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REPORTABLE

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION

CRIMINAL APPEAL NO.2358 of 2010

MUNNA                     ... APPELLANT

VERSUS

STATE OF M.P.                                   ... RESPONDENT

J U D G M E N T

ADARSH KUMAR GOEL, J.

1. This  appeal has been preferred against the conviction  

and sentence of the appellant for offences under Sections 450  

and 376 of the Indian Penal Code (IPC) for which the appellant  

stands sentenced to undergo rigorous imprisonment for seven  

years  under  both  heads  but  the  sentences  are  to  run  

concurrently, apart from being sentenced to pay fine.

2. Case of the prosecution as per FIR is that on 19 th April,  

1993,  when the prosecutrix (PW 1) was sleeping in her house  

at  1.00  A.M.,  the  appellant  along  with  co-accused   Sahab  

Singh @ Mutta entered the house of the prosecutrix and both  

of  them committed  rape  on  the  prosecutrix  and  then  fled

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away.   They  were  carrying  knife  which  was  shown  to  the  

prosecutrix  to  threaten  her  if  she  raised  alarm.   The  

prosecutrix narrated the incident to her husband and lodged  

First Information Report at the Police Station on the next day.  

After investigation both the accused were sent up for trial.  

The  prosecutrix  did  not  support  the  version  against  co-

accused Sahab Singh @ Mutta.  Accordingly, he was acquitted  

by the trial Court. Relying upon her version supported by her  

husband                       Balkishan (PW 2) and Kotwar of the  

village  Manaklal  (PW  3),  the  trial  Court  convicted  and  

sentenced the  appellant  which  has  been confirmed by  the  

High Court.

3. We have heard learned counsel for the parties.

4. Learned counsel for the appellant has pointed out that  

there  are  major  discrepancies  in  the  version  of  the  

prosecution  which  create  doubt  about  the  veracity  of  the  

prosecution  case  against  the  appellant.   The  discrepancies  

pointed out are as follows :

(i) Though initially,  two persons were named and it  

was alleged that both threatened the prosecutrix with a  

knife,   version  at  the  trial  was  different  and  only  the  

appellant has been named.

(ii) The  prosecutrix  gave  affidavit  dated  23th  April,

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1993 three days after the lodging of the FIR, disowning  

the  version  and  exonerating  the  appellant.   The  said  

affidavit was duly acted upon by the trial Court, as the  

prosecutrix  appeared  in  Court  and  supported  the  

contents  of  the  affidavit,  for  granting  the  accused  

anticipatory bail vide Order dated 29th April, 1993.  The  

order of anticipatory bail reads as under:

“Affidavit of the complainant perused.  According to   which  Village  Patel  Shiv  Kumar  had  put  pressure   upon  the  complainant  and  got  a  false  report   registered.   Additional  Public  Prosecutor  has  not   objected the bail application.

Bail  of  accused  Mutta  is  already  granted  on  this   ground  hence  this  accused  is  also  being  granted  benefit  of bail  and it  is  ordered that if  in this case   applicant is arrested then he should be released on   bail bond of Rs.5,000/- and surety.”

(iii) PW 3 has admitted that husband of the prosecutrix  

had enmity with the appellant.  The medical report inter  

alia read as follows :

“………..No signs of injury anywhere……….  One  cream color petticoat on which there no stains of   looking like Semenal stains present……..”

(iv) The  statement  of  the  prosecutrix  has  also  

contradictions, as at one place she states that she had  

seen the accused only  when he was escaping and not  

before,  while  at  the  other  place  she  gave  a  different  

statement.  Similarly her husband PW 2 has contradicted

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the prosecutrix about the presence of the accused when  

PW  2  arrived.  According  to   

PW 2, accused was still at the house and ran away only  

when he opened the door while according to prosecutrix  

the accused had ran away before arrival of her husband.

5. We find that the above discrepancies are supported by  

the record.

6. We are conscious  that  testimony of  the prosecutrix  is  

almost at par with an injured witness and can be acted upon  

without  corroboration  as  held  in  various  decisions  of  this  

Court.   Reference  may  be  made  to  some  of  the  leading  

judgments.    

