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Reportable

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION

CIVIL APPEAL NO.   9084      OF 2012 (@ SLP (C) NO. 16063 OF 2007)

Mst. Param Pal Singh Through Father ….Appellant

VERSUS

M/s National Insurance Co. & Anr.                 .…Respondents

J U D G M E N T

Fakkir Mohamed Ibrahim Kalifulla, J.

1. Leave granted.

2. This appeal is directed against the judgment of the High  

Court  of  Delhi  passed  in  FAO  No.184/2005  dated  

23.05.2007. The said appeal before the High Court arose  

out of an award passed by the Workmen’s Compensation  

Commissioner  in  its  order  dated  29.12.2004  in  

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WCD/113/NWD/02.  The  Workmen’s  Compensation  

Commissioner  determined  the  compensation  payable  to  

the appellant herein in a sum of Rs.2,20,280/- along with  

another  sum  of  Rs.2500/-  as  funeral  charges  under  

Section  4(4)  of  the  Workmen’s  Compensation  Act.  A  

separate  show-cause-notice  was  issued  for  payment  of  

interest and penalty. The respondent herein preferred the  

abovesaid appeal in FAO No.184/2005 in which the High  

Court passed the impugned order setting aside the order  

passed  by  the  Commissioner.  It  is  in  the  abovesaid  

background the appellant-claimant has come forward with  

this appeal.  

3. At  the very outset,  it  is required to be stated that  the  

appellant  claimed himself  to be the adopted son of the  

deceased  Jeet  Singh  @  Ajit  Singh.  According  to  the  

claimant  the  deceased  Jeet  Singh  @  Ajit  Singh  was  

employed  as  Truck  Driver  by  the  second  respondent  

herein to drive truck bearing No.DL-IG-8255. It is stated  

that in July 2002 the deceased Jeet Singh @ Ajit Singh  

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was assigned the duty of driving the abovesaid truck in  

connection  with  the  trade  and  business  of  the  second  

respondent from Delhi to Nimiaghat, that on 17.07.2002  

when  the  vehicle  reached  near  about  the  destination  

Nimiaghat, District Giridih, the deceased suffered a health  

set-back and therefore he parked the vehicle on the road  

side of a nearby hotel. It is further stated that immediately  

after  parking  the  vehicle  he  fainted  and  the  persons  

nearby  took  him  to  the  hospital  where  the  doctors  

declared that he was brought dead. An FIR was stated to  

have  been  lodged  with  the  police  and  thereafter  the  

postmortem  was  conducted  at  Civil  Hospital,  District  

Giridih.  The  said  truck  was  insured  with  the  first  

respondent  herein.  In  the  abovesaid  background  the  

appellant  preferred  the  application  before  the  

Commissioner  of  Workmen’s  Compensation,  Delhi  

contending  that  the  death  of  the  deceased  was  in  the  

course of his employment with the trade and business of  

the  second  respondent  and  that  his  death  was  due  to  

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stress and strain while driving the said truck continuously  

over a period of time. It was further claimed that at the  

time of his death the deceased was drawing wages at the  

rate of Rs.3091/- per month apart from a sum of RS.50/-  

per day as allowances and in all a sum of Rs.4591/- per  

month. The age of the deceased was stated to be 45 years  

at the time of his death. Appellant also claimed interest @  

12% p.a from the date  of  accident till  realization apart  

from claiming penalty.  

4. The  claim  of  the  appellant  was  resisted  by  the  first  

respondent  substantively  on  two  grounds.  In  the  first  

place it was contended that the appellant had no locus to  

file  the  claim  petition  inasmuch  as  he  was  not  a  

dependant. It was then contended that the death of the  

deceased was due to natural causes and that there was no  

CAUSAL CONNECTION between the death of the deceased  

and that of his employment. The specific stand of the first  

respondent  was  that  the  deceased  was  an  unmarried  

person, that on that day he was not driving the vehicle  

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and  that  one  Bhure  Singh  s/o  Dharam Pal  Singh  was  

driving the truck in question and that  no accident  took  

place.  The  jurisdiction  of  the  Commissioner  was  also  

questioned.  

