REPORTABLE

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION

CIVIL APPEAL No. 21784 OF 2017         (ARISING OUT OF SLP (C) No.32044/2016)

Mr. Ranvir Dewan    ...Appellant(s)

VERSUS

Mrs. Rashmi Khanna & Anr.       ….Respondent(s)

J U D G M E N T

Abhay Manohar Sapre, J.

1. Leave granted.

2. This appeal is filed by plaintiff No.1 against the

final judgment and order dated 13.07.2016 passed

by the Division Bench of the High Court of Delhi at

New Delhi in R.F.A.(OS) No.147 of 2013 whereby the

High Court  dismissed the  appeal  filed  by Plaintiff

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No.2 (since dead) and the appellant (plaintiff No.1)

herein  and  confirmed   the  judgment  and  order

dated 11.10.2013  of the Single Judge of the High

Court  in C.S.(O.S.) No.1502 of 2010.   

3. In order to appreciate the controversy involved

in the appeal, it is necessary to set out the facts of

the case.

4. The  appellant  is  plaintiff  No.1  whereas  the

respondents  are  the  defendants  in  a  suit  out  of

which  this  appeal  arises.  The  appellant  is  the

brother whereas respondent No.1 is the appellant’s

sister.  

5. The  dispute  in  this  appeal  is  essentially

between  the  mother,  brother(son)  and  the

sister(daughter).  It  relates  to  a  residential  house

consists of basement and two floors situated at D-

246, Defense Colony, New Delhi (hereinafter referred

to as the “suit house”).

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6. Mr. B.R. Dewan was the sole owner of the suit

house.  He  had  two  wives-Mrs.  Kamla  Devi  and

second - Mrs. Pritam.  Out of wedlock with first wife

- Mrs. Kamla Devi, a son - Ashok was born whereas

out of wedlock with second wife -Mrs. Pritam, a son-

Ranvir-appellant  and  a  daughter-Rashmi-

respondent  No.1  were  born.  Mr.  Dewan  owned

moveable and immovable properties,

7. On 24.06.1984, Mr. Dewan executed a Will of

his properties (movables and immoveable).  So far

as the suit house with which we are concerned in

this appeal, Mr. Dewan gave its ground floor to his

son-Ranvir  Dewan  exclusively  whereas  the  first

floor,  he  gave  exclusively  to  his  daughter-Rashmi

Khanna.  

8. So far as wife-Pritam was concerned, he gave

to her a “life interest” to reside in the suit house till

her death and also to recover the rent and utilize

the  income  earned  by  way  of  rent  to  maintain

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herself and the suit house.  He also gave her a right

to evict the tenants and induct the new ones.  

9. The Will, in clear terms, recited that the wife -

Mrs. Pritam is given “life interest” in the suit house

and she will act as a trustee of its legal owners (son

and daughter) and utilize the income earned out of

it  and on her  death,  by his  son and daughter  to

whom the suit house was given exclusively.  

10. The Will also recited that Ranvir and Rashmi

would be free to get themselves assessed as owners

of their respective shares in the suit house in their

wealth tax assessment  cases  on the death of  Mr.

Dewan.

11. Mr.  Dewan  then  gave  his  share  in  HUF

property - B.R. Dewan & sons which consists of a

plot  at  Ghaziabad,  bank  balances,  shares,

debentures,  fixed  deposits  and  all  household

articles exclusively to his wife –Mrs. Pritam.  He also

made provision for his first wife-Kamla Devi for her

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maintenance  to  pay  Rs.500/-  per  month  to  her

during her life time.  

12. In this manner, Mr. Dewan made disposition of

his entire moveable and immoveable property in the

Will.  In the last, he expressed that he has executed

the Will with a hope that there would be no dispute

and litigation amongst his family members qua the

properties on his death.

13. On  16.09.1984,  Mr.  Dewan  expired.  Mrs.

Pritam - second wife of late Mr. Dewan then applied

for grant of  probate of  the Will  dated 26.04.1984.

The  Competent  Court  granted  the  probate  on

12.10.1987.  It  was  followed  by  the  consequential

order dated 05.01.1989 to enable the parties to give

effect to the Will.  The son and daughter accordingly

got their names mutated in the municipal records

as  owners  of  their  respective  shares  in  the  suit

house.  

