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REPORTABLE

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA

CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION

CRIMINAL     APPEAL     NO.     671     OF     2005   

Nagesh … Appellant

Versus

State of Karnataka … Respondent

J     U     D     G     M     E     N     T   

Swatanter     Kumar,     J  .

1. A Bench of the High Court of Karnataka at Bangalore vide  

its judgment dated 19th December, 2003 while rejecting all the  

contentions raised by the accused Nagesh, confirmed the  

judgment of conviction and order of sentence passed by the trial  

court vide its judgment dated 18th January, 2000 convicting the  

accused for an offence under Section 302 of the Indian Penal  

Code, 1860 (IPC) and sentencing him to undergo imprisonment  

for life and pay a fine of Rs.2000/- in default to undergo further

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rigorous imprisonment for six months.  Aggrieved from the  

judgment of the High Court, the accused has preferred the  

present appeal.

2. We may, at the very outset, briefly refer to the facts as per  

the case of the prosecution.    The deceased, Smt. Nagaratna,  

was a student of second year Pre-University College (PUC) at the  

relevant time.  Her parents, namely Smt. Sumitra, PW4 and  

Shivarai Shetti, PW9, had six daughters.  PW9 was running a  

small tea shop at Gokarna.  The deceased was earlier staying  

with her parents.  The accused No.1, Anant, was a close relative  

of Nagaratna and was unmarried at the relevant time.  Accused  

No.1 also was the resident of Gokarna but at that time was  

residing at Belgaum.  The other two accused, namely, Venketesh,  

Accused No.1 and Nagesh, Accused No.3, were brothers-in-law of  

Anant.  All of them were residents of village Gokarna.  Anant had  

pressed upon the parents of Nagaratna for sending her to  

Belgaum with him.  During the Ganapathi festival, she had  

visited her parents at Gokarna and was very reluctant to go back  

to Belgaum.  However, Anant again persuaded her parents to  

send her to Belgaum promising them to secure her a good job at  

Belgaum.  Her parents, thus, had sent her back with him to  

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Belgaum.  Hence, at the relevant time, she was staying with  

Anant at Belgaum.   

3. PW1, Smt. Roopa, is the owner of the building called ‘Sai  

Prasad’, bearing No.304/31 and CCB No. 18 situated at Shastri  

Nagar, Goodshed Road, Belgaum comprising of three blocks.  

She herself was staying in one of the blocks with her husband  

and children while Anant was staying in the second block along  

with the deceased, Nagaratna.  Chotubhai, PW2, was also  

residing in the upstairs portion of the same block.  In other  

words, PW1 and PW2, both were the immediate neighbours of  

Anant.

4. On 7th October, 1993 at about 5.00 p.m. in the evening,  

Anant had gone to the temple leaving Nagaratna alone in the  

house.   The accused Nagesh, appellant herein, came to the  

house of Anant and tried to outrage the modesty of the deceased  

and have sexual intercourse with her.  But when she resisted  

such attempts then Nagesh assaulted her and is stated to have  

murdered her by administering poison.   

5. Smt. Roopa, PW1, saw Anant returning to the house at  

about 8.30 p.m. and taking the deceased Nagaratna along with  

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him outside the house by holding her hands.  On her enquiry,  

she was told by Anant that Nagaratna was not well and was  

being taken for treatment to the doctor.  PW1 also tried to  

enquire from Nagaratna as to what had happened to her but she  

was unable to give any reply except that she was producing or  

making some groaning/moaning sound of “huhu huhu”.  Upon  

this, PW1 gave some saline water to Nagaratna.   In the  

meantime, Venketesh came there with an Ambassador car.  By  

then, some persons from the neighbourhood had also gathered  

there.  Even a police jeep had come there.  Thereafter, the  

deceased was put into the car and the police jeep as well as the  

car left from the place.   

6. It is stated that Chotubhai, PW2 who was watching  

television in his house at about 8.45 p.m., came out of his house  

upon hearing some commotion outside the house.  He saw the  

arrival of the Ambassador car and the deceased being put into  

the car by the accused persons.  He was also told that Nagaratna  

was not well.  Later, it was learnt that Nagaratna had expired.   

