MAUVIN GODINHO Vs THE STATE OF GOA
Bench: HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE N.V. RAMANA, HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE S. ABDUL NAZEER
Judgment by: HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE N.V. RAMANA
Case number: Crl.A. No.-000315-000315 / 2011
Diary number: 32339 / 2007
Advocates: CHANDER SHEKHAR ASHRI Vs
K J JOHN AND CO
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REPORTABLE
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION
CRIMINAL APPEAL NO. 315/2011
MAUVIN GODINHO Appellant(s) VERSUS STATE OF GOA Respondent(s)
WITH
CRIMINAL APPEAL NO. 314/2011
M/S MARMAGOA STEEL LTD.& ORS. Appellant(s)
VERSUS STATE OF GOA Respondent(s)
CRIMINAL APPEAL NO. 313/2011
T. NAGARAJAN Appellant(s)
VERSUS STATE OF GOA Respondent(s)
CRIMINAL APPEAL NO. 312/2011
KATREDDI VENKATA SAHAYA KRISHNAKUMAR Appellant(s)
VERSUS STATE OF GOA Respondent(s)
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CRIMINAL APPEAL NO. 311/2011
M/S GLASS FIBRE DIVISION Appellant(s) (A Division of Binani Zinc Ltd.) presently known as M/S GOA GLASS FIBRE LTD.
VERSUS
STATE OF GOA Respondent(s)
JUDGMENT
N.V. RAMANA, J.
1. These Criminal Appeals, by way of special leave, are filed
by the appellants against a common order dated 26th October, 2007
passed by the High Court of Bombay at Goa in Criminal Revision
Application Nos. 3, 10, 19, 21 and 22 of 2007, whereby the High
Court while setting aside the charges framed by the learned Special
Judge, Panaji against the accused—appellants for the offences
punishable under Sections 120-B, 409, 420, 465 and 471, IPCand
directed to frame charges against them under Sections 13 (1)(d)(i)
and 13(1)(d)(ii) of the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988 read with
Section 120-B, IPC.
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2. In a nutshell, the genesis of the dispute in all these
appealspertains to a Notification dated 30thSeptember, 1991 issued
by the Government of Goa, duly approved by the Cabinet, according
to which those industrial units who apply for bona fide use of High
Tension or Low Tension power supply to their industrial units
would be eligible for a rebate of 25% in their tariff for a period of five
years. The appellant in Criminal Appeal No. 315 of 2011 (Accused
No. 1) was the Minister of Power for the State of Goa during the
period 22-12-1994 to 29-07-1998 whereas the appellant in
Criminal Appeal No. 313 of 2011 (Accused No. 2) was also a public
servant at that time being Chief Electrical Engineer.Accused Nos. 3
and 4 were Managing Director and Executive Director, respectively,
of the appellant Company in Criminal Appeal 314 of 2011 (Accused
No. 6), while the appellant in Criminal Appeal No. 312 of 2011
(Accused No. 5) was the General Manager of appellant Company in
Criminal Appeal No. 311 of 2011 (Accused No. 7).
3. The Government of Goa, during the tenure of accused No.
1 as Minister of Power, with the consent of Cabinet, issued another
Notification dated 31-03-1995 cancelling the earlier Notification
dated 30-09-1991 without assigning any reason for its cancellation.
Afterwards, it is alleged that another Notification dated 15-5-1996
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was issued, without approval of the Cabinet introducing another
category of ‘Extra High Tension’ power supply and after that one
more Notification dated 01-08-1996 was issued, again without
Cabinet approval, restoring the benefit of 25% rebate, at the
instance of accused No. 1, only to benefit accused nos. 6 & 7
Companies.
4. Acting upon a complaint lodged by an M.L.A., the State
levelled allegations against the accused individuals that by entering
into a criminal conspiracy they provided wrongful gains to both the
appellant Companies (Accused Nos. 6 & 7) and favored the two
Companies for availing 25% rebate on power tariff by illegal means
and thereby caused huge loss of Rs.4,52,77,856/- to the exchequer
of Government of Goa.
