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REPORTABLE  

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA  

CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION  

CIVIL APPEAL NO. 10222   OF  2017  (Arising out of SLP (C) No.24862 of 2012)  

 MOHINDER SINGH (DEAD)  ….          APPELLANTS  THROUGH L.Rs.  

:Versus:  

PARAMJIT SINGH & ORS.   ….      RESPONDENTS                     

J U D G M E N T  

A.M. Khanwilkar, J.  

1. The singular question that emerges for consideration in  

this appeal is: whether Section 14 of the Limitation Act, 1963  

(for short “the 1963 Act”), has no impact in view of the  

provisions contained in Punjab Limitation (Custom) Act, 1920   

(for short “the 1920 Act”) and, if so, will it be applicable in the  

facts of this case?

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2. The relevant undisputed facts of this case can be  

delineated as under:   

A gift deed was executed by one Ujjagar Singh in respect  

of the lands, which included two parcels of lands, measuring   

7 Kanals 17 Marlas bearing Khasra No.46/16, situated in the  

revenue estate of Village Pandori, Tehsil Batala; and 11 Kanals  

4 Marlas bearing Khasra Nos.25/4/5, No.25/4/1, 25/3/3 and  

25/3/6 situated in the revenue estate of Village Ghuman,  

Tehsil Batala, District Amritsar (Punjab), to one Rura Singh  

son of Surendra Singh (predecessor of the respondents) vide  

Gift Deed dated 6th March, 1963. The said land was ancestral  

land in the hands of Ujjagar Singh wherein Mohinder Singh  

(predecessor of the appellants) and others were coparceners.  

Resultantly, the original appellant Mohinder Singh filed a suit  

for declaration that the gift deed was void, being Suit No.367  

of 1963 before the Sub Judge, First Class, Batala. During the  

pendency of the said suit, a compromise was arrived at  

between Rura Singh (predecessor of the respondents) and  

Mohinder Singh (predecessor of the appellants). The parties  

made statements before the Trial Court that as per the

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compromise, Mohinder Singh was to be given the land  

comprised in Khasara No.46/16 situated at Village Pandori,  

Tehsil Batala and 26/4/2/4, 26/3/3 Min East, 26/4/1,  

26/3/3 Min West of Village Ghuman after the death of Ujjagar  

Singh out of the entire land and Mohinder Singh also gave up  

his house.  A statement was made by Rura Singh before the  

Court which reads thus:   

“Stated that decree for declaration for ownership regarding  

Khasra no. 46/16 situated at Pandori, No.26/4/2/4, 26/3/3  

Min. East. 26/4/1, 26/3/3 Min West situated at Ghuman be  

passed in favour of the plaintiff.  Remaining suit be  

dismissed. Parties shall bear their own expenses.”  

 3. On the basis of the said arrangement, the Court disposed  

of the suit on 20th August, 1963 on the basis of compromise in  

the following terms:   

        “In view of the above statements of the parties, the suit as  

prayed for is decreed herewith solely in respect of khasra  

number 46/16 of village Pandori and 26/4/2/4, 26/3/3 Min  

east, 26/4/1, 26/3/3 Min west of village Ghuman against  

the defendant no.2.  The suit against defendant No.1 will  

stand dismissed.  The parties will bear their own costs.”  

 4. Mohinder Singh then took out execution petition No.430  

of 1964 on 23rd December, 1964. The said execution petition

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was dismissed being premature, by the Executing Court vide  

order dated 7th August, 1965 which reads thus:   

 “COPY OF ORDER: As per decision of D.H. counsel the  execution is dismissed as pre-mature and be consigned  record-room on the Satisfied.”  

 5. The said Ujjagar Singh died on 14th January, 1971,  

whereafter Mohinder Singh took out  second execution petition  

on 18th February, 1971. He also took out an application for  

summoning the original file with the decree sheet. This  

application was filed on 23rd August, 1971 before the  

Executing Court. It then transpired that the decree was  

prepared and the decree sheet was drawn on 19th August,  

1972.  However, the execution petition instituted by Mohinder  

Singh came to be dismissed for default on 2nd February, 1973.  

On the same day, Mohinder Singh took out third execution  

petition which was dismissed on 2nd February, 1974 on the  

ground that the same was not maintainable.  The relevant  

portion of the order passed by the Executing Court in  

Execution Application No.11/1973 reads thus:   

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“3. The following issue was framed:-  

1)  Whether the decree is executable? O.P.D.H.  

4. From the perusal of the decree sheet copy of which is  

Ex. D.H.1. it is abundantly clear that the decree which is  

sought to be executed is a declaratory one and it ensure to  

the benefit of the decree holder after the death of the vendor.  

The decree-holder can only file a separate suit if so  

advised for possession of the suit property but the  

execution is not maintainable. The declaratory decree  

cannot be executed and the possession of the land in  

question cannot be granted to the decree holder in  

execution of the same. This issue is decided against the  

decree-holder.   

