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REPORTABLE

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION

CIVIL APPEAL No. 5927 OF 2014 [Arising out of SLP(C) No.7704 of 2008]

MCLEOD RUSSEL INDIA LIMITED                  ….. APPELLANT

vs

REG. PROVIDENT FUND COMMISSIONER,  JALPAIGURI & ORS.                                          ….. RESPONDENTS

J U D G M E N T

VIKRAMAJIT SEN,J.  

1 Leave granted.

2 This Appeal assails the judgment of the Division Bench of the  

High Court at Calcutta which had allowed the Appeal preferred against  

the judgment of the learned Single Judge, who in turn had applied and  

implemented  the  opinion  of  the  Division  Bench  as  expressed  in  

Darjeeling  Dooars  Plantation  Ltd.  vs  Regional  Provident  Fund  

Commissioner,  1995  ILLJ  939  Cal.    In  the  impugned  Order,  the  

present Division Bench had the advantage of perusing the view taken  

by a Special Bench of three learned Judges of the Calcutta High Court

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in Dalgaon Agro Industries Ltd. vs Union of India, (2006) 1 CALLT  

32 (HC), which was decided on 24.06.2005. The Special Bench was  

constituted in view of a reference submitted by a Single Judge in Writ  

Petition No. 16037(W), who had entertained an opinion which differed  

with three earlier decisions rendered by Single Judges in three separate  

matters.  Along with the aforestated writ  petition, an appeal  pending  

before a Division Bench against one of those Single Judge decisions  

was also taken up by the Special Bench.  In this Appeal, therefore, we  

have primarily to consider whether the exposition of law by the Special  

Bench in Dalgaon Agro Industries Ltd. is the logical and acceptable  

view.

3 The  factual  matrix  obtaining  in  the  case  at  hand,  succinctly  

stated, is that M/s. Mathura Tea Estate, P.O. Mathura Bagan, District  

Jalpaiguri,  West  Bengal,  owned  by  Saroda  Tea  Company  Ltd.,  

indubitably  an  establishment  covered  by  the  Employees’  Provident  

Funds  and  Miscellaneous  Provisions  Act,  1952  (‘the  EPF  Act’  for  

brevity),  had  defaulted  in  remitting  the  contributions  and  

accumulations  payable  under  the EPF Act  and the  sundry  Schemes  

formulated under that statute.   It was in those circumstances that the  

Regional  Provident  Fund  Commissioner  (‘RPF  Commissioner’  for

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brevity), Jalpaiguri, West Bengal, had issued notices to M/s. Mathura  

Tea  Estate  enabling  it  to  show  cause  against  the  imposition  of  

‘damages’  as  envisaged under  Section 14B of  the EPF Act.    M/s.  

Mathura Tea Estate requested for a waiver of damages, which request  

came to be rejected on the predication that the said establishment was  

neither  a  sick  unit  nor  the subject  of  any scheme for  rehabilitation  

sanctioned by the Board for Industrial and Financial Reconstruction. In  

the duration of those proceedings, the management of M/s. Mathura  

Tea Estate under the erstwhile ownership of Saroda Tea Company Ltd.  

was taken over by Eveready Industries (India) Ltd, which thereafter  

discharged the liability of entire principal sum of Provident Fund dues  

to  the  tune  of   Rs.75,76,000/-  pertaining to  the  period prior  to  the  

takeover  in  consonance  with  the  Memorandum  of  Understanding  

entered into  between it and Saroda Tea Company Ltd. Significantly,  

the said Memorandum of Understanding also included a clause to the  

effect that any damages payable for the failure  to deposit the dues and  

accumulations under the EPF Act would be the exclusive liability of  

Saroda Tea Company Ltd making it palpably evident that the appellant  

was fully alive to this liability.  It is in these premises that Eveready  

Industries  (India)  Ltd.  undauntedly  contended  before  the  RPF

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Commissioner,  Jalpaiguri,  in  the  event  in  futility,  that  proceedings  

