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       REPORTABLE

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA

                    CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION                      CRIMINAL APPEAL NO. 1263 OF 2011

Maya Devi & Anr. .... Appellant(s)

Versus

State of Haryana                   .... Respondent(s)

                  J U D G M E N T

R.K. Agrawal, J.

1) This appeal has been filed against the judgment and order dated  

14.01.2010  passed  by  the  High  Court  of  Punjab  and  Haryana  at  

Chandigarh  in  Criminal  Appeal  No.  488-DB  of  1999  whereby  the  

Division Bench of the High Court dismissed the appeal.   

2) Brief facts:

(a) As per the prosecution story, the marriage of Kavita @ Kusum  

(since  deceased)  was  solemnized  with  Karamvir,  son  of  Mahavir,  

resident of House No. 36, Type II, M.D. University Campus, Rohtak  

according to Hindu rites and ceremonies on 17.07.1994.  After 20-25  

days of the solemnization of the marriage, Karamvir (appellant No. 2  

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herein),  his  mother  Maya  Devi  (appellant  No.  1  herein),  brothers  

Dharamveer  and  Paramveer  and  Sister  Sonika@Pinki  started  

harassing,  maltreating  and  beating  Kavita  (since  deceased)  on  

account of dowry.  Despite all efforts, the attitude and relations of her  

in-laws towards her went from bad to worse.

(b) On  26.09.1996,  the  police  got  a  telephonic  message  from  a  

stranger at 3:30 a.m. that the dead body of a woman was lying in  

House No. 36, Type II, M.D. University Campus, Rohtak.  On coming  

to know about the incident, Kanwar Singh (the complainant) - father  

of Kavita reached the spot and identified the body to be that of his  

daughter.

(c) A complaint was lodged by Kanwar Singh (PW-3) at the P.S. Civil  

Lines, Rohtak regarding the incident on 27.09.1996 alleging torture  

and harassment meted out to the deceased on account of demand of  

dowry  who  had  committed  suicide  by  consuming  some  poisonous  

substance.  On the basis of the said complaint, FIR No. 466 of 1966  

was  registered  under  Sections  498A,  304B,  306/34  of  the  Indian  

Penal  Code,  1860  (in  short  ‘the  IPC’).  After  investigation,  charges  

under Sections 498A and 304B read with Section 34 of the IPC were  

framed against the accused persons.    

(d) The case was committed to the Court of Sessions and numbered  

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as  11/10.04.1997  and  Maya  Devi-mother-in-law  of  the  deceased  

(appellant No. 1 herein), Karamvir-husband of the deceased (appellant  

No. 2 herein) and Dharamveer and Paramveer-brothers of Karamvir  

were arrayed as accused.  

(e) The  Court  of  Sessions  Judge,  Rohtak,  by  order  dated  

22/27.09.1999,  while  acquitting  Dharamveer  and  Paramveer  

-brothers of Karamvir, convicted the appellant Nos. 1 and 2 herein for  

the commission of offence under Sections 498A and 304B of the IPC  

and  sentenced  them  to  suffer  rigorous  imprisonment  (RI)  for  life  

under  Section  304B  of  the  IPC.   Both  the  accused  were  further  

sentenced to undergo rigorous imprisonment (RI)  for 2 (two)  years,  

along with a fine of  Rs. 500/- each, for the offence under Section  

498A of the IPC.

(f) Being aggrieved, the appellant herein filed Criminal Appeal No.  

488-DB  of  1999  before  the  High  Court.   Kanwar  Singh-the  

complainant also filed Criminal Revision No. 208 of 2000 before the  

High  Court  for  setting  aside  the  judgment  and  order  dated  

22/27.09.1999  to  the  extent  of  acquittal  of  Dharamveer  and  

Paramveer.

(g) The  Division  Bench  of  the  High  Court,  by  order  dated  

14.01.2010, dismissed the appeal filed by the appellants herein while  

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modifying  the  sentence  of  life  imprisonment  to  that  of  rigorous  

imprisonment for 10 years for the offence under Section 304B while  

maintaining the sentence in respect of other offence.  The Division  

Bench also dismissed the revision filed by the complainant.        

(h)   Aggrieved by the said judgment, the appellants have preferred  

this appeal by way of special leave before this Court.

3)   Heard  Mr.  T.S.  Doabia,  learned  senior  counsel  for  the  

appellants and Mr. Narender Hooda, learned senior counsel for the  

respondent-State.

Rival Submissions:

4) Learned senior counsel for the appellants submitted before this  

Court  that  Kavita  (since  deceased)  was  suffering  from  mental  

depression and psychosis and no case has been made out for bringing  

the same within the definition of dowry as contained in the Dowry  

Prohibition Act, 1961.  Learned senior counsel further contended that  

she was suffering from mental depression even before her marriage.  

Her brother and uncle used to administer anti-depression medicines  

to her secretly.  In support of the same, learned senior counsel relied  

upon the deposition of Dr. V.P. Mehla, MD, Consultant Psychiatric  

Centre, Civil Hospital, Rohtak who deposed as under:-

“Kavita wife of Karambir remained under my treatment and because I  have seen her in the OPD on 26.08.1996 vide OPD No. 1034/96. Ex.  DC is her OPD slip. As per my record, patient was suffering from  

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moderate depressing episode. The patient suffered from sadness of  mood,  absent  mindless,  loss  of  interest  in  the  usual  activities,  decreased sleep and appetite for the last two month, when I first saw  her. On mental status examination by me, she was found to have  said, irritable facets. She was having depressed mood and expressed  pessimistic  ideas  and complained against  her         in-laws and  husband.  She  also  expressed  occasional  suicidal  ideas.  Her  Judgment and insight was read to be fair by me. On the basis of  above findings, I judged her to be suffering from moderate depressive  episode and I had prescribed her capsule flute 20 mg. / OD and I  have  counseled her  and her  husband who had accompanied her,  regarding  the  needful  treatment  and  importance  of  psychosocial  support in this disease. History of the patient is contained in Ex. DB.  XXX’C. Question : How much time did you take examining patient  Kavita in this case ? Ans :- I can give no time in this case but routine I used to take new  patient 20 to 30 minutes.  