In view of my above said finding the application is  dismissed. File be consigned to the Record Room.”      

(emphasis supplied)    

 6. Taking cue from the observations in this order and left  

with no other option for getting possession of the land referred  

to in the decree passed in suit No.367 of 1963, Mohinder  

Singh filed a fresh suit on 11th June, 1974, in the Court of  

Civil Judge, Junior Division, Batala, being C.S. No.173/1974.   

He asserted that the declaratory decree was prepared on 19th  

August, 1972 and because of the order passed by the  

Executing Court on 2nd February, 1974, he had to file the suit  

for possession on the basis of the cause of action which had  

arisen on 19th August, 1972 and because of the refusal of the

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respondents (defendants) to deliver the suit lands to him. The  

respondents filed written statement in which they admitted  

the fact that the decree was prepared on 19th August, 1972,  

but asserted that the present suit was barred by limitation as  

the same was filed after lapse of 3 years from the date of death  

of Ujjagar Singh. In that, Ujjagar Singh died on 14th January,  

1971 whereas the suit has been filed on 11th June, 1974.   

Further, the factum of preparation of decree on 19th August,  

1972 would be of no avail as the decree had been passed in  

the previous suit on 20th August, 1963. The date on which the  

previous suit was decided would be the relevant date.  

However, subsequently the respondents (defendants) filed  

additional written statements so as to withdraw the admission  

made earlier that the decree sheet was prepared on 19th  

August, 1972.    

 7. The Civil Judge, Junior Division, Batala vide his  

judgment dated 20th May, 2008 negatived the objection taken  

by the respondents regarding the suit being barred by

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limitation. The relevant portion of the judgment of the Trial  

Court reads thus:   

“13. Article 2(b) of the Punjab Limitation (Customs) Act 1920  

provides the period of limitation of three years for a suit for  

possession of an ancestral immovable property which has  

been alienated, on the ground that alienation is not binding  

on the plaintiff according to custom where such declaratory  

decree is obtained.  The time from which period of limitation  

is to begin is the date on which right to sue accrues or the  

date on which declaratory decree is obtained whichever is  

later.  It is the case of the defendants that Ujjagar Singh died  

on 14.01.1971 the entry of the death of Ujjagar Singh is also  

placed on the record as Ex.D1 and the period of limitation is  

to be computed from 14.01.1971, when the right to sue  

accrues to the plaintiff on the death of Ujjagar Singh and the  

present suit is not within the period of three years as the  

suit has been filed on 11.06.1974.  However the article 2(b)  

of the Punjab Limitation (Customs) Act 1920, provides  

that period of three years for the institution   of the suit  

is to be ascertained from the date on which right to sue  

accrues or the date on which declaratory decree is  

obtained whichever is later.  It is claimed by the plaintiff  

that decree sheet was prepared on 19.08.1972, the fact  

which is admitted by the defendants while filing the  

original written statement.  However, it is argued by  

counsel for the defendants that order in the execution  

application No. 32 of 1971, dated 19.8.1972 on which the  

decree is alleged to have been prepared by the plaintiff is in  

fact with regard to the dismissal of the said execution  

application due to the non appearance of the parties.  I am  

of the considered opinion that only on the ground that  

said order dated 19.08.1972 relates with the dismissal of  

the execution it cannot  be said that decree sheet was  

not prepared during the proceedings of the said  

execution.  It has already been held that the decree  

sheet was prepared during the execution bearing No. 32

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of 1971.  Even if it is considered that the decree sheet  

was prepared on dated 29.07.1972 and not on  

19.08.1972 as discussed above even then the present  

suit is within the period of limitation i.e. 3 years as per  

article 2(b) of the Punjab Limitation (Customs) Act 1920.    

14. It is also argued by counsel for the defendants that  

while filing the replication inconsistent pleas taken by the  

plaintiff from the plaint already fled by him and the  

replication filed by the plaintiff can be taken into  

consideration.  In support of his contention, counsel for the  

defendants has relied upon 2001 (3) Civil Court Cases 565  

(Rajasthan) Gurjant Singh Versus Krishan Chander and Ors.   

But I am of the considered view that in fact the defendants  

themselves have taken the inconsistent pleas by filing the  

amended written statement from the original written  

statement.  In the amended written statement it is claimed  

by the defendants that no decree sheet was prepared on  

19.08.1972 and the decree sheet of Civil suit No. 367 of  

14.06.1963 has been passed on 20.8.1963 itself.  The  

plaintiff has only contested the pleadings of the amended  

written statement by filing the replication and accordingly it  

cannot be said that the plaintiff has taken the inconsistent  

pleas from the pleas already taken by him in his plaint, while  

filing the replication.   

15. In view of discussion above, this issue No. 1 is decided  

in favour of the plaintiff.  The suit of the plaintiff is also held  within the period of limitation and issue No.2 is also decided  

in favour of the plaintiff and against the defendants.”    