In  Bharwada  Bhoginbhai  Hirjibhai vs. State  of  

Gujarat  .  1  ,   this Court held as under :

“9. In the Indian setting,  refusal  to act on the  testimony  of  a  victim  of  sexual  assault  in  the  absence of corroboration as a rule, is adding insult to   injury.  Why should  the  evidence  of  the  girl  or  the   woman who complains of rape or sexual molestation   be  viewed  with  the  aid  of  spectacles  fitted  with   lenses tinged with doubt, disbelief or suspicion? To   do so is to justify the charge of male chauvinism in a  male  dominated  society.  We  must  analyze  the   argument  in  support  of  the need for  corroboration   and subject  it  to  relentless  and remorseless  cross- examination. And we must do so with a logical, and  not an opinionated, eye in the light of probabilities   with our feet firmly planted on the soil of India and  with  our  eyes  focussed  on  the  Indian  horizon.  We   must not be swept off the feet by the approach made  in the western world which has its own social milieu,   its own social mores, its own permissive values, and   

1  (1983) 3 SCC 217

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its own code of life. Corroboration may be considered   essential  to  establish  a  sexual  offence  in  the  backdrop of the social ecology of the western world.   It is wholly unnecessary to import the said concept   on a turnkey basis and to transplant it on the Indian   soil  regardless  of  the  altogether  different   atmosphere,  attitudes,  mores,  responses  of  the   Indian society,  and its  profile.  The identities of  the   two worlds  are  different.  The solution  of  problems   cannot therefore be identical.  

10.   Without  the  fear  of  making  too  wide  a  statement, or of overstating the case, it can be said   that rarely will a girl or a woman in India make false   allegations of sexual assault …….. The statement is   generally true in the context of  the urban as also   rural  society.  It  is  also  by  and  large  true  in  the   context  of  the  sophisticated,  not  so  sophisticated,   and  unsophisticated  society.  Only  very  rarely  can  one conceivably  come across an exception or  two   and that too possibly from amongst the urban elites.   Because (1) A girl or a woman in the tradition-bound   non-permissive society of India would be extremely   reluctant even to admit that any incident which is   likely to reflect on her chastity had ever occurred.   (2) She would be conscious of the danger of being  ostracized by the society or being looked down by   the society including by her own family members,   relatives,  friends,  and  neighbours.  (3)  She  would  have to brave the whole world. (4) She would face  the risk of losing the love and respect of her own  husband and near relatives, and of her matrimonial   home and happiness being shattered. (5) If  she is  unmarried,  she would  apprehend that  it  would  be   difficult to secure an alliance with a  suitable match  from a respectable  or  an  acceptable  family.  (6)  It  would almost inevitably and almost invariably result   in  mental  torture and suffering to herself.  (7)  The  fear  of  being taunted by  others  will  always  haunt   her.  (8)  She  would  feel  extremely  embarassed  in   relating the incident to others being overpowered by   a feeling of shame on account of the upbringing in a   tradition-bound society  where  by  and large sex is   taboo. (9) The natural inclination would be to avoid   giving publicity to the incident lest the family name  and family honour is brought into controversy. (10)  The parents of an unmarried girl as also the husband  and members of the husband’s family of a married   woman,  would  also  more  often  than  not,  want  to   avoid  publicity  on  account  of  the  fear  of  social  

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stigma on the family name and family honour. (11)  The fear of the victim herself being considered to be  promiscuous  or  in  some  way  responsible  for  the  incident  regardless  of  her  innocence.  (12)  The  reluctance to face interrogation by the investigating   agency,  to  face  the  court,  to  face  the  cross- examination by counsel for the culprit, and the risk   of being disbelieved, acts as a deterrent.”

In State of Maharashtra vs. Chandraprakash  

Kewalchand  Jain  2  , this Court held as under :

“15. It is necessary at the outset to state what the  approach of the court should be while evaluating the   prosecution evidence, particularly the evidence of the  prosecutrix,  in sex offences.  Is  it  essential that the   evidence of the prosecutrix should be corroborated in   material  particulars  before  the  court  bases  a  conviction  on  her  testimony  ?  Does  the  rule  of   prudence demand that in all cases save the rarest of   rare  the court  should  look  for  corroboration  before   acting on the evidence of the prosecutrix ? Let us see   if the Evidence Act provides the clue. Under the said   statute ‘Evidence’ means and includes all statements   which  the  court  permits  or  requires  to  be  made   before it by witnesses, in relation to the matters of   fact under inquiry. Under Section 59 all facts, except   the contents of documents, may be proved by oral   evidence. Section 118 then tells us who may give oral   evidence.  According to that section all  persons are   competent to testify unless the court considers that   they are prevented from understanding the questions   put to them, or from giving rational answers to those   questions, by tender years, extreme old age, disease,   whether of body or mind, or any other cause of the   same kind. Even in the case of an accomplice Section   133 provides that he shall  be a competent witness   against an accused person; and a conviction is not   illegal  merely  because  it  proceeds  upon  the  uncorroborated  testimony  of  an  accomplice.   However,  illustration (b)  to Section 114,  which lays   down a rule  of  practice,  says  that  the  court  ‘may’   presume that  an accomplice  is  unworthy of  credit,   unless he is corroborated in material particulars. Thus   under Section 133, which lays down a rule of law, an   accomplice is a competent witness and a conviction   based solely on his uncorroborated evidence is  not   

2  (1990) 1 SCC 550

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illegal although in view of Section 114, illustration (b),  courts do not as a matter of practice do so and look   for corroboration in material particulars. This is  the   conjoint effect of Sections 133 and 114, illustration  (b).

