MONTFORD BORTHERS OF ST.GABRIEL Vs UNITED INDIA INSURANCE .
Bench: P SATHASIVAM,RANJAN GOGOI,SHIVA KIRTI SINGH
Case number: C.A. No.-003269-003270 / 2007
Diary number: 5404 / 2004
Advocates: ASHWANI KUMAR Vs
MANJEET CHAWLA
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REPORTABLE
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION
CIVIL APPEAL NOS. 3269-3270 OF 2007
MONTFORD BROTHERS OF ST. GABRIEL & ANR. ... APPELLANTS
VS.
UNITED INDIA INSURANCE & ANR. ETC. ... RESPONDENTS
J U D G M E N T
SHIVA KIRTI SINGH,J.
Heard learned counsel for the appellants and learned
counsel for the respondent-Insurance Company.
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2. The facts relevant for deciding this appeal are not in dispute and hence noted only in brief.
3. The appellant No.1 is a charitable society registered under the Societies Registration Act, 1960.
It runs various institutions as a constituent unit of
Catholic Church. It is running various orphanages,
industrial schools and other social service activities
besides number of educational schools/institutions.
Its members after joining the appellant society
renounce the world and are known as “Brother”. Such a
`Brother’ severs his all relations with the natural
family and is bound by the constitution of the society
which includes Article 60 quoted in paragraph 3 of the
order dated 10.12.2003 passed in Review Petition No.4
of 2002 and in annexure P.5 as such:
“Whatever the `Brother’ receives by way of salary, subsidies, gifts, pension or from insurance or other such benefits belongs to the community as by right and goes into the common purse.”
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4. Appellant No.2 is Principal of St. Paul’s Higher Secondary School, Aizawal, Mizoram and represents
appellant no.1 as well.
5. One `Brother’ of the Society, namely, Alex Chandy Thomas was a Director-cum-Head master of St. Peter High
School and he died in a motor accident on 22.06.1992.
The accident was between a Jeep driven by the deceased
and a Maruti Gypsy covered by insurance policy issued
by the respondent Insurance Company. At the time of
death the deceased was aged 34 years and was drawing
monthly salary of Rs.4,190/-. The claim petition
bearing No.55 of 1992 was filed before M.A.C.T.,
Aizawal by appellant no.2 on being duly authorized by
the appellant no.1-the society. The owner of the Gypsy
vehicle discussed in his written statement that vehicle
was duly insured and hence liability, if any, was upon
the Insurance Company. The respondent-Insurance
Company also filed a written statement and thereby
raised various objections to the claim. But as is
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clear from the written statement under Annexure P.2 it
never raised the issue that since the deceased was a
`Brother’ and therefore without any family or heir, the
appellant could not file claim petition for want of
locus standi. The issue no.1 regarding maintainability
of claim petition was not pressed by the respondents.
The Tribunal awarded a compensation of Rs.2,52,000/- in
favour of the claimant and against the opposite parties
with a direction to the insurer to deposit
Rs.2,27,000/- with the Tribunal as Rs.25,000/- had
already been deposited as interim compensation. The
Tribunal also permitted interest at the rate of 12% per
annum, but from the date of judgment dated 14.07.1994
passed in MACT case Nos. 55 and 82 of 1992.
6. Instead of preferring appeal against the order of the Tribunal, the respondent-Company preferred a writ
petition under Article 226 of the Constitution of India
before the Gauhati High Court and by the impugned order
under appeal dated 20.08.2002, the High Court allowed
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the aforesaid writ petition (C) No.20 of 2002 ex-parte,
and held the judgment and order of the learned Tribunal
to be invalid and incompetent being in favour of
person/persons who according to the High court were not
competent to claim compensation under the Motor Vehicle
Act. This was the only ground of challenge to the
judgment and Award of the Tribunal. The High Court,
however, did not disturb the Award of Rs.25,000/-
already made as interim compensation. Review Petition
preferred by the appellants was also rejected on
10.12.2003 but after noticing the relevant facts
relating to locus of the appellants.
7. From the facts noted above, it is evident that there is no dispute between the parties with regard to
the quantum of compensation determined by the Tribunal
and the only issue is whether the High Court was
correct in law in holding that the appellants are not
competent to claim compensation under the Motor Vehicle
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Act for the accidental death of `Brother’ belonging to
the appellant-society.