5. Before  the  Commissioner  the  biological  father  of  the  

appellant examined himself as a witness who was cross-

examined on behalf of the respondents. One Anil Sharma  

s/o the second respondent gave evidence on his side who  

was cross-examined by the counsel for the appellant. On  

behalf  of  the  first  respondent  one  A.B.  Dutta  was  

examined. On behalf of the appellant Exhibits AW1/1 to  

AW1/7 and AW1/R were marked. AW1/1 is the copy of  

FIR, AW1/2 is the copy of postmortem report, AW1/3 is  

the  copy  of  insurance  policy,  AW1/4  is  the  copy  of  

registration certificate,  AW1/5 and AW1/6 are  copies of  

ration card, AW1/7 is the copy of affidavit of Sh. Santokh  

Singh regarding the age and name of the deceased and  

AW1/R is the Adoption Deed.  

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6. The  Commissioner  repelled  both  the  contentions  of  the  

respondents, namely, about the locus of the appellant as  

well  as  the  CAUSAL  CONNECTION of  the  death  of  the  

deceased with that of his employment and awarded the  

compensation  as  mentioned  above.  The  learned  Judge,  

however, held that the death of the deceased was due to  

natural causes and it had no CAUSAL CONNECTION with  

his employment and also held that  the  adoption of  the  

appellant was not proved.  

7. We heard Mr. R.K. Nain, learned counsel for the appellant  

and Shri M.K. Dua, learned counsel for the respondent(s).  

Learned counsel for the appellant strenuously contended  

that the impugned judgment of the High Court is liable to  

be set aside on both the grounds. According to learned  

counsel when once the employment of the deceased with  

the  second  respondent  was  proved  there  was  every  

justification for the Commissioner in having held that the  

death  of  the  deceased  was  in  the  course  of  his  

employment  in  an  accident  arising  out  of  such  

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employment.  It  was  then  contended  that  the  learned  

Judge failed to consider  the evidence which was placed  

before the Court relating to valid adoption of the appellant  

by  the  deceased  in  a  ceremony  held  for  that  purpose  

where  the  biological  father  gave  appellant  in  adoption  

when he was three years old which was accepted by the  

deceased  to  be  his  adopted  son.  The  learned  counsel  

relied upon the decisions in Lakshman Singh Kothari V.  

Smt.  Rup  Kanwar -  AIR  1961  SC  1378,  Messrs  

Mackinnon  Mackenzie  &  Co.  Pvt.  Ltd. V.  Ritta  

Farnandes - 1969 A.C.J. 419, Mackinnon Mackenzie &  

Co. Pvt. Ltd. V. Ibrahim Mahmmod Issak 1969 A.C.J.  

422, State of Rajasthan V. Ram Prasad and another -  

2001  A.C.J.  647,  Anand  Bihari  and  others  V.  

Rajasthan State Road Trans. Corpn. and another  -  

1991 A.C.J. 848, Lalo Devi V. Superintendent of Mines  

-1988 ACJ 886 and Shakuntala Chandrakant Shreshti  

V.  Prabhakar Maruti  Garvali  & another -  IV (2006)  

ACC 769 (SC) in support of his submission.  

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8. Though notice was duly served on the second respondent,  

he did not evince any interest in contesting this appeal.  

Learned counsel for the first respondent in his submissions  

contended that the judgment of the High Court does not  

call  for  any  interference.  According  to  learned  counsel  

since there was no accident and the death of the deceased  

was due to natural causes, no compensation was payable  

under the Workmen’s Compensation Act. Learned counsel  

also contended that the adoption of the appellant by the  

deceased was not proved in the manner known to law.

9. Having heard learned counsel for  the respective parties  

and having perused the judgment of the learned Judge as  

well  as  that  of  the  Workmen’s  Compensation  

Commissioner and all other material papers placed before  

us, we find that the judgment of the learned Judge cannot  

be sustained.