16. A prosecutrix of a sex offence cannot be put on   par with an accomplice. She is in fact a victim of the   crime.  The  Evidence  Act  nowhere  says  that  her   evidence  cannot  be  accepted  unless  it  is   corroborated  in  material  particulars.  She  is   undoubtedly a competent witness under Section 118   and her evidence must receive the same weight as   is  attached  to  an  injured  in  cases  of  physical   violence. The same degree of care and caution must   attach in the evaluation of her evidence as in the   case of  an injured complainant  or  witness  and no  more. What is necessary is that the court must be   alive to and conscious of the fact that it is dealing   with the evidence of a person who is interested in   the  outcome of  the  charge levelled  by  her.  If  the   court keeps this in mind and feels satisfied that it   can act on the evidence of the prosecutrix, there is   no  rule  of  law  or  practice  incorporated  in  the   Evidence Act similar to illustration (b) to Section 114  which  requires  it  to  look  for  corroboration.  If  for   some reason the court is hesitant to place implicit   reliance on the testimony of the prosecutrix it may  look for evidence which may lend assurance to her   testimony short of corroboration required in the case   of an accomplice. The nature of evidence required to   lend assurance to the testimony of the prosecutrix   must  necessarily  depend  on  the  facts  and  circumstances of each case. But if a prosecutrix is   an  adult  and  of  full  understanding  the  court  is   entitled to base a conviction on her evidence unless   the same is shown to be infirm and not trustworthy.   If the totality of the circumstances appearing on the   record of the case disclose that the prosecutrix does   not  have  a  strong  motive  to  falsely  involve  the  person charged, the court should ordinarily have no   hesitation  in  accepting  her  evidence.  We  have,   therefore, no doubt in our minds that ordinarily the   evidence  of  a  prosecutrix  who  does  not  lack   understanding  must  be  accepted.  The  degree  of   proof required must not be higher than is expected  of  an  injured  witness.  For  the  above  reasons  we  think that exception has rightly been taken to the   approach  of  the  High  Court  as  is  reflected  in  the   following passage:

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“It  is  only  in  the rarest of  rare cases if  the court   finds  that  the  testimony  of  the  prosecutrix  is  so   trustworthy,  truthful  and  reliable  that  other  corroboration may not be necessary.” With respect, the law is not correctly stated. If we may   say so, it is just the reverse. Ordinarily the evidence of   a  prosecutrix  must  carry  the  same  weight  as  is   attached  to  an  injured  person  who  is  a  victim  of   violence, unless there are special circumstances which   call for greater caution, in which case it would be safe  to  act  on  her  testimony  if  there  is  independent   evidence lending assurance to her accusation.

17. We think it proper, having regard to the increase   in  the number of  sex violation cases in  the recent   past,  particularly  cases  of  molestation  and rape in   custody, to remove the notion, if it persists, that the   testimony  of  a  woman  who  is  a  victim  of  sexual   violence must ordinarily be corroborated in material   particulars except in the rarest of rare cases. To insist   on corroboration except in the rarest of rare cases is   to  equate a woman who is  a  victim of  the lust  of   another with an accomplice to a crime and thereby  insult womanhood. It would be adding insult to injury   to  tell  a  woman that  her  story  of  woe will  not  be   believed  unless  it  is  corroborated  in  material   particulars  as  in  the  case  of  an  accomplice  to  a   crime.  Ours  is  a  conservative  society  where  it   concerns sexual behaviour. Ours is not a permissive   society  as  in  some  of  the  western  and  European   countries. Our standard of decency and morality in   public life is not the same as in those countries. It is,   however, unfortunate that respect for womanhood in   our  country  is  on  the  decline  and  cases  of   molestation and rape are steadily growing. An Indian  woman  is  now  required  to  suffer  indignities  in   different  forms,  from lewd remarks  to  eve-teasing,   from molestation to rape. Decency and morality in   public life can be promoted and protected only if we  deal  strictly  with  those  who  violate  the  societal   norms. The standard of proof to be expected by the   court in such cases must take into account the fact   that such crimes are generally committed on the sly   and  very  rarely  direct  evidence  of  a  person  other   than the prosecutrix  is  available.  Courts  must  also   realise that ordinarily a woman, more so a young girl,   will  not  stake  her  reputation  by  levelling  a  false   charge concerning her chastity.”

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Similar observations were made in State of Punjab vs.  

