractor in  

the  night  intervening  16/3/1993  and  17/3/1993.   The  

accused attacked Singaiah and Chanchiah and PWs-1 to 16  

when  they  reached  Dammalapadu  Donka.   Bombs  were  

hurled.  Singaiah succumbed to the injuries at the spot.  PW-

1  to  PW-10  and  Chanchiah,  who  sustained  injuries,  were  

admitted  in  the  Government  Hospital,  Sattenapally.  

Chanchiah succumbed to the injuries on 17/3/1993 while he  

was undergoing treatment.  The hospital authorities sent an  

intimation to the Additional Munsiff Magistrate, Sattenapally.  

Pursuant  to  the  said  information,  the  learned  Magistrate  

went to the hospital and recorded the statement of PW-1 R.  

Venkata Rao, on the same day, in the presence of the Duty  

Medical Officer.  On receipt of the statement of PW-1, the  

Sub Inspector of Police, Sattenapally, registered a case being  

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Crime No.43 of 1993 for offences punishable under Sections  

147, 148, 324, 307 and 302 read with Section 149 of the IPC  

and Sections 3 and 5 of the Explosive Substances Act and  

transferred the case to Muppala Police Station, within whose  

jurisdiction the incident occurred.  On receipt of the copy of  

the  FIR,  Muppala  Police  re-registered  it  as  Crime  No.6  of  

1993 of  their  police  station.   PW-29,  the  Circle  Inspector,  

Muppala, conducted the investigation.  After completion of  

investigation, the accused came to be charged as aforesaid.  

At  the  trial,  the  prosecution  examined  as  many  as  31  

witnesses.  The accused denied the prosecution case.   As  

earlier stated, the trial court rejected the prosecution case,  

held that  the prosecution has not  proved its case beyond  

reasonable  doubt  and  acquitted  the  accused.   The  High  

Court  reversed  the  order  of  acquittal  and  convicted  the  

accused as aforesaid.  Hence, these appeals.  

5.  We have heard learned senior counsel appearing for  

the appellants.  Counsel submitted that the High Court erred  

in disturbing the acquittal  order passed by the trial  court.  

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Counsel submitted that the view taken by the trial court was  

a reasonably possible view.  It was not a perverse view.  The  

High Court ought not to have set aside the acquittal order  

just because it felt that some other view was also possible.  

Counsel submitted that the High Court has not indicated in  

the impugned judgment the reasons why it felt that the trial  

court’s view was not sustainable.   Counsel  submitted that  

the trial court has meticulously considered the evidence of  

every witness, marshaled the facts correctly and held that  

the prosecution has not proved its case beyond reasonable  

doubt.  It is, therefore, necessary to set aside the impugned  

order and restore the trial court’s order.  

6. Mr. A.T.M. Rangaramanujam, learned senior counsel for  

the State of Andhra Pradesh, on the other hand, supported  

the impugned judgment.  He submitted that the trial court  

gave  undue  importance  to  trivial  matters.   It  wrongly  

disbelieved  the  evidence  of  injured  eye-witnesses  on  

account of minor discrepancies.  The trial court’s judgment  

rested  on  conjectures  and  surmises.   It  was  a  perverse  

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judgment and, therefore, the High Court rightly set it aside.  

No interference is, therefore, necessary with the impugned  

order.  Counsel urged that the appeals be dismissed.  

7. The High Court reversed the order of acquittal passed  

by the trial court.  The question is whether the High Court  

justified in doing that.  To answer this question, it would be  

necessary  to refresh our  memory and have a look at  the  

principles laid down by this Court for guidance of the Court  

dealing  with  an  appeal  against  an  order  of  acquittal.   In  

Chandrappa   & Ors.  v.    State of Karnataka  1, this Court  

laid down the principles as under:

“42.  From  the  above  decisions,  in  our  considered view, the following general principles   regarding  powers  of  the  appellate  court  while   dealing  with  an  appeal  against  an  order  of   acquittal emerge:

(1) An appellate court has full power to review,   reappreciate  and  reconsider  the  evidence  upon   which the order of acquittal is founded.