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10. In the first instance we wish to deal with the issue  

relating to validity of the adoption of the appellant since if  

only his  adoption is held to  be valid there  is scope for  

examining his right to claim compensation over the death  

of the deceased as his adopted son. In Hindu Law in the  

celebrated decision of this Court reported in  Lakshman  

Singh Kothari  (supra), the legal requirement for a valid  

adoption has been succinctly stated in paragraph 10 which  

reads as under:

“10. The law may be briefly stated thus: Under the  Hindu law, whether among the regenerate caste or  among Sudras, there cannot be a valid adoption  unless the  adoptive boy is  transferred from one  family to another and that can be done only by the  ceremony of giving and taking. The object of the  corporeal  giving  and  receiving  in  adoption  is  obviously to secure due publicity. To achieve this  object it is essential to have a formal ceremony.  No particular form is prescribed for the ceremony,  but the law requires that the natural parent shall  hand  over  the  adoptive  boy  and  the  adoptive  parent  shall  receive  him.  The  nature  of  the  ceremony  may  vary  depending  upon  the  circumstances of each case. But a ceremony there  shall be, and giving and taking shall be part of it.  The  exigencies  of  the  situation  arising  out  of  diverse  circumstances  necessitated  the  introduction  of  the  doctrine  of  delegation;  and,  

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therefore,  the  parents,  after  exercising  their  volition to give and take the boy in adoption, may  both or either of them delegate the physical act of  handing over the boy or receiving him, as the case  may be, to a third party.”

11. The  said  legal  position  has  been  consistently  

followed by this Court which can be mentioned by referring  

to a recent decision of this Court reported in M. Gurudas  

and others V.  Rasaranjan and others - 2006 (8) SCC  

367. Paragraphs 26 and 27 are relevant for our purpose  

which read as under:

“26. To  prove  valid  adoption,  it  would  be  necessary to bring on record that there had been  an  actual  giving  and  taking  ceremony.  Performance  of  “datta  homam”  was  imperative,  subject  to  just  exceptions.  Above all,  as  noticed  hereinbefore,  the  question  would  arise  as  to  whether adoption of a daughter was permissible in  law.

27. In Mulla's Principles of Hindu Law, 17th Edn.,  p. 710, it is stated:

“488.  Ceremonies  relating  to  adoption.—(1)  The ceremonies relating to an adoption are— (a)  the  physical  act  of  giving  and  receiving,  with intent to transfer the boy from one family  into another;

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(b)  the  datta  homam,  that  is,  oblations  of  clarified butter to fire; and (c) other minor ceremonies, such as  putresti  jag (sacrifice for male issue).

(2) The physical act of giving and receiving is  essential to the validity of an adoption.

As to  datta  homam it  is not  settled whether  its  performance  is  essential  to  the  validity  of  an  adoption in every case.

As  to  the  other  ceremonies,  their  performance is not necessary to the validity of an  adoption.

(3) No religious ceremonies, not even  datta  homam, are necessary in the case of shudras. Nor  are religious ceremonies necessary amongst Jains  or in the Punjab.”

12. In this context, it will be worthwhile to note the  

requirement of registration of an Adoption Deed. Section  

17  of  the  Registration  Act  specifically  refers  to  the  

documents of which registration is compulsory. The deed  

of adoption is not one of the documents mentioned in sub-

section  1  of  Section  17  which  mandatorily  required  

registration. Sub-section 3 of Section 17 only refers to the  

mandatory requirement of registration of an authorization  

that  may  be  given  for  adopting  a  son  executed  after  

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01.01.1872 if such authorization was not conferred by a  

Will.  Dealing  with  the  said  provision  relating  to  

authorization, it has been held in the decision reported in  

Vishvanath  Ramji  Karale  V.  Rahibai  Ramji  Karale  

and  others  -  AIR  1931  Bombay  105  by  a  deed  of  

adoption as distinguished from authority to adopt does not  

require registration.

13. Keeping the  above statement  of  law in mind as  

regards the procedure to be followed for a valid adoption  

and the statutory stipulation that an adoption deed does  

not require registration, the claim of the appellant as the  

adopted son of the deceased requires to be considered.  

