Page 1

Reportable

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA

CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION

CRIMINAL  APPEAL  NO.  785  OF 2013 (Arising out of SLP (Crl. )  No. 294 of 2013)

Moti Lal Songara ...Appellant

Versus

Prem Prakash @ Pappu and Anr.              ...Respondents

J U D G M E N T

Dipak Misra, J.

Leave granted.  

2. The  factual  score  of  the  case  in  hand  frescoes  a  

scenario  and  reflects  the  mindset  of  the  first  

respondent  which  would  justifiably  invite  the  

statement “court is not a laboratory where children  

come to play”.  The action of the accused-respondent  

depicts the attitude where one calculatedly conceives

Page 2

the  concept  that  he  is  entitled  to  play  a  game of  

chess in a court of law and the propriety, expected  

norms from a litigant and the abhorrence of courts to  

the issues of suppression of facts can comfortably be  

kept  at  bay.   Such  a  proclivity  appears  to  have  

weighed uppermost in his mind on the base that he  

can play in aid of technicalities to his own advantage  

and the law, in its essential substance, and justice,  

with  its  divine  attributes,  can  unceremoniously  be  

buried  in  the  grave.   But,  an  eloquent  one,  the  

complainant  with  his  committed  and  adroit  

endeavour  has  allowed  the  cause  to  rise  like  a  

phoenix from the grave by invoking the jurisdiction of  

this  Court  assailing  the  order  passed  by  the  High  

Court  of  Judicature  of  Rajasthan  at  Jodhpur  in  

Criminal  Revision  No.  327  of  2011  whereby  the  

learned  single  Judge  by  order  dated  13.8.2012  

accepted  the  plea  of  the  accused-respondent  and  

quashed  the  charges  framed  against  him  for  the  

offences punishable under Sections 323, 324 and 307  

of the Indian Penal Code (for short “IPC”) not on the  

2

Page 3

substratum of merits but on the foundation that the  

order  dated  19.11.2008  passed  by  the  learned  

Additional Chief Judicial Magistrate taking cognizance  

and issuing summons had already been set aside by  

the  Additional  District  and  Sessions  Judge,  No.  1,  

Jodhpur,  in  Criminal  Revision  No.  7  of  2009  and,  

therefore,  the  principle  “when  the  infrastructure  

collapses,  the  superstructure  is  bound to  collapse”  

got attracted.  As it appears, though the High Court  

noticed the various dates,  the suppression of  facts  

and the factum that the accused being fully aware  

that the charges had been framed in Sessions Case  

No.  9  of  2009  by  the  learned  Additional  Sessions  

Judge,  No.  3,  Jodhpur  on  27.7.  2009,  chose not  to  

inform  the  revisional  court,  namely,  the  learned  

Additional District and Sessions Judge, No. 1, Jodhpur,  

yet, possibly feeling legally helpless, interfered with  

the order of framing charges and quashed the same  

granting  liberty  to  the  prosecution  to  file  an  

application under Section 319 of the Code of Criminal  

3

Page 4

Procedure  (for  brevity  “the  Code”)  at  the  relevant  

stage.

3. Presently  to  the  initial  factual  exposition.   The  

appellant,  as  informant,  lodged  a  First  Information  

Report  No.  428  of  2007  on  23.11.2007  at  Police  

Station Pratap Nagar, District Jodhpur, on the basis of  

which investigation was carried on and, eventually, a  

charge sheet was placed for the offences punishable  

under  Sections  341,  323,  324,  307  and  379  IPC  

against  one  Shyam  Lal  s/o  Venaram.   After  the  

submission of the charge-sheet,  the informant filed  

an  application  before  the  learned  Additional  Chief  

Judicial Magistrate No. 2, Jodhpur, asseverating that  

another  accused,  Prem Prakash,  who had attacked  

his son with knife had deliberately not been made an  

accused.   The  learned  Magistrate,  as  is  manifest,  

after  analyzing  the  materials  on  record,  thought  it  

appropriate to take cognizance against Prem Prakash  

@ Pappu for the offences punishable under Sections  

323,  324,  307  and  379  IPC  and,  accordingly,  

summoned him through arrest warrant.