8. The only issue noted above requires to look into Section 166 of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1988,
(hereinafter referred to as `The Act’). Sub-section
(1) of Section 166 is relevant for the purpose. It
provides thus:
“166. Application for compensation:-(1) An application for compensation arising out of an accident of the nature specified in sub- section (1) of section 165 may be made—
(a) by the person who has sustained the injury; or
(b) by the owner of the property; or
(c) where death has resulted from the accident, by all or any of the legal representatives of the deceased; or
(d) by any agent duly authorised by the person inured or all or any of the legal representatives of the deceased, as the case may be:
Provided that where all the legal representatives of the deceased have not joined in any such application for compensation, the application shall be made on behalf of or for the benefit of all the legal representatives of the
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deceased and the legal representatives who have not so joined, shall be impleaded as respondents to the application. “
9. The Act does not define the term “legal representative” but the Tribunal has noted in its
judgment and order that clause (C) of Rule 2 of the
Mizoram Motor Accident Claims Tribunal Rules, 1988,
defines the term `legal representative’ as having the
same meaning as assigned to it in clause (11) of
Section 2 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908, which
is as follows:
“Section 2(11)`Legal representative’ means a person who in law represents the estate of a deceased person and includes any person who intermeddles with the estate of the deceased and where a party sues or is sued in a representative character the person on whom the estate devolves On the death of the party so suing or sued”.
10. From the aforesaid provisions it is clear that in case of death of a person in a motor vehicle accident,
right is available to a legal representative of the
deceased or the agent of the legal representative to
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lodge a claim for compensation under the provisions of
the Act. The issue as to who is a legal representative
or its agent is basically an issue of fact and may be
decided one way or the other dependent upon the facts
of a particular case. But as a legal proposition it is
undeniable that a person claming to be a legal
representative has the locus to maintain an application
for compensation under Section 166 of the Act, either
directly or through any agent, subject to result of a
dispute raised by the other side on this issue.
11. Learned counsel for the Insurance Company tried to persuade us that since the term `legal representative’
has not been defined under the Act, the provision of
Section 1-A of the Fatal Accidents Act, 1855, should be
taken as guiding principle and the claim should be
confined only for the benefit of wife, husband, parent
and child, if any, of the person whose death has been
caused by the accident. In this context, he cited
judgment of this Court in the case of Gujarat State
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Road Transport Corporation, Ahmedabad vs. Raman Bhai Prabhatbhai & Anr. 1 . In that case, covered by the Motor Vehicles Act of 1939, the claimant was a brother
of a deceased killed in a motor vehicle accident. The
Court rejected the contention of the appellant that
since the term `legal representative’ is not defined
under the Motor Vehicles Act, the right of filing the
claim should be controlled by the provisions of Fatal
Accident Act. It was specifically held that Motor
Vehicles Act creates new and enlarged right for filing
an application for compensation and such right cannot
be hedged in by the limitations on an action under the
Fatal Accidents Act. Paragraph 11 of the report
reflects the correct philosophy which should guide the
courts interpreting legal provisions of beneficial
legislations providing for compensation to those who
had suffered loss.
“11. We feel that the view taken by the Gujarat High Court is in consonance with the principles of justice, equity and good conscience having regard to the conditions of the Indian society. Every
1 AIR 1987 SC 1690
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legal representative who suffers on account of the death of a person due to a motor vehicle accident should have a remedy for realisation of compensation and that is provided by Sections 110-A to 110-F of the Act. These provisions are in consonance with the principles of law of torts that every injury must have a remedy. It is for the Motor Vehicles Accidents Tribunal to determine the compensation which appears to it to be just as provided in Section 110-B of the Act and to specify the person or persons to whom compensation shall be paid. The determination of the compensation payable and its apportionment as required by Section 110-B of the Act amongst the legal representatives for whose benefit an application may be filed under Section 110-A of the Act have to be done in accordance with well-known principles of law. We should remember that in an Indian family brothers, sisters and brothers’ children and some times foster children live together and they are dependent upon the bread-winner of the family and if the bread-winner is killed on account of a motor vehicle accident, there is no justification to deny them compensation relying upon the provisions of the Fatal Accidents Act, 1855 which as we have already held has been substantially modified by the provisions contained in the Act in relation to cases arising out of motor vehicles accidents. We express our approval of the decision in Megjibhai Khimji Vira v. Chaturbhai Taljabhai, (AIR 1977 Guj.195) and hold that the brother of a person who dies in a motor vehicle accident is entitled to maintain a petition under Section 110-A of the Act if he is a legal representative of the deceased.”