We find from the record that the appellant has produced  

Exhibit AW1/R which is the copy of the Adoption Deed. To  

appreciate  the  claim  of  the  appellant  in  the  proper  

perspective  the  contents  of  the  said  document  can  be  

usefully referred to which reads as under:

“TRUE TRANSLATION IN ENGLISH

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Stamp

ADOPTION DEED

1. Ajit Singh son of Surta Singh son of Deva Singh,  am residing at village Dhariwal Kalan, Tehsil &  Distt-Gurdaspur, Punjab (hereinafter called the  first party). That I am unmarried so I have no  children. Keeping in mind that in absence of the  children one becomes without any care. Hence,  for the purpose of proper maintenance a son is  necessary.  So,  I  have  thought  it  fit  to  take  Master Parampal son of Sh. Santokh Singh and  Smt. Nirmal Kaur (hereinafter called the second  party)  resident  of  village  Dhariwal  Kalan  in  adoption and they have decided to give. Master  Parampal’s  date  of  birth  is  8-12-1996.  His  bringing  up  is  being  done  by  me  and  I  am  planning to send him to school. For the interest  of his health and medication I myself do care.  Parampal Singh is a very obedient boy and he  always remains obedient  to me and show me  utter respect. I always have a great affection for  him. I  want  that  whatever  I  leave  behind be  owned by Parampal Singh. I, in the presence of  all  respected  persons  and  Panchayat,  adopt  Master  Parampal Singh as my son and in the  ceremony goods and sweets are distributed for  the happiness of one and all.

Adoption  Deed  is  reduced  in  writing  for  the  purpose of proof.

First party Second party

Ajit Singh LTI Sd/- Sd/- Gurbax Singh Nirmal Kaur

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Sarpanch 15/2/1999 Sd/- Gram Panchayat Seal & Stamp Dhariwal Kalan

Witnesses:- Witnesses:- Sd/- Sd/- Nishan Singh        Tarsem Singh

S/o-Dayal Singh      S/o-Bawa Singh  Vill- Chhina Retwala   R/o-Dhariwalkalan 15/2/1999   Sd/-

Karnail Singh  Nambardar

     Vill-Kallu Sohal”

14. The biological father of the appellant filed his proof  

affidavit on behalf of the appellant and offered himself for  

cross-examination. In the said affidavit it was specifically  

mentioned that the appellant was the dependent of the  

deceased workman as his adopted son. In the course of  

the  cross-examination  of  the  appellant  by  the  

respondents, the witness produced the original Adoption  

Deed along with the photocopy and after verifying with the  

original the photocopy was marked as Exhibit AW1/R. The  

relevant part of cross-examination as regards the adoption  

of the appellant can be extracted which are as under:

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“……It is correct that Ajit Singh is my elder brother.  At the time of writing of this Adoption Deed there  were  15-20  persons  present.  Those  who  were  present  were known to  me.  This  Adoption Deed  was written by “SARPANCH OF THE VILLAGE” Shri  Gurbux  Singh.  At  the  time  of  writing  of  this  ‘Adoption Deed’ no mantra ceremony was done. It  is wrong to say that at the time of writing of this  ‘Adoption  Deed’  Ajit  Singh  was  not  present.  ‘Adoption  Deed’  exbt.  AW1/R  at  point  ‘A’  my  signatures are there. At point ‘B’ & ‘C’ there are  signatures  of  witnesses.  At  point  ‘D’  there  was  signature  of  SARPANCH.  At  point  ‘E’  there  are  signatures  of  another  witness.  Signatures are  of  only five persons. Apart from 15-20 people there  were some women as well. It is wrong to say that  this ‘Adoption Deed’ has been written afterwards.  At  the  time  of  writing  of  this  ‘Adoption  Deed’  Parampal was 3 years old. It is wrong to say that I  am deposing falsely.”

15. Conspectus consideration of the deed of adoption  

and the oral evidence led on behalf of the appellant, we  

find  that  there  was  a  simple  ceremony  though  not  a  

mantra ceremony held in which the deceased participated  

wherein  it  was  expressed  that  the  deceased  being  a  

bachelor thought it fit to take the appellant in adoption for  

which  the  biological  parents  of  the  appellant  were  also  

willing to give him in adoption. In the Adoption Deed it was  

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specifically mentioned that  the  process of  adoption was  

carried out in the presence of respected persons of the  

Panchayat in a ceremony where goods and sweets were  

distributed in commemoration of the function of adoption.  