7. On 8th October, 1993, at about 7.30 a.m. in the morning,  

the deceased Nagaratna was brought to the house of PW9 in the  

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Ambassador car.  By that time, she is stated to have already  

died.  Her father, PW9, noticed some marks of violence on the  

body of the deceased when she was brought inside the house.   It  

is stated that on seeing the dead body of Nagaratna, PW9 fainted  

and when he regained consciousness, he enquired from the  

accused Anant, as to how his daughter died.  Thereon the  

accused Anant jumped into the well but was rescued by some  

persons.   Despite resistance, the body of the deceased was  

cremated.  Thereafter, the accused including Nagesh did not stay  

in the village and they immediately returned to Belgaum.  The  

father of the deceased, PW9, lodged a complaint with the police,  

Ex.P6 on the basis of which the First Information Report (FIR)  

Exhibit P10 was registered and the investigative machinery was  

set into motion.  The Investigating Officer, upon completing the  

investigation, filed charge-sheet stating that the five accused,  

namely, Anant Ramanna Kudatalkar, Venkatesh Shesha  

Revankar, Nagesh Shriniwas Raikar, Prabhakar Ramnath Raikar,  

and Veerbhadra Purshottam Shetty had committed the offence.  

Accused No.3 Nagesh was charged with an offence under Section  

302 IPC while all others were stated to have committed an  

offence punishable under Sections 201 and 202 read with  

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Section 34 IPC.  All the accused stood the trial and vide  

judgment dated 18th January, 2000, the Trial Court acquitted all  

the accused for all offences except Nagesh, accused No.3 who  

was convicted for the offence under Section 302 IPC and, as  

already noticed, awarded imprisonment for life and a fine of  

Rs.2,000/, in default, to undergo rigorous imprisonment for six  

months.  As already noticed, the High Court has confirmed the  

judgment of the Trial Court, giving rise to the present appeal.

8. The learned counsel appearing for the sole appellant-

accused No.3 argued with some vehemence that this is a case of  

circumstantial evidence and the prosecution has failed to  

establish the complete chain of events pointing towards the guilt  

of the appellant.  As in the peculiar circumstances of the case  

two views are possible, the Court should take a view which is  

favourable to the accused.   

9. It is further contended that the story of the prosecution is  

based upon conjectures and surmises.  There are serious and  

patent discrepancies in the case of the prosecution.  The conduct  

of the appellant is such that absolves him of any liability under  

the criminal law because he had throughout participated in  

taking the deceased to the hospital, attended her funeral and  

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never ran away.  If the appellant had committed the offence, the  

first thing he would have done was to disappear.  The statements  

of the witnesses do not establish the offence under Section 302  

against the appellant.

10. In response to this submission, the counsel appearing for  

the State argued that the prosecution has been able to establish  

its case beyond any reasonable doubt, not only by circumstantial  

evidence but also by the statement of the witnesses who saw the  

deceased and the accused immediately prior and after the  

occurrence in question.

11. This Court in the case of Kali Ram v. State of H.P. [(1973) 2  

SCC 808], held as under :

“25. Another golden thread which runs  through the web of the administration of  justice in criminal cases is that if two views  are possible on the evidence adduced in the  case, one pointing to the guilt of the accused  and the other to his innocence, the view  which is favourable to the accused should be  adopted. This principle has a special  relevance in cases wherein the guilt of the  accused is sought to be established by  circumstantial evidence. Rule has  accordingly been laid down that unless the  evidence adduced in the case is consistent  only with the hypothesis of the guilt of the  accused and is inconsistent with that of his  innocence, the Court should refrain from  

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recording a finding of guilt of the accused. It  is also an accepted rule that in case the  Court entertains reasonable doubt regarding  the guilt of the accused, the accused must  have the benefit of that doubt. Of course, the  doubt regarding the guilt of the accused  should be reasonable; it is not the doubt of a  mind which is either so vacillating that it is  incapable of reaching a firm conclusion or so  timid that is is hesitant and afraid to take  things to their natural consequences. The  rule regarding the benefit of doubt also does  not warrant acquittal of the accused by  report to surmises, conjectures or fanciful  considerations. As mentioned by us recently  in the case of State of Punjab v. Jagir Singh a  criminal trial is not like a fairy tale wherein  one is free to give flight to one's imagination  and phantasy. It concerns itself with the  question as to whether the accused  arraigned at the trial is guilty of the offence  with which he is charged. Crime is an event  in real life and is the product of interplay of  different human emotions. In arriving at the  conclusion about the guilt of the accused  charged with the commission of a crime, the  Court has to judge the evidence by the  yardstick of probabilities, its intrinsic worth  and the animus of witnesses. Every case in  the final analysis would have to depend  upon its own facts. Although the benefit of  every reasonable doubt should be given to  the accused, the Courts should not at the  same time reject evidence which is ex facie  trustworthy on grounds which are fanciful or  in the nature of conjectures.”