under Section 14B of the EPF Act against it were unjustified as it was  

not the “employer” defined under Section 2(e) of the EPF Act, which  

defaulted  in  paying  contributions.    The  RPF  Commissioner  has  

recorded that M/s.  Mathura Tea Estate had defaulted in payment of  

dues  for  the  period  from  March,  1989  to  February,  1998,  which  

assertion of fact is not in dispute.   It held that on a conjoint reading of  

Sections 14B and 17B of the EPF Act it was clear that damages under  

Section 14B were recoverable jointly and severally from Saroda Tea  

Company  Ltd.  as  well  as  Eveready  Industries  (India)  Ltd.    After  

tabulating the rates of damages, i.e. percentage of arrears per annum  

depending  on  the  period  of  default,  damages  were  assessed  at  

Rs.70,37,950; and it was further directed that failure to deposit penal  

damages within the stipulated period would attract the provisions of  

Section 7Q of the EPF Act, thereby enhancing the liability to include  

simple interest at the rate of 12 per cent per annum on the damages.  

It was this Order of the RPF Commissioner that failed to find favour  

with the learned Single Judge of the High Court at Calcutta, who set  

aside the Commissioner’s  Orders and directed the said Authority to  

reconsider the issues within a period of three months.   The learned

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Single  Judge  had  drawn  reliance  from  the  ruling  reported  as  The  

Regional  Provident  Fund  Commissioner,  Mangalore  vs  Karnataka  

Forest Plantations Corporation Ltd., Bangalore, 2000 (1) LLJ 1134,  

which had ruled that on an interpretation of Section 17B the transferee  

employer would be liable to pay all outstanding contributions even for  

the period preceding the  transfer,  but  it  could not  be fastened with  

punitive liability for acts of omission or commission of the previous  

employer for the period anterior to the transfer. It will bear reiteration  

that in terms of the judgment of the Division Bench impugned before  

us,  the  decision  of  the  learned  Single  Judge  in  its  own  turn  was  

reversed on the application of the dictum of the Special Three-Judge  

Bench in Dalgaon Agro Industries Ltd.

4 The Special Bench of the High Court of Calcutta in Dalgaon  

Agro  Industries  Ltd.  has  rendered  a  detailed  judgment  on  the  

conundrum before us.   Succinctly stated, the Special Bench has opined  

that (a) the transferor and the transferee managements remain jointly  

and severally  liable under Sections 14B and 17B of the Act for  all  

sums due including damages; (b) the transferor’s indebtedness comes  

to a halt on the date of the transfer but includes the sums computed  

under both these Sections till the date of transfer; (c) the transfer does

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not bind either the employees or the Fund; (d) the transferee stands  

cautioned by virtue of Sections 1(3) and 17B that the erstwhile as well  

as the current employer remain responsible for liabilities under both  

the  Sections  as  a  consequence  of  liability  being  that  of  the  

establishment  in  question  of  which  employers  are  merely  fictional  

representatives  to  facilitate  recovery  of  dues;  (e)  recovery  of  any  

amount due is protected under Section 11(2) of the Act, which grants  

priority  to  the  amount  so  due  over  all  other  debts  under  any other  

statute as being the first charge on the assets of the establishment; (f)  

the  Act  has  innovated  radical  and  effective  modes  of  recovery  as  

evident from Sections 8B and 8F, which further reinforces the fact that  

liability to pay dues is of the establishment recoverable through the  

employer; (g) liability under Section 14B admits no waiver except as  

provided; (h) damages could be recovered regardless of any reasonable  

period  of  prescription;  (i)  the  covenants  in  the  Transfer  Deed  are  

irrelevant for determination and recovery of dues and damages; and (j)  

criminal liability would be attracted only in the event the outstandings  

are not completely recovered.

5 For facility of reference, the relevant provisions of the EPF Act  

are reproduced:-

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An  Act  to  provide  for  the  institution  of  provident  funds,   pension fund and deposit-linked insurance fund for employees   in factories and other establishments.