It  has  come  in  evidence  that  the  Adoption  Deed  was  

written  by  Gurbux  Singh  on  15.02.1999  who  was  the  

Sarpanch  of  the  village  at  that  point  of  time.  The  left  

thumb impression of the deceased was found affixed in the  

Adoption Deed which was signed both  by the  biological  

parents apart from three witnesses, namely, Nishan Singh  

s/o Dayal Singh of village Chhina Retwala, Tarsem Singh  

s/o  Bawa  Singh  r/o  Dhariwalkalan  and  Karnail  Singh  

Nambardar of village Kallu Soha. It was stated that about  

15 to 20 persons apart from women folk were present at  

the  time  when  the  adoption  ceremony  was  held.  The  

suggestion, that the deed was written later on, was duly  

denied  by  the  witnesses.  It  was  also  stated  that  the  

appellant was just three years old at the time when the  

adoption took place. Further Exhibits AW1/5 and AW1/6  

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are the copies of ration cards in which it is mentioned that  

the father of the appellant is Ajit Singh.  

16. All the above factors which are born out by records  

as well as in the oral version of the witnesses, examined  

on  behalf  of  the  appellant,  in  our  considered  opinion  

conclusively proved that  the  appellant  was the  adopted  

son of the deceased having been adopted as early as on  

15.02.1999 i.e.  long before the death  of the deceased,  

namely, 17.07.2002. Unfortunately, the learned Judge in  

the impugned judgment has completely misled himself by  

rejecting  the  claim  of  adoption  by  holding  that  the  

document was not registered with the Tahsildar, that no  

ceremony  was  held,  that  the  adoptive  father  was  not  

present,  that  there  was  no  giving  and  taking  of  the  

adopted son and, therefore, the adoption of the appellant  

by the deceased not proved. On the contrary, as stated  

above, we find that everyone of the prescription required  

for a valid adoption were very much present in the form of  

both  oral  and  documentary  evidence  on  record  and  

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consequently the conclusion of the learned Judge in having  

held that the appellant was not the adopted son of the  

deceased cannot be sustained and the same is set aside.  

Having reached the above conclusion, we proceed to deal  

with the claim of the appellant on merits.

17. On merits to retrace the facts, the deceased Jeet  

Singh @ Ajit Singh was employed as truck driver by the  

second respondent. His services were utilized for driving  

the  truck  belonging  to  the  second  respondent  bearing  

No.DL-IG-8255. The deceased was driving the said truck  

in connection with the commercial transport operation of  

the  second  respondent  from  Delhi  to  Nimiaghat  on  

17.07.2002.  According  to  the  claimant  when  the  truck  

reached the near about of Nimiaghat, District Giridih, the  

deceased felt giddy and, therefore, parked the vehicle on  

the road side near a hotel and soon thereafter he stated to  

have  fainted.  The  deceased  was  removed  to  a  nearby  

hospital where the doctors declared him brought dead. An  

FIR was lodged with the Police Station, Nimiaghat in FIR  

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No.7/2002 dated 18.07.2002. The postmortem was stated  

to have been conducted on 19.07.2002 and thereafter the  

dead body was taken to his native place for performing  

last  rites.  The  claimant  in  his  application  before  the  

Commissioner submitted that the death of the deceased  

was due to the strain and stress of continuous driving in  

the course of his employment with the second respondent,  

that the vehicle which he was driving bearing No.DL-IG-

8255 was insured with the first respondent vide covering  

note  No.0968499  for  the  period  of  14.02.2002  to  

13.02.2003 and that an additional premium was also paid  

for  coverage  of  compensation  payable  under  the  

Workmen’s  Compensation  Act.  The  claimant,  as  an  

adopted son of the deceased, claimed compensation as his  

dependant.  

18. As far as the merits of the claim was concerned,  

the stand of the first respondent in its written statement  

was that the deceased was not in the employment of the  

second  respondent,  that  no  accident  took  place  in  the  

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course  of  the  employment  of  the  deceased  with  the  

second respondent, that the deceased was not holding a  

valid  license  at  the  time  of  alleged  accident,  that  the  

deceased was under the influence of alcohol or drug at the  

time of alleged accident and, therefore, no compensation  

was payable and the first respondent was not liable to pay  

any compensation. The second respondent also took the  

stand in his written statement that the deceased was not  

in his employment and that he was not in his professional  

visit in the truck bearing No.DL-IG-8255 to Nimiaghat. It  

was  also  stated  that  one  Bhure  Singh  s/o  Dharam Pal  

Singh was driving the said truck and that in all possibilities  

the said Bhure Singh might have given lift to the deceased  

and the deceased might have died due to heavy dose of  

drug with tea.  