12. The Court also cautioned that wrongful acquittals are  

undesirable and shake the confidence of the people in the  

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judicial system much worse, however, is the wrongful conviction  

of an innocent person.  In the case of Amarsingh Munnasingh  

Suryawanshi v. State of Maharashtraa [(2007) 15 SCC 455], this  

Court, while dealing with a situation where the accused-husband  

was absconding and the husband and wife were living together  

and at the time of death they were alone in the room, observed  

that it was for the accused-husband to explain as to how the  

deceased met her death.  Again, while dealing with a case based  

upon circumstantial evidence, this Court, in a recent judgment  

in the case of Birendar Poddar v. State of Bihar [(2011) 6 SCC  

350], held as under :

“7. It is obviously true that this case rests  solely on circumstantial evidence. It is true  that in cases where death takes place within  the matrimonial home, it is very difficult to  find direct evidence. But for appreciating  circumstantial evidence, the court has to be  cautious and find out whether the chain of  circumstances led by the prosecution is  complete and the chain must be so complete  and conclusive as to unmistakably point to  the guilt of the accused. It is well settled that  if any hypothesis or possibility arises from  the evidence which is incompatible with the  guilt of the accused, in such case, the  conviction of the accused which is based  solely on circumstantial evidence is difficult  to be sustained. {See Hanumant Govind  Nargundkar v. State of M.P. [AIR 1952 SC  343], Bhagat Ram v. State of Punjab [AIR  

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1954 SC 621]and Eradu v. State of  Hyderabad [AIR 1956 SC 316]}”

13. It is neither possible nor prudent to state a straight-jacket  

formula or principle which would apply to all cases without  

variance.  Every case has to be appreciated on its own facts and  

in light of the the evidence led by the parties.  It is for the Court  

to examine the cumulative effect of the evidence in order to  

determine whether the prosecution has been able to establish its  

case beyond reasonable doubt or that the accused is entitled to  

the benefit of doubt.

14. In the present case, there is no eye-witness to the actual  

scene of crime that resulted in the death of the deceased.  To  

that limited extent, it is a case of circumstantial evidence.  

Certain enough, the statement of the parents of the deceased,  

PW4 and PW9, the neighbours, PW1 and PW2 and the  

Investigating Officer, PW15 clearly establishes the case of the  

prosecution.  PW1 has stated that the accused Anant had gone to  

the temple and the deceased was in the room along with the  

appellant.  At 8.30 p.m., Anant came and he brought the  

deceased by holding her hand and, upon enquiry from PW1, she  

was told that the deceased was not feeling well.  Seeing her  

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condition and the moaning sound made by the deceased, PW1  

gave her saline water.  Then, the accused Venkatesh also came  

there in the Ambassador car.  Even other people gathered by that  

time.  The Police also came at the spot and the deceased was  

taken to the hospital in the Ambassador car.  Later, it was learnt  

that the police had come to the spot and informed that  

Nagaratna had died.  Similarly, PW2 is the other neighbour who  

had been watching TV at about 8.45 p.m. on that day but after  

hearing the commotion, had come out of his house saw that  

Nagaratna was being taken away in the Ambassador car and he  

was told by the accused that they were taking her to a doctor as  

she was not well.  PW4 is the mother of the deceased while PW9  

is the father of the deceased.  Both of them have stated that  

Anant had pressurized them to send their daughter to Belgaum  

with him.  On 8th October, 1993, the accused brought her dead  

body in the car and at that time her nose was bleeding and there  

were blood clottings on the cheeks as well.  Anant and Nagesh  

had informed the parents that she died as a result of consuming  

poison.  They did not give any further information.  Further, the  

father of the deceased, PW9, had objected that her body be not  

cremated but despite his protest, the dead body was cremated in  

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the village.  PW11, Praveen, who was running a tea shop at  

Belgaum, stated that he had seen the accused persons in the  

Ambassador car and he even knew the driver.  He was standing  

near the taxi stand when the driver brought the three accused  

persons in the car and there was a girl sleeping in the car.  The  

statement of these witnesses examined in light of the statement  

of the Investigating Officer, PW15, provides a complete chain as  

to how the deceased was brought to Belgaum and was last seen  

with accused Nagesh, whereafter she died and her body was  

cremated in the village despite protest by her parents.   