4

Page 5

4. Being  dissatisfied,  accused  Prem Prakash  called  in  

question the legal sustainability of the said order in  

Criminal  Revision No.  7 of 2009 which came to be  

dealt  with  by  the  learned  Additional  District  and  

Sessions Judge, No. 1, Jodhpur who, after referring to  

the rulings in Kalamudeen and others v. State of  

Rajasthan  and  another1 and  Natthi  Singh  v.  

State  of  Rajasthan  and  another2,  opined  that  

when the offences were triable by a court of Session,  

the Magistrate could not have taken cognizance on  

the basis of a protest petition and, accordingly, set it  

aside vide order dated 14.10.2009.

5. Be  it  noted,  on  that  day,  the  Additional  Public  

Prosecutor  was  present  but,  unfortunately,  the  

informant who was arrayed as opposite party No. 2 in  

the  revision  petition  was  absent.   The  disturbing  

feature, as is perceptible, is that on the basis of the  

cognizance  taken  by  the  learned  Additional  Chief  

Judicial  Magistrate,  both  the  accused  persons,  

namely, Shyam Lal and Prem Prakash, were sent up  

1 2005 (2) Cr.L.R. (Raj.) 1118 2 2007 (1) Cr.L.R. (Raj.) 621

5

Page 6

for trial and the matter was dealt with by the learned  

Additional District and Sessions Judge, No. 3, Jodhpur  

who, on 27.7.2009, heard the learned counsel for the  

parties, the Public Prosecutor and after dwelling upon  

the  allegations  in  the  FIR,  considering  the  

involvement of the accused persons in the crime in  

question,  taking  note  of  the  nature  of  injuries,  

adverting  to  the  ingredients  of  the  offence  under  

Section  307  IPC,  prima  facie  appreciating  the  

credibility of the witnesses and many other factors,  

held as follows: -

“.......looking to the facts and circumstances of  the  case,  in  the  perspective  of  the  principle  propounded  in  the  abovementioned  rulings,  prima facie, it appears that due to the reason of  old enmity the accused persons have inflicted a  number of injuries by the sharp weapon on the  body of the victim and therefrom it is clear that  common intention of the accused persons was  to attempt to commit the murder of the victim  Dinesh  Kumar.   At  this  stage,  it  is  not  appropriate to minutely and critically appreciate  the evidence.  From the guidance sought from  the abovementioned rulings, it is clear that at  this  stage compared to  the result  of  the acts  committed  by  the  accused  persons,  criminal  intention  of  the  accused  persons  is  more  important.   Any  fatal  injury  has  not  been  inflicted  on  any  vital  part  of  the  body  of  the  victim and only on that ground at this stage, it  is  not  justified  and  lawful  to  discharge  the  

6

Page 7

accused  persons  from the  offence  punishable  under Section 307 of the Indian Penal Code.”

6. However, as far as the offence under Section 379 IPC  

is concerned, he discharged them of the said charge.  

Ultimately,  charges  were  framed  for  the  offences  

under  Section  341,  323/34,  324/34,  307  in  the  

alternative under Section 307/304 IPC.   

7. We  have  referred  to  the  said  order  in  detail  to  

highlight that the matter was heard at length at the  

time  of  framing  of  charge  and  arguments  were  

considered  seeking  discharge.   However,  for  the  

reasons  best  known to  the  prosecution and to  the  

accused-respondent, it was not brought to the notice  

of the learned Additional District and Sessions Judge  

No. 1, Jodhpur who allowed the revision holding that  

the order issuing summons was not  justified.   It  is  

really unfathomable as to  why the sustainability  of  

the order taking cognizance when called in question  

was not heard by the learned Additional District and  

Sessions  Judge  No.  3,  who  was  dealing  with  the  

Sessions Case No. 9 of 2009.

7

Page 8

8. After  the order  taking cognizance was set  aside in  

revision,  an  application  was  filed  on  11.1.2010  

seeking discharge.  The learned trial Judge narrated  

the entire gamut of facts and observed that the fact  

of framing of charges was not brought to the notice  

of the learned Additional District and Sessions Judge,  

No.1, and further the High Court, in Criminal Revision  

No.  1046 of  2009 which was preferred against  the  

order of framing of charge, neither set it aside nor  

modify  it  and,  accordingly,  did  not  think  it  

appropriate to discharge the accused-respondent.   