Section 1(3) Subject to the provisions contained in section 16,  it applies - (a) to every establishment which is a factory engaged in any  industry specified in Schedule I and in which twenty or more  persons are employed, and (b)  to  any  other  establishment  employing  twenty  or  more  persons  or  class  of  such  establishments  which  the  Central  Government  may,  by  notification  in  the  Official  Gazette,  specify in this behalf: Provided that the Central Government may, after giving not  less  than  two  months’  notice  of  its  intention  so  to  do,  by  notification in  the Official  Gazette,  apply the provisions  of  this  Act  to  any  establishment  employing  such  number  of  persons  less  than  twenty  as  may  be  specified  in  the  notification.

Section 2(e) “employer” means – (i)  in  relation  to  an  establishment  which  is  a  factory,  the  owner or occupier of the factory, including the agent of such  owner  or  occupier,  the  legal  representative  of  a  deceased  owner or occupier and, where a person has been named as a  manager of the factory under clause (f) of sub-section (1) of  section 7 of the Factories Act, 1948 (63 of 1948), the person  so named; and (ii) in relation to any other establishment, the person who, or  the authority which, has the ultimate control over the affairs  of the establishment, and where the said affairs are entrusted  to  a  manager,  managing  director  or  managing  agent,  such  manager, managing director or managing agent;  

Section 7A. Determination of moneys due from employers.  –  (1)  The  Central  Provident  Fund  Commissioner,  any  Additional  Central  Provident  Fund  Commissioner,  any  Deputy  Provident  Fund  Commissioner,  any  Regional  Provident  Fund  Commissioner  or  any  Assistant  Provident  Fund Commissioner may, by order, -

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(a)  in  a  case  where  a  dispute  arises  regarding  the  applicability  of  this  Act  to  an  establishment,  decide  such  dispute; and

(b)  determine the amount due from any employer under  any  provision  of  this  Act,  the  Scheme  or  the  [Pension]  Scheme or the Insurance Scheme, as the case may be,

       and for any of the aforesaid purposes may conduct such  inquiry as he may deem necessary.

Section  7Q.  Interest  payable  by  the  employer  --   The  employer shall be liable to pay simple interest at the rate of  twelve per cent per annum or at such higher rate as may be  specified in the Scheme on any amount due from him under  this Act from the date on which the amount has become so  due till the date of its actual payment: Provided that higher rate of interest specified in the Scheme  shall not exceed the lending rate of interest charged by any  scheduled bank.

Section  8.  Mode  of  recovery  of  moneys  due  from  employers– Any amount due - (a) from the employer in relation to an establishment to which  any Scheme or the Insurance Scheme applies in respect of any contribution payable to the Fund or, as the case may be, the  Insurance  Fund  damages  recoverable  under  section  14B,  accumulations required to be transferred under sub-section (2)  of section 15 or under sub-section (5) of section 17, or any  charges payable by him under any other provision of this Act  or of any provision of the Scheme or the Insurance Scheme;  or (b)  from  the  employer  in  relation  to  an  exempted  establishment  in  respect  of  any damages  recoverable  under  section 14B or any charges payable by him to the appropriate  Government under any provision of this Act or under any of  the conditions specified under section 17 or in respect of the  contribution  payable  by  him  towards  the  Pension  Scheme  under the said section 17,

       may, if the amount is in arrear, be recovered in the manner  specified in sections 8B to 8G.

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Section  11(2) Without  prejudice  to  the  provisions  of  sub- section (1), if any amount is due from an employer whether in  respect  of  the  employee’s  contribution  deducted  from  the  wages  of  the  employee  or  the  employer’s  contribution,  the  amount so due shall be deemed to be the first charge on the  assets  of  the  establishment,  and  shall,  notwithstanding  anything contained in any other law for the time being force,  be paid in priority to all other debts.