5. Taking note of the allegations levelled against the
accused, the Special Judge, Panaji by order dated 8thDecember,
2006 framed charges against the accused—appellants for the
offences punishable under Sections 120-B, 409, 420, 465, 468 and
471, IPC and also under Section 13(1)(d)(i) and 13(1)(d)(ii) read with
Section 13(2) of the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988. The
aggrieved appellants approached the High Court by way of Criminal
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Revision Applications. The High Court on the analysis of facts,
arrived at the conclusion that the facts of the case do not disclose
an offence of cheating and there was no offence of criminal breach
of trust. Accordingly, the appellants were discharged from the
offences punishable under Sections 120-B, 409, 420, 465, 468 and
471, IPC. However, the High Court observed that there is sufficient
prima facie material against the accused for framing charges
against them under Section 13(1)(d)(i) and 13(1)(d)(ii) read with
Section 120-B, IPC. Feeling aggrieved thereby, the accused—
appellants are before us in these appeals.
6. We have heard Mr. M.L. Varma, learned Senior counsel
appearing for the appellant in Criminal Appeal No.315/2011, Ms.
Binu Tamta, learned counsel appearing for the appellant in
Criminal Appeal No.311 of 2011, Ms. Asha Gopalan Nair, learned
counsel appearing for the appellant in Criminal Appeal No.313 of
2011 and alsothe learned counsel appearing for the State of Goa at
length.
7. Learned senior counsel for the appellant in Criminal
Appeal No. 315 of 2011 relying upon this Court’s order in Civil
Appeal Nos. 3206-3217 of 1999, passed on 13th February, 2001
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while dealing with the same Notifications, submitted that there is
no need to continue further criminal proceedings against the
appellants herein. The said order reads thus:
“The High Court by the impugned judgment has held that the circular dated 31st March, 1998 issued by the Government of Goa suspending the release of rebate with immediate effect as well as suspension of rebate agreed to be governed in sixty monthly installments has no legal efficacy and is, therefore, invalid. The High Court has further held that the notification dated 24th July, 1998 is legal and valid. Consequently the High Court directed that the writ petitioners are entitled to 25% rebate in power tariff till 26th July, 1998. This has been challenged by means of the present appeals. Second set of appeals have been filed by the writ petitioners against the judgment of the High Court whereby and whereunder the High Court has held that notification dated 27th July 1998 is valid.
We have heard counsel for the parties and perused the record. The High Court has taken the aforesaid view after taking into consideration overall facts and circumstances and inasmuch as public interest which, according to us, is very balanced view of the matter. We, therefore, are not inclined to interfere with the matters Both the sets of appeals fail and are accordingly dismissed. There shall be no order as to costs”.
8. It is further argued before us that the High Court erred in
not taking into account the factum that the complaint against the
accused—appellants was filed by political opponent of the appellant
whohad foisted the charges which are mala fide, misconceived and
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concocted with a view to score political vendetta.Whereas power
rebate policy was existing in the State since 1991 and in 1993, out
of the High Tension category an Extra High Tension category was
carved out by the Government for the purpose of providing
additional benefit to industrial consumers. Drawing our attention to
a judgment of this Court in MRF Limited vs. Manohar Parrikar &
Others, (2010) 11 SCC 374, learned senior counsel submitted that
this Court has already considered the Notifications in question, in
an earlier round of litigation and expressed the view that the
decision taken by the appellant herein—accused No. 1 as a Minister
was balanced.
9. Ms. Binu Tamta, learned counsel appearing for the
appellantsin Criminal Appeal Nos. 311 & 312 of 2011 submitted
that as a matter of fact, the complaint in question was already
closed on 2.2.1999, but to meet the political will of the complainant
when he came to power in the State, the complaint was reopened at
his instance. The view taken by the Courts below in framing
charges against the accused is entirely wrong inasmuch as the trial
Court made an observation that the circumstances give rise to
suspicion that accused Nos. 1 to 5 conspired to extend benefit to
the accused Nos. 6 & 7 Companies. Mere suspicion does not
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warrant framing of charges against the appellants. learned counsel
wrongly placed reliance on a decision of this Court in Hira Lal
Hari Lal Bhagwati Vs. CBI, New Delhi, (2003) 5 SCC 257 and
submitted that by virtue of the Notifications in question, no benefit
was got by the appellant and whatever amount had to be paid, has
already been paid, and accordingly the charges against the
appellant should be dropped.