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14. Contrary to the testator’s hope, soon after his

demise,  the  disputes  started  between  the  mother

and son on one side and the daughter on the other

side.  Initially, parties sat together and decided to

develop  the  suit  house  by  making  some

additions/alterations  and  accordingly  entered  in

family settlement followed by an agreement with the

developers/builders to develop the suit house.

15. However,  the  disputes  could  not  be  settled

amicably and instead got precipitated.  The disputes

were  essentially  centered  around to  their  inter  se

ownership rights over the suit house including its

nature, their shares, income earned from the suit

house and the newly constructed 3rd floor and who

should receive it and lastly, ownership rights over

the 3rd floor.  

16. Mrs.  Pritam-mother  and  Ranvir-son  then

jointly filed a suit being O.S. No.1502/2010 against

the daughter/sister - Rashmi and the developer on

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the original side of the High Court at New Delhi out

of  which this  appeal  arises  and claimed following

reliefs:

“(i) That  this  Hon’ble Court be pleased to pass a decree of permanent injunction restraining  the  Defendants,  their agents, successors and any third party claiming  through  them  from  creating any/any  further  third  party  rights  in respect of the 2nd and 3rd floors of the property  bearing  No.D-246,  Defence Colony, New Delhi.

(ii) That this  Hon’ble Court be pleased to pass  a  decree  of  declaration  that  the alleged  tenancy  agreement  dated  7th July,  2010  executed  by  Defendant No.01 in favour of Defendant No.02 are illegal, null and void and of no effect.

(iii) That this  Hon’ble Court be pleased to pass  a  decree  of  declaration  that  the Plaintiff No.02 is entitled to the rental, the security deposit all  other incomes accruing  from  the  2nd floor  of  the property  bearing  No.D-246  Defence Colony, New Delhi.

(iv) That this  Hon’ble Court be pleased to pass  a  decree  of  declaration  that  the Plaintiff No.02 is entitled to the rental, the  security  deposit  and  all  other income accruing  from the  3rd floor  of the property bearing No.D-246, Defence Colony, New Delhi.

(v) That this  Hon’ble Court be pleased to pass  a  decree  of  declaration  that  the Plaintiff  No.01  is  entitled  to  absolute

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rights over the 3rd floor and roof rights of the 3rd floor apart from the Basement and  Ground  Floor  of  the  property bearing No.D-246, Defence Colony, New Delhi.”

17.  Though the plaint runs into several pages and

seeks  to  claim  five  reliefs  but,  in  substance,  the

controversy centered around to relief No.(v) only.  

18. According  to  the  plaintiff,  Mrs.  Pritam (wife)

was entitled to seek a declaration that she is  the

absolute owner of  the suit  house including its  3rd

floor.  It  was  alleged  that  her  “life  interest”  was

enlarged and ripened into an absolute interest by

virtue of Section 14 (1) of the Hindu Succession Act

(hereinafter referred to as “the Act”) on the death of

her husband.  Though the plaint contains several

other averments but they need not be stated herein

being unnecessary to examine the issue relating to

grant of relief No. (v).

19. Respondent  No.1  (defendant  No.1)  filed  the

written  statement.  While  denying  the  plaintiffs’

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claim,  it  was  contended  that  plaintiff  No.2-Mrs.

Pritam did not acquire absolute interest in the suit

house and nor her “life interest” was enlarged and

ripened  into  an  absolute  interest  by  virtue  of

Section  14  (1)  of  the  Act.  It  was  contended  that

plaintiff  No.2 received only “life interest” to live in

the suit house during her lifetime in terms of the

Will and, therefore, such right squarely falls under

Section 14(2) of the Act.  It was contended that so

far as respondent No.1 is concerned, she acquired

an absolute ownership right in the first floor of the

suit house on the strength of clear recitals in the

Will.

20. The  Single  Judge  framed  the  issues.  Parties

adduced their evidence. By judgment/decree dated

11.10.2013,  the  suit  was dismissed.   It  was  held

that Mrs. Pritam received only “life interest” in the

suit  house.  In  other  words,  it  was  held  that  the

plaintiffs’ case falls under Section 14 (2) of the Act.  