I have not mentioned any marks of identification or signatures  of the patient Kavita in Ex. DD. Whatever was stated by husband of  the  patient  was  recorded  in  Ex.  DD.  (Volunteered  that  Chief  Complaints recorded in Ex. DD were told by patient’s husband and  patient herself). I cannot specifically state as to what was told by the  patient and what was by her husband, Ex. DD contains the mixture  of observation of the complaints of patient and her husband. It is  correct  that  patient  only  came to  me on 26.08.1996.  There  is  no  pagination in the patient register but serial no. has been maintained.  There is one entry only on 26.08.1996 and that is at the fag end of  the page. Besides Kavita, who was examined on 26.8.96 as a new  patient,  I  also  examined  old  patients  on  the  said  date  and  their  registration no is mentioned as 226/94 and 983/96 by the side of  entry no. 1034. Patient had this illness as first episode. As per my  record  there  was  no  family  or  past  history  of  psychiatric  illness.  Moderate depressing episode is a diagnostic category as defined in  ICD/10 as a  depressive illness with symptoms of  depression with  moderate intensity. In an expert hand, this disease is 100% curable. I  did not  feel  the need of  any test  of  the patient.  In a  predisposed  individual  any  kind  of  stress  can  lead  to  the  precipitation  of  a  depressive disease and illness. It is incorrect to suggest that I have  deposed falsely.”  

5) In  view  of  the  above,  learned  senior  counsel  relied  upon  a  

decision of this Court in  Sharad Birdhichand Sarda vs.  State of  

Maharashtra (1984) 4 SCC 116 wherein it was held as under:-

“40. Thus, from the recitals in the letters we can safely hold that  

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there was a clear possibility and a tendency on her part to commit  suicide due to desperation and frustration. She seems to be tired of  her married life, but she still hoped against hope that things might  improve. At any rate, the fact that she may have committed suicide  cannot be safely excluded or eliminated. It may be that her husband  may have murdered her but when two views are reasonably possible  the benefit must go to the accused. In order to buttress our opinion,  we  would  like  to  cite  some  passages  of  an  eminent  psychiatrist,  Robert J. Kastenbaum where in his book Death, Society and Human  Experience he  analyses  the causes,  the  circumstances,  the moods  and  emotions  which  may  drive  a  person  to  commit  suicide.  The  learned author has written that a person who is psychotic in nature  and suffers from depression and frustration is more prone to commit  suicide than any other person. In support of  our view, we extract  certain passages from his book:

“The  fact  is  that  some  people  who  commit  suicide  can  be  classified as psychotic or severely disturbed.

If we are concerned with the probability of suicide in very large  populations,  then  mental  and  emotional  disorder  is  a  relevant  variable to consider.

And  it  is  only  through  a  gross  distortion  of  the  actual  circumstances that one could claim all suicides are enacted in a  spell of madness.

Seen in these terms, suicide is simply one of the ways in  which a relatively weak member of society loses out in the jungle- like struggle.

The  individual  does  not  destroy  himself  in  hope  of  thereby  achieving a noble post-mortem reputation or a place among the  eternally blessed. Instead he wishes to subtract himself from a life  whose quality seems a worse evil than death,

The newly awakened spirit of hope and progress soon became  shadowed by a sense of disappointment and resignation that, it  sometimes seemed, only death could swallow,

Revenge fantasies and their association with suicide are well  known to people who give ear to those in emotional distress.

People who attempt suicide for reasons other than revenge may  also act on the assumption that, in a sense, they will survive the  death to benefit by its effect.                              * * *

The victim of suicide may also be the victim of self-expectations  that  have  not  been  fulfilled.  The  sense  of  disappointment  and  frustration may have much in common with that experienced by  the  person  who  seeks  revenge  through  suicide....  However,  for  some people a critical moment arrives when the discrepancy is  experienced  as  too  glaring  and  painful  to  be  tolerated.  If  something has to go it may be the person himself, not the perhaps  excessively  high  standards  by  which  the  judgment  has  been  

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made.... Warren Breed and his colleagues found that a sense of  failure is prominent among many people who take their own lives.

41. The  above  observations  are  fully  applicable  to  the  case  of  Manju. She solemnly believed that her holy union with her husband  would bring health and happiness to her but unfortunately it seems  to  have  ended  in  a  melancholy  marriage  which  in  view  of  the  circumstances detailed above, left her so lonely and created so much  of emotional disorder resulting from frustration and pessimism that  she was forced to end her life. There can be no doubt that Manju was  not  only  a  sensitive  and  sentimental  woman  but  was  extremely  impressionate  (sic)  and  the  letters  show  that  a  constant  conflict  between  her  mind and body  was going  on and unfortunately  the  circumstances which came into existence hastened her end. People  with such a psychotic philosophy or bent of mind always dream of an  ideal and if the said ideal fails, the failure drives them to end their  life, for they feel that no charm is left in their life.