(2) The Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 puts   no limitation, restriction or condition on exercise   

1 (2007) 4 SCC 415

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of  such  power  and  an  appellate  court  on  the   evidence before it may reach its own conclusion,   both on questions of fact and of law.

(3)  Various  expressions,  such  as,  ‘substantial   and  compelling  reasons’,  ‘good  and  sufficient   grounds’,  ‘very  strong  circumstances’,  ‘distorted   conclusions’,  ‘glaring  mistakes’,  etc.  are  not   intended  to  curtail  extensive  powers  of  an  appellate  court  in  an  appeal  against  acquittal.   Such  phraseologies  are  more  in  the  nature  of   ‘flourishes  of  language’  to  emphasise  the   reluctance of an appellate court to interfere with   acquittal than to curtail the power of the court to   review  the  evidence  and  to  come  to  its  own  conclusion.

(4) An appellate court,  however, must bear in   mind  that  in  case  of  acquittal,  there  is  double   presumption in favour of the accused.  Firstly, the  presumption  of  innocence  is  available  to  him  under  the  fundamental  principle  of  criminal   jurisprudence  that  every  person  shall  be  presumed  to  be  innocent  unless  he  is  proved  guilty by a competent court of law. Secondly, the  accused  having  secured  his  acquittal,  the   presumption of his innocence is further reinforced,   reaffirmed and strengthened by the trial court.

(5)  If  two reasonable conclusions are possible   on  the  basis  of  the  evidence  on  record,  the   appellate court should not disturb the finding of   acquittal recorded by the trial court.”

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8. In Dwarka Dass & Ors.  v.  State of Haryana  2  , this  

Court observed as under:

“2. While  there  cannot  be  any  denial  of  the  factum that the power and authority to appraise   the evidence in an appeal, either against acquittal   or conviction stands out to be very comprehensive   and wide, but if two views are reasonably possible,   on  the  state  of  evidence:  one  supporting  the   acquittal and the other indicating conviction, then   and in  that  event,  the High Court  would not  be   justified in interfering with an order of acquittal,   merely because it  feels  that it,  sitting as a trial   court,  would  have  taken  the  other  view.  While   reappreciating the evidence, the rule of prudence   requires  that  the High Court  should  give proper   weight and consideration to the views of the trial   Judge. But if the judgment of the Sessions Judge   was  absolutely  perverse,  legally  erroneous  and   based on a wrong appreciation of the evidence,   then it would be just and proper for the High Court   to reverse the judgment of acquittal, recorded by   the Sessions Judge, as otherwise, there would be   gross miscarriage of justice.”

9. In  Bihari Nath Goswami  v. Shiv Kumar Singh &  

Ors.  3  , this Court observed as under:

“8. There is no embargo on the appellate court   reviewing  the  evidence  upon  which  an  order  of   

2 (2003) 1 SCC 204 3 (2004) 9 SCC 186

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acquittal is based. Generally, the order of acquittal   shall  not  be  interfered  with  because  the  presumption  of  innocence  of  the  accused  is   further  strengthened  by  acquittal.  The  golden   thread  which  runs  through  the  web  of   administration of justice in criminal cases is that if   two views are possible on the evidence adduced in   the case, one pointing to the guilt of the accused   and the other to his innocence, the view which is   favourable to the accused should be adopted. The  paramount consideration of the court is to ensure   that  miscarriage  of  justice  is  prevented.  A   miscarriage  of  justice  which  may  arise  from  acquittal  of  the  guilty  is  no  less  than  from the   conviction of an innocent.”  

Keeping  the  above  principles  in  mind,  we  shall  

approach the present case.  