Gurmit Singh  3  , as under :

“……………The  courts  must,  while  evaluating  evidence, remain alive to the fact that in a case of   rape, no self-respecting woman would come forward   in  a  court  just  to  make  a  humiliating  statement   against  her  honour  such  as  is  involved  in  the   commission of rape on her. In cases involving sexual   molestation, supposed considerations which have no  material  effect  on  the  veracity  of  the  prosecution  case or even discrepancies in the statement of the   prosecutrix should not, unless the discrepancies are   such which are of fatal nature, be allowed to throw  out  an  otherwise  reliable  prosecution  case.  The  inherent  bashfulness  of  the  females  and  the  tendency  to  conceal  outrage  of  sexual  aggression  are factors which the courts should not overlook. The   testimony of  the victim in  such cases  is  vital  and  unless  there  are  compelling  reasons  which   necessitate  looking  for  corroboration of  her  statement, the courts should find no difficulty to act   on the testimony of a victim of sexual assault alone  to convict an accused where her testimony inspires   confidence  and  is  found  to  be  reliable.  Seeking  corroboration of her statement before relying upon   the same, as a rule, in such cases amounts to adding   insult to injury. Why should the evidence of a girl or   a  woman  who  complains  of  rape  or  sexual   molestation,  be  viewed  with  doubt,  disbelief  or   suspicion? The court while appreciating the evidence   of a prosecutrix may look for some assurance of her  statement to satisfy its judicial conscience, since she  is a witness who is interested in the outcome of the  charge levelled by her, but there is no requirement   of law to insist upon corroboration of her statement   to base conviction of an accused. The evidence of a   victim of sexual assault stands almost on a par with   the evidence of an injured witness and to an extent   is  even  more  reliable.  Just  as  a  witness  who  has   sustained some injury in the occurrence, which is not   found to be self-inflicted, is considered to be a good  witness in the sense that he is least likely to shield   the real culprit, the evidence of a victim of a sexual   offence  is  entitled  to  great  weight,  absence  of   corroboration  notwithstanding.  Corroborative  evidence is not an imperative component of judicial   

3  (1996) 2  SCC 384

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credence in every case of rape. Corroboration as a   condition for judicial reliance on the testimony of the   prosecutrix  is  not  a  requirement  of  law  but  a  guidance of prudence under given circumstances. It   must  not  be  overlooked  that  a  woman  or  a  girl   subjected to sexual assault is not an accomplice to   the crime but is a victim of another person’s lust and   it is improper and undesirable to test her evidence   with a certain amount of suspicion, treating her as if   she  were  an  accomplice.  Inferences  have  to  be  drawn from a given set of facts and circumstances   with realistic diversity and not dead uniformity lest   that type of  rigidity  in  the shape of rule  of  law is   introduced  through  a  new  form  of  testimonial   tyranny  making  justice  a  casualty.  Courts  cannot   cling to a fossil formula and insist upon corroboration  even if, taken as a whole, the case spoken of by the   victim  of  sex  crime  strikes  the  judicial  mind  as   probable.”  

7. Thus,  while  absence  of  injuries  or  absence  of  raising  

alarm or delay in FIR may not by itself be enough to disbelieve  

the version of prosecutrix in view of the statutory presumption  

under Section 114A of the Evidence Act but if such statement  

has inherent infirmities, creating doubt about its veracity, the  

same  may  not  be  acted  upon.   We  are  conscious  of  the  

sensitivity with which heinous offence under Section 376, IPC  

has to be treated but in the present case the circumstances  

taken as a whole create doubt about the correctness of the  

prosecution version.  We are, thus, of the opinion that a case  

is made out for giving benefit of doubt to the accused.

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8. Accordingly,  we  allow  this  appeal,  set  aside  the  

conviction of the appellant and acquit him of the charge.

…………………………….J. [ V. GOPALA GOWDA ]

………………………………..J. NEW DELHI        [ ADARSH KUMAR GOEL ] September  16, 2014

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ITEM NO.1C-For Judgment   COURT NO.14           SECTION IIA                S U P R E M E  C O U R T  O F  I N D I A                        RECORD OF PROCEEDINGS Criminal Appeal  No(s).  2358/2010 MUNNA                                          Appellant(s)                                 VERSUS STATE OF M.P.                                 Respondent(s)

Date : 16/09/2014 This appeal was called on for JUDGMENT  today.

For Appellant(s)  Mr. C.D. Singh, Adv.  Ms. Sakshi Kakkar, Adv.

                    Ms. Pragati Neekhra, Adv. For Respondent(s)                      Mr. Mishra Saurabh,Adv.                      Ms. Vanshaja Shukla, Adv.

Mr. Ankit Kr.Lal, Adv. Hon'ble  Mr.  Justice  Adarsh  Kumar  Goel  pronounced  the  

judgment of the Bench comprising Hon'ble Mr. Justice V.Gopala  Gowda and His Lordship.

The appeal is allowed in terms of the signed order.       (VINOD KUMAR)    (MALA KUMARI SHARMA)

COURT MASTER COURT MASTER (Signed Reportable judgment is placed on the file)