(emphasis supplied)    

8. Aggrieved, the respondents (defendants) filed a first  

appeal before the District Court being Civil Appeal No.373 of  

2008 (12th June, 2008) which was heard by the Additional  

District Judge, Gurdaspur and was finally dismissed on 2nd

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February,  2012.  The District Court rejected the argument of  

the respondents on the issue of suit being barred by  

limitation, by observing  thus:       

“…But learned counsel for the appellants has contended that  

decree sheet may be prepared at any time but it relates back  

to the date of judgment. Though it is a settled proposition of  

law that decree follows the judgment, but in the instant case  

there is no fault on behalf of respondent no.1 who has able  

to prove on record that when he filed the suit while  

challenging the gift deed which was decided on the basis of  

the compromise and statements of the parties on 20.08.1963  

and thereafter he filed an application for execution of the  

same in which objections were raised by Rura through  

counsel and execution was dismissed being premature and  

after the death of Ujjagar Singh in the year 1971 he again  

moved an execution applicable in which the fresh decree  

sheet was ordered to be prepared which was ultimately  

prepared in the presence of the parties and during those  

proceedings no copy of the decree sheet which has now been  

referred by learned counsel for the appellants has placed on  

file nor any such objection has been raised that decree sheet  

has already been prepared and more so, the decree sheet  

was ordered to be prepared in presence of both the parties.  

Later on execution was dismissed on filing of objections by  

appellants by learned Sub Judge 1st Class, Batala with the  

observation that it enures to the benefit of the decree holder  

after the death of the vendor and same was ultimately  

ordered to be dismissed on 02.02.1974 and if one computed  

the period of limitation from the day of preparation of decree  

i.e. in the year 1972 because the day when the execution  

application has been dismissed by Court of Shri A.S.  

Rampal, the then Sub Judge 1st Class, Batala, by observing  

then the suit of respondent no.1 is certainly within  

limitation.”   

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9. The respondents then preferred a second appeal before  

the High Court of Punjab and Haryana at Chandigarh, being  

Regular Second Appeal No.166 of 2012 (O&M), which has been  

allowed by the learned Single Judge of the High Court, vide  

judgment dated 25th April, 2012.  The High Court accepted the  

argument of the respondents in the following words:    

 “I have carefully considered the aforesaid contentions.  It is  

undisputed that the earlier suit was decided on the basis of  

compromise vide judgment dated 20.08.1963.  From the  

judgments of the courts below, it appears that formal decree  

in the said suit was not drawn immediately but was drawn  

on 19.08.1972 when plaintiff moved for the same because  

while seeking execution of the said decree, the plaintiff learnt  

that formal decree had not been drawn.  However, formal  

decree drawn on 19.08.1972 on the basis of compromise  

judgment dated 20.08.1963 shall relate back to the date  

of judgment i.e. 20.8.1963.  Merely because formal  

decree was drawn on 19.08.1972, it cannot be said that  

limitation period started on 19.08.1972.  On the  

contrary, earlier declaratory decree was passed vide  

judgment dated 20.08.1963 and therefore, limitation  

period in the instant case commenced on 14.01.1971 on  

the death of Ujjagar Singh.  Consequently, suit filed on  

11.06.1974 i.e. after expiry of limitation period of three  

years is patently barred by limitation.  Finding of the  

courts below to the contrary is patently perverse and  

illegal and, therefore, unsustainable.    

Substantial question of law arises for determination in this  

second appeal as to whether suit is barred by limitation and  

finding of the courts below holding the suit to be within the  

limitation is perverse and illegal.  The said substantial  

question of law is answered in favour of

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defendants/appellants holding that the suit is barred by  

limitation.    

Resultantly the instant second appeal is allowed.   

Judgments and decrees of both the courts below are set  aside.  Suit filed by the respondent No.1-plaintiff stands  dismissed.  The parties are, however, left to suffer their  

respective costs throughout.”  

 (emphasis supplied)  

10. In this backdrop, the present appeal, by special leave,  

has been filed by the original plaintiff Mohinder Singh who  

died during the pendency of the appeal before this Court and  

consequently, his heirs and legal representatives have been  

brought on record to espouse the cause. According to the  

appellants, the suit for possession was filed by Mohinder  

Singh on the basis of the declaratory decree which was within  

the limitation period of three years as provided by Article 2(b)  

of the Schedule to the 1920 Act. Inasmuch as, Section 2(b) of  

the said Act stipulates that the limitation would commence  

from the date on which the right to sue accrues or the date on  

which the declaratory decree is obtained, whichever is later. In  

the present case, the right to sue accrued after the death of  

Ujjagar Singh on 14th January, 1971.  However, the plaintiff

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was advised to pursue execution of the decree passed in the  