10. We shall examine the trial court’s view on each salient  

aspect  of  the  case  and  see  whether  it  was  perverse,  

warranting High Court’s interference.  It  must be borne in  

mind that the incident took place at dead of night and in an  

area which was away from town.  Admittedly, there were two  

factions  in  the  village  and the  relations  between the  two  

factions were strained.   In  an earlier  incident,  PW-19 was  

attacked by the opposite group.   Hence,  the possibility of  

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witnesses trying to falsely implicate persons belonging to the  

rival group cannot be ruled out.  Also important is the fact  

that according to the prosecution, 50 persons were involved  

in the brutal attack.  In a case of this nature, availability of  

light for  identification of the accused would assume great  

importance.   The  trial  court  meticulously  scanned  the  

evidence and opined that there was no sufficient light at the  

scene  of  offence  to  enable  the  witnesses  to  identify  the  

accused.  On a reading of evidence of witnesses and noticing  

some discrepancies, the trial court arrived at a finding that  

the story that the assault was witnessed by the witnesses in  

torch light or tractor light is not acceptable.  While coming to  

this conclusion, the trial court further noted that in the FIR,  

in the observation report and in the inquest report, there is  

no mention of availability of light.   

11. The High Court overturned the findings of the trial court  

on availability of light on the ground inter alia that witnesses  

were deposing  5½ years  after  the incident  and there  are  

bound to be some discrepancies in their evidence.  The High  

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Court also observed that  at  night,  vehicles are not driven  

without lights.  The High Court noted that the prosecution  

witnesses have stated that they knew the accused as they  

belonged  to  the  opposite  group  and,  therefore,  it  was  

possible for them to identify the accused.  The High Court  

also  noted  that  PW-1  was  injured  so  he  might  not  have  

mentioned about availability of light in Ex-P/1.  Moreover, the  

witnesses have not  identified all  the  accused.   This  gives  

credibility to their evidence.  The High Court also noted that  

four torches were found at the scene of offence and, hence,  

there was sufficient light at the scene of offence.  We feel  

that the High Court was not right in setting aside the trial  

court’s reasonable view on availability of light.  The fact that  

neither in the FIR nor in the observation report nor in the  

inquest  report  there  is  mention  of  availability  of  light,  is  

important.  By itself each of these circumstances may not be  

significant.   But,  taken  with  other  facts,  they  assume  

importance.   

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12. The  trial  court  rightly  observed  that  assuming  the  

prosecution witnesses had torches in their hands, they would  

not switch them on for fear of being spotted and subjected  

to attack. Besides, according to the prosecution, there were  

50 accused. Some of them hurled bombs at the witnesses.  

Therefore, the attack must have resulted in smoke and dust  

rising in the air.  In such a situation, it would not be possible  

for the prosecution witnesses to identify the assailants out of  

50 persons, who, according to the prosecution, launched the  

attack.   In  any  case,  it  would  not  be  possible  for  the  

witnesses to note what role each accused played.  The overt  

acts  attributed by the witnesses to the accused must  be,  

therefore, taken with a pinch of salt.  All the accused were  

not known to the witnesses, because some witnesses stated  

that they would be able to identify them if they are shown to  

them.  But even assuming they knew the accused and there  

was some light at the scene of offence, it does not appear  

that it was sufficient to enable the witnesses to identify the  

accused and note overt act of each of them.  Possibility of  

wrong identification cannot be ruled out.  The view taken by  

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the trial  court  on this  aspect  is  reasonably  possible  view.  

The  High  Court  was  wrong  in  disturbing  it  in  an  appeal  

against acquittal.  

13. According to the prosecution, after admitting PW-19 at  

Sattenapally Government Hospital, PW-1 to PW-16, the two  

deceased and others were returning to Tondepi village.  At  

that  time,  at  Dammalapadu Donka,  the incident occurred.  

PW-1 is an important witness because he was injured in the  

incident.  His dying declaration was recorded, which is at Ex-

P/1.  On the basis of that dying declaration, Ex-P/26, the FIR  

was registered at P.S.  Sattenapally.   PW-1 stated that the  

police came to the spot immediately and within 15 minutes  

of  their  arrival,  they  were  shifted  to  Sattenapally  

Government  Hospital.   He  stated  that  PW-28  S.I.,  P.S.  