9. As the factual matrix would uncurtain, undeterred by  

his conduct, the respondent, Prem Prakash, preferred  

Criminal Revision before the High Court.  The learned  

single Judge of the High Court, after chronicling the  

facts  in  detail,  came  to  hold  that  when  the  order  

dated  14.10.2009  passed  by  the  revisional  court  

setting  aside  the  order  taking  cognizance  was  not  

challenged, the very basis of the continuance of the  

proceeding had become extinct and,  therefore,  the  

order of framing of charges could not be sustained.  

8

Page 9

However, as stated earlier, he granted liberty to the  

prosecution to file an application under Section 319  

of the Code for summoning the additional accused at  

the appropriate stage.  Be it noted, the High Court  

has also observed that the order passed in revision  

setting  aside  the  order  of  cognizance  was  not  

justified in law.

10. Ms.  Madhurima  Tatia,  learned  counsel  for  the  

appellant, has submitted that when the accused has  

not  approached  the  court  in  clean  hands  and  the  

High Court itself has observed that the order setting  

aside  the  order  of  cognisance  was  not  justified,  it  

should not have interfered with the order passed by  

the  learned  trial  Judge  declining  to  discharge  the  

accused.  Per contra, Mr. Rishabh Sancheti, learned  

counsel for the respondent No. 1, would contend that  

the  order  passed  by  the  High  Court  in  revision  is  

absolutely  impeccable inasmuch as  once the  order  

taking  cognizance  had  gone  unchallenged,  it  was  

obligatory on the part of the High Court to direct a  

discharge.   That apart,  it  is  urged by him that the  

9

Page 10

learned Magistrate could not have taken cognizance  

in exercise of power under Section 190 of the Code of  

Criminal  Procedure.   Mr.  Imtiaz  Ahmed,  learned  

counsel  for  the  State,  submitted  that  though  the  

State has not challenged the order, yet it is a case  

where the accused-respondent should not have been  

discharged.     

11. First,  we shall  advert  to  the  legal  propriety  of  the  

order  taking  cognizance  by  the  learned  Additional  

Chief Judicial Magistrate.  The learned counsel for the  

accused-respondent  has  submitted  with  immense  

vehemence that in view of the conflicting views, the  

controversy relating to the power of the Magistrate  

under Section 190 of the Code has been referred to  

the  larger  Bench  and,  hence,  the  order  of  taking  

cognizance is  invulnerable.   To appreciate the said  

submission,  we  think  it  seemly  to  refer  to  certain  

pronouncements  pertaining  to  the  said  issue.   In  

Ranjit  Singh  v.  State of  Punjab3,  a  three-Judge  

Bench  was  dealing  with  the  issue  whether  the  

3 (1998) 7 SCC 149

10

Page 11

Sessions Court can add a new person to the array of  

the accused in a case pending before it at a stage  

prior  to  collecting  any  evidence.   The  three-Judge  

Bench was dealing with the said issue as reservations  

were  expressed  by  a  two-Judge  Bench  in  Raj  

Kishore Prasad  v.  State of Bihar4 with regard to  

the  ratio  laid  down in  Kishun Singh  v.  State of  

Bihar5.   The conclusion that has been recorded in  

Ranjit Singh’s case is as follows: -

“19. So  from  the  stage  of  committal  till  the  Sessions Court  reaches the stage indicated in  Section  230 of  the  Code,  that  court  can  deal  with only the accused referred to in Section 209  of the Code. There is no intermediary stage till  then for  the Sessions Court  to  add any other  person to the array of the accused.

20. Thus,  once  the  Sessions  Court  takes  cognizance  of  the  offence  pursuant  to  the  committal order, the only other stage when the  court is empowered to add any other person to  the  array  of  the  accused  is  after  reaching  evidence collection when powers under Section  319 of the Code can be invoked. We are unable  to find any other power for the Sessions Court  to permit addition of new person or persons to  the  array  of  the  accused.  Of  course  it  is  not  necessary for the court to wait until the entire  evidence  is  collected  for  exercising  the  said  powers.”