       Section  14B.  Power  to  recover  damages -  Where  an  employer makes default in the payment of any contribution to  the Fund the Pension Fund or the Insurance Fund or in the  transfer of accumulations required to be transferred by him  under  sub-section  (2)  of  section  15  or  sub-section  (5)  of  section 17 or in the payment of any charges payable under any  other  provision of  this  Act  or  of  any Scheme or  Insurance  Scheme or under any of the conditions specified under section  17, the Central Provident Fund Commissioner or such other  officer as may be authorised by the Central Government, by  notification in the Official Gazette, in this behalf may recover  from  the  employer  by  way  of  penalty  such  damages,  not  exceeding the amount of arrears, as may be specified in the  Scheme. Provided that  before levying and recovering such damages,  the employer shall be given a reasonable opportunity of being  heard. Provided further that the Central Board may reduce or waive  the  damages  levied  under  this  section  in  relation  to  an  establishment  which  is  a  sick  industrial  company  and  in  respect  of  which  a  scheme  for  rehabilitation  has  been  sanctioned  by  the  Board  for  Industrial  and  Financial  Reconstruction  established  under  section  4  of  the  Sick  Industrial  Companies  (Special  Provisions)  Act,  1985  (1  of  1986),  subject  to  such  terms  and  conditions  as  may  be  specified in the Scheme.

Section 17B. Liability in case of transfer of establishment -  Where an employer, in relation to an establishment, transfers  that establishment in whole or in part, by sale, gift, lease or  licence or in any other manner whatsoever, the employer and

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the person to whom the establishment is so transferred shall  jointly  and  severally  be  liable  to  pay  the  contribution  and  other sums due from the employer under any provision of this  Act or the Scheme or the Pension Scheme or the Insurance  Scheme, as the case may be, in respect of the period up to the  date of such transfer: Provided that the liability of the transferee shall be limited to  the value of the assets obtained by him by such transfer.”

6 We shall briefly discuss a decision of this Court namely, Sayaji  

Mills Ltd. vs. Regional Provident Fund Commissioner, 1984 (Supp)  

SCC 610, even though the questions before this Court are disparate in  

quotient.  The management/owners of the Sayaji Mills had contended  

that since the factory had been purchased in 1955 in certain liquidation  

proceedings and the period of three years had not elapsed from the date  

of  its  establishment,  the EPF Act  would have  no applicability  to  it  

under unamended Section 16(1)(b) of the Act.  This Court observed  

that  the  statute  is  a  beneficent  legislation  and  any  interpretation  

facilitating  the  evasion  of  its  provisions  should  be  abjured,  as  

employers  would  “spare  no  ingenuity  in  seeking  to  deprive  the  

employees  of  all  the  benefits  conferred  upon  them”;  that  the  old  

establishment should virtually have come to an end for the EPF Act to  

apply  afresh;  and  most  significantly,  that  the  said  Act  is  made  

applicable to the factory in contradistinction to its owner.  Once this

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rationale is applied to the present conundrum, it becomes apparent that  

the  inter  se  covenants  between the  Eveready Industries  (India)  Ltd.  

and the erstwhile  owners viz.  Saroda Tea Company Ltd.  would not  

insulate the former from the rigours of damages imposed by the EPF  

Act.  Damages must be calculated, it is plain, and be recovered by the  

Authority  in  the  most  efficacious  and  convenient  manner.   This  

decision,  Sayaji  Mills  Ltd.,  was  not  brought  to  the  notice  of  the  

Division Bench of  the Karnataka High Court  in  Karnataka Forest  

Plantations  Corporation  Limited,  otherwise  it  would  not  have  

endeavoured  to  explore  which  party/employer  was  ‘guilty’  of  the  

infraction of the statutory provisions.  The reasoning of the Karnataka  

decision is evidently flawed and runs counter to the intendment of the  

EPF Act as is crystal clear from a perusal of its Preamble (supra); and  

manifests  the  ingenuity  that  employers  may  devise  to  circumvent  

liability.  