Muppala came there.  He also stated that there was a police  

camp at Gram Panchayat Office of Tondepi village.  PW-28  

S.I., P.S. Muppala confirmed that there was police camp at  

the Gram Panchayat Office.  He was posted on bandobast  

duty on account of the incident in which PW-19 was injured.  

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He had recorded the statements of witnesses in the earlier  

case from 5.00 p.m. to 8.00 p.m. on 16/3/1993.  Evidence of  

witnesses shows that they had informed the police about the  

incident  in  question.   PW-2  an  injured  eye-witness  stated  

that  he  informed  the  police  about  the  incident,  but  his  

statement was not recorded.  PW-3 the Head Constable, who  

had accompanied PW-19 to the hospital on 16/3/1993 stated  

that PW-28 S.I., P.S. Muppala and other police staff came to  

the place of occurrence and injured were taken to the village  

and then to the hospital within an hour.  He stated that PW-

28 S.I., P.S. Muppala did not record his statement.  PW-3 was  

attached to P.S. Muppala.  PW-28 S.I., P.S. Muppala should  

have recorded his statement and registered a case but he  

did not do so.  PW-8 stated that S.I., P.S. Muppala came to  

the spot but he did not record his statement.  PW-9 and PW-

10 made similar statements.  PW-12 stated that he escaped  

from the scene of offence, went to the village and came back  

to the scene of offence with the villagers.  He stated that he  

informed the police about the incident.  PW-13 stated that he  

escaped from the scene of  offence and returned with the  

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police.  He stated that when he revealed the incident to the  

police, they recorded his statement.  PW-14 stated that he  

had informed about the incident to the police but he does  

not  know whether  the police had reduced his  information  

into  writing.   PW-15  stated  that  he  had  witnessed  the  

occurrence for about three minutes.  He had informed the  

police about the incident but the police did not record his  

statement.   

14. PW-28 S.I.,  P.S. Muppala admitted that he shifted the  

injured to the hospital and the injured informed him that the  

opposite group had attacked them.  He stated that when he  

went to the village to get a tractor to shift the injured, he  

had informed his superiors about the incident on phone.  He  

further stated that PW-29 Circle Inspector (IO) came to the  

village at 3.00 a.m. and he assisted him in the investigation  

at the spot.  Thereafter, he proceeded to the Police Station,  

Muppala and there, he received copy of the FIR from S.H.O.,  

Sattenapally.  The evidence of all these witnesses read with  

evidence of PW-28 S.I., P.S. Muppala show that the witnesses  

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had informed PW-28 about the incident and the fact that the  

opposite  party  had  attacked  them.   While  statements  of  

some  witnesses  were  not  recorded,  statements  of  some  

witnesses were recorded, but they were not produced.  PW-

28 S.I., P.S. Muppala ought to have registered the FIR on the  

basis  of  statements  of  injured eye-witnesses.   PW-3 Head  

Constable was,  in  fact,  attached to the P.S.,  Muppala and  

was working under him.  It is not understood why his FIR was  

not recorded.  The omission to record the statement of any  

of the injured witnesses as FIR or to record statements of  

witnesses under Section 161 of the Cr.P.C. by PW-28 casts a  

shadow of  doubt on the prosecution case.   There was no  

need for the police to wait for recording of the statement of  

PW-1, treat that as dying declaration and then register the  

FIR on that basis.  While, according to the prosecution, the  

incident  took  place  at  1.00  a.m.  on  17/3/1993,  PW-1’s  

statement [Ex-P/1] was recorded at 3.15 a.m.  In the facts of  

this case, not registering FIR on the basis of statement of  

injured witnesses at the spot of incident and the delay in  

registering  FIR  give  rise  to  a  suspicion  that  the  injured  

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witnesses were unable to name the accused on account of  

darkness and that the FIR was doctored in the form of dying  

declaration of PW-1 which was subsequently converted into  

Ex-P/26.   This  reasoning  of  the  trial  court  appears  to  be  

correct and ought not to have been disturbed by the High  

Court.  

