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 REPORTABLE

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA

CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION

CIVIL APPEAL NO.19662 OF 2017 [Arising out of S.L.P. (C)No. 23410 of 2017]

Medical Council of India      ....Appellant

Versus

G.C.R.G. Memorial Trust & Ors.      ....Respondents

J U D G M E N T

DIPAK MISRA, CJI.

Leave granted.

2. The present appeal frescoes the scenario where one is

tempted to quote a few lines from what has been stated in

Quillen v. Board of Education1.  It reads thus:-

“The  distinction  between  the  gourmet  and  the gourmand is as neat and decisive in the prosaic realm  of  negotiation  as  in  the  festive  sphere  of gastronomic enjoyment — attempting to satisfy an unrestrained or exaggerated appetite in either field may prove discomforting if not disastrous.”

The purpose of referring to the same is to highlight the

unrestrained and exaggerated appetite.  When the factual 1 115 NYS 2d 122, 126  (1952)

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matrix would be unrolled, the greed in all its colours shall

come to the forefront.

3. The present appeal by special leave calls in question

the  legal  acceptability  of  the  order  dated  01st September

2017  passed  by  a  Division  Bench  of  the  High  Court  of

Allahabad,  Lucknow  Bench  in  Misc.  Bench  No.13530  of

2017 whereby the High Court has quashed the order dated

19th August  2017  as  well  as  order  dated  31st May  2017

passed by the Central Government and eventually granted

permission to the 1st respondent to admit students for the

Academic Session 2017-2018.   

4. When the matter was listed on 06th September 2017,

this Court had passed the following order :

“Issue notice fixing a returnable date within four weeks.

As  Mr.  Maninder  Singh,  learned  Additional Solicitor  General  for  respondent  No.3-Union  of India  and  Mr.  Mukul  Rohatgi,  learned  senior counsel  has  entered  appearance  on  behalf  of respondent No.1 and 2, no further notice need be issued.

As  far  as  respondent  No.5  and  6  are concerned, let notice be issued.   

Dasti in addition is permitted.

As an interim order, it is directed that there shall  be  stay  of  the  operation of  order  dated 1st

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September,  2017  further  corrected  on  4th September 2017.

If the Institution has admitted students they are debarred from continuing in the course.  We have passed this order as we while disposing of the writ  petition  preferred  under  Article  32  of  the Constitution had passed the following order :-

'Learned  counsel  for  the  petitioners seeks leave of  this  Court to withdraw the writ petition to approach the High Court  under  Article  226  of  the Constitution of India.

The  writ  petition  is  permitted  to  be withdrawn.  However, it is made clear that the High Court, while entertaining the  writ  petition,  shall  not  pass  any interim  order  pertaining  to  the academic year 2017-2018.'

We really fail to fathom the manner in which the High Court has misconstrued our order and passed  the  final  order  for  2017-2018.   We  are issuing  notice  only  to  test  the  propriety  of  the order and also if  the Institution is eligible to get the renewal of letter of permission for 2018-2019.”

The  aforesaid  order  eloquently  reflects  the  shock

expressed by this Court. As is reflectible from the aforesaid,

notice was issued only to test the propriety of the order and

also  if  the  institution  is  eligible  to  get  the  renewal  for

2018-2019.  

5. We shall initially address the first issue.  To adjudge

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the issue of propriety of the order passed by the High Court,

we  are  compelled  to  travel  in  a  time  machine.   The

respondent-institution  had  filed  a  writ  petition,  i.e.,  Writ

Petition (Civil) No.13530 of 2017 before the High Court and

was dealt with by the Division Bench of the High Court on

08th August 2017. On that day, the following order came to

be passed:  

“In reference to order dated 4.8.2017, the Central Government,  as  per  the  instructions received by Mr.  Asit  Kumar  Chaturvedi,  learned  Senior Counsel  appearing  for  the  respondent  no.1,  has agreed  to  entertain  the  petitioners'  matter  along with  other  similar  matters  and  consider  it  to revaluate the recommendations/views of the MCI, Hearing  Committee,  DGHS  and  the  Oversight Committee  as  available  on  record  for  grant  of approval to the petitioner-institution to admit the students  in  MBBS  Course,  after  affording  an opportunity of hearing to the petitioner-institution to the extent necessary.  To facilitate the Central Government,  the  whole  paragraph  25  of  the judgment  in  which directive  has  been issued by the Supreme Court is reproduced below:

'25.  In  the  above  persuasive  premise,  the Central  Government  is  hereby  ordered  to consider  afresh  the  materials  on  record pertaining  to  the  issue  of  confirmation  or otherwise of the letter of permission granted to  the  petitioner  colleges/institutions.   We make  it  clear  that  in  undertaking  this exercise,  the  Central  Government  would revaluate the recommendations/views of the MCI,  Hearing  Committee,  DGHS  and  the Oversight  Committee,  as  available  on

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records.  It would also afford an opportunity of  hearing  to  the  petitioner colleges  /institutions  to  the  extent necessary.  The process of hearing and final reasoned decision thereon, as ordered, would be completed peremptorily within a period of 10  days  from  today.   The  parties  would unfailing  co-operate  in  compliance  of  this direction to meet the time frame fixed.'

Therefore,  we  also  direct  the  Central Government  to  consider  the  petitioners' matter  accordingly  within  seven  days  as framed by Hon'ble the Supreme Court.

The  matter  is  listed  before  Hon'ble  the Supreme Court on 24.8.2017.

We, therefore, also direct the registry to list this matter on 28.8.2017.”

6. In pursuance of the aforesaid order, taking note of the

deficiencies, the Central Government passed the following

order on 19.8.2017 :

“17. Now, in compliance with the above direction of  Court,  the  Ministry  granted  hearing  to  the college  on  16.08.2017.   The  Hearing  Committee after  considering  the  records  and oral  & written submission of the college submitted its report to the  Ministry.   The  findings  of  the  Hearing Committee are as under-

The  Committee  notes  that  there  was  no deficiency  of  faculty  and  residents  as  per  MCI assessment report.   The findings of  the assessor indicate  some deficiency  of  clinical  material  and the observance of hospital protocols.

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During  the  course  of  hearing,  the  college produced  certain  documents  contesting  the findings of the assessors.  The Committee perused the case sheet of single normal delivery on the day of inspection as shown by the college.  The delivery of  Ms.  Sameerun  was  performed  without  blood transfusion  and  the  mother  was  discharged without  treatment  of  anaemeia  when  she  was severely anaemic at the time of admission with a haemoglobin  level  of  6.5  gm%.  This  is  gross negligence.  Further, the college could not produce any  Government  issued  birth  certificates  in support  of  their  claim  of  average  number  of deliveries.    

The inept handling of patients in the hospital is  further  confirmed during the perusal  of  cases pertaining to casualty and ICUs.  The college could not  satisfy  regarding  the  patients  in  casualty wards.  None of the 3 patients in ICCU seemed to have cardiac history.  The pulse rate of one of the patient  who  was  a  PSVT  (tachycardia)  case  was noted as 72/min at  the time of  admission.   NO investigation  was  done.  Other  two  patients  with diagnosis of Kyphoscoliosis (spinal deformity) and vestibular  neuritis  (ear  problem)  were  also admitted  in  the  cardiac  ICU.  This  confirms  the finding  of  assessors  and  the  college  had  no explanation.  It is understood that as per MSR, the requirement  is  for  requisite  number  of  beds  in ICUs, however, the college seem to be employing doubtful measures to show patients.

It was also noted that the college was neither aware  nor  following  the  provisions  of  biomedical waste (BMW) rules.

The  explanation  offered  by  the  college  in obtaining 14 cadavers from `Dera Saccha Sauda' Sirsa,  Haryana without  requisite  permission and death certificates is a serious issue to be looked into by the concerned authorities.

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In view of the above, despite the fact that no deficiency  of  faculty  and  residents  is  noted,  the functioning  of  the  hospital  as  per  norms  is  in serious doubt and the Committee agrees with the decision  of  the  Ministry  vide  letter  dated 31.05.2017 to debar the college for two years and also permit MCI to encash bank guarantee.

18. Accepting  the  recommendations  of  the Hearing  Committee,  the  Ministry  reiterates  its earlier  decision  dated  31.05.2017  to  debar  the college from admitting students for a period of two years  i.e.  2017-18  and  2018-19  and  also  to authorize  NCI  to  encash the  Bank Guarantee  of Rs.2 Crore.”

