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REPORTABLE

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA

CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION

CIVIL     APPEAL     NO(s).     4990     OF     2003   

MULCHAND KHANUMAL KHATRI                Appellant (s)

                   VERSUS

STATE OF GUJARAT & ORS.                 Respondent(s)

J     U     D     G     M     E     N     T   

R.M.     Lodha,     J.   

The judgment and order dated December 26, 2002  

passed by the Gujarat High Court is under challenge in this  

Appeal by special leave.

2. The appellant claims to be joint owner of the land  

being Survey No.  11430 admeasuring 34 sq. mtr. at Palanpur,  

Gujarat.  On April 1, 1980, a notification was issued under  

Section 4 of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894 (for short, ‘the  

Act’) that proposed acquisition of the appellant’s land and  

some other land for the public purpose, namely, construction  

of Palanpur City and taluka Police Station. The said  

notification was published in the Government Gazette on

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January 8, 1981.  Later on, Section 4 notification was  

revised and published in the Official Gazette on September  

22, 1983. The declaration under Section 6 was published on  

January 5, 1984. The appellant challenged the acquisition of  

his land through the above notifications in a Special Civil  

Application before the Gujarat High Court.  An interim  

relief in the above matter was granted on April 18, 1984.  

3.The Act was amended on September 24, 1984 by the Land  

Acquisition (Amendment) Act, 1984 (for short, 'the Amendment  

Act') whereby Section 11A  was brought in the statute book.  

4.The Special Civil Application filed by the appellant was  

dismissed on January 11, 1996.  The Dy. Collector made the  

award on August 31, 1998.

5. Before the High Court, inter alia, the argument  

was canvassed on behalf of the appellant that the award  

having been passed beyond two years from the date of the  

publication of the declaration under Section 6, by virtue of  

Section 11A of the Act, the entire acquisition proceedings  

had lapsed.  The High Court, however, repelled the above  

argument and held as follows :

“The submission of the learned Counsel for  the petitioner was that their earlier  petitions were dismissed and the stay  granted earlier stood vacated by the  Division Bench of this Court on 11.1.96.  Therefore, the Authority was supposed to  declare the Award within a period of 2 years  from that day i.e. 11.1.96.  The said period

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would expire on January 10, 1998 whereas  Award u/s 11 came to be passed only in  August, 1998 which is admittedly after a  period of 2 years.   It is no doubt true  that the Division Bench of this Court  earlier dismissed their writ petitions on  11.1.96 and vacated the interim relief, but  the vacation of interim relief granted in  favour of the petitioners must be brought to  the notice of the concerned Authority.  Merely because they were represented through  their counsel before the court would not be  sufficient. Unless and until certified copy  of the said judgment and order passed by the  court is brought to the notice of the  Authority, the Authority is not supposed to  act.  The period of 2 years would start only  from the date of the notice. In reply  affidavit it has been clearly stated that  the copy of the judgment and order passed by  this Court on 11.1.96 was received by them  only 5.9.97.

In that view of the matter, admittedly the  Award dt. 31.8.98 passed u/s 11 of the Act  was within a period of 2 years.”

6. From the above discussion, it is apparent that the  

High Court was of the view that unless and until certified  

copy of the judgment and order passed by the court was  

brought to the notice of the authority, the authority was  

not supposed to act and the period of two years under  

Section 11A of the Act would start only from the date of  

such notice and as the copy of the judgment and order passed  

by the High Court on January 11, 1996 was received by the  

competent authority on September 5, 1997, the respondents  

were entitled to the benefit of the entire period from  

January 11, 1996 to September 5, 1997.

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7.      We are unable to accept the view of the High Court.

8.      Section  11A of the Act reads as under :-

11A. Period within which an award shall be  made.- (1) The Collector shall make an award under  section 11 within a period of two years from  the date of the publication of the  declaration and if no award is made within  that period, the entire proceedings for the  acquisition of the land shall lapse:  

Provided that in a case where the said  declaration has been published before the  commencement of the Land Acquisition  (Amendment) Act, 1984, the award shall be  made within a period of two years from such  commencement.

Explanation.- In computing the period of  two years referred to in this section, the  period during which any action or proceeding  to be taken in pursuance of the said  declaration is stayed by an order of a Court  shall be excluded.

9. Section 11A mandates that an award shall be made  

by the Collector under Section 11 of the Act within a period  

of two years from the date of the publication of the  

declaration.  The non-adherence to this period results in  

entire acquisition proceedings being lapsed.  The proviso  

that follows sub-section (1) states that where the  

declaration under Section 6 has been published before the  

commencement of the Amendment Act the award shall be made  

within a period of two years from such commencement.  The  

Explanation appended to Section 11A clarifies that the

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period during which any action or proceeding relating to  

acquisition taken pursuant to such declaration remains  

stayed by an order of the court, such period shall be  

excluded.