19. On  behalf  of  the  first  respondent  its  Divisional  

Manager  filed his  proof  affidavit  while  on  behalf  of  the  

second respondent one Anil Sharma was examined. As far  

as the employment of the deceased was concerned, the  

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Commissioner has noted that the FIR which was marked  

as Exhibit AW1/1 disclose that  the second driver  Bhure  

Singh himself admitted therein that the deceased was the  

senior driver who was driving the vehicle at the time of his  

death. As regards the said piece of evidence contained in  

AW1/1 nothing was brought out in his evidence either by  

way of trip sheet  or attendance register  or  payment of  

wages register or any other document to show that the  

deceased  was  not  in  the  employment  of  the  second  

respondent at any point of time or on the fateful day. The  

Commissioner  also  noted  that  there  was  no  cross-

examination of WW1/A Santokh Singh on that issue. On  

the other hand RW.1 Anil Sharma in his cross-examination  

admitted  that  a  sum of  Rs.10,000/-  was  given  to  the  

family of the deceased for cremation purposes. Therefore,  

the issue relating to the employment of the deceased by  

the second respondent as found to have been established  

before the Commissioner cannot be assailed.

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20. Once we cross the said hurdle only other question  

to be considered is whether death of the deceased was in  

an  accident  arising  out  of  and  in  the  course  of  his  

employment with the second respondent? It  is common  

ground that the vehicle which was driven by the deceased  

did not meet with any road accident on 17.07.2002. As a  

matter of fact, the deceased while driving the vehicle from  

Delhi  to  Nimiaghat  when  reached  near  the  destination,  

namely, Nimiaghat felt giddy and thereafter stated to have  

collapsed  as  he  was  found  in  a  faint  condition  in  the  

vehicle which he managed to park on the road side.  

21. The entitlement to claim compensation is therefore  

dependent on fulfillment of the stipulations contained in  

Section 3(1) of the Workmen’s Compensation Act, which  

read as under:

“3. Employer’s liability for compensation.-(1)  If  personal  injury  is  caused  to  an  employee  by  accident  arising out  of  and in  the  course  of  his  employment,  his  employer  shall  be liable to pay  compensation in accordance with the provisions of  this Chapter:

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Provided that  the  employer  shall  not  be so  liable –  

(a) …… …… ……

(b) …… …… ……

(i) …… …… ……

(ii) …… …… ……

(iii) …… …… ……”

22. However, there are decisions of the English Court  

as  early  as  of  the  year  1903  onwards  stating  that  

unlooked-for mishap or an untoward event which is not  

expected or designed should be construed as falling within  

the definition of an “accident” and in the event of such  

“untoward”  “unexpected”  event  resulted  in  a  personal  

injury  caused  to  the  workman  in  the  course  of  his  

employment in connection with the trade and business of  

his  employer,  the  same  would  be  governed  by  the  

provisions of Section 3 of the Workmen’s Compensation  

Act. Such a legal principle evolved from time immemorial  

got the seal of approval of this Court and for this purpose  

we  can  refer  to  the  celebrated  decision  in  Ritta  

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Farnandes (supra).  After  referring  to  the  decision  of  

House  of  Lords  in  Clover  Clayton  &  Co. V.  Hughes  

reported  in  1910  A.C.  242  this  Court  referred  to  the  

relevant  passage  in  the  decision  of  House  of  Lords  in  

paragraph 4, which reads as under:

“4.  Even  if  a  workman dies  from a  pre-existing  disease, if the disease is aggravated or accelerated  under the circumstances which can be said to be  accidental,  his  death  results  from  injury  by  accident.  This was clearly laid down by the House  of Lords in Clover Clayton & Co. v. Hughes where  the  deceased,  whilest  tightening  a  nut  with  a  spanner, fell back on his hand and died.  A post  mortem  examination  showed  that  there  was  a  large aneurism of the aorta, and that death was  caused by a rupture of the aorta.  The aneurism  was in such an advanced condition that it might  have burst  while the man was asleep,  and very  slight exertion or strain would have been sufficient  to bring about a rupture.  The County Court Judge  found  that  the  death  was  caused  by  a  strain  arising out of the ordinary work of the deceased  operating upon a condition of body which was such  as to render  the strain fatal, and held upon the  authorities  that  this  was  an  accident  within  the  meaning of the Act.  His decision was upheld both  by the Court of Appeal and the House of Lords:

“No doubt the ordinary accident,”  said Lord  Loreburn, L.C. “is associated with something  external:  the  bursting  of  a  boiler  or  an  explosion in a mine, for example.  But it may  be merely from the man’s own miscalculation,  

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such as tripping and falling.  Or it may be due  both to internal and external conditions, as if  a  seaman  were  to  faint  in  the  rigging  and  tumble into the sea.  I think it may also be  something  going  wrong  within  the  human  frame itself,  such as straining of  muscle or  the  breaking  of  a  blood  vessel.   If  that  occurred  when  he  was  lifting  a  weight,  it  would properly be described as an accident.  So,  I  think,  rupturing  an  aneurism  when  tightening  a  nut  with  a  spanner  may  be  regarded as an accident.”

With regard to Lord Macnanghten’s definition of an  accident  being  “an  unlooked  for  mishap  or  untoward event which is not expected or designed”  it was said that an event was unexpected if it was  not  expected  by the  man who suffered  it,  even  though everyman of commonsense who knew the  circumstances would think it certain to happen.”

23. In a recent decision of this Court in  Shakuntala  

Chandrakant  Shreshti (supra),  the  factors  to  be  

established to prove that an accident has taken place have  

been culled out and stated as under in paragraph 28:

“28. In a case of this nature to prove that accident  has taken place, factors which would have to be  established, inter alia, are:

1. stress  and  strain  arising  during  the  course of employment

2. nature of employment

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3. injury  aggravated  due  to  stress  and  strain”

24. In  Mallikarjuna  G.  Hiremath V.  Branch  

Manager,  Oriental  Insurance  Co.  Ltd.  and another  

reported in AIR 2009 SC 2019 the  principles to  attract  

Section 3 of the Workmen’s Compensation Act have been  

stated as under in paragraph 14:

“14. There  are  a  large  number  of  English  and  American  decisions,  some  of  which  have  been  taken note of in ESI Corpn’s case (supra) in regard  to essential  ingredients  for  such finding and the  tests attracting the provisions of Section 3 of the  Act.  The principles are:

(1) There  must  be  a  casual  connection  between the injury and the accident and  the  accident  and  the  work  done  in  the  course of employment.

(2) The onus is  upon the  applicant  to  show  that  it  was  the  work  and  the  resulting  strain which contributed to or aggravated  the injury.

(3) If  the  evidence  brought  on  records  establishes  a  greater  probability  which  satisfies a reasonable man that the work  contributed to the causing of the personal  injury,  it  would  be  enough  for  the  workman to succeed, but the same would  depend upon the fact of each case.”

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25. The  Madhya  Pradesh  High  Court  in  Smt.  

Sundarbai V.  The  General  Manager,  Ordnance  

Factory, Khamaria, Jabalpur reported in 1976 Lab I.C.  

1163 in paragraph 10 the principles have been culled out  

as under:

“10. On a review of the authorities, the principles  insofar as relevant for our purposes may be stated  as follows:

(A) Accident means an untoward mishap which is  not  expected  or  designed  by  the  workman.  “Injury” means physiological injury.

(B) “Accident”  and “injury” are distinct in cases  where accident is an event happening externally to  a man; e.g. when a workman falls from a ladder  and suffers injury.  But accident may be an event  happening internally to a man and in such cases  “accident” and “injury” coincide.  Such cases are  illustrated by bursting of  an aneurism, failure of  heart and the like while the workman is doing his  normal work.

(C) Physiological  injury  suffered  by  a  workman  due mainly to the progress of disease unconnected  with employment, may amount to an injury arising  out of and in the course of employment if the work  which the workman was doing at the time of the  occurrence  of  the  injury  contributed  to  its  occurrence.

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(D) The  connection  between  the  injury  and  employment may be furnished by ordinary strain  of ordinary work if the strain did in fact contribute  to or accelerate or hasten the injury.