4 (1996) 4 SCC 495 5 (1993) 2 SCC 16

11

Page 12

12. In  Kishori  Singh and others  v.  State of  Bihar  

and another6, the learned Judges have opined thus:  

-

“10. So  far  as  those  persons  against  whom  charge-sheet  has  not  been filed,  they  can  be  arrayed  as  “accused  persons”  in  exercise  of  powers  under  Section  319  CrPC  when  some  evidence or materials are brought on record in  course of trial or they could also be arrayed as  “accused  persons”  only  when  a  reference  is  made either by the Magistrate while passing an  order of commitment or by the learned Sessions  Judge to the High Court and the High Court, on  examining  the  materials,  comes  to  the  conclusion that sufficient materials exist against  them even though  the  police  might  not  have  filed charge-sheet, as has been explained in the  latter three-Judge Bench decision. Neither of the  contingencies has arisen in the case in hand.”

13. In  M/s.  India  Carat  Pvt.  Ltd.  v.  State  of  

Karnataka  and  another7,  a  three-Judge  Bench,  

after analyzing the provisions of the Code, referred to  

the  decisions  in  Abhinandan  Jha  v.  Dinesh  

Mishra8 and  H.S. Bains  v.  State9 and, eventually,  

ruled thus: -

“The position is, therefore, now well settled that  upon receipt  of  a  police  report  under  Section  173(2)  a  Magistrate  is  entitled  to  take  

6 (2004) 13 SCC 11 7 (1989) 2 SCC 132 8 AIR 1968 SC 117 9 (1980) 4 SCC 631

12

Page 13

cognizance of an offence under Section 190(1) (b) of the Code even if the police report is to the  effect  that  no  case  is  made  out  against  the  accused. The Magistrate can take into account  the statements of  the witnesses examined by  the  police  during  the  investigation  and  take  cognizance  of  the  offence  complained  of  and  order  the  issue  of  process  to  the  accused.  Section  190(1)(b)  does  not  lay  down  that  a  Magistrate  can  take cognizance of  an  offence  only if the investigating officer gives an opinion  that  the  investigation  has  made  out  a  case  against the accused. The Magistrate can ignore  the  conclusion  arrived  at  by  the  investigating  officer and independently apply his mind to the  facts emerging from the investigation and take  cognizance  of  the  case,  if  he  thinks  fit,  in  exercise of his powers under Section 190(1)(b)  and direct the issue of process to the accused.”

14. In  Dharam Pal and others  v.  State of Haryana  

and  another10,  a  three-Judge  Bench  was  dealing  

with a reference to resolve the conflict of opinions in  

Kishori  Singh  (supra),  Rajinder  Prasad  v.  

Bashir11 and  SWIL Ltd.   v.  State of Delhi12.  At  

that juncture, the pronouncements in Kishun Singh  

(supra)  and  Ranjit  Singh (supra)  were brought  to  

the notice  of  the Court.   After  referring to  various  

provisions of the Code,  the Bench of three learned  

Judges expressed as follows: -

10 (2004) 13 SCC 9 11 (2001) 8 SCC 522 12 (2001) 6 SCC 670

13

Page 14

“Prima  facie,  we  do  not  think  that  the  interpretation  reached  in  Ranjit  Singh  case is  correct.   In  our  view,  the  law  was  correctly  enunciated  in  Kishun  Singh  case.   Since  the  decision in  Ranjit  Singh case is  of three-Judge  Bench, we direct that the matter may be placed  before the Hon’ble the Chief Justice for placing  the same before a larger Bench.”

15. There is no dispute that the reference is still pending.  

In  Uma Shankar  Singh  v.  State  of  Bihar  and  

another13, a two-Judge Bench was dealing with the  

issue pertaining to the power of the Magistrate under  

Section 190(1)(b) of the Code.  After taking note of  

the decisions and the reference order in Dharam Pal  

(supra), the Court accepted the submission that the  

law is well settled that the Magistrate is not bound to  

accept  the  final  report  filed  by  the  investigating  

agencies  under  Section  173(2)  of  the  Code and  is  

entitled  to  issue  process  against  an  accused  even  

though  exonerated  by  the  said  authorities  without  

holding  any  separate  enquiry  on  the  basis  of  the  

police report itself.  The learned Judges proceeded to  

state that even if the investigating authority is of the  

view that  no  case  has  been  made  out  against  an  

13 (2010) 9 SCC 479

14

Page 15

accused,  the  Magistrate  can  apply  his  mind  

independently  to  the  materials  contained  in  the  

police  report  and  take  cognizance  thereupon  in  

exercise of his powers under Section 190(1)(b) CrPC.