10. Insofar as present case is concerned, there is no  

dispute that the proviso that follows sub-section (1) of  

Section 11A is attracted because the declaration under  

Section 6 was published before the commencement of the  

Amendment Act and the award was made after coming into force  

of Section 11A.  The period of two years shall thus commence  

from September 24, 1984 when the amendment to the Act was  

notified. It is also not in issue that in computing the  

period of two years, the period during which the interim  

relief granted by the Gujarat High Court remained operative  

shall have to be excluded.  The stay order of the High Court  

remained operative for the period September 24, 1984 to  

January 11, 1996. The question is, whether Section 11A of  

the Act permits exclusion of time that was taken in  

obtaining the certified copy of the judgment and order  

passed by the High Court and the period from the date the  

certified copy was obtained and it was brought to the notice  

of the authority.   

11. The question with which we are concerned came up  

for consideration in Ravi Khullar and Another Vs.  Union of

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India and Others, (2007) 5 SCC 231. In paras 54, 55 and 56  

of the report, this Court stated as follows:  

“54. In the matter of computing the period  of limitation three situations may be  visualized, namely, (a) where the Limitation  Act applies by its own force; (b) where the  provisions of the Limitation Act with or  without modifications are made applicable to  a special statute; and (c) where the special  statue itself prescribes the period of  limitation and provides for extension of  time and/or condonation of delay.  The  instant case is not one which is governed by  the provisions of the Limitation Act. The  Land Acquisition Collector in making an  award does not act as a court within the  meaning of the Limitation Act.  It is also  clear from the provisions of the Land  Acquisition Act that the provisions of the  Limitation Act have not been made applicable  to proceedings under the Land Acquisition  Act in the matter of making an award under  Section 11-A of the Act.  However, Section  11-A of the Act does provide a period of  limitation within which the Collector shall  make his award.  The Explanation thereto  also provides for exclusion of the period  during which any action  or proceeding to be  taken in pursuance of the declaration is  stayed by an order of a court.  Such being  the provision, there is no scope for  importing into Section 11-A of the Land  Acquisition Act the provisions of Section 12  of the Limitation Act.  The application of  Section 12 of the Limitation Act is also  confined to matters enumerated therein.  The  time taken for obtaining a certified copy of  the judgment is excluded because a certified  copy is required to be filed while  preferring an appeal/revision/review etc.  challenging the impugned order.  Thus a  court is not permitted to read into Section  11-A of the Act a provision for exclusion of  time taken to obtain a certified copy of the  judgment and order.  The Court has,  therefore, no option but to compute the  period of limitation for making an award in

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accordance with the provisions of Section  11-A of the Act after excluding such period  as can be excluded under the Explanation to  Section 11-A of the Act.     

55. Our conclusion finds support from the  scheme of the Land Acquisition Act itself.  Section 11-A of the Act was inserted by Act  68 of 1984 with effect from 24-9-1984.  Similarly, Section 28-A was also inserted by  the Amendment Act of 1984 with effect from  the same date.   In Section 28-A the Act  provides for a period of limitation within  which an application should be made to the  Collector for  redetermination of the  amount  of  compensation  on  the basis of  the award of the Court.  The proviso to sub- section (1) of Section 28-A reads as  follows:-

"Provided that in computing the  period of three months within which  an application to the Collector  shall be made under this sub- section, the day on which the award  was pronounced and the time  requisite for obtaining a copy of  the award shall be excluded."

56. It will thus be seen that the  legislature wherever it considered necessary  incorporated by express words the rule  incorporated in Section 12 of the Limitation  Act. It has done so expressly in Section 28- A of the Act while it has consciously not  incorporated this rule in Section 11-A even  while providing for exclusion of time under  the Explanation. The intendment of the  legislature is therefore unambiguous and  does not permit the court to read words into  Section 11-A of the Act so as to enable it  to read Section 12 of the Limitation Act  into Section 11-A of the Land Acquisition  Act.”

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12. We are in respectful agreement with the above  

legal position. The period prescribed in Section 11A is  

mandatory.  The consequence of breach is provided in the  

provision itself viz., the entire acquisition proceedings  

get lapsed.  Insofar as computation of the period is  

concerned, the period of two years commences from the date  

of the publication of the declaration.  Where the  

declaration has been published before the Amendment Act,  

then the period commences from the commencement of the  

Amendment Act.  The only period that is excludable is the  

period during which the action or proceedings to be taken  

pursuant to the said declaration remains stayed under the  

order of a court and no other. Section 11A is a special  

provision for the purposes of the Act and the legislative  

intent being clear from the bare language of the explanation  

appended thereto, we find no justification to read the  

provisions of the Limitation Act, 1963 and particularly  

Section 12 thereof into it.

13. In view of the above legal position and the facts  

noticed above, we hold as we must, that the award having not  

been made within the period prescribed in Section 11A of the  

Act, the entire proceedings for the acquisition of the  

appellant’s land has lapsed. The High Court was clearly in  

error in excluding the period from January 11, 1996 to  

September 5, 1997. This period cannot be excluded under  

explanation appended to Section 11A of the Act.

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14. In view of the above, Civil Appeal is allowed and  

the impugned judgment and order is set aside. The entire  

proceedings for the acquisition concerning the appellant’s  

land is declared to have lapsed.  No costs.

.......................J. (R.M. LODHA)

NEW DELHI; .......................J. MARCH 27, 2012 (H.L. GOKHALE)