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21. Felt  aggrieved,  plaintiffs  filed  first  appeal

bearing  R.F.A.  (OS)  No.147  of  2013  before  the

Division  Bench  of  the  High  Court.  By  impugned

judgment  dated  13.07.2016,  the  Division  Bench

dismissed  the  appeal  and  upheld  the

judgment/decree of the Single Judge giving rise to

filing the present appeal by way of special leave by

plaintiff No.1 in this Court.  

22.  Heard  Mr.  Guru  Krishan  Kumar,  learned

senior  counsel  for  the  appellant  and  Mr.  K.

Ramamoorthy, learned counsel for respondent No.1

and  Mr.  S.S.  Jauhar,  learned  counsel  for

respondent No.2.

23. Mr.  Guru  Krishan  Kumar,  learned  senior

counsel for the appellant while assailing the legality

and  correctness  of  the  impugned  judgment

reiterated the same submissions, which were urged

unsuccessfully before the Courts below.    

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24. His main submission was that the appellant’s

case squarely falls under Section 14(1) of the Act,

which confers on Mrs. Pritam the absolute right of

ownership over the suit house.  

25. Elaborating  the  submission,  learned  counsel

urged that since the wife is entitled in law to claim

maintenance from her husband even prior to and

also  after  coming  into  force  of  the  Act,  it  is  in

recognition  of  this  pre-recognized  right  when  the

husband  gave  a  “life  interest”  through  Will,  the

same  got  enlarged  and  ripened  into  an  absolute

right  by  virtue  of  Section  14  (1)  of  the  Act.  It  is

essentially  this  submission,  which was elaborated

by  the  learned  counsel  with  reference  to  decided

cases.        

26. In reply, Mr. K. Ramamoorthy, learned senior

counsel  for  respondent  No.1  while  supporting  the

reasoning and the conclusion arrived at by the two

Courts  below  contended  that  the  same  is  in

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accordance with the law and does not call for any

interference.  

27. According to learned counsel,  as rightly held

by  the  two  Courts  below,  the  appellant's  case

squarely falls under Section 14 (2) of the Act.  

28. Having  heard  the  learned  counsel  for  the

parties and on perusal of the record of the case, we

find  no  merit  in  the  appeal.  In  our  view,  the

reasoning and the conclusion arrived at by the two

Courts is just and proper and being in accordance

with law does not call for any interference.

29. Before  we  proceed  to  decide  the  appeal  on

merits, we may take a note of one subsequent event,

which  occurred  during  the  pendency  of  this

litigation.   It  is  the  death  of  wife-Mrs.  Pritam

(plaintiff No.2) on 12.09.2016.  She left behind her

two  legal  representatives,  namely,  appellant,  i.e.,

son and respondent No.1, i.e., daughter.  Both being

Class I heirs would succeed to their mother's estate

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in equal share, if she has died intestate.  However, if

she has made any testamentary disposition of her

estate  in  favour  of  any  person  then  subject  to

proving  the  claim in  accordance  with  law  by  the

person(s)  concerned,  the  disposition  of  her  estate

would take place accordingly.

30. We,  however,  express  no  opinion  on  any  of

these  issues  because,  in  our  view,  it  is  not  the

subject matter of this appeal and leave the parties

to  work  out  their  inter  se rights,  if  any,  in

accordance with law in the estate of Mrs. Pritam  in

appropriate forum as and when occasion so arises.

31. The  main  question,  which  arises  for

consideration in this appeal, is whether two Courts

below  were  justified  in  holding  that  the  case  of

appellant, i.e. Mrs. Pritam falls under Section 14 (2)

of the Act thereby she continued to enjoy only the

“life interest” in the suit house.

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32.  In  other  words,  the  question  arises  for

consideration  in  this  appeal  is,  what  is  the  true

nature of the right received by Mrs. Pritam in the

suit house through Will dated 24.08.1986 from her

husband, viz., "absolute" by virtue of Section 14 (1)

of the Act or "life interest" by virtue of Section 14 (2)

of the Act.