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12. From the aforesaid quoted extract it is evident that only if there is a justification in consonance
with principles of justice, equity and good conscience,
a dependant of the deceased may be denied right to
claim compensation. Hence, we find no merit in the
submission advanced on behalf of the respondent-
Insurance Company that the claim petition is not
maintainable because of the provisions of the Fatal
Accidents Act.
13. On behalf of the appellants it has been rightly contended that proceeding before the Motor Vehicle
Claims Tribunal is a summary proceeding and unless
there is evidence in support of such pleading that the
claimant is not a legal representative and therefore
the claim petition be dismissed as not maintainable, no
such plea can be raised at a subsequent stage and that
also through a writ petition. The objection filed on
behalf of the Insurance Company, contained in annexure
P.2, does not raise any such objection nor there is any
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evidence led on this issue. As noted earlier, the
Tribunal did frame any issue regarding maintainability
of the claim petition on law and fact as issue no.1 but
the findings recorded by the Tribunal at page 41 of the
paper book show that this issue together with issue
nos. 2 and 3 were not pressed by the opposite parties
during trial and were accordingly decided in favour of
the claimants.
14. In the aforesaid circumstances, the order under appeal dated 20.8.2002 allowing the writ petition
suffers from apparent mistake in not noticing the
relevant issue decided by the Tribunal and also the
fact that the Insurance Company, which was the writ
petitioner, had not pressed this issue. It had neither
raised pleadings nor led evidence relevant for the said
issue.
15. On coming to know about the High Court judgment the appellants filed a review petition in which they gave
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all the relevant facts including the constitution of
the society appellant no.1 in support of their claim
that a `Brother’ of the Society renounced his relations
with the natural family and all his earnings and
belongings including insurance claims belonged to the
society. These facts could not have been ignored by the
High Court but even after noticing such facts the
review petition was rejected.
16. A perusal of the judgment and order of the Tribunal discloses that although issue no.1 was not pressed and
hence decided in favour of the claimants/appellants,
while considering the quantum of compensation for the
claimants the Tribunal adopted a very cautious approach
and framed a question for itself as to what should be
the criterion for assessing compensation in such case
where the deceased was a Roman Catholic and joined the
church services after denouncing his family, and as
such having no actual dependants or earning? For
answering this issue the Tribunal relied not only upon
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judgments of American and English Courts but also upon
Indian judgments for coming to the conclusion that even
a religious order or organization may suffer
considerable loss due to death of a voluntary worker.
The Tribunal also went on to decide who should be
entitled for compensation as legal representative of
the deceased and for that purpose it relied upon the
Full Bench judgment of Patna High Court reported in AIR
1987 Pat. 239, which held that the term `legal
representative’ is wide enough to include even
“intermeddlers” with the estate of a deceased. The
Tribunal also referred to some Indian judgments in
which it was held that successors to the trusteeship
and trust property are legal representatives within the
meaning of Section 2(11) of the Code of Civil
Procedure.
17. In the light of the aforesaid discussions, we have no hesitation in holding that the High Court erred in
law in setting aside the judgment of the learned
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Tribunal by ignoring the fact that the respondent-
Insurance Company had not pressed issue no.1 nor it had
pleaded and led evidence in respect to the said issue.
The Court explained that the appellants were the legal
representatives of the deceased. Such an issue of
facts could not be decided by the High Court for the
first time in a writ petition which could only be
entertained under Article 227 of the Constitution for
limited purpose.
18. Accordingly, orders of the High Court dated August 20, 2002 and December 10, 2003 are set aside and the
judgment and order of the Tribunal dated July 14, 1994,
is restored. The dues of compensation including
interest, as per judgment of the Tribunal, shall be
deposited by the respondent-Insurance Company with the
Tribunal within eight weeks from the date of this
order. The Tribunal shall permit the claimants to
withdraw the same in the light of its order.
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19. The appeals are allowed to the extent indicated above. No costs.
……………………………………………C.J.I. (P. SATHASIVAM)
…………………………………………………J. (RANJAN GOGOI)
…………………………………………………J. (SHIVA KIRTI SINGH)
New Delhi, January 28,2014.
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