15. Pertinently,  the High Court also took note of the fact  

that PW-28 S.I., P.S. Muppala did not record the statements  

of witnesses.  But the High Court brushed aside this serious  

lacuna in a perfunctory manner.  The High Court noted that  

even though injured persons were present, PW-28 S.I., P.S.  

Muppala did not record their statements, he did not obtain  

any written complaint, he did not register any complaint and  

did not send any requisition for medical treatment.  The High  

Court  further  noted that  PW-28 S.I.,  P.S.  Muppala  did  not  

make any enquiry with PW-2 and PW-4 about the incident.  

The High Court observed that PW-2 and PW-4 would have  

given the earliest version of the incident.  But, surprisingly,  

the High Court  explained away PW-28 S.I.,  P.S.  Muppala’s  

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inaction  by  observing  that  probably,  he  might  not  have  

brought any papers to the scene of offence.  The High Court  

observed that since the witnesses were injured, PW-28 S.I.,  

P.S. Muppala’s first duty was to shift them to the hospital.  

The High Court then observed that PW-28 S.I., P.S. Muppala  

might be aware that being only Sub-Inspector, he could not  

have conducted investigation of a murder case and that he  

was perhaps expecting the Inspector  of  Police to  take up  

investigation as he had informed him on phone.  The High  

Court further observed that at best not recording statements  

of witnesses is an irregularity and cannot affect the veracity  

of prosecution case.  We are of the opinion that the High  

Court  treated  this  gross  lacuna  in  the  prosecution  case  

lightly.  In this case, where relations between the two sides  

were strained,  there was an earlier incident of attack and  

there were about 50 accused involved in the incident, the  

earliest version of the prosecution case was most crucial but  

it was not noted down.   

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16. The  evidence  of  PW-29,  the  Circle  Inspector,  P.S.  

Muppala, who was the Investigating Officer, would also throw  

some light on this aspect.  It is clear from his evidence that  

he received the information with regard to the incident much  

prior to Ex-P/1.  He was informed by PW-28 S.I., P.S. Muppala  

about the several statements made by the witnesses.  He  

stated that he instructed PW-28 S.I.,  P.S. Muppala to send  

the  injured  witnesses  viz.  PW-11,  PW-12  and  PW-13  to  

Government  Hospital,  Sattenapally  and then he examined  

PW-14, PW-15 and PW-16.  He admitted that he did not note  

down  the  information  received  about  the  occurrence  

anywhere.  He further stated that on the night intervening  

16/3/1993 and 17/3/1993, he did not visit Tondepi village at  

all and he did not ascertain from the police picket at Tondepi  

village as to whether any report was received by the police  

picket on that night regarding the incident.  He stated that  

he did not make any further enquiry.  He stated that when  

he reached P.S. Muppala between 7.00 p.m. and 8.00 p.m.,  

the Sentry talked to him and told him about the incident.  He  

admitted that he did not give any instructions to the Sentry  

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to register  the case on the basis  of that information.   He  

admitted that after visiting the scene of offence where PW-

28 S.I., P.S. Muppala and other staff were present, he did not  

register the case nor did he ask PW-28 S.I., P.S. Muppala to  

register the case.  He further admitted that PW-28 S.I., P.S.  

Muppala had informed him that the injured persons had told  

him that people from  Rayudu group waylaid and attacked  

them  with  country  made  bombs  and  they  could  identify  

them.  But, he did not register any FIR nor did he ask PW-28  

S.I., P.S. Muppala to register the FIR.  He tried to explain this  

by  stating  that  since  the  dying  declaration  was  being  

recorded, he directed PW-28 S.I., P.S. Muppala to register the  

FIR on the basis of the dying declaration.  He admitted that  

by the time he conducted the inquest of the dead body of  

Singaiah  at  the  place  of  offence,  he  had  examined  and  

recorded  the  statements  of  PW-1  to  PW-11  and  after  the  

inquest he recorded the statements of PW-12 to PW-16.  He  

admitted that the FIR was not registered even at the time of  

examination of PW-1 to PW-6 by him in the hospital.   The  

evidence of this witness also shows that though the earliest  

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version was available, it  was suppressed.  This makes the  

investigation of the case suspect.  