7 Mr. Jayant Bhushan, learned Senior Counsel for the Appellant  

has  sought  sustainment  for  his  submissions  from  Employees’  State  

Insurance  Corporation vs  HMT Ltd. (2008)  3  SCC 35,  but  in  our  

consideration,  in  vain.    In  that  case,  the  ESIC raised  a  claim  for  

deposit  of  interest  on  outstanding  contributions  of  the  management

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under the ESIC Act and the concerned Regulations,  and in addition  

thereto  levied  damages  in  terms of  Section 85B of  the Employees’  

State Insurance Act, 1948 (‘ESIC Act’ for brevity). Section 85B of the  

ESIC Act is essentially para materia Section 14B of the EPF Act, and  

therefore this decision assumes great importance.  The submission of  

the HMT Management was that damages ought not to be levied, since  

Section 85B was an enabling provision and did not intend to make levy  

of damages mandatory.  We shall reproduce for facility of reference  

and comparison, the statutory provision of ESIC Act, 1948 to spotlight  

the legal nodus with which we are presently engrossed –  

85B. Power to recover damages.  – (1) Where an employer  fails to pay the amount due in respect of any contribution or  any other amount payable under this Act, the Corporation may  recover from the employer by way of penalty such damages  not exceeding the amount of arrears as may be specified in the  regulations: Provided that before recovering such damages, the employer  shall be given a reasonable opportunity of being heard: Provided further that the Corporation may reduce or waive the  damages  recoverable  under  this  section  in  relation  to  an  establishment which is a sick industrial company in respect of  which a scheme of rehabilitation has been sanctioned by the  Board for Industrial and Financial Reconstruction established  under  section  4  of  the  Sick  Industrial  Companies  (Special  Provisions) Act, 1985 (1 of 1986), subject to such terms and  conditions as may be specified in regulations. (2) Any damages recoverable under sub-section (1) may be  recovered as an arrear of land revenue or under section 45C to  section 45-I.

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8 In HMT Ltd., this Court noted the beneficial nature of the ESIC  

Act; that subordinate legislation must conform to the provisions of the  

parent Act. Despite giving due regard to the use of the words “may  

recover damages by way of penalty”, and mindful that  mens rea and  

actus reus to contravene a statutory provision are necessary ingredients  

for levy of damages,   this Court set aside the interference of the High  

Court  vis-à-vis  the  imposition  of  damages  and  further  held  that  

imposition of damages by way of penalty was not mandated in each  

and every case.  The dispute was remitted back to the High Court for  

fresh  consideration,  i.e.  to  proceed  on the  premise  that  the  levy  of  

penalty under the Act was not a mere formality, a foregone conclusion  

or an inexorable imposition; and that  the circumstances surrounding  

the  failure  to  deposit  the  contribution  of  the  employees  concerned  

would  also  have  to  be  cogitated  upon.    This  decision  does  not  

prescribe that damages or penalties cannot or ought not to be imposed.  

Further, the presence or absence of mens rea and/or actus reus would  

be a determinative factor in imposing damages under Section 14B, as  

also the quantum thereof since it is not inflexible that 100 per cent of  

the arrears has to be imposed in all the cases.  Alternatively stated, if  

damages have been imposed under Section 14B it will be only logical

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that  mens rea and/or  actus reus was prevailing at the relevant time.  

We may also note that this Court had yet again reiterated the well-

known but  oft  ignored principle  that  High Courts  or  any Appellate  

Authority created by a statute should not substitute their perspective of  

discretion on that of the lower Adjudicatory Authority if the impugned  

Order does not otherwise manifest perversity in the process of decision  

taking.   HMT Ltd. does not  proscribe imposition of  damages;  that  

would  negate  the  intent  of  the  legislature.   The  submission  of  the  

petitioner  before  us  is  that  the  liability  was  of  the  erstwhile  

management and since the petitioner was not the “employer” at the  

relevant time, default much less deliberate and wilful default on the  

part of the petitioner was absent.  However, it seems to us that once  

these  damages  have  been  levied,  the  quantification  and  imposition  

could be recovered from the party which has assumed the management  

of the concerned establishment.