previous Suit No.367 of 1963 and was driven to file the  

present suit on 11th June, 1974 after the order was passed by  

the Executing Court on 2nd February, 1974. Nevertheless, as  

the decree sheet was prepared only on 19th August, 1972, the  

suit filed on 11th June, 1974 was within limitation in terms of  

Article 2(b) of the 1920 Act. To buttress this submission  

reliance has been placed on the decision in Lala Balmukund  

(Dead) Through L.Rs. Vs. Lajwanti and Ors.1, wherein it has  

been held that “obtaining” the copy means drawing of a  

decree.  That happened in this case on 19th August, 1972 and  

for which reason the suit filed on 11th June, 1974 was within  

limitation.  Reliance has been placed on the contemporaneous  

record, including written statement and the appeal memo filed  

before the First Appellate Court by the respondents  

(defendants), admitting preparation of decree on 19th August,  

1972.  Reliance is also placed on Section 14 of the 1963 Act  

for exclusion of time during which Mohinder Singh (plaintiff)  

had bona fide pursued the execution proceedings. It is  

                                                           1  (1975) 1 SCC 725

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submitted that Section 14 of the 1963 Act will be attracted not  

only because of Section 29(2) of the 1963 Act, but also  

because of Section 5 of the 1920 Act expressly providing for  

application of Sections 4 to 25 of the 1963 Act. Reliance is  

placed on a three-Judge Bench decision of this Court in  

Consolidated Engineering Enterprises Vs. Principal  

Secretary, Irrigation  Department and Ors.,2  which has  

enunciated that a liberal approach should be adopted by the  

Court, unless the application  of  Section 14 is expressly   

excluded by the special law. It is contended that although the  

first execution petition moved by the plaintiff was dismissed as  

premature as also the subsequent execution petition was  

dismissed on 2nd February, 1974 on the ground that the  

proper remedy was to file a suit for possession, the defendants  

neither raised any objection nor challenged the said orders.  

On the other hand, the plaintiff acted upon the said orders  

and eventually filed a suit for possession on 11th June, 1974.  

Relying on the decision of this Court in Union of India and  

                                                           2   (2008) 7 SCC 169

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Ors. Vs. West Coast Paper Mills Ltd. and Anr. 3 , it is  

submitted that the conclusion reached by the Trial Court and  

commended to the First Appellate Court, is the correct  

approach in the fact situation of the present case. Taking any  

other view would be awarding bonus to the respondents   

despite Rura Singh (predecessor of respondents) having agreed  

for giving possession of the subject properties to Mohinder  

Singh (predecessor of the appellants) vide compromise decree  

dated  20th August, 1963.   

  11. The respondents, on the other hand, submitted that the  

High Court has justly reversed the concurrent judgment of two  

Courts on the issue of suit being barred by limitation after  

having found that the decree drawn on 19th August, 1972 on  

the basis of the compromise judgment dated 19th August,  

1963 must relate back to the date of the judgment i.e. 19th  

August, 1963.  Thus, mere preparation or drawing of a formal  

decree on 19th August, 1972 would be of no avail to the  

appellants as the limitation in the present case had  

                                                           3   (2004) 3 SCC 458

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commenced consequent to the death of Ujjagar Singh on 14th  

January, 1971 but the suit was filed on 11th June, 1974 after  

the expiry of 3 years‟  limitation period. It is submitted that the  

parties are governed by the provisions of Article 2(b) of the  

Schedule to the 1920 Act and the plaintiff failed to exercise  

due diligence for which reason cannot take advantage in  

calculating the limitation period from 19th August, 1972. It is  

contended that Section 14 of the 1963 Act was limited to  

accord protection to a litigant against the bar of limitation  

when he institutes civil proceeding, which by reason of some  

technical defects cannot be decided on merits and is  

dismissed.  To buttress this submission, reliance has been  

placed on paragraphs 21, 22 and 31 in particular, of the  

decision in the case of Consolidated Engineering  

Enterprises (supra). According to the respondents, the  

subject suit was barred by limitation as it was not instituted  

within the limitation period specified in Article 2(b) of the  

Schedule to the 1920 Act and provisions of Section 14 will be  

of no avail to the plaintiff. Furthermore, no explanation or  

justification whatsoever has been offered by the plaintiff for

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the period between 2nd February, 1974 (when the third  

execution petition was dismissed) and 11th June, 1974 (when  

the suit for possession was filed by the plaintiff).  The question  

of showing any indulgence, much less by invoking Section 14  

of the 1963 Act, does not arise. The respondents pray for  

dismissal of this appeal and affirmation of the view taken by  

the High Court whilst allowing the second appeal filed by  

them.  

 12. We have heard Mr. Mahabir Singh, learned senior  

counsel appearing for the appellants and Mr. Manoj Swarup,  

learned counsel appearing for the respondents.   

 13. There is no dispute that the issue of suit being barred by  

limitation will have to be answered with reference to the  

special law as applicable i.e. the 1920 Act.  The said Act was  

enacted to amend and consolidate the law governing the  

limitation of suits relating to alienations of ancestral  

immovable property and appointments of heirs by persons  

who follow custom in the area to which the Act would apply.   