42. Mary K. Hinchliffe, Douglas Hooper and F. John Roberts in  their book The Melancholy Marriage observe that—

“Studies of attempted suicide cases have also revealed the high  incidence of marital problems which lie behind the act. In our own  study of  100 consecutive cases (Roberts  and Hooper  1969),  we  found  that  most  of  them  could  be  understood  if  the  patients’  interactions with others in their environment were considered.”(p.  5) 43. Such  persons  possess  a  peculiar  psychology  which  instils  

extreme  love  and  devotion  but  when  they  are  faced  with  disappointment or find their environment so unhealthy or unhappy,  they seem to lose all the charms of life. The authors while describing  these sentiments observe thus:

“‘Hopelessness’, ‘despair’, ‘lousy’ and ‘miserable’ draw attention  to the relationship of the depressed person ‘to his environment.  The articulate depressed person will often also struggle to put into  words  the  fact  that  not  only  does  there  appear  to  be  no  way  forward and thus no point to life — but that the world actually  looks different.” (p. 7) 44. Coleridge in Ode to Dejection in his usual ironical manner has  

very beautifully explained the sentiments of such persons thus: “I see them all so excellently fair — I see, not feel, how beautiful they are;”

45. At another place the authors (Hinchliffe, Hooper, and John)  come to  the  final  conclusion  that  ruptured personal  relationships  play  a  major  part  in  the  clinical  picture  and  in  this  connection  observed thus:

“Initially we applied these ideas to study of cases of attempted  suicide  (Roberts  and  Hooper  1969)  and  although  we  did  not  assume that they were all  necessarily  depressed, we looked for  

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distal  and proximal  causes  for  their  behaviour  and found that  ruptured personal relationships played a major part in the clinical   picture.”

The  observations  of  the  authors  aptly  and  directly  apply  to  the  nature, mood and the circumstances of the unfortunate life of Manju  which came to an end within four months of her marriage.”

6) Learned  senior  counsel  further  submitted  that  Kavita  had  

committed  suicide  on  account  of  the  fact  that  she  was  mentally  

depressed and no case is made out under Section 304B of the IPC as  

the requirement of law is that the harassment and cruelty should be  

“soon before her death” and no evidence has come on record for this  

purpose.  In order to bring home conviction under Section 304B of the  

IPC, it will not be sufficient to only lead evidence showing that cruelty  

or  harassment  had  been  meted  out  to  the  victim,  but  that  such  

treatment  was in  connection with the  demand for  dowry.      The  

phrase, “soon before her death”, no doubt, is an elastic expression  

and  can  refer  to  a  period  either  immediately  before  her  death  or  

within a few days or even a few weeks before it.  But the proximity to  

her death is the pivot indicated by that expression.  The legislative  

intent  in providing such a radius of  time by employing the words  

“soon before her death” is to emphasis the idea that her death should,  

in  all  probabilities,  has  been  the  aftermath  of  such  cruelty  or  

harassment.  There should be a perceptible nexus between her death  

and the dowry related harassment or cruelty inflicted on her.   

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7) In support of the above contention, learned senior counsel for  

the appellants referred to a decision of this Court in  Durga Prasad  

and  Another vs.  State  of  Madhya  Pradesh (2010)  9  SCC  73  

wherein it was held as under:-

7. It was pointed out that the only evidence on which reliance had  been placed both by the trial court, as well as the High Court, for  convicting the appellants, was the evidence of Vimla Bai, PW 1, the  mother of the deceased and Radheshyam, PW 3, the brother of the  deceased. In fact, the prosecution story was that since no dowry had  been received from the family of the victim, she had been beaten and  treated  with  cruelty.  There  is  no  other  evidence  regarding  the  physical and mental torture which the deceased was alleged to have  been subjected to.

8. Mr  Gupta  urged  that  the  marriage  of  Appellant  1  with  the  deceased  was  performed  as  part  of  a  community  marriage  being  celebrated  on  account  of  the  poverty  of  couples  who  could  not  otherwise  meet  the  expenses  of  marriage  and  that  even  the  few  utensils which were given at the time of such community marriage  were given by the persons who had organised such marriages.

9. Mr Gupta submitted that the evidence in this case was wholly  insufficient  to even suggest  that  the victim had been subjected to  cruelty or harassment which was sufficient to compel her to commit  suicide. In support of his submissions, Mr Gupta firstly referred to  the decision of this Court in Biswajit Halder v. State of W.B. wherein,  in  facts  which  were  very  similar,  it  was  held  that  there  was  practically  no  evidence  to  show  that  there  was  any  cruelty  or  harassment for, or in connection with, the demands for dowry. There  was also no finding in that regard. It was further observed that this  deficiency in evidence proved fatal for the prosecution case and even  otherwise mere evidence of cruelty and harassment was not sufficient  to attract Section 304-B IPC. It  had to be shown in addition that  such cruelty or harassment was for, or in connection with, demand  of dowry. Mr Gupta urged that since the appellants had not been  convicted under the provisions of the Dowry Prohibition Act, 1961,  the charge under Section 304-B would also fail since the same was  linked  with  the  question  of  cruelty  or  harassment  for,  or  in  connection with, the demand for dowry.

14. Ms Makhija then contended that as had been laid down by  this Court in Anand Kumar v.  State of M.P., in order to counter the  presumption  available  under  Section  113-B,  which  is  relatable  to  Section 304-B, a heavy burden has been shifted on to the accused to  prove his innocence. Having regard to the language of Section 113-B  

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of the Evidence Act, which indicates that when a question arises as  to whether a person has committed the dowry death of a woman and  it is shown that soon before her death such woman was subjected to  cruelty or harassment by such other person or in connection with  any demand for dowry, the court shall presume that such person had  caused  such  dowry  death.  Ms  Makhija  urged  that  the  aforesaid  wording  of  Section  113-B  of  Evidence  Act  and  the  use  of  the  expression “shall” would clearly indicate that the court shall presume  such death as dowry death provided the conditions in Section 113-B  were  satisfied  and  it  would  then  be  for  the  accused  to  prove  otherwise.