17. PW-21  is  the  doctor  attached  to  the  Government  

Hospital, Sattenapally.  He stated that he sent an intimation  

to the Police Station, Sattenapally in respect of admission of  

PW-1, PW-3 and PW-4.  The intimation is at Ex-P/20.  It bears  

the date 16/3/1993 but does not state the time.  It also bears  

the  signature  of  PW-21.   PW-21  further  stated  that  on  

17/3/1993 at 3.05 a.m., he sent requisition to the Magistrate  

for recording the dying declaration of PW-1.  It is at Ex-P/18.  

Admittedly on this requisition, the date was originally put as  

16/3/1993.  But, later on, ‘6’ is overwritten as ‘7’.  Thus, Ex-

P/20 and Ex-P/18 create doubt about the time and date of  

the incident. If PW-1, PW-3 and PW-4 were admitted in the  

Government Hospital on 16/3/1993 then, the incident could  

not  have  happened  at  1.00  a.m.  on  17/3/1993.  The  

explanation given by PW-21 that he changed the date from  

16/3/1993  to  17/3/1993  as  it  crossed  midnight  does  not  

stand to reason.  It is pertinent to note that PW-21 did not  

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send any intimation to the police in respect of other injured  

witnesses.  PW-28 S.I.,  P.S.  Muppala and PW-29 the Circle  

Inspector, P.S. Muppala also did not send any requisition to  

the hospital with respect to the other injured witnesses.  PW-

27 S.I., P.S. Sattenapally stated that he received Ex-P/20 i.e.  

intimation in respect of admission of PW-1, PW-3 and PW-4  

bearing  date  ‘16/3/1993’  and  the  signature  of  PW-21  at  

10.30 p.m.  This means the injured were in the hospital by  

the time of preparation of Ex-P/20 i.e. before 12.00 midnight.  

The  trial  court’s  view  that  this  creates  doubt  about  the  

prosecution’s claim that the incident happened at 1.00 a.m.  

on 17/3/1993 cannot be called perverse.  Moreover, if PW-1,  

PW-3 and PW-4 were admitted in the hospital on 16/3/1993  

much prior to midnight and if PW-1’s dying declaration had  

to  be  recorded,  requisition  should  have  been  sent  to  the  

Magistrate by PW-21 immediately and not at 3.05 a.m. on  

17/3/1993.  Consequently, Ex-P/1 i.e. the dying declaration  

of PW-1 recorded at 3.15 a.m. on 17/3/1993 gives scope to  

criticism that  after  prolonged discussion,  the investigating  

officer through PW-21 sent the requisition to the Magistrate  

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and  the  dying  declaration  was  recorded  after  much  

deliberation.   Pertinently,  PW-8  stated  that  some  of  their  

party  leaders  had  visited  them  in  Sattenapalli  hospital.  

Besides, PW-19, who was attacked prior to the incident in  

question, was already there in the hospital.  Therefore, there  

is basis for the criticism that there was deliberation before  

recording the dying declaration.  The High Court has referred  

to the evidence of PW-4 to the effect that no leaders from  

the  party  of  the  prosecution  witnesses  had  visited  the  

hospital.  The High Court held that therefore, there can be no  

tutoring.  It is difficult to accept this submission given the  

history of this incident.  PW-19 was attacked by the other  

group prior to the incident in question.  His presence in the  

hospital at the time of recording of PW-1’s dying declaration  

and  other  statements  itself  is  sufficient  to  create  doubt  

about the credibility of the prosecution case.

18. It is also pertinent to note that while PW-13, the Head  

Constable  stated  that  the  injured  were  first  taken  to  the  

village and then to  the hospital,  PW-28 S.I.,  P.S.  Muppala  

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stated that the injured were directly taken to the hospital.  If,  

as stated by PW-13 the injured witnesses were first taken to  

the village and then to the hospital, then it is possible that  

after consultation with villagers they implicated the accused.  