7. As the facts would further uncurtain, the institution

filed a petition under Article 32 of the Constitution before

this Court and chose to withdraw the same to approach the

High Court under Article 226 of the Constitution.  The said

order has already been quoted while reproducing the order

dated 06.09.2017.

8. The  content  of  the  order  dated  28.08.2017  is

graphically clear.  The High Court was not allowed to pass

any  interim  order  pertaining  to  the  Academic  Session

2017-2018 but the Division Bench of  the High Court,  for

some  unfathomable  and  inscrutable  reason,  referred  to

certain judgments of this Court and allowed the prayer. It is

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beyond our comprehension as to how the High Court could

have even remotely thought of passing an order granting the

Letter  of  Permission for  the Academic Session 2016-2017

and renewal for 2017-2018.  It is worthy to mention here

that before the High Court, time was sought on behalf of the

Central Government and the MCI to file counter affidavits.

The  same  was  denied  and  the  contesting  parties  were

deprived of the opportunity to contest.  Be it noted, the writ

petition that was filed before this Court was withdrawn on

28th August, 2017 and a fresh writ was filed before the High

Court on 29th August 2017 and the judgment was delivered

without waiting for the reply from the Central Government

or MCI on 01st September 2017.  It is clear as the cloudless

sky that the judgment of the High Court shows unnecessary

and  uncalled  for  hurry,  unjustified  haste  and  an

unreasonable sense of promptitude possibly being oblivious

of the fact that the stand of the Medical Council of India and

the Central Government could not be given indecent burial

when they were parties on record. Such a procedure cannot

be countenanced in law.   

9. The  controversy  cannot  be  allowed  to  end  with  our

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aforesaid  finding.  The  judicial  propriety  requires  judicial

discipline.  In  the  absence  of  a  reply  filed by the  Medical

Council of India and the Central Government, it could not

have been possible to answer the factual matrix of the case.

What is not possible, is not possible.  We may hasten to add

that in respect of the cases where renewal was granted, Mr.

Vikas Singh would submit that  the deficiency was within

the permissible limit but in the present case, it was not so

and  in  any  case,  granting  renewal  for  2017-2018  and

confirmation  of  letter  of  permission  for  2016-2017  was

totally unwarranted. In most of the cases, this Court has

directed for re-inspection by the MCI which would then take

a final decision for the academic year 2018-2019.  It is a

most  unfortunate  situation  that  the  Division  Bench  has

paved  such  a  path.  One  cannot  but  say  that  the

adjudication by the Division Bench tantamounts to a state

as  if  they  dragged  themselves  to  the  realm  of  “willing

suspension of disbelief”. Possibly, they assumed that they

could do what they intended to do.  A Judge cannot think in

terms of  “what  pleases  the  Prince  has  the  force  of  law”.

Frankly speaking, the law does not allow so, for law has to

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be observed by requisite respect for law.

10. In this context, we may note the eloquent statement of

Benjamin Cardozo who said:  

“The judge is not a knight errant, roaming at will in pursuit  of  his  own ideal  of  beauty and good- ness.”  

11. In  this  regard,  the  profound  statement  of  Felix

Frankfurter2 is apposite to reproduce:

“For  the  highest  exercise  of  judicial  duty  is  to subordinate one's personal pulls and one's private views to the law of which we are all guardians - those impersonal convictions that make a society a civilized  community,  and  not  the  victims  of personal rule.”

 The learned Judge has further stated3:

“What becomes decisive to a Justice's functioning on the Court in the large area within which his individuality moves is his general attitude toward law, the habits of the mind that he has formed or is  capable  of  unforming,  his  capacity  for detachment,  his  temperament  or  training  for putting his passion behind his judgment instead of in front of it. The attitudes and qualities which I am groping to characterize are ingredients of what compendiously  might  be  called  dominating humility.”

12. In  Shiv  Mohan  Singh  v.  The  State  (Delhi

Administration)4, the Court has observed:  2 Clark, Tom C., “Mr. Justice Frankfurter :’A Heritage for all Who Love the Law”, 51  A.B.A.J. 330, 332 (1965) 3 Foreword, to Memorial issue for Robert H. Jackson, 55 Columbia Law Review  (April, 1955) p. 436 4 (1977) 2 SCC 238

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“... a Judge even when he is free, is still not wholly free; he is not to innovate at pleasure; he is not a knight-errant roaming at will in pursuit of his own ideal of beauty or of goodness; he is to draw inspi- ration from consecrated principles’...”    