15. Ms Makhija,  thereupon,  urged that  the order  of  conviction  passed by the trial court holding the appellants guilty under Sections  498-A and 304-B IPC, confirmed by the High Court, did not warrant  any interference by this Court.

16. Having carefully considered the submissions made on behalf  of the respective parties, we are inclined to allow the benefit of doubt  to the appellants having particular regard to the fact that except for  certain bald statements made by PWs 1 and 3 alleging that the victim  had been subjected to cruelty and harassment prior to her death,  there is no other evidence to prove that the victim committed suicide  on account of cruelty and harassment to which she was subjected  just  prior  to  her  death,  which,  in  fact,  are  the  ingredients  of  the  evidence to be led in respect of Section 113-B of the Evidence Act,  1872,  in order  to  bring home the guilt  against  an accused under  Section 304-B IPC.

17. As  has  been  mentioned  hereinbefore,  in  order  to  hold  an  accused guilty of an offence under Section 304-B IPC, it has to be  shown that apart from the fact that the woman died on account of  burn or bodily injury, otherwise than under normal circumstances,  within 7 years of her marriage, it has also to be shown that soon  before her death, she was subjected to cruelty or harassment by her  husband or any relative of her husband for, or in connection with,  any demand for dowry. Only then would such death be called “dowry  death” and such husband or relative shall be deemed to have caused  the death of the woman concerned.

18. In this case, one other aspect has to be kept in mind, namely,  that  no  charges  were  framed  against  the  appellants  under  the  provisions of the Dowry Prohibition Act, 1961 and the evidence led in  order to prove the same for the purposes of Section 304-B IPC was  related to a demand for a fan only.

19. The decision cited by Mr R.P. Gupta, learned Senior Advocate,  in  Biswajit  Halder  case was  rendered  in  almost  similar  circumstances.  In order to bring home a conviction under Section  304-B IPC, it will not be sufficient to only lead evidence showing that  cruelty or harassment had been meted out to the victim, but that  such treatment was in connection with the demand for dowry. In our  view,  the  prosecution  in  this  case  has  failed  to  fully  satisfy  the  

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requirements of both Section 113-B of the Evidence Act, 1872 and  Section 304-B of the Penal Code.

8) Learned senior counsel further relied upon  Satvir Singh and  

Others vs. State of Punjab and Another (2001) 8 SCC 633 which is  

as under:-

“21. Thus,  there  are  three  occasions  related  to  dowry.  One  is  before the marriage, second is at the time of marriage and the third is  “at any time” after the marriage. The third occasion may appear to be  an unending period. But the crucial words are “in connection with  the marriage of the said parties”. This means that giving or agreeing  to give any property or valuable security on any of the above three  stages  should  have  been  in  connection  with  the  marriage  of  the  parties. There can be many other instances for payment of money or  giving  property  as  between  the  spouses.  For  example,  some  customary  payments  in  connection  with  birth  of  a  child  or  other  ceremonies are prevalent in different societies. Such payments are  not  enveloped  within  the  ambit  of  “dowry”.  Hence  the  dowry  mentioned  in  Section  304-B  should  be  any  property  or  valuable  security given or agreed to be given in connection with the marriage.

22. It is not enough that harassment or cruelty was caused to the  woman with a demand for dowry at some time, if Section 304-B is to  be invoked. But it  should have happened “soon before her death”.  The said phrase, no doubt, is an elastic expression and can refer to a  period either immediately before her death or within a few days or  even a few weeks before it. But the proximity to her death is the pivot  indicated by that expression. The legislative object in providing such  a radius of time by employing the words “soon before her death” is to  emphasise the idea that her death should, in all probabilities, have  been the aftermath of such cruelty or harassment. In other words,  there  should  be  a  perceptible  nexus  between  her  death  and  the  dowry-related harassment or cruelty inflicted on her. If the interval  elapsed between the infliction of such harassment or cruelty and her  death is wide the court would be in a position to gauge that in all  probabilities  the  harassment  or  cruelty  would  not  have  been  the  immediate cause of her death. It is hence for the court to decide, on  the facts and circumstances of each case, whether the said interval  in  that  particular  case  was  sufficient  to  snuff  its  cord  from  the  concept “soon before her death”.”

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9) Learned senior counsel for the appellants further contended that  

so far as Maya Devi-appellant No. 1 herein is concerned, she was not  

staying  at  Rohtak  at  the  relevant  time  and  she  was  a  teacher  in  

Municipal School at Delhi which is apparent from the statement of  

Smt. Rajbala (DW-3), Head Mistress, Nagar Nigam Prathmik Balika  

Vidyalaya, Ladpur, Delhi as also from the investigation and the case  

of the prosecution.  Even, Karamvir-husband of the deceased was not  

present in the house when Kavita committed the act of suicide.  He  

finally contended that there is nothing on record to show that any  

demand  for  dowry  was  made  and  she  meted  out  cruelty  or  

harassment soon before her death.  Learned senior counsel further  

contended that even for the purpose of Section 498A the evidence is  

lacking.

10) On the other hand, learned senior counsel for the respondent-

State  submitted  that  there  is  no  dispute  that  Kavita  died  on  

26.09.1996 in her matrimonial home otherwise than under normal  

circumstances due to poisoning.  Admittedly,  there were persistent  

demands put up by the accused right from the solemnization of the  

marriage which continued till the date of the death of the deceased.  