16. In the said case, while dealing with the pendency of a  

reference before a larger Bench and also adverting to  

the pending reference in relation to the lis, the Court  

observed as follows: -

“...it is not necessary to wait for the outcome of  the  result  of  the  reference  made  to  a  larger  Bench  in  Dharam Pal  case.   The  reference  is  with regard to the Magistrate’s power of enquiry  if he disagreed with the final report submitted  by the investigating  authorities.   The facts  of  this case are different and are covered by the  decision  of  this  Court  in  India  Carat  (P)  Ltd.  following the line of cases from Abhinandan Jha  v. Dinesh Mishra onwards.”

17. In view of the aforesaid enunciation of law, we are of  

the considered view that the order taking cognizance  

cannot be found fault with.  We may hasten to clarify  

that the learned Additional Chief Judicial Magistrate  

has taken cognizance on the basis of facts brought to  

his notice by the informant and, therefore, he has, in  

15

Page 16

fact, exercised the power under Section 190(1)(b) of  

the Code.

18. The second limb of the submission is whether in the  

obtaining  factual  matrix,  the  order  passed  by  the  

High  Court  discharging  the  accused-respondent  is  

justified in law.  We have clearly stated that though  

the respondent was fully aware about the fact that  

charges had been framed against him by the learned  

trial  Judge,  yet  he  did  not  bring  the  same  to  the  

notice  of  the  revisional  court  hearing  the  revision  

against  the  order  taking  cognizance.   It  is  a  clear  

case  of  suppression.   It  was  within  the  special  

knowledge  of  the  accused.   Any  one  who  takes  

recourse to method of suppression in a court of law,  

is, in actuality, playing fraud with the court, and the  

maxim  supressio  veri,  expression  faisi,  i.e.,  

suppression  of  the  truth  is  equivalent  to  the  

expression  of  falsehood,  gets  attracted.   We  are  

compelled to say so as there has been a calculated  

concealment of the fact before the revisional court.  

It  can  be  stated  with  certitude  that  the  accused-

16

Page 17

respondent tried to gain advantage by such factual  

suppression. The fraudulent intention is writ large.  In  

fact, he has shown his courage of ignorance and tried  

to play possum.  The High Court, as we have seen,  

applied the principle “when infrastructure collapses,  

the superstructure is bound to collapse”.  However,  

as the order has been obtained by practising fraud  

and suppressing material fact before a court of law to  

gain advantage, the said order cannot be allowed to  

stand.  That apart, we have dealt with regard to the  

legal sustainability of the order in detail.  Under these  

circumstances,  we  are  disposed  to  think  that  the  

power  under  Article  142  of  the  Constitution  is  

required  to  be  invoked  to  do  complete  justice  

between the parties.  Cognizance of the offences had  

been  rightly  taken  by  the  learned  Magistrate  and  

charges, as we find, have been correctly framed by  

the learned trial Judge.  A victim of a crime has as  

much  right  to  get  justice  from  the  court  as  an  

accused who enjoys the benefit of innocence till the  

allegations are proven against him.  In the case at  

17

Page 18

hand, when an order of quashment of summons has  

been  obtained  by  suppression,  this  Court  has  an  

obligation to set aside the said order and restore the  

order framing charges and direct the trial to go on.  

And we so direct.

19. Consequently,  the  appeal  is  allowed,  the  order  

passed by the  High Court  in  Criminal  Revision  No.  

327 of  2011 and the  order  passed by the learned  

Additional District and Sessions Judge, No.1, Jodhpur,  

in Criminal Revision No. 7 of 2009 are set aside and it  

is directed that the trial which is pending before the  

learned Additional District and Sessions Judge, No. 3,  

Jodhpur, shall proceed in accordance with law.

……………………………….J. [K. S. Radhakrishnan]

….………………………….J.                                            [Dipak Misra]

New Delhi; May 16, 2013.

18