REPORTABLE

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA

CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION

CIVIL APPEAL No.7426 OF 2011

Meg Raj (dead)  Thr. L.Rs. & Ors.              ….Appellant(s)

VERSUS

Manphool(Dead) Thr. L.Rs. & Ors.            …Respondent(s)

WITH

CIVIL APPEAL No.3145  OF 2019 (arising out of S.L.P.(c) No.9723/2009)

J U D G M E N T

Abhay Manohar Sapre, J.

1. Leave granted in S.L.P.(c) No.9723/2009.

2. These appeals are directed against the final

judgment and order dated 28.01.2008 passed by the

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High  Court of  Punjab  &  Haryana  at  Chandigarh in

R.S.A. Nos.40/1984 & 2712/1987 whereby the High

Court dismissed  R.S.A.  No.40 of 1984 and allowed

R.S.A. No.2712 of 1987.

3. A few facts need mention for the disposal of these

appeals,  which  involve a short point.  The  facts are

taken from R.S.A. No.40/1984 which arose out of C.S.

No.24­C/1979.

4. The appellants are the legal representatives of the

original  plaintiffs  and the respondents  are the legal

representatives of original defendants in the Civil suit

No.24­C/1979 & Civil Suit No.62­C/1979 out of which

these appeals arise.

5. The dispute relates to 4/5th   share  in the  land

measuring 643 Bighas and 4 Biswas situated in village

Umedpura, District Sirsa, State of Haryana

(hereinafter referred to  as “the suit land”).  The suit

land was subjected to ceiling proceedings under  the

Haryana Ceiling on Land Holdings Act, 1972 (for short,

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"the Act") wherein the Prescribed Authority had passed

an order dated 17.10.1978 in relation to the suit land.

6. This led to filing of two civil suits by two sets of

persons claiming  interest in  the  suit land.  One civil

suit was  C.S. No. 24­C of 1979 and other was C.S. No.

62­C of 1979.

7. So far as C.S. No. 24­C of 1979 is concerned, it

was filed by the plaintiffs in the Court of Sub­Judge III

Class, Sirsa, against the defendants. In this suit, the

plaintiffs sought a declaration that the order dated

17.10.1978 passed by the Prescribed Authority under

the Act is null and void. The Trial Court, by

judgment/decree dated 06.11.1981, dismissed the suit

as being barred.

8. The plaintiffs felt aggrieved and filed first appeal

(C.A.421­C/83) in the Court of Additional District

Judge, Sirsa. By Judgment dated 17.09.1983, the

First Appellate Court dismissed the appeal and upheld

the judgment/decree of the Trial Court.  

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9. The plaintiffs then carried the matter  in appeal

(R.S.A.No.40/1984) against the judgment/decree of

the First Appellate Court in the High Court of Punjab

&Haryana  at Chandigarh.

10. So far as C.S. No. 62­C of 1979 is concerned, it

was filed by other set of plaintiffs. It was filed in the

Court of Sub­Judge 1st Class,   Sirsa against other set

of  defendants, though  it  was also in relation  to the

same suit land, which was the subject of C.S. No.24­C

of 1979. In this suit also, the plaintiffs sought a

declaration that the order dated 17.10.1978 passed by

the Prescribed Authority under the Act is null and void

but the Trial Court, by judgment/decree dated

15.04.1985, decreed the suit.  

11. The defendants felt aggrieved and filed first

appeal (C.A.77­C/85) in the Court of Additional

District Judge, Sirsa. By judgment dated 23.07.1987,

the  First  Appellate  Court  dismissed  the  appeal.  The

defendants felt aggrieved and carried the  matter in

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appeal (R.S.A.  No.2712/1987) in the  High  Court of

Punjab & Haryana  at Chandigarh.

12. Both the second appeals were clubbed together

for their disposal.    

13.  By a common impugned order dated 28.01.2008,

the High Court dismissed R.S.A. No. 40/1984 which

arose out of C.S. No.24­C/79 and allowed RSA   No.

2712/1987  which  arose  out of  C.S.  No.  62­C/1979

giving rise to filing of these appeals by  special leave by

the plaintiffs of both the civil suits mentioned above  in

this Court.

14.   So,  the short question involved in the present

appeals is  whether the  High  Court  was justified in

dismissing R.S.A. No.40/1984 and allowing R.S.A. No.

2712/1987.  

15. Heard learned counsel for the parties.

16. Having heard the learned counsel for the parties

and on perusal of the record of the case, we find no

merit in these appeals.

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17. In our considered opinion, the High Court  was

justified in holding that both the civil suits were

barred and thus were not triable by the Civil Court in

the light of express bar contained in Section 26 of the

Act. Section 26 of the Act reads as under:

“26.   Bar of Jurisdiction – (1) No civil court shall have jurisdiction to­

(a) entertain or proceed with a suit for specific  performance of  a  contract for transfer of land which affects the right of the State Government to the surplus area under this Act; or

(b) settle, decide or deal with any matter which is under this Act required to be settled, decided or dealt  with by the Financial Commissioner, the Commissioner, the Collector or the Prescribed Authority.

(2) No order of the Financial Commissioner, the  Commissioner, the Collector or the prescribed authority made under or in pursuance of this Act shall be called in question in any court.”

18. Mere perusal of the plaint in both the civil suits

would go to show that the plaintiffs (appellants) had

challenged therein the legality of the order dated

17.10.1978 passed by the Prescribed Authority under

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the Act and prayed that the order dated 17.10.2018 be

declared null and void.

19. Section 9 of the Civil Procedure Code, 1908

provides that the Courts shall have jurisdiction to try

all suits of civil nature excepting suits of which their

cognizance is either expressly or impliedly barred.   

20. Section 26 (b) of the Act clearly bars filing of civil

suit to examine the legality of the order passed by the

Prescribed  Authority  under the  Act. In  other  words,

the Civil Court’s jurisdiction is expressly taken away

by Section 26(b) of the Act from examining the legality

of  orders passed under the Act.  The remedy of  the

plaintiffs in such case lies in filing appeal/revision

under Section 18 of the Act against the order of the

Prescribed Authority. (See  Dhulabhai vs. State of

M.P., AIR 1969 SC 78)

21. In view of the foregoing discussion, we are of the

considered opinion that the High Court was justified in

dismissing the appellants’ suits as  being  barred  by

virtue of the bar contained in Section 26 of the Act. We

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concur with the reasoning and the conclusion arrived

at by the High Court finding no case to interfere in the

impugned order in these appeals.

22. The appeals are, therefore, devoid of any merit.

They are accordingly dismissed.

         ………...................................J.        [ABHAY MANOHAR SAPRE]

   …...……..................................J.                 [DINESH MAHESHWARI]

New Delhi; March 15, 2019

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