He  further  contended  that  the  accused  had  been  maltreating,  

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harassing  and subjecting  her  to  cruelty  for  the  fulfillment  of  their  

demands for  additional  dowry.   It  was next  contended that  in the  

present case, besides Kavita, the accused had also humiliated Pankaj  

(PW-4) – brother of the deceased.  When PW-4 visited the house of the  

accused with some ceremonial  articles on the day of  ‘sakrant’,  the  

accused expressed displeasure upon the articles brought by him.  He  

further contended that the claim that the deceased was suffering from  

moderate  depressing  episode  and  was  having  suicidal  tendencies  

prior to her death which had come true on 26.09.1996 is hardly of  

any  consequence.   A  series  of  transactions  of  maltreatment  and  

cruelty which commenced just 20-25 days after the solemnization of  

the  marriage  of  the  deceased  with  appellant  No.  2  herein  and  

culminated on the date of the death of the deceased would go a long  

way to show that she was harassed, maltreated and was subjected to  

cruelty soon before her death for and in connection with the demands  

for dowry.  It was further submitted that the deceased was so much  

depressed as a result of cruelty/harassment meted out to her at the  

hands of the appellants that she developed the suicidal tendencies.  

He further submitted that the accused had created such a vicious  

and charged atmosphere in the matrimonial home that Kavita (since  

deceased) started picking up the ideas of committing suicide.   

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11) Learned  senior  counsel  for  the  respondent-State  vehemently  

contended that all the accused except appellant No. 1 were living in a  

house  and  the  claim  of  the  appellants  that  there  is  no  point  of  

involvement of Maya Devi in the whole incident is wholly irrelevant as  

she too was a frequent visitor to Rohtak as admitted by her in the  

statement made under Section 313 of the Code of Criminal Procedure,  

1973 (in short ‘the Code’) and there is sufficient evidence on record to  

show that as and when the demands were put up by the accused to  

the complainant party, Maya Devi always accompanied her son.       

12) Learned  senior  counsel  for  the  respondent-State  finally  

contended that the trial  Court rightly convicted and sentenced the  

appellants under Section 304B and 498A of the IPC and the High  

Court upheld the same with some modification in the sentence. The  

appellants deserve a deterrent punishment in the present case.   

Discussion:

13) Before considering the prosecution case as well  as the defence  

pleaded, it is desirable to extract the relevant provisions of Section  

304B which relates to dowry death:

“304B. Dowry death.—(1) Where the death of a woman is caused  by any burns or bodily injury or occurs otherwise than under normal  circumstances within seven years of her marriage and it is shown  that  soon  before  her  death  she  was  subjected  to  cruelty  or  harassment by her husband or any relative of her husband for, or in  connection with, any demand for dowry, such death shall be called  ‘dowry death’, and such husband or relative shall be deemed to have  

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caused her death. Explanation.—For  the purpose of  this  sub-section,  ‘dowry’  shall  

have the same meaning as in Section 2 of the Dowry Prohibition Act,  1961 (28 of 1961).

(2)  Whoever  commits  dowry  death  shall  be  punished  with  imprisonment for a term which shall not be less than seven years but  which may extend to imprisonment for life.”

The above provision was inserted by Act 43 of 1986 and came into  

force  with  effect  from  19.11.1986.  There  is  no  dispute  about  the  

applicability of the above provision since the marriage and the death  

occurred in the year 1994 and 1996 respectively.

14) In order to convict an accused for the offence punishable under  

Section 304B IPC, the following essentials must be satisfied:

(i)  the death of a woman must have been caused by burns or  bodily injury or otherwise than under normal circumstances;

(ii)  such death must have occurred within seven years of  her  marriage;

(iii) soon before her death, the woman must have been subjected  to cruelty or harassment by her husband or any relatives of her  husband;

(iv)  such cruelty or harassment must be for,  or in connection  with, demand for dowry.

When the above ingredients are established by reliable and acceptable  

evidence, such death shall be called dowry death and such husband  

or  his  relatives  shall  be  deemed to  have  caused her  death.  If  the  

abovementioned  ingredients  are  attracted  in  view  of  the  special  

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provision, the court shall presume and it shall record such fact as  

proved unless and until it is disproved by the accused. However, it is  

open to  the  accused to  adduce such evidence  for  disproving  such  

conclusive presumption as the burden is unmistakably on him to do  

so and he can discharge such burden by getting an answer through  

cross-examination  of  the  prosecution  witnesses  or  by  adducing  

evidence on the defence side.

15)  Section  113B  of  the  Evidence  Act,  1872  speaks  about  

presumption as to dowry death which reads as under:

“113-B. Presumption as to dowry death.—When the question is  whether a person has committed the dowry death of a woman and it  is shown that soon before her death such woman has been subjected  by such person to cruelty or harassment for, or in connection with,  any demand for dowry, the Court shall presume that such person  had caused the dowry death. Explanation.—For the purposes of  this section, ‘dowry death’  shall  have the same meaning as in Section 304B of the Indian Penal Code  (45 of 1860).”

As stated earlier,  the  prosecution under  Section 304B IPC cannot  

escape from the burden of proof that the harassment or cruelty was  

related to the demand for dowry and such was caused “soon before  

her death”. In view of the Explanation to the said section, the word  

“dowry” has to be understood as defined in Section 2 of the Dowry  

Prohibition Act, 1961 which reads as under:

“2. Definition  of  ‘dowry’.—In  this  Act,  ‘dowry’  means  any  property  or  valuable  security  given  or  agreed  to  be  given  either  

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directly or indirectly— (a)  by  one  party  to  a  marriage  to  the  other  party  to  the  

marriage; or (b) by the parent of either party to a marriage or by any other  

person, to either party to the marriage or to any other person, at or before or any time after the marriage in connection with the  

marriage of the said parties, but does not include dower or mahr in  the  case  of  persons  to  whom the  Muslim  Personal  Law  (Shariat)  applies.”