33.  In order to decide the question as to whether

the appellant’s case falls under Section 14 (1) or (2)

of the Act, it is necessary to first examine as to what

is the true nature of the estate held by the testator.

Second, what the testator had intended and actually

bequeathed to his wife by his Will; and lastly, the

right in the property received by Mrs. Pritam, viz.,

absolute interest by virtue of sub-section (1) or “life

interest” by virtue of sub-section (2) of Section 14 of

the Act.   

34. Coming now to the facts of the case, it is not in

dispute that  the suit  house was the  self-acquired

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property of late Mr. Dewan.  It is also not in dispute

as one can take it from reading the contents of Will

that  Mr.  Dewan  had  intended  to  give  only  “life

interest" to his wife in the suit house, which he gave

to her for the first time by way of disposition of his

estate independent of her any right.  It is also not in

dispute that it was confined to a right of residence

to live in the suit house during her lifetime and to

use  the  income  earned  from  the  suit  house  to

maintain herself and the suit house.  It is also not

in dispute that the testator gave to his son ground

floor of the suit house and first floor to his daughter

with absolute right of ownership.  The testator also

permitted both of them to get their names mutated

in  the  municipal  records  as  absolute  owners  and

also get them assessed as owners in the wealth tax

assessment cases.

35. So  far  as  other  properties,  viz.,  one  plot  at

Ghaziabad, share in HUF and moveable properties

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were concerned, Mr. Dewan gave these properties to

Mrs. Pritam-his wife absolutely.  

36. It  is  a settled principle  of  law that  what the

testator intended to bequeath to any person(s) in his

Will  has  to  be  gathered  primarily  by  reading  the

recitals of the Will only.

37.  As mentioned above, reading of the Will would

go  to  show  that  it  does  not  leave  any  kind  of

ambiguity therein and one can easily find out as to

how and in what manner and with what rights, the

testator  wished  to  give  to  three  of  his  legal

representatives his self acquired properties and how

he wanted to make its disposition.

38. Law relating to interpretation of Section 14 (1)

and (2) of the Act is fairly well settled by series of

decisions of this Court.  However, the discussion on

the interpretation of Section 14 (1) and (2) of the Act

can never be complete without mentioning the first

leading decision of this Court in  V. Tulasamma &

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Ors. vs. Sesha Reddy(Dead) by L.Rs. (1977) 3 SCC

99.  In this decision, Their Lordships (Three Judge

Bench) interpreted succinctly sub-sections (1)  and

(2)  of  Section  14  of  the  Act  and  then  on  facts

involved in that case held that the case falls under

Section 14(1) of the Act.  This decision is referred by

this  Court  in  every  subsequent  case  dealing  with

the issue relating to Section 14 of the Act and then

after explaining its ratio has applied the same to the

facts of each case to find out as to whether the case

on hand attracts Section 14(1) or 14(2) of the Act.

Indeed, we find that attempts were made in past for

reconsideration  of  the  law  laid  down  in  V.

Tulasamma  (supra),  but  this  Court  consistently

turned  down the  request.  (see-Gullapalli  Krishna

Das vs. Vishnumolakayya Venkayya & Anr. (1978)

1  SCC  67,  Bai  Vajia  (Dead)  by  L.Rs.  vs.

Thakorbhai Chelabhai & Ors.,  (1979) 3 SCC 300

and  Thota  Sesharathamma  &  Anr.  vs. Thota

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Manikyamma  (Dead)  by  L.Rs.  &  Ors.,  (1991)  4

SCC 312 ).  

39. In  the  case  of  V.  Tulasamma(supra),   the

learned  Judge,  Justice  S.  Murtaza  Fazal  Ali,

speaking for the Bench, succinctly and in a lucid

manner while  analyzing the true scope of  Section

14(1) and (2) of the Act held as under :  

“Section 14(1) and the Explanation thereto of the Hindu Succession Act, 1956 provide that any property  possessed  by  a  female  Hindu, whether  acquired  before  or  after  the commencement  of  the  1956  Act,  shall  be held by her as full owner thereof and not as a limited  owner;  and  that  ‘property’  includes both  movable  and  immovable  property acquired by her by inheritance or devise, or at a partition, or in lieu of  maintenance or arrears of maintenance, or by gift from any person,  whether  from  a  relative  or  not, before, at or after her marriage, or by her own skill  or  exertion,  or  by  purchase  or  by prescription,  or  in  any  other  manner whatsoever, and also any such property held by her as stridhana immediately before the commencement  of  the  1956  Act.   The language is in the widest possible terms and must be liberally construed in favour of the females so as to advance the object of the Act and  promote  the  socio-economic  ends, namely,  to  enlarge  her  limited  interest  to absolute  ownership  in  consonance  with  the changing temper of  the times sought to be achieved by such a long legislation.