15. All the three accused had put the deceased into the car and  

never took her to the doctor but instead they went to the village  

Gokarna where they reached next morning and handed over the  

dead body of the deceased to the parents.

16. A contention has also been raised to argue that the First  

Information Report (FIR), Exhibit P10, is an afterthought as it  

was lodged after deliberation and planning, that too, after a  

considerable time.  The Court cannot ignore the fact that young  

daughter of PW4 and PW9 had died allegedly by consuming  

poison.  No other details were brought to their notice, they had  

other daughters present in the house and the dead body of the  

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deceased was cremated against their wish.  After the cremation,  

the FIR was lodged.  The delay, if any, in the circumstances of  

the case, thus, stands properly explained.  The Court has to  

examine the evidence in its entirety, particularly, in the case of  

circumstantial evidence, the Court cannot just take one aspect of  

the entire evidence led in the case like delay in lodging the FIR in  

isolation of the other evidence placed on record and give undue  

advantage to the theory of benefit of doubt in favour of the  

accused.  This Court, in the case of Sucha Singh & Anr. v. State  

of Punjab [(2003) 7 SCC 643] has stated :

“20. Exaggerated devotion to the rule of  benefit of doubt must not nurture fanciful  doubts or lingering suspicion and thereby  destroy social defence.  Justice cannot be  made sterile on the plea that it is better to  let hundred guilty escape thatn punish an  innocent.  Letting guilty escape is not doing  justice according to law.  (See Gurbachan  Singh v. Satpal Singh & Ors. (AIR 1990 SC  209).  Prosecution is not required to meet  any and every hypothesis put forward by the  accused  (See State of U.P. v. Ashok Kumar  Srivastava (AIR 1992 SC 840).  A reasonable  doubt is not an imaginary, trivial or merely  possible doubt, but a fair doubt based upon  reason and common sense.  It must grow  out of the evidence in the case.  If a case is  proved perfectly, it is argued that it is  artificial; if a case has some flaws inevitable  because human beings are prone to err, it is  argued that it is too imperfect. One wonders  whether in the meticulous hypersensitivity  

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to eliminate a rare innocent from being  punished, many guilty persons must be  allowed to escape.  Proof beyond reasonable  doubt is a guideline, not a fetish.  (See Inder  Singh and another v. State (Delhi Admn.) (AIR  1978 SC 1091.  Vague hunches cannot take  place of judicial evaluation.  ‘A Judge does  not preside over a criminal trial, merely to  see that no innocent man is punished.  A  Judge also presides to see that a guilty man,  does not escape.  Both are public duties.’  (Per Viscount Simen in Stirland v. Director of  Public Prosecutor 91944 AC (PC 315) quoted  in State of U.P. v. Anil Singh (AIR 1988 SC  1998).  Doubts would be called reasonable if  they are free from a zest for abstract  speculation.  Law cannot afford any favourite  other than truth.”

17. Firstly, we are unable to find any major discrepancy or even  

an iota of real doubt in the case of the prosecution and secondly,  

despite clear irresponsible attitude on the part of the Police  

officials who were present at the residence of the accused  

persons when the deceased was brought to the car on the pretext  

of taking her to a doctor for treatment but her body was taken  

away, still the prosecution has been able to establish the  

complete chain of events pointing undoubtedly towards the guilt  

of the appellant.  Another very important aspect of this case is  

that the accused in their statement under Section 313 of the  

Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (Cr.PC) took up the stand of  

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complete denial of their involvement in the crime and offered no  

explanation before the Court.   As noticed above, the law  

required the accused Nagesh in particular to provide some  

explanation as he was last seen in the room with the deceased.  

Rather than providing some explanation of the circumstances  

under which the deceased died, the appellant offered complete  

denial.  But strangely when PW4, the mother of the deceased,  

was cross-examined by the defence, they put the suggestion to  

her that the deceased was having a love affair with a student  

from her college and her parents had sent her to Belgaum to  

ensure that the said love affair failed.  The deceased had become  

desperate at Belgaum and had taken poison and died.  If this be  

the stand of the accused, then there was no occasion for the  

accused to deny every material piece of evidence as well as not to  

give any explanation when the accused were specifically asked  

for.  The purpose of a statement under Section 313 Cr.PC is to  

put to the accused the material evidence appearing in the case  

against him as well as to provide him an opportunity to explain  

his conduct or his version of the case.  This Court in the case of  

Asraf Ali v. State of Assam [(2008) 16 SCC 328] has observed as  

follows :

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“21. Section 313 of the Code casts a duty on  the court to put in an enquiry or trial questions  to the accused for the purpose of enabling him  to explain any of the circumstances appearing  in the evidence against him. It follows as a  necessary corollary therefrom that each  material circumstance appearing in the  evidence against the accused is required to be  put to him specifically, distinctly and  separately and failure to do so amounts to a  serious irregularity vitiating trial, if it is shown  that the accused was prejudiced.