Section 8 of the 1920 Act postulates that when any person

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obtains a decree declaring that an alienation of ancestral  

immovable property or appointment of an heir is not binding  

on him according to custom, the decree shall enure for the  

benefit of all persons entitled to impeach the alienation or the  

appointment of an heir. For such a declaratory suit, the  

limitation is provided in the schedule. Article 2 of the Schedule  

also envisages that the period of limitation for a suit for  

possession of ancestral immovable property which has been  

alienated, on the ground that alienation is not binding on the  

plaintiff according to custom, inter alia, within three years  

from the date the declaratory decree is obtained. Section 8 of  

the 1920 Act reads thus:   

“8. Benefit of declaratory decree.- When any person  obtains a decree declaring that an alienation of ancestral  immoveable property or the appointment of an heir is not  binding on him according to custom, the decree shall enure  

for the benefit of all persons entitled to impeach the  alienation or the appointment of an heir.”   

   Article 2 of the Schedule reads thus:    

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SCHEDULE  

Description of suit Period of  Limitation  

Time from  which period  

begins to run  

1. xxx  

 2. A suit for possession of  ancestral immovable property  

which has been alienated on  the ground that the alienation  

is not binding on the plaintiff  according to custom-    

(a) If no declaratory  decree of the nature  referred to in Article 1  

is obtained  (b) If such declaratory  

decree is obtained       

 3. xxx  xxx  xxx    

4. xxx  xxx  xxx    5. xxx  xxx  xxx  

 6. xxx  xxx  xxx  

6 Years      

 3 years  

As above      

 The date on which the  

right to sue accrues or  the date on which the  declaratory decree is  

obtained, whichever is  later.  

14. In the present case, the declaratory decree has been  

passed on 20th August, 1963 on the basis of the compromise  

between the plaintiff - Mohinder Singh (predecessor of the

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appellants) and defendant - Rura Singh (predecessor of the  

respondents). However, that being a conditional decree, the  

right to sue for possession would not have accrued until the  

death of Ujjagar Singh which happened only on 14th January,  

1971. The appellants are not invoking the first part of Article  

2(b), which postulates that the time from which period  

commences would be the date on which the right to sue  

accrues. First, because declaratory decree was passed on  

20.8.1963; second, because it was a conditional decree and  

was unenforceable during the life time of Ujjagar Singh; third,  

because Ujjagar Singh died on 14th January, 1971 but the  

fresh suit was filed on 11th June, 1974 due to the observation  

made by the Executing Court in its order dated 2nd February,  

1974. Resultantly, the appellants are relying on the second  

part of Article 2(b), which postulates that the time from which  

period would commence to file a suit for possession would be  

the date on which the “declaratory decree is obtained”.  

 15. The substratum of the claim of the plaintiff is founded on  

the factum of date on which the decree sheet in respect of the

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compromise decree was prepared and drawn on 19th August,  

1972. The expression “declaratory decree is obtained” would  

take within its fold the event of drawing of or preparation of  

the decree. Notably, the Trial Court as well as the Appellate  

Court has accepted the stand taken by the plaintiff that the  

compromise decree was prepared or drawn on 19th August,  

1972.  Even the High Court has not reversed that finding.  The  

High Court, however, has held that drawing of a formal decree  

on 19th August, 1972 will be of no avail as it would relate back  

to the compromise decree passed on 20th August, 1963.  That  

would not save the limitation period for filing the suit for  

possession. Whereas, the cause of action for filing such suit  

had arisen on 14th January, 1971 on the death of Ujjagar  

Singh but the suit was filed after the expiry of limitation period  

of three years on 11th June, 1974.     

 16. In this backdrop, the moot question in the present case  

is the meaning of the expression “the declaratory decree is  

obtained”.  Does it mean the date of pronouncement of the  

judgment i.e. 20th August, 1963 or the date of preparation of

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decree sheet i.e. 19th August, 1972? The expression “obtain”,   

as understood in common parlance and defined in Concise  

Oxford English Dictionary,  would mean -  “acquire, secure,  

have granted to one”. This may also encompass obtaining a  

copy of the decree. In central legislation, the expression is  

made explicit by providing “for obtaining a copy of the decree”,  

as was considered in Lala Balmukund (supra). The  

expression “obtained”, therefore, would pre-suppose, in the  

context of reckoning limitation period for filing a suit for  

possession, of securing a certified copy of the decree (decree-

sheet) on the basis of which, the suit for possession could be  

instituted.  In other words, the date on which the decree is  

drawn would be the relevant date for commencement of  

limitation period. As in the case of execution proceedings,  

mere passing of the judgment by the Court is not enough but  

a decree has to be drawn on the basis of such declaratory  

judgment which is then put into execution. Applying the same  

analogy, if a suit for possession is founded on a declaratory  

decree it could proceed only after a drawn up decree on the

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basis of a declaratory judgment of the Civil Court is made  

ready and obtained by the decree-holder.   