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Section  14(2)  provides  that  nothing contained in Section 14(1) shall apply to any property acquired by way of gift or under a will  or  any  other  instrument  or  under  a decree or order of a civil court or under an award  where  the  terms  of  the  gift,  will  or other  instrument or  decree,  order  or  award prescribes  a  restricted  estate  in  such property.  It is in the nature of a proviso and has a field of its own without interfering with the  operation  of  Section  14(1)  materially. The  proviso  should  not  be  construed  in  a manner  so  as  to  destroy  the  effect  of  the main provision or the protection granted by Section 14(1)  or  in  a  way so  as  to  become totally inconsistent with the main provision.

Section  14(2)  applies  only  to instruments,  decrees,  awards,  gifts,  etc. which create independent and new titles in favour of the females for the first time and has  no  application  where  the  instrument concerned merely seeks to confirm, endorse declare or recognize pre-existing rights.   In such cases, a restricted estate in favour of a female  is  legally  permissible  and  section 14(1) will not operate in that sphere.  Where, however,  an  instrument  merely  declares  or recognizes  a  pre-existing  right  such  as  a claim to maintenance or partition or share to which  the  female  is  entitled,  Section  14(2) has  absolutely  no  application  and  the female’s limited interest would automatically be enlarged into an absolute one by force of Section 14(1) and the restrictions placed, if any, under the document would have to be ignored.  Thus, where a property is allotted or transferred  to  a  female  in  lieu  of maintenance  or  a  share  at  a  partition,  the instrument  is  taken  out  of  the  ambit  of sub-section  (2)  and  would  be  governed  by Section 14(1) despite any restrictions placed on the powers of the transferee.

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The use of terms like ‘property acquired by a female Hindu at a partition’, ‘or in lieu of maintenance’, or ‘arrears of maintenance’ etc.  in  the  Explanation  to  Section  14(1) clearly makes sub-section (2) inapplicable to these  categories  which have been expressly excepted  from the  operation  of  sub-section (2).

The words ‘restricted estate’ in Section 14(2)  are  wider  than  limited  interest  as indicated in Section 14(1)  and they include not only limited interest but also any other kind of limitation that may be placed on the transferee.”    

.   40. Similarly,  while  explaining  the  ratio  of  V.

Tulasamma  (supra) and how one has to read the

ratio for being applied to the facts of  a particular

case,  this  Court  in  the  case  of  Sadhu Singh  vs.

Gurudwara Sahib Narike & Ors., (2006) 8 SCC 75

again  succinctly  discussed  the  applicability  of

Section  14  (1)  and  (2)  of  the  Act  and  on  facts

involved therein held that the facts involved would

attract  Section  14(2)  of  the  Act.  Justice

Balasubramanyan  speaking  for  two  Judge  Bench

held in paras 13 and 14 and 15 as under:    

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“13. An owner of property has normally the right to deal with that property including the right to devise or bequeath the property. He could  thus  dispose  it  of  by  a  testament. Section  30  of  the  Act,  not  only  does  not curtail  or  affect  this  right,  it  actually reaffirms  that  right.  Thus,  a  Hindu  male could testamentarily dispose of his property. When he does that,  a succession under the Act stands excluded and the property passes to  the  testamentary  heirs.  Hence,  when  a male Hindu executes a will bequeathing the properties, the legatees take it subject to the terms  of  the  will  unless  of  course,  any stipulation  therein  is  found  invalid. Therefore, there is nothing in the Act which affects the right of a male Hindu to dispose of his property by providing only a life estate or limited  estate  for  his  widow.  The  Act  does not  stand  in  the  way  of  his  separate properties  being  dealt  with  by  him  as  he deems  fit.  His  will  hence  could  not  be challenged as being hit by the Act.