22. The object of Section 313 of the Code is  to establish a direct dialogue between the court  and the accused. If a point in the evidence is  important against the accused, and the  conviction is intended to be based upon it, it is  right and proper that the accused should be  questioned about the matter and be given an  opportunity of explaining it. Where no specific  question has been put by the trial court on an  inculpatory material in the prosecution  evidence, it would vitiate the trial. Of course,  all these are subject to rider whether they have  caused miscarriage of justice or prejudice. This  Court also expressed a similar view in S.  Harnam Singh v. State (Delhi Admn.) while  dealing with Section 342 of the Criminal  Procedure Code, 1898 (corresponding to  Section 313 of the Code). Non-indication of  inculpatory material in its relevant facts by the  trial court to the accused adds to the  vulnerability of the prosecution case. Recording  of a statement of the accused under Section  313 is not a purposeless exercise.”

18. Again, in its recent judgment in Manu Sao v. State of Bihar  

[(2010) 12 SCC 310], a Bench of this Court to which one of us,  

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Swatanter Kumar, J., was a member, has reiterated the above-

stated view as under :

“12. Let us examine the essential features of  this Section 313 CrPC and the principles of  law as enunciated by judgments, which are  the guiding factors for proper application  and consequences which shall flow from the  provisions of Section 313 of the Code.

13. As already noticed, the object of  recording the statement of the accused  under Section 313 of the Code is to put all  incriminating evidence against the accused  so as to provide him an opportunity to  explain such incriminating circumstances  appearing against him in the evidence of the  prosecution. At the same time, also to permit  him to put forward his own version or  reasons, if he so chooses, in relation to his  involvement or otherwise in the crime. The  court has been empowered to examine the  accused but only after the prosecution  evidence has been concluded. It is a  mandatory obligation upon the court and  besides ensuring the compliance therewith  the court has to keep in mind that the  accused gets a fair chance to explain his  conduct. The option lies with the accused to  maintain silence coupled with simpliciter  denial or in the alternative to explain his  version and reasons for his alleged  involvement in the commission of crime.  This is the statement which the accused  makes without fear or right of the other  party to cross-examine him. However, if the  statements made are false, the court is  entitled to draw adverse inferences and pass  consequential orders, as may be called for,  in accordance with law. The primary purpose  is to establish a direct dialogue between the  

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court and the accused and to put to the  accused every important incriminating piece  of evidence and grant him an opportunity to  answer and explain. Once such a statement  is recorded, the next question that has to be  considered by the court is to what extent  and consequences such statement can be  used during the enquiry and the trial. Over  the period of time, the courts have explained  this concept and now it has attained, more  or less, certainty in the field of criminal  jurisprudence.

14. The statement of the accused can be  used to test the veracity of the exculpatory  nature of the admission, if any, made by the  accused. It can be taken into consideration  in any enquiry or trial but still it is not  strictly evidence in the case. The provisions  of Section 313(4) explicitly provides that the  answers given by the accused may be taken  into consideration in such enquiry or trial  and put in evidence against the accused in  any other enquiry or trial for any other  offence for which such answers may tend to  show he has committed. In other words, the  use is permissible as per the provisions of  the Code but has its own limitations. The  courts may rely on a portion of the  statement of the accused and find him guilty  in consideration of the other evidence  against him led by the prosecution, however,  such statements made under this section  should not be considered in isolation but in  conjunction with evidence adduced by the  prosecution.”

19. It is also possible and permissible that an accused may  

remain silent but in that circumstance and with reference to the  

facts and circumstances of a given case, the Court may be  

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justified in drawing an adverse inference against the accused.  