10. Learned counsel appearing for the appellant in Criminal
Appeal No.313 of 2011, Ms. Asha G. Nair, submitted that the
appellant in his official capacity had only made submissions in
accordance with the instructions received by superiors in the
normal course of discharging his official duties. By any stretch of
imagination, the appellant cannot be equated as conspirator when
the deciding authorities were the Secretary and the Minister. She
has further submitted that the appellant has already retired from
his service and virtually he has no role to play in the alleged
conspiracy and the allegation that he is close to Minister does not
form a ground for levelling charges against him.
11. Learned counsel for the State while supporting the
impugned judgment, submitted that there was enough material on
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record to establish that accused Nos. 1 & 2, being public servants
at the relevant time, had entered into a criminal conspiracy to
facilitate wrongful gains to accused Nos. 6 & 7 Companies in
collusion with their officials (accused Nos. 3 & 4). In pursuit of their
criminal conspiracy, they abused their positions and caused huge
loss to the public exchequer and benefited accused Companies by
illegal means. It is also vehemently argued that accused No. 1 while
abusing his official capacity prepared a false document giving an
appearance of genuine one and deceived the Government in taking
policy decision and enabled the accused Companies to avail 25%
rebate on power supply. He ultimately made a submission that
taking note of misdeeds of all the accused, the High court has in
clear terms expressed the opinion that there is sufficient prima facie
material to frame charges against all the accused, hence there is no
occasion for this Court to interfere and revisit the matter.
12. At the outset it would be pertinent to note the law
concerning the framing of charges and the standard which courts
must apply while framing charges. It is well settled that a court
while framing charges under Section 227 of the Code of Criminal
Procedure should apply the prima facie standard. Although the
application of this standard depends on facts and circumstance in
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each case, a prima facie case against the accused is said to be made
out when the probative value of the evidence on all the essential
elements in the charge taken as a whole is such that it is sufficient
to induce the court to believe in the existence of the facts pertaining
to such essential elements or to consider its existence so probable
that a prudent man ought to act upon the supposition that those
facts existed or did happen. However, at this stage, there cannot be
a roving enquiry into the pros and cons of the matter and weigh the
evidence as if he was conducting a trial. [Refer Sajjan Kumar v.
CBI, (2010) 9 SCC 368; State v. A. Arun Kumar, (2015) 2 SCC
417; State by the Inspector of Police, Chennai vs. S. Selvi and
Ors., (2018) 1 SCALE 5.]
13. Having thoughtfully considered the arguments advanced
by respective learned counsel and upon going through the record,
particularly the impugned judgment, in the light of sequence of
events, prima facie, it cannot be said that no case can be made out
against the accused—appellants. Allegedly, the Notifications dated
15-5-1996 and 1-8-1996 were issued without the approval of
Cabinet and by violation of rules. Looking at the facts of the case in
a holistic manner, we do not think it necessary to go into the aspect
of thorough examination of merits of the case, particularly when the
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issue is still at the stage of framing of charges only. There is no
error in framing charges, as suggested by the High Court, when
presumably the material on record obligated the Court to do so.
14. In light of the above discussion, we do not see any
illegality in the impugned order. Therefore, we find no reason to
interfere with the order passed by the High Court. However, learned
counsel appearing for the appellants, at this stage wants to place
before the trial Court, the material, judgments and the earlier
passed order of this Court which are referred before us. We grant
liberty to the learned counsel to do so.
15. With the above observations, the appeals are disposed of.
..................................J. (N.V. RAMANA)
..................................J. (S. ABDUL NAZEER)
NEW DELHI, JANUARY 17, 2018.