14. When  he  thus  validly  disposes  of  his property by providing for a limited estate to his heir, the wife, the wife or widow has to take it as the estate falls. This restriction on her right so provided, is really respected by the Act.  It  provides in Section 14(2)  of  the Act, that in such a case, the widow is bound by the limitation on her right and she cannot claim any higher  right  by  invoking Section 14(1) of the Act. In other words, conferment of a limited estate which is otherwise valid in law  is  reinforced  by  this  Act  by  the introduction of Section 14(2) of the Act and excluding the  operation  of  Section 14(1)  of the Act, even if that provision is held to be attracted in the case of  a succession under the Act.  Invocation  of  Section 14(1)  of  the Act in the case of a testamentary disposition

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taking  effect  after  the  Act,  would  make Sections 30 and 14(2) redundant or otiose. It will  also  make  redundant,  the  expression “property  possessed  by  a  female  Hindu” occurring  in  Section  14(1)  of  the  Act.  An interpretation  that  leads  to  such  a  result cannot certainly be accepted. Surely, there is nothing  in  the  Act  compelling  such  an interpretation. Sections 14 and 30 both have play.  Section  14(1)  applies  in  a  case  where the female had received the property prior to the Act  being  entitled to  it  as  a  matter  of right, even if the right be to a limited estate under  the  Mitakshara  law  or  the  right  to maintenance.

15. Dealing  with  the  legal  position established by the decisions in  Tulasamma1

and  Bai  Vajia v.  Thakorbhai  Chelabhai13 the  position  regarding  the  application  of Section  14(2)  of  the  Act  is  summed  up  in Mayne on Hindu Law thus:

“Sub-section  (2)  of  Section  14 applies  to  instruments,  decrees, awards,  gifts,  etc.,  which  create independent  and  new  title  in favour  of  females  for  the  first time and has no application where the  instruments  concerned merely seek to confirm, endorse, declare  or  recognise  pre-existing rights.  The  creation  of  a restricted  estate  in  favour  of  a female  is  legally  permissible  and Section 14(1)  will  not operate in such  a  case.  Where  property  is allotted or transferred to a female in lieu of maintenance or a share at  partition  the  instrument  is taken  out  of  the  ambit  of sub-section  (2)  and  would  be

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governed by Section 14(1) despite any  restrictions  placed  on  the powers of  the transferee.”(See p. 1172 of the 15th Edn.)”

41. Reading of the aforementioned principle of law

laid down in the cases of V. Tulasamma and Sadhu

Singh (supra), it is clear that the ambit of Section

14(2) of  the Act must be confined to cases where

property is acquired by a female Hindu for the first

time  as  a  grant  without  any  pre-existing  right,

under  a  gift,  will,  instrument,  decree,  order  or

award,  the  terms of  which  prescribe  a  “restricted

estate” in the property.  Where, however, property is

acquired by a Hindu female at a partition or in lieu

of  right  of  maintenance,  it  is  in  virtue  of  a

pre-existing right and such an acquisition would not

be within the scope and ambit of Section 14(2) of

the  Act,  even  if  the  instrument,  decree,  order  or

award allotting the property prescribes a “restricted

estate” in the property.  

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42. Applying  the  principle  laid  down  in  the

aforementioned two cases to the facts of the case on

hand, we are of the considered opinion that the case

of  plaintiff  No.2-Mrs.  Pritam  does  not  fall  under

Section 14 (1) of the Act but it squarely falls under

Section 14 (2) of  the Act.   In other words, in our

view, in the facts of this case, the law laid down in

Sadhu Singh’s case(supra) would apply.

43.  A  fortorari,  plaintiff  No.2-late  Mrs.Pritam

received only “life interest” in the suit house by the

Will  dated 24.06.1986 from her late husband and

such “life interest” was neither enlarged nor ripened

into  an  absolute  interest  in  the  suit  house  and

remained  “life  interest”,  i.e.,  “restricted estate”  till

her death under Section 14(2) of the Act. This we

say for following factual reasons arising in the case.