 17. The expression “the declaratory decree is obtained”,  

therefore, assumes significance.  If the legislature intended to  

provide it differently, it could have couched the provision as  

“the date on which the declaratory judgment is passed”. The  

legislature in enacting 1920 Act, however, consciously used  

the expression “the declaratory decree is obtained”, which  

intrinsically includes the date on which a formal decree is  

drawn or prepared and not merely the date on which a  

declaratory judgment is passed by the Court. Taking any other  

view would be rewriting the expression “the declaratory decree  

is obtained” and doing violence to the legislative intent.  

Besides, the expression “obtained” in Article 2(b) is prefixed by  

expression “is”; and further it follows with expression  

“whichever is later”. Even this would reinforce the position  

that the date on which the declaratory decree is drawn could  

ignite the period of limitation for instituting a suit for  

possession and not a mere declaratory judgment rendered by

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the Court in the previous suit (for declaration simplicitor).  

Taking any other view will render the last part of Article 2(b),  

providing for “whichever is later” nugatory and otiose.   

18. The appellants have justly relied on the exposition in the  

case of Lala Balmukund  (supra), (in particular paragraphs  

20 and 21), which has answered similar issue regarding the  

date of obtaining decree and while explicating the term  

“obtaining a copy”, has held that the time will start only after  

the decree is drawn. It is apposite to reproduce the dictum in  

paragraph 19, which reads thus:    

“19. We do not wish to encumber this judgment with a  detailed discussion of all the citations and the reasoning  advanced therein in support of one or the other view. It will  be sufficient to say that upon the language of Section 12(2)  

both the constructions are possible, but the one adopted by  the majority of the courts, appears to be more consistent  

with justice and good sense. The Limitation Act deprives  or restricts the right of an aggrieved person to have  recourse to legal remedy, and where its language is  

ambiguous, that construction should be preferred which  preserves such remedy to the one which bars or defeats  

it. A court ought to avoid an interpretation upon a  statute of limitation by implication or inference as may  have a penalising effect unless it is driven to do so by  

the irresistible force of the language employed by the  Legislature.”  

             (emphasis supplied)   

24    

19.  It may be useful to advert to the elucidation in W.B.  

Essential Commodities Supply Corpn. Vs. Swadesh Agro  

Farming & Storage Pvt. Ltd. and Anr.4. Indeed, in that case  

the factual narrative on which the question was examined was  

somewhat different, namely, whether the period of limitation  

under Article 136 of the 1963 Act will start from the date of  

the decree or from the date when the decree is actually drawn  

up and signed by the Judge, as articulated in paragraph 2 of  

the judgment. In paragraph 12 of the judgment this Court  

observed thus:   

“12. There may, however, be situations in which a decree  

may not be enforceable on the date it is passed. First, a  

case where a decree is not executable until the  

happening of a given contingency, for example, when a  

decree for recovery of possession of immovable property  

directs that it shall not be executed till the standing  

crop is harvested, in such a case time will not begin to  

run until harvesting of the crop and the decree becomes  

enforceable from that date and not from the date of the  

judgment/decree. But where no extraneous event is to  

happen on the fulfillment of which alone the decree can  

be executed it is not a conditional decree and is capable  

of execution from the very date it is passed (Yeshwant  

Deorao v. Walchand Ramchand5). Secondly, when there is  

a legislative bar for the execution of a decree then  

                                                           4   (1999) 8 SCC 315  

5 AIR 1951 SC 16

25    

enforceability will commence when the bar ceases. Thirdly,  

in a suit for partition of immovable properties after  

passing of preliminary decree when, in final decree  

proceedings, an order is passed by the court declaring  

the rights of the parties in the suit properties, it is not  

executable till final decree is engrossed on non-judicial  

stamp paper supplied by the parties within the time  

specified by the Court and the same is signed by the  

Judge and sealed. It is in this context that the  

observations of this Court in Shankar Balwant Lokhande  

v. Chandrakant Shankar Lokhande 6  have to be  

understood. These observations do not apply to a money  

decree and, therefore, appellant can derive no benefit from  

them.”  

(emphasis supplied)    

 20. As in the present case, even though the declaratory  

judgment was pronounced by the Court in the previous suit  

on 20th August, 1963, on the basis of compromise entered into  

by Mohinder Singh (original plaintiff) and Rura Singh (original  

defendant), that declaration could be given effect to only after   

the death of Ujjagar Singh.  The decree as passed was  

enforceable only thereafter. Suffice it to observe that the  

decree sheet  having been made ready on 19th August, 1972  

and the suit for possession filed three years thereafter on 11th  

June, 1974, was thus within the prescribed period of  

                                                           6 (1995) 3 SCC 413

26    

limitation in terms of Article 2(b) of the Schedule to the 1920  

Act.  