16) To  attract  the  provisions  of  Section  304B,  one  of  the  main  

ingredients of the offence which is required to be established is that  

“soon before her death” she was subjected to cruelty or harassment  

“for,  or  in connection with the demand for  dowry”.  The expression  

“soon before her death” used in Section 304B IPC and Section 113B  

of the Evidence Act is present with the idea of proximity test. In fact,  

learned senior counsel appearing for the appellants submitted that  

there  is  no  proximity  for  the  alleged  demand  of  dowry  and  

harassment. With regard to the said claim, we shall advert to while  

considering  the  evidence  led  in  by  the  prosecution.  Though  the  

language used is “soon before her death”, no definite period has been  

enacted  and the  expression “soon before  her  death”  has  not  been  

defined in both the enactments. Accordingly, the determination of the  

period which can come within the term “soon before her death” is to  

be  determined  by  the  courts,  depending  upon  the  facts  and  

circumstances  of  each  case.  However,  the  said  expression  would  

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normally  imply that  the  interval  should  not  be  much between the  

cruelty or harassment concerned and the death in question. In other  

words, there must be existence of a proximate and live link between  

the effect of cruelty based on dowry demand and the death concerned.  

If the alleged incident of cruelty is remote in time and has become  

stale  enough not  to  disturb  the  mental  equilibrium of  the  woman  

concerned, it would be of no consequence.  

17) The aforesaid provisions were considered by this Court in Bansi  

Lal vs.  State of Haryana (2011) 11 SCC 359 wherein it was held  

that while considering the case under Section 304B cruelty has to be  

proved during the close proximity of the time of death and it should  

be continuous and such continuous harassment, physical or mental,  

by the accused should make life of the deceased miserable which may  

force her to commit suicide.  This Court further held that where the  

cruelty  has  been proved during  the  close  proximity  of  the  time of  

death then the provisions of Section 113B of the Indian Evidence Act,  

1872 providing for presumption that the accused is responsible for  

dowry death, have to be pressed in service.  In paras 19 and 20 of the  

judgment, this Court has further held as follows:-

“19. It may be mentioned herein that the legislature in its wisdom  has used the word “shall” thus, making a mandatory application on  the part of the court to presume that death had been committed by  the  person  who  had  subjected  her  to  cruelty  or  harassment  in  

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connection with any demand of dowry. It is unlike the provisions of  Section  113-A  of  the  Evidence  Act  where  a  discretion  has  been  conferred upon the court wherein it  had been provided that court  may presume abetment of suicide by a married woman. Therefore, in  view of the above, onus lies on the accused to rebut the presumption  and in case of Section 113-B relatable to Section 304-B IPC, the onus  to  prove  shifts  exclusively  and  heavily  on  the  accused.  The  only  requirements are that death of a woman has been caused by means  other than any natural circumstances; that death has been caused or  occurred within 7 years of her marriage; and such woman had been  subjected to cruelty or harassment by her husband or any relative of  her husband in connection with any demand of dowry.

20. Therefore, in case the essential ingredients of such death have  been established by the prosecution, it  is the duty of the court to  raise a presumption that the accused has caused the dowry death. It  may also be pertinent to mention herein that the expression “soon  before  her  death”  has  not  been  defined  in  either  of  the  statutes.  Therefore,  in  each  case,  the  Court  has  to  analyse  the  facts  and  circumstances leading to the death of the victim and decide if there is  any proximate connection between the demand of dowry and act of  cruelty or harassment and the death.”

18) This  Court,  in  Mustafa  Shahadal  Shaikh vs  State  of  

Maharashtra (2012) 11 SCC 397 held as under:-

“9. In order to convict an accused for the offence punishable under  Section 304-B IPC, the following essentials must be satisfied:

(i)  the death of  a  woman must have been caused by burns or  bodily injury or otherwise than under normal circumstances;

(ii)  such  death  must  have  occurred  within  seven  years  of  her  marriage;

(iii) soon before her death, the woman must have been subjected  to  cruelty  or  harassment  by  her  husband or  any  relatives  of  her  husband;

(iv) such cruelty or harassment must be for, or in connection with,  demand for dowry.

When the above ingredients are established by reliable and acceptable  evidence, such death shall be called dowry death and such husband or  his  relatives  shall  be  deemed  to  have  caused  her  death.  If  the  abovementioned  ingredients  are  attracted  in  view  of  the  special  provision,  the  court  shall  presume  and  it  shall  record  such  fact  as  proved unless and until it is disproved by the accused. However, it is  open  to  the  accused  to  adduce  such  evidence  for  disproving  such  compulsory presumption as the burden is unmistakably on him to do so  and he can discharge such burden by getting an answer through cross-

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examination of the prosecution witnesses or by adducing evidence on  the defence side.