44. First,  the  testator-Mr.Dewan  being  the

exclusive  owner  of  the  suit  house  was  free  to

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dispose of his property the way he liked because it

was his self earned property.  

45. Second,  the  testator  gave  the  suit  house  in

absolute ownership to his son and the daughter and

conferred on them absolute ownership.  At the same

time, he gave only “life interest” to his wife, i.e., a

right to live in the suit house which belonged to son

and daughter.  Such disposition, the testator could

make by virtue of Section 14 (2) read with Section

30 of the Act.  

46. Third, such “life interest” was in the nature of

“restricted  estate”  under  Section  14(2)  of  the  Act

which remained a “restricted estate” till  her death

and did not ripen into an “absolute interest” under

Section 14(1) of  the Act. In other words, once the

case falls under Section 14(2) of the Act, it comes

out  of  Section  14(1).   It  is  permissible  in  law

because Section 14(2) is held as proviso to Section

14(1) of the Act.  

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47. Fourth,  the  effect  of  the  Will  once  became

operational after the death of testator, the son and

the  daughter  acquired  absolute  ownership  in  the

suit house to the exclusion of everyone whereas the

wife became entitled to live in the suit house as of

right.  In other words, the wife became entitled in

law to enforce her right to live in the suit house qua

her son/daughter so long as she was alive.  If for

any reason, she was deprived of this right, she was

entitled to enforce such right qua son/daughter but

not  beyond  it.   However,  such  was  not  the  case

here.

48. Fifth,  the  testator  had  also  given  his  other

properties absolutely to his wife which enabled her

to  maintain  herself.  Moreover,  a  right  to  claim

maintenance, if any, had to be enforced by the wife.

She, however,  never did it  and rightly so because

both were living happily.  There was, therefore, no

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occasion  for  her  to  demand  any  kind  of

maintenance from her husband.  

49. Sixth, it is a settled principle of law that the

“life interest”  means an interest which determines

on the termination of life.  It  is incapable of  being

transferred by such person to others being personal

in nature.  Such person, therefore, could enjoy the

“life interest” only during his/her lifetime which is

extinguished on his/her death.   Such is the case

here.   Her  “life  interest”  in  the  suit  house  was

extinguished on her death on 12.09.2016.  

50. Seventh, as mentioned above, the facts of the

case on hand and the one involved in the case of

Sadhu  Singh (supra)  are  found  to  be  somewhat

similar.  The facts of the case of Sadhu Singh were

that the husband executed a Will  in favour of his

wife of his self-acquired property in 1968.  Though

he  gave  to  wife  absolute  rights  in  the  properties

bequeathed but some restrictions were put on her

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right to sell/mortgage the properties and further it

was mentioned in the Will that the said properties

after  wife’s  death  would  go  to  testator’s  nephew.

Due to these restrictions put by the testator on his

wife’s  right  to  sell/mortgage,  it  was held that  the

wife received only the “life interest” in the properties

by Will and such “life interest”, being a “restricted

estate” within the meaning of Section 14(2) of  the

Act, did not enlarge and nor ripen into the absolute

interest  under  Section  14(1)  but  remained  a  “life

interest” i.e. “restricted estate” under Section 14(2)

of the Act.  It was held that such disposition made

by  the  husband  in  favour  of  his  wife  was

permissible in law in the light of Section 14(2) read

with Section 30 of the Act.  In our view, the facts of

the case on hand are similar to the facts of  Sadhu

Singh’s case(supra) and, therefore, this case is fully

covered  by  the  law  laid  down  in  Sadhu  Singh's

case.

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51. In view of foregoing discussion, we are of the

considered  opinion  that  there  is  no  error  in  the

impugned judgment, which has rightly held that the

case  of  Mrs.  Pritam  (Plaintiff  No.2)  falls  under

Section 14 (2) of the Act insofar as it relates to the

suit house.  

52. We,  therefore,  find  no  merit  in  the  appeal,

which thus fails and is accordingly dismissed.     

                                         …........................................J.                     [R.K. AGRAWAL]

                         ...……..................................J.     [ABHAY MANOHAR SAPRE]

New Delhi; December 12, 2017

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