   21. Assuming for the sake of argument that the three years‟  

period provided in Article 2(b) ought to be reckoned from the  

date of death of Ujjagar Singh i.e. 14th January, 1971, the  

question would be whether the provisions of Section 14 of the  

1963 Act would come to the aid of the plaintiff (appellants).   

The purport of Section 14 of the 1963 Act has been delineated  

in the case of Union of India and Ors. Vs. West Coast Paper  

Mills Ltd. (supra). The Court while considering the question  

as to whether the suit was barred by limitation examined the  

question whether Section 14 of the 1963 Act was applicable to  

that case.  In paragraph 14 of the judgment, after referring to  

the decision in CST  Vs. Parson Tools and Plants 7, this  

Court observed thus:  

 “14. In the submission of Mr. Malhotra, placing reliance on  

CST v. Parson Tools and Plants8, to attract the applicability  

of Section 14 of the Limitation Act, the following  

requirements must be specified: (SCC p.25, para 6)  

                                                           7   (1975) 4 SCC 22  

8  (1975) 4 SCC 22 : 1975 SCC (Tax) 185

27    

„6. (1) both the prior and subsequent proceedings are  civil proceedings prosecuted by the same party;  

 (2) the prior proceedings had been prosecuted with  

due diligence and in good faith;    (3) the failure of the prior proceedings was due to a  

defect of jurisdiction or other case of a like nature;    (4) both the proceedings are proceedings in a Court.‟  

 In the submission of the learned Senior Counsel, filing of  

civil writ petition claiming money relief cannot be said to be  a proceeding instituted in good faith and secondly, dismissal  of writ petition on the ground that it was not an appropriate  

remedy for seeking money relief cannot be said to be 'defect  of jurisdiction or other cause of a like nature' within the  

meaning of Section 14 of the Limitation Act. It is true that  the writ petition was not dismissed by the High Court on the  ground of defect of jurisdiction. However, Section 14 of the  

Limitation Act is wide in its application, inasmuch as it  is not confined in its applicability only to cases of defect  of jurisdiction but it is applicable also to cases where the  

prior proceedings have failed on account of other causes  of like nature. The expression ‘other cause of like  

nature’ came up for the consideration of this Court in  Roshanlal Kuthalia v. R.B. Mohan Singh Oberai9 and it  was held that Section 14 of the Limitation Act is wide  

enough to cover such cases where the defects are not  merely jurisdictional strictly so called but others more  or less neighbours to such deficiencies. Any  

circumstances, legal or factual, which inhibits  entertainment or consideration by the Court of the  

dispute on the merits comes within the scope of the  Section and a liberal touch must inform the  interpretation of the Limitation Act which deprives the  

remedy of one who has a right.”  

(emphasis supplied)    

     22. The expanse of Section 14 of the Act, therefore, is not  

limited to mere jurisdictional issue but also other cause of a                                                              9  (1975) 4 SCC 628

28    

like nature. Taking cue from this decision, the appellant would  

contend that the plaintiff  immediately  after compromise  

judgment was pronounced on 20th August, 1963 took recourse  

to Execution Petition No.433/1964  on 23rd December, 1964  

but the same was dismissed by the Executing Court on 7th  

August, 1965, as being premature.  The plaintiff verily believed  

that the execution of the decree passed in the previous suit  

would result in getting possession of the property albeit after  

the death of Ujjagar Singh.  Consequently, after the death of  

Ujjagar Singh on 14th January, 1971, the plaintiff moved  

second execution petition on 18th February, 1971 and in those  

proceedings moved an application for summoning the file with  

a decree sheet.  It transpired that the decree was drawn and  

the decree sheet was made ready on 19th August, 1972, but  

the said execution petition stood dismissed for default on 2nd  

February, 1973. For that reason,  the appellant on the same  

day moved the third execution petition i.e. on  2nd February,  

1973  which, however, was dismissed on 2nd February, 1974  

on the ground that the remedy  for the plaintiff to get  

possession of the suit property was to file a suit for possession

29    

on the basis of the declaratory decree.  It is only thereafter the  

plaintiff resorted to the subject suit, being Civil Suit  

No.173/1974 filed on 11th June, 1974.   

 23.  Notably, the respondents did not question the decisions  

of the Executing Court – be it on the ground that it was  

premature or on the ground that the remedy for the plaintiff  

was to file a suit for possession.  Indubitably, the proceedings  

such as execution petition resorted to by the plaintiff would be  

a civil proceeding. Further, the Trial Court as well as the  

Appellate Court have found that the plaintiff was pursuing  

that remedy in good faith.  That finding has not been  

disturbed by the High Court.  The reasons which weighed with  

the Executing Court for dismissing the execution petitions  

were just causes covered by the expression “defect of  

jurisdiction” and in any case, “other cause of a like nature”,  

ascribed by the Executing Court for its inability to grant relief  

of possession  of suit property to the plaintiff. The fact  

situation of the present case would certainly satisfy the tests  

specified in Section 14 of the 1963 Act, for showing indulgence

30    

to the plaintiff to exclude the period during which the plaintiff  

pursued execution proceedings for reckoning the period of  

limitation for filing the suit for possession on 11th June, 1974.  