9 The Two-Judge Bench decision in Organo Chemical Industries  

vs Union of India (1979) 4 SCC 573, makes compelling reading not  

only  because  of  the  contrasting  styles  of  two  of  our  illustrious  

predecessors;  A.P.  Sen  J  for  his  erudite,  efficient  and  precise  

exposition  of  the  law and  V.R.  Krishna  Iyer  J  for  his  elegance  of

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expression  and  verve  impregnated  with  humanism and  compassion.  

Organo involved  a  petition  under  Article  32  of  the  Constitution  

challenging the Constitutional vires of Section 14B of the EPF Act.  

The contention was that the default of the employer/establishment was  

not  wilful,  rendering  inappropriate  the  imposition  of  damages  of  a  

penal  nature; and since the computation of damages was left  totally  

unguided and untrammelled, violation of Article 14 was plainly and  

expectedly obvious.    The Court  while upholding the Constitutional  

validity of Section 14B held that the raison d’etre for the introduction  

of Section 14B (by Act 40 of 1973) was to deter and thwart employers  

from defaulting in forwarding contributions to the Funds, most often  

with the ulterior motive of misutilizing not only their own but also the  

employees’ contributions. Section 14B originally restricted damages to  

25 per cent of the withheld amounts which, having been found to be  

ineffectual  for  the  attainment  to  the  objectives  of  the  Act,  was  

increased to a sum “not exceeding the amount of arrears”.   This Court  

also  interred  the  division  or  dichotomy  of  opinions  flowing  from  

differing decisions of different High Courts by clarifying that the word  

‘damages’ has been employed in this dispensation to mean penalty on  

recalcitrant   employers  as  well  as  reparation  for  loss  caused to  the

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Fund.   The Court stoutly repelled the contention that damages were  

merely compensatory in nature and, therefore, should not exceed the  

interest  that  would  have  accrued  in  favour  of  the  Funds  had  the  

contributions been diligently dispatched to  the Funds.   Organo  has  

been  favourably  followed  in  Babubhai  &  Co.  vs.  State  of  Gujarat  

(1985) 2 SCC 732.

10 There is no gainsaying that criminal liability remains steadfastly  

fastened  to  the  actual  perpetrator  and  cannot  be  transferred  by  any  

compact between persons or even by statute.  But this incontrovertible  

legal  principle  does  not  support  or  validate  the  contention  of  Mr.  

Jayant  Bhushan,  Learned  Senior  Advocate  for  the  Appellants,  that  

damages  levied in  terms of  Section 14B of  the EPF Act  cannot  be  

foisted onto his clients.  Sections 14, 14A, 14AA, 14AB and 14AC of  

the  EPF  Act  are  the  provisions  postulating  prosecution;  in  

contradistinction Section 14B contemplates the power to “recover from  

the  employer  by  way  of  penalty  such  damages,  not  exceeding  the  

amount of arrears, as may be specified in the Scheme”.  It is true that it  

is not a river but a mere rivulet that segregates and distinguishes the  

legal  concepts  of  damages  or  compensatory  damages  or  exemplary  

damages  or  deterrent  damages  or  punitive  damages  or  retributory

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damages.   We  shall  abjure  from  writing  a  dissertation  on  this  

compelling  legal  nodus;  save  to  clarify  that  modern  jurisprudence  

recognizes  that  the  imposition  of  punitive  damages,  quintessentially  

quasi-criminal in character, can be resorted to even in civil proceedings  

to deter wilful wrongdoing by making an admonished example of the  

wrongdoer.  This is the essential purpose, it seems to us, of Section  

14B of the EPF Act, and an imposition within its confines does not  

assume  criminal  prosecution  so  as  to  stand  proscribed  insofar  as  

transfer  of  establishment  from  one  management/employer  to  its  

successor is concerned.