13. In this context, we may refer with profit the authority

in Om Prakash Chautala v. Kanwar Bhan5 wherein it has

been stated:  

“19. It needs no special emphasis to state that a Judge is not to be guided by any kind of notion. The decision-making process expects a Judge or an adjudicator to apply restraint, ostracise percep- tual subjectivity, make one’s emotions subservient to one’s reasoning and think dispassionately. He is expected to be guided by the established norms of judicial process and decorum.”   

And again:

“20.  A  Judge  should  abandon  his  passion.  He must constantly remind himself that he has a sin- gular master “duty to truth” and such truth is to be arrived at within the legal parameters. No hero- ism, no rhetorics.”

 14. In Dwarikesh Sugar Industries Ltd. v. Prem Heavy

Engineering  Works  (P)  Ltd.  and  another6,  the

three–Judge Bench observed:  

“32. When a position in law is well settled as a re- sult  of  judicial  pronouncement  of  this  Court,  it would  amount  to  judicial  impropriety  to  say  the least,  for  the  subordinate  courts  including  the

5 (2014) 5 SCC 417 6 (1997) 6 SCC 450

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High  Courts  to  ignore  the  settled  decisions  and then to pass a judicial order which is clearly con- trary to the settled legal position. Such judicial ad- venturism  cannot  be  permitted  and  we  strongly deprecate the tendency of the subordinate courts in not applying the settled principles and in pass- ing whimsical orders which necessarily has the ef- fect of granting wrongful and unwarranted relief to one of  the  parties.  It  is  time that  this  tendency stops.”

15. The  aforestated  thoughts  are  not  only  meaningfully

pregnant  but  also  expressively  penetrating.  They  clearly

expound  the  role  of  a  Judge,  especially  the  effort  of

understanding and attitude of judging.  A Judge is expected

to abandon his personal notion or impression gathered from

subjective  experience.  The  process  of  adjudication  lays

emphasis on the wise scrutiny of materials sans emotions.

A  studied  analysis  of  facts  and  evidence  is  a  categorical

imperative.  Deviation  from them is  likely  to  increase  the

individual  gravitational  pull  which has  the  potentiality  to

take justice to her coffin.  

16. As is perceptible, we had stayed the operation of the

order at the interim stage and further directed that if the

Institution had admitted students they were debarred from

continuing in the course.  The same stands confirmed.   

17. Further, the question that remains to be adjudicated is

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whether  the  students  who  were  given  admission  by  the

institution that had taken recourse to unholy and uncalled

for  practice  should  be  allowed  to  suffer.   We  think  not.

Students are to be compensated.  They had paid the fees.

Hopes were kindled in their hearts and aspirations in their

mind. Their young minds were polluted by the institution

and, therefore, we direct the respondent-institution to pay

Rs.10,00,000/-  to  each  of  the  students  who  had  taken

admission apart from refunding their fees.  Additionally, as

the  conduct  of  the  1st respondent,  namely,  G.C.R.G.

Memorial Trust, is absolutely blameworthy, we impose costs

of Rs.25 lacs to be deposited before this Court within eight

weeks hence.

18. Before parting, it is necessary to add and repeat that

the Division Bench had no reason to abandon the concept of

judicial  propriety  and  transgress  the  rules  and  further

proceed on a path where it was not required to. Such things

create  institutional  problems  and  we  are  sure  that  the

learned Judges shall be guided by it.  As far as the prayer of

the institution as regards the Academic Session 2018-2019

is  concerned,  it  does  not  deserve  consideration  and,

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accordingly, stands rejected. We say so as an unscrupulous

litigant who conceived the idea of paving the path of his own

desire,  moving according to his design, proceeding as per

his whim and marching ahead with brazenness abandoning

any sense of prudence cannot be leniently dealt with.  It is

the duty of the Court  to take stringent action, for he has

polluted  the  purity  attached  to  the  justice  dispensation

system and sullied the majesty of law.

19. In  view of  the  aforesaid  analysis,  the  appeal  stands

allowed. Costs as already assessed.  

                                                                       ….……........................CJI.

[DIPAK MISRA]

….………........................J. [A.M. KHANWILKAR]

…….……..........................J. [Dr. D.Y. CHANDRACHUD]

New Delhi. November 23, 2017.