The argument of the respondents that the plaintiff did not offer  

any explanation for the period from 2nd February, 1974 till 11th  

June, 1974 does not impress us at all. That period is only of  

four months and once the period from 14th January, 1971 till  

2nd February, 1974 was to be excluded as being time spent  by  

the plaintiff in pursuing other civil proceedings in good faith,  

there would be no delay in filing of the suit.  What is posited  

by Section 14 of the 1963 Act is the exclusion of time of  

proceeding bona fide in Court without jurisdiction or other  

cause of a like nature, for which the concerned Court is  

unable to entertain the lis. The fact that no explanation  

whatsoever has been offered for the period from 2nd February,  

1974  to 11th June, 1974, therefore, would not whittle down  

the rights of the plaintiff to institute and pursue suit for  

possession of the subject land on the basis of declaratory  

decree.   

31    

24. That takes us to the last question as to whether Section  

14 of the 1963 Act has any application to the case on hand.  

This issue need not detain us. Section 5 of the 1920 Act is  

explicit and it unambiguously postulates that the suit referred  

to in the First Schedule to the said Act would be governed by  

the provisions contained in Sections 4 to 25 (inclusive) of the  

Limitation Act.   Section 5 of the 1920 Act reads thus:  

“5. Dismissal of suits of the descriptions specified in the  Act if instituted after the period of limitation therein  

prescribed has expired.- Subject to the provision contained  in sections 4 to 25 (inclusive), of the Indian Limitation Act,  

1908, and notwithstanding anything to the contrary  contained in the first schedule of the said Act, every suit, of  any description specified in the schedule annexed to this  

Act, instituted after the period of limitation prescribed  therefor in the schedule shall be dismissed, although  

limitation has not been set up as a defence.”  

    25. It may be apposite to also advert to Section 29(2) of the  

1963 Act,  the same reads thus:  

 “29. Savings.- (1) xxx  

(2) Where any special or local law prescribes for any suit,  

appeal or application a period of limitation different from the  

period prescribed by the Schedule, the provisions of section  

3 shall apply as if such period were the period prescribed by  

the Schedule and for the purpose of determining any period  

of limitation prescribed for any suit, appeal or application by

32    

any special or local law, the provisions contained in sections  

4 to 24 (inclusive) shall apply only in so far as, and to the  

extent to which, they are not expressly excluded by such  

special or local law.   

(3) xxx  

(4) xxx.”  

26. We find force in the submission of the appellants that  

Section 14 of the 1963 Act would be attracted in the fact  

situation of the present case, in light of Section 5 of the 1920  

Act and also Section 29(2) of the 1963 Act coupled with the  

fact that there is no express provision in the 1920 Act, to  

exclude the application of Section 14 of the 1963 Act.  

 27. Both sides have relied on the exposition in the case of  

Consolidated Engineering Enterprises (supra). In that case,  

the Court noted that Section 14 of the 1963 Act envisages that  

it is a provision to afford protection to a litigant against bar of  

limitation when he institutes a proceeding  which by reason of  

some  technical defects cannot be decided on merits and is  

dismissed.  While considering the provisions of Section 16 and  

its application, this Court observed that a proper approach will  

have to be adopted and the provisions will have to be

33    

interpreted so as to advance cause of action rather than abort  

the proceedings, inasmuch as the section is intended to  

provide relief against bar of limitation in cases of mistaken  

remedy or selection of a wrong forum.   

28. It is not necessary to dilate on this judgment any further,  

having already observed that both the Trial Court and the  

Appellate Court were right in decreeing the suit in favour of  

the original plaintiff (predecessor of the appellants) by rejecting  

the objection regarding the suit being barred by limitation. The  

High Court committed manifest error in overturning the  

decisions of the Trial Court and the First Appellate Court,  

merely on the ground that the formal decree drawn on 19th  

August, 1972 on the basis of compromise judgment dated 20th  

August, 1963 must relate back to the date of the judgment i.e.  

20th August, 1963 and would not arrest the limitation period  

until the preparation of the decree on 19th August, 1972.   

 29. In view of the above, we allow this appeal and set aside  

the impugned judgment and order and decree passed by the  

High Court and instead, restore the judgment and decree

34    

passed by the Trial Court as affirmed by the First Appellate  

Court.   

 30. Accordingly, this appeal is allowed with no order as to  

costs.    

 ..……………………………...CJI.  

             (Dipak Misra)   

…..…………………………..….J.           (A.M. Khanwilkar)     

New Delhi;  March 28, 2018.