(E) The  burden  to  prove  the  connection  of  employment with the injury is on the applicant, but  he  is  entitled  to  succeed  if  on  a  balance  of  probabilities a reasonable man might hold that the  more  probable  conclusion  is  that  there  was  a  connection.”

26. Again  in  yet  another  celebrated  decision  of  this  

Court  in  Ibrahim Mahmmod Issak  (supra) this  Court  

has set down the principles applied in such cases as under  

in paragraph 5:

“5. To come within the Act the injury by accident  must  arise  both  out  of  and  in  the  course  of  employment.   The  words  “in  the  course  of  the  employment”  mean  “in  the  course  of  the  work  which the workman is employed to do and which is  incidental  to  it.”  The  words  “arising  out  of  employment” are understood to mean that “during  the course of the employment, injury has resulted  from  some  risk  incidental  to  the  duties  of  the  service, which, unless engaged in the duty owing  to  the  master,  it  is  reasonable  to  believe  the  workman would not otherwise have suffered.” In  other  words there must be a casual relationship  between the accident and the employment.  The  expression  “arising  out  of  employment”  is  again  not  confined  to  the  mere  nature  of  the  

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employment.  The  expression  applies  to  employment as such to its nature, its conditions,  its obligations and its incidents.  If by reason of  any of those factors the workman is brought within  the zone of special danger the injury would be one  which  arises  ‘out  of  employment’.   To  put  it  differently if the accident had occurred on account  of a risk which is an incident of the employment,  the claim for compensation must succeed, unless  of course the workman has exposed himself to an  added  peril  by  his  own  imprudent  act.  In  Lancashire and Yorkshire Railway Co. v. Highley,  Lord  summer  laid  down  the  following  test  for  determining whether an accident “arose out of the  employment.”

(Emphasis added)

27. Applying the  various  principles  laid  down in  the  

above decisions to the facts of this case, we can validly  

conclude  that  there  was  CAUSAL  CONNECTION  to  the  

death of the deceased with that of his employment as a  

truck driver. We cannot lose sight of the fact that a 45  

years old driver meets with his unexpected death, may be  

due to heart failure while driving the vehicle from Delhi to  

a distant place called Nimiaghat near Jharkhand which is  

about 1152 kms. away from Delhi, would have definitely  

undergone  grave  strain  and  stress  due  to  such  long  

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distance driving. The deceased being a professional heavy  

vehicle driver when undertakes the job of such driving as  

his  regular  avocation  it  can  be  safely  held  that  such  

constant driving of heavy vehicle, being dependant solely  

upon  his  physical  and  mental  resources  &  endurance,  

there was every reason to assume that the vocation of  

driving was a material contributory factor if not the sole  

cause  that  accelerated  his  unexpected  death  to  occur  

which in all  fairness should be held to  be an untoward  

mishap in his life span. Such an ‘untoward mishap’ can  

therefore  be  reasonably  described  as  an  ‘accident’  as  

having been  caused solely attributable to the nature of  

employment indulged in with his employer which was in  

the course of such employer’s trade or business.  

28. Having regard to  the  evidence placed on record  

there was no scope to hold that the deceased was simply  

travelling in the vehicle and that there was no obligation  

for him to undertake the work of driving. On the other  

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hand, the evidence as stood established proved the fact  

that the deceased was actually driving the truck and that  

in  the  course  of  such  driving  activity  as  he  felt  

uncomfortable he safely parked the vehicle on the side of  

the road near  a hotel  soon whereafter  he breathed his  

last.  In  such circumstances,  we are  convinced that  the  

conclusion  of  the  Commissioner  of  Workmen’s  

Compensation that the death of the deceased was in an  

accident  arising  out  of  and  in  the  course  of  his  

employment  with  the  second  respondent  was  perfectly  

justified and the conclusion to the contrary reached by the  

learned Judge of the High Court in the order impugned in  

this appeal deserves to be set aside. The appeal stands  

allowed. The order impugned is set aside. The order of the  

Commissioner  for  Workmen’s  Compensation  shall  stand  

restored and there shall be no order as to costs.

  …..……….…………………………...J.                                 [T.S. Thakur]

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  ……………. ………………………………J.

           [Fakkir Mohamed Ibrahim Kalifulla]

New Delhi; December 14, 2012

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