11. To  attract  the  provisions  of  Section  304-B,  one  of  the  main  ingredients of  the offence which is required to be established is that  “soon before her death” she was subjected to cruelty or harassment “for,  or  in  connection  with  the  demand for  dowry”.  The  expression  “soon  before her death” used in Section 304-B IPC and Section 113-B of the  Evidence  Act  is  present  with  the  idea  of  proximity  test.  In  fact,  the  learned counsel appearing for the appellant submitted that there is no  proximity for the alleged demand of dowry and harassment. With regard  to the said claim, we shall  advert to the same while considering the  evidence led in by the prosecution. Though the language used is “soon  before  her  death”,  no  definite  period  has  been  enacted  and  the  expression “soon before her death” has not been defined in both the  enactments.  Accordingly,  the  determination  of  the  period  which  can  come within the term “soon before her death” is to be determined by the  courts,  depending  upon  the  facts  and  circumstances  of  each  case.  However,  the  said expression would normally  imply  that  the  interval  should not be much between the cruelty or harassment concerned and  the  death in question.  In other  words,  there must  be  existence  of  a  proximate and live link between the effect  of cruelty based on dowry  demand and the death concerned. If the alleged incident of cruelty is  remote in time and has become stale enough not to disturb the mental  equilibrium of the woman concerned, it  would be of no consequence.  These principles have been reiterated in  Kaliyaperumal v.  State of T.N.  and Yashoda v. State of M.P.”

19) In the case of  Ramesh Vithal Patil vs.  State of Karnataka  

(2014) 11 SCC 516 this Court held as follows:-

“20. Moreover, admittedly the deceased committed suicide within  a period of seven years from the date of her marriage. Section 113-A  of  the  Evidence  Act  is,  therefore,  clearly  attracted  to  this  case.  Presumption  contemplated  therein  must  spring  in  action.  This  provision was introduced by the Criminal Law (Second Amendment)  Act, 1983 to resolve the difficulty of proof where married women are  forced to commit suicide but incriminating evidence is difficult to get  as it  is  usually  available  within the four walls of  the matrimonial  home…..”  

20) With these principles in mind, let us analyse the evidence led in  

by the prosecution.  The marriage of Kavita@Kusum (since deceased)  

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was  solemnized  with  Karamvir  on  17.07.1994.   Kavita  died  on  

26.09.1996  after  consuming  some  poisonous  substance  at  her  

matrimonial home.  The father of  the deceased lodged a complaint  

against the accused persons that he had given dowry on the eve of  

marriage  beyond  his  means  but  after  20-25  days  of  marriage,  

Karamvir-appellant  No.  2  herein,  Maya  Devi-appellant  No.1  herein  

and brothers Dharamveer and Paramveer and sister Sonika, started  

harassing  his  daughter  for  more money.   When Kavita  visited her  

father’s house, she narrated the entire tale of woes to her parents and  

brother.   When  the  complainant  enquired  about  the  matter,  the  

appellants informed the complainant that the appellant No. 2 is in  

need of money and they also have to perform the marriage of Sonika.  

A  sum  of  Rs.  20,000/-  was  paid  to  appellant  No.  2  so  that  the  

daughter of the complainant is not harassed.  It was further stated  

that  the  complainant  received  a  letter  of  his  daughter  regarding  

continuous demand for dowry and sufferings meted out to her.  The  

complainant paid a further sum of Rs. 25,000/- for the purchase of  

refrigerator and gold chain to the appellant No. 2.  Kavita was sent  

with her husband on the assurance that the accused family would  

not harass her in future.   Even on the day of  ‘sakrant’,  when the  

brother of the deceased visited her matrimonial home, the accused  

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threatened them that the household articles of Kavita will be thrown  

out.  A further demand of Rs. 30,000/- was made to meet the kitchen  

expenses by the appellants.  Since that demand was not fulfilled, the  

deceased  was  left  with  her  father  at  Delhi.   Subsequently,  the  

complainant requested to compromise the matter and tendered his  

apology in writing.  In June 1996, the deceased was brought to home  

by  the  accused  persons.   After  some days,  when the  complainant  

visited  her  matrimonial  home  at  Rohtak,  he  was  informed  that  

situation has not changed and whenever she brings money, the peace  

returns for  10-20 days otherwise she is  beaten mercilessly  by  the  

accused  persons.   On  26.09.1996,  the  complainant  got  the  

information  about  the  death  of  his  daughter.     The  case  was  

committed to the Court of Sessions and the accused were found guilty  

under Section 304B and 498A of the IPC.  There is ample evidence  

that  the deceased was harassed,  maltreated and was subjected to  

cruelty,  for  and in connection with the demands for  dowry by the  

accused.  Admittedly,  appellant No.  2 was present in his office on  

26.09.1996 located at M.D. University Campus at Rohtak but he did  

not attend to his wife at the relevant time.  The assertion made by  

learned  senior  counsel  for  the  appellants  that  the  deceased  was  

suffering from moderate depressing episode and was having suicidal  

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tendencies prior to her death is of no consequence.  Dr. V.P. Mehla  

(DW-2) was apprised by the deceased about the harassment and the  

maltreatment by her in-laws a month prior to her death when she  

was taken to the aforesaid doctor for the alleged treatment.  According  

to DW-2, the deceased was so much depressed as a result of the act  

of cruelty meted out to her at the hands of the appellants that she  

developed suicidal tendencies.  The testimony of DW-2 shows that the  

accused had created such a charged environment in her matrimonial  

home that she developed suicidal tendencies. Except appellant No. 1  

herein, all were living in the house at Rohtak. Appellant No. 1 herein  

was a frequent visitor to that house and she herself admitted this fact  

in her statement under Section 313 of the Code.   Thus, it  is  very  

much clear that accused persons maltreated, harassed and subjected  

the deceased to cruelty, after the solemnization of her marriage with  

the appellant No. 2 herein, during her life time and soon before her  

death, for and in connection with the demands for dowry, who died at  

her matrimonial home within seven years of her marriage otherwise  

than in normal circumstances.  