This makes a dent in the prosecution story.  

19. There are certain other  aspects which add up to the  

weaknesses  of  the  prosecution  case.   Ex-P/1  states  that  

Challa Narasimha Rao went to the hospital along with PW-1,  

but his name was not in the charge-sheet as a witness.  Ex-

P/1 refers to Somapalli Kotaiah as an assailant but his name  

does not figure in the charge-sheet as an accused.  Ex-P/1,  

which was recorded at 3.15 a.m. on 17/3/1993, states that  

two persons were murdered.   As per  intimation [Ex-P/19],  

deceased-Chanchaiah died at 4.50 a.m. on 17/3/1993.  It is  

not understood how it is stated in Ex-P/1 that two persons  

were dead.  PW-1 stated in his cross-examination that he did  

not get down from the tractor at any stage. But in his dying  

declaration  [Ex-P/1],  he  stated  that  he  fell  down  in  the  

bushes.  Moreover, in the inquest report prepared by PW-29,  

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the  name  of  one  Challa  Koteshwar  Rao  is  shown  as  the  

person who first saw deceased-Singhaiah dead.  In column 4,  

name of Challa Koteshwar Rao is mentioned as the person  

who had last seen deceased-Singhaiah alive and that he was  

traveling in the tractor along with other witnesses.  However,  

PW-17 Cholla Mangammao, the wife of deceased Singhaiah  

stated that on that day,  Challa Koteshwar Rao was in the  

village.  Seizure of weapons has been disbelieved by the trial  

court as well as the High Court. It is also important to note  

that PW-1 stated in Ex-P/1 that 30 people attacked them.  

But  names  of  only  A1  to  A12  and  A15  figured  therein.  

Names of all the accused were not stated by the witnesses.  

They stated that they would be able to identify the accused.  

However,  no  identification  parade  was  held.  Therefore,  it  

cannot be said with certainty which accused attacked whom.  

Moreover, there are so many omissions and contradictions in  

the evidence of prosecution witnesses, that the entire fabric  

of prosecution case appears to be ridden with gaping holes.  

These discrepancies have been meticulously noted by the  

trial  court.   The  High  Court,  however,  holds  that  the  

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witnesses were examined 5½ years after the incident and,  

therefore, such discrepancies are natural.  It is true that due  

to passage of time, witnesses do deviate from their police  

statements  as  their  memory  fades  to  some  extent.  

Reasonable allowance can be made for such discrepancies.  

But  when  such  discrepancies  make  the  foundation  of  

prosecution case shaky, Court has to take strict note thereof.  

In  this  case,  the  trial  court  has  meticulously  located  the  

discrepancies  and  opined  that  the  witnesses  have  

discredited themselves.  The High Court ought not to have  

overlooked this reasoning of the trial court.  

20. Finally, we must note that the High Court has not stated  

why it felt that the trial court’s view was perverse.  It has not  

stated what were the compelling reasons, which persuaded  

it to disturb the order of acquittal.  As noted by this Court in  

several decisions if two reasonable views are possible, the  

appellate  court  shall  not  disturb  the  order  of  acquittal  

because  it  feels  that  some  other  view  is  possible.   The  

reasonable  view  which  reinforces  the  presumption  of  

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innocence of the accused must be preferred.  In our opinion  

the trial court’s view was not perverse.  It was taken after  

thorough  marshalling  of  evidence.   It  was  a  reasonably  

possible view.  The High Court erred in disturbing it.  

21. In  the  circumstances,  the  appeals  are  allowed.   The  

impugned judgment and order is set aside.  The appellants  

in both the appeals are acquitted of all the charges.  They  

are on bail.  Their bail bonds stand discharged.  

…..……...…………………………..J. (Sudhansu Jyoti Mukhopadhaya)

.…………………………..J. (Ranjana Prakash  

Desai)

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New Delhi; April 22, 2014.

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