PW5, Smt. Pushpa, is another vital witness who had seen the  

deceased when she was brought to the Ambassador car and,  

according to her, lips of the deceased were blackish and her neck  

had black marks on two sides and when she enquired about her  

from the accused, she was told that the deceased had taken  

poison.  The statements of PW1, PW4 and PW9 read with the  

statement of this witness, establish the facts which form the very  

basis of the case of the prosecution and they have been proved in  

accordance with law.  The trend of cross-examination on behalf  

of the accused implies admission of the death of the deceased  

having taken place in the premises in question by taking poison,  

however, the accused have failed to offer any explanation therefor  

which was least expected of him.

20. Lastly, we may also notice the contention of the appellant  

that learned courts below have not appreciated the evidence in  

its proper perspective and in accordance with law.  The findings  

are based upon surmises and conjectures.  Resultantly, the  

findings are incorrect in law and unsustainable.  

21. When the evidence is legally admissible and has been  

appreciated by the Courts in its correct perspective then merely  

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because another view is possible, this Court, in exercise of its  

powers under Article 136 of the Constitution, would be very  

reluctant to interfere with the concurrent findings of the Courts  

below.  Of course, there are excpetions but they are very limited  

ones.  Where upon careful appreciation of evidence, this Court  

finds that the courts below have departed from the rule of  

prudence while appreciating the evidence in a case or the  

findings are palpably erroneous and are opposed to law or the  

settled judicial dictums, then the Court may interfere with the  

concurrent findings.  Still, it is not possible to exhaustively state  

the principles or the kind of cases in which the Court would be  

justified in disturbing the concurrent findings.  It will always  

depend upon the facts and circumstances of a given case.   

22. While noticing the caution expressed by Baron Alderson  

with regard to the possibility of our minds getting swayed by the  

tragic facts of the case and our assessment of the case being  

influenced by the preconceived notions, the Court in the case of  

Mousam Singha Roy & Ors. v. State of W.B. [(2003) 12 SCC 377  

held as under :

“Appropos what was observed by this Court  in the case of Hanumant Govind (supra), it  will be useful to note the warning addressed  

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by Baron Alderson to the jury in Reg. V.  Hodge 1838 2 Lewin 227 which is also  quoted with approval by this Court in the  case of Hanumant Govind (supra) :

‘The mind was apt to take a pleasure in  adapting circumstances to one another,  and even in straining them a little, if  need be, to force them to form parts of  one connected whole; and the more  ingenious the mind of the individual,  the more likely was it considering such  matters, to overreach and mislead  itself, to supply some little link that is  wanting, to take for granted some fact  consistent with its previous theories  and necessary to render them  complete.”

23. In view of the above factual matrix and upon appreciation of  

evidence, the Court found itself unable to concur with the  

findings recorded by the courts below.  It was primarily for the  

reason that the courts had departed from the Rule of Prudence in  

appreciation of evidence.  In the present case, the evidence is  

admissible evidence and has been appreciated in consonance  

with the rules of prudence and law.  These findings can neither  

be termed as perverse or so improper that no person of common  

prudence can arrive at that conclusion.  In light of the above  

noted principles of appreciation of evidence, we would not  

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interfere merely because it is possible to take another vie on the  

same evidence.

24. Before we close our judgment, we will be failing in our duty  

if we do not direct the Director General of Police/Commissioner  

of Police, Karnataka to take disciplinary action against the police  

officers/officials at Belgaum, whether in service or not, who were  

present at the place of occurrence when Ms. Nagaratna was  

brought from her room downstairs where the car was parked,  

and failed to take appropriate action and register the case  

despite the fact that it was openly stated that Ms. Nagratna had  

consumed poison.  Further, we direct disciplinary action to be  

taken against the police officers/officials, whether in service or  

not, at village Gokarna who were present when the body of the  

deceased was cremated and they failed to take charge of the dead  

body and proceed in accordance with law, it being an unnatural  

death.  They did not discharge their public duty and mandatory  

obligations under the provisions of the Police Manual and the  

Code of Criminal Procedures.  We further direct that the Director  

General of Police shall view the matter seriously and ensure  

completion of the disciplinary proceedings within six months  

from the date of this order.   

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25. In view of the above discussion we find no substance in the  

submissions made on behalf of the accused-appellant.  They  

merit rejection and are hereby rejected accordingly.

26. We find no merit in the present appeal, the same is  

dismissed accordingly.

…….…………......................J.                                                     (A.K. Patnaik)

...….…………......................J.                                                     (Swatanter Kumar)

New Delhi May 8, 2012  

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