21)   Section  304B IPC  does  not  categorise  death  as  homicidal  or  

suicidal or accidental. This is because death caused by burns can, in  

a given case, be homicidal or suicidal or accidental. Similarly, death  

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caused by bodily injury can, in a given case, be homicidal or suicidal  

or  accidental.  Finally,  any  death  occurring  “otherwise  than  under  

normal circumstances” can, in a given case, be homicidal or suicidal  

or accidental. Therefore, if all the other ingredients of Section 304B  

IPC  are  fulfilled,  any  death  (homicidal  or  suicidal  or  accidental)  

whether caused by burns or by bodily injury or occurring otherwise  

than  under  normal  circumstances  shall,  as  per  the  legislative  

mandate, be called a “dowry death” and the woman’s husband or his  

relative  “shall  be  deemed  to  have  caused  her  death”.  The  section  

clearly specifies what constitutes the offence of dowry death and also  

identifies the single offender or multiple offenders who has or have  

caused the dowry death.   

22) The key words under Section 113B of the Evidence Act, 1872 are  

“shall  presume” leaving no option with a court but to presume an  

accused  brought  before  it  of  causing  a  dowry  death  guilty  of  the  

offence. However, the redeeming factor of this provision is that the  

presumption  is  rebuttable.  Section  113B  of  the  Act  enables  an  

accused to prove his innocence and places a reverse onus of proof on  

him or her.  In the case on hand, accused persons failed to prove  

beyond  reasonable  doubt  that  the  deceased  died  a  natural  death.  

When  Kavita  allegedly  committed  suicide,  her  husband-appellant  

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No.2, though he was not present in the house, was present in his  

office at M.D. University, Rohtak at the relevant time but he did not  

make any sincere effort to take her to the hospital which was very  

near to the place of the incident.  Similarly, appellant No. 2 got the  

deceased examined by DW-2 in order to create an impression that she  

was struggling with chronic depression but the truth floated upon the  

surface  when the  deceased reveals  that  the  accused persons were  

maltreating her and she had started picking up the ideas of suicide.  

Lastly, appellant No. 2 falsely informed the court that having learnt  

about the death of  his  wife  Kavita,  he left  for  Delhi  to  inform her  

family members.  In fact, the accused never went to Delhi and the  

complainant received a telephonic message from an unknown person  

regarding the death of his daughter.   So far as Maya Devi-appellant  

No. 1 herein is concerned, there is no denying the fact that she was  

working as a teacher in a government school and she was not present  

at the relevant time at the place of incident but it is very much clear  

from the evidence on record that  both the accused persons had a  

dominating  role  in  the  entire  episode  and  she  had  always  

accompanied  her  son-appellant  No.  2  herein  to  the  house  of  the  

complainant (PW-3) for the dowry demands.  The presumption under  

Section 113B of the Act is mandatory may be contrasted with Section  

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113A of the Act which was introduced contemporaneously.  Section  

113A of the Act, dealing with abetment of suicide, uses the expression  

“may  presume”.  This  being  the  position,  a  two-stage  process  is  

required  to  be  followed in  respect  of  an offence  punishable  under  

Section  304-B  IPC:  it  is  necessary  to  first  ascertain  whether  the  

ingredients of the Section have been made out against the accused; if  

the ingredients are made out, then the accused is deemed to have  

caused the death of the woman but is entitled to rebut the statutory  

presumption of having caused a dowry death.  From the evidence on  

record, we are of the opinion that in the present case Kavita died an  

unnatural  death  by  committing  suicide  as  she  was  subjected  to  

cruelty/harassment by her husband and in-laws in connection with  

the demand for dowry which started from the time of her marriage  

and continued till  she committed suicide.   Thus,  the provisions of  

Sections 304B and 498A of the IPC will be fully attracted.    

Conclusion:

23) In the light of the above discussion, we are of the opinion that  

Kavita@Kusum suffered death at  her  matrimonial  home,  otherwise  

than  under  normal  circumstances,  within  seven  years  of  her  

marriage, and the case squarely falls within the ambit of dowry death.  

In the present case, from the evidence of the Doctor (DW-2), PW-3 and  

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PW-4, we find that the harassment of the deceased was with a view to  

coerce her to convince her parents to meet the demands for dowry.   

24) All the above factors clearly established the legal requirements  

for an offence falling under Sections 304B and 498A IPC with the aid  

of Section 113B of the Evidence Act, 1872 against the appellants and  

the  conviction  and  sentence  imposed,  therefore,  do  not  call  for  

interference.  Hence, the appeal fails and is accordingly dismissed.   

...…………….………………………J.                            (VIKRAMAJIT SEN)                                  

.…....…………………………………J.                     (R.K. AGRAWAL)                                  

NEW DELHI; DECEMBER 7, 2015.  

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ITEM NO.1A               COURT NO.12               SECTION IIB (for Judgment)                S U P R E M E  C O U R T  O F  I N D I A                        RECORD OF PROCEEDINGS

Criminal Appeal  No(s).  1263/2011 MAYA DEVI & ANR.                                   Appellant(s)                                 VERSUS STATE OF HARYANA                                   Respondent(s)

Date : 07/12/2015 This appeal was called on for pronouncement of  judgment today.

For Appellant(s)  Mr. Jagjit Singh Chhabra, AOR                       For Respondent(s) Mr. Kamal Mohan Gupta, AOR                                            

Hon'ble Mr. Justice R.K. Agrawal pronounced the reportable  judgment of the Bench comprising Hon'ble Mr. Justice Vikramajit  Sen and His Lordship.  

The appeal is dismissed  in  terms of the signed reportable  judgment.  

(R.NATARAJAN)        (SNEH LATA SHARMA)  Court Master       Court Master

(Signed reportable judgment is placed on the file)  

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