11 It has also been argued that damages as postulated in Section  

14B would not be transferable under Section 17B.  This argument has  

to  be  stated  only  to  be  rejected  for  the  reason  that  Section  17B  

specifically speaks of “the contributions and other sums due from the  

employer  under any provision of this Act or the Scheme” (emphasis  

added).   The  proviso  to  Section  17B  indeed  clarifies  the  position  

inasmuch as it restricts and/or limits the liability of the transferee up to  

the  date  of  the  transfer  to  the  value  of  the  assets  obtained by him  

through such transfer.  

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12     We are also not impressed by the argument addressed by Mr.  

Bhushan to the effect that damages under Section 14B are not jointly  

and  separately  recoverable  from  the  erstwhile  and  the  present  

managements under Section 17B as Section 14B moves in its own and  

independent orbit.   Several amendments have been made to the EPF  

Act  so  far  as  the  fasciculous of  Sections  7A  to  Section  7Q  is  

concerned.    This is also true of the pandect containing Sections 14A,  

14AA, 14AB, 14AC, 14B and 14C; and for that matter Sections 17A,  

17AA and 17B.   Where such widespread amendments and changes are  

incorporated  in  a  statute,  it  is  always  salutary  and  advisable  to  

reposition the provisions and number them sequentially and logically.  

The argument that the phrase “determination of amounts due from any  

employer” is found in Section 7A as well  as in Section 17B is not  

factually correct.    Section 17B speaks of   “contributions and other  

sums dues from the employer under any provision of  this Act …….”;  

the latter Section is, therefore, wider in ambit than the previous one.  In  

our opinion, Section 14B is complete in itself so far as the computation  

of damages is concerned.   It is conceivable that the money due from  

an employer would have to be calculated under Section 7A, and in the  

event  the  default  or  neglect  of  the  employer  is  contumacious  and

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contains the requisite mens rea and actus reus yet another exercise of  

computation has to be undertaken under Section 14B.    Where the  

Authority is of the opinion that damages under Section 14B need to be  

imposed, the computations would come within the purview of Section  

14B  and  it  would  be  recoverable  jointly  and  severally  from  the  

erstwhile  as  well  as  the  current  managements.    A  perusal  of  the  

Appeals  Section,  namely,  7I  is  illustrative  of  the  fact  that  these  

exercises are distinct from each other as per the enumerations found in  

the first sub-Section of Section 7I.   It also appears logical to us, in the  

wake of the numerous and different dates of amendments, that Section  

7A(2) would also be available to proceedings under Section 14B of the  

Act.   The applicability of Civil Procedure Code, 1908 to proceedings  

under Section 14B has not specifically been barred by the statute.      

13         It is necessary to clarify that Eveready Industries (India) Ltd.  

had in the interregnum of this litigation changed its name to Mcleod  

Russel India Ltd.  In view of our above analysis, it is our considered  

opinion  that  the  impugned  Judgment  deserves  to  be  upheld.    It  

contains a detailed and logical exposition of facts as well as the law  

pertaining  to  the  present  dispute.  We  also  approve  the  pithy  

observations of the RPF Commissioner, Jalpaiguri in the subject Order

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that  failure  on  the  part  of  the  employers  to  make  remittances  of  

accumulations  and  contributions,  undermines  the  objectives  and  

purposes of the statute.   We underscore that the liability of the Fund to  

pay interest to subscribers regardless of whether employers have paid  

their  dues,  runs  relentlessly.    The  Commissioner  has  specifically  

recorded  that  he  has  taken  a  lenient  view  in  the  matter  and  has  

eschewed imposition of damages to the extent of 100 per cent of the  

arrears even though this is envisaged by the EPF Act.   The Appellant-

Petitioner  has,  in  the  circumstances  of  the  case,  been  also  rightly  

burdened with the payment of interest under Section 7Q of the EPF  

Act.   Accordingly, the Appeal is dismissed and the interim Orders are  

recalled.   Although, it is our opinion that the Appeal is wholly devoid  

of merit, we refrain from imposing costs.

                 ............................................J.                    [T.S. THAKUR]   

                 ............................................J.                    [VIKRAMAJIT SEN]

New Delhi; July 02, 2014.