17 January 2018
Supreme Court
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MAUVIN GODINHO Vs THE STATE OF GOA

Bench: HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE N.V. RAMANA, HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE S. ABDUL NAZEER
Judgment by: HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE N.V. RAMANA
Case number: Crl.A. No.-000315-000315 / 2011
Diary number: 32339 / 2007
Advocates: CHANDER SHEKHAR ASHRI Vs K J JOHN AND CO


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REPORTABLE

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION

CRIMINAL APPEAL NO.  315/2011

MAUVIN GODINHO                                    Appellant(s)                                 VERSUS STATE OF GOA  Respondent(s)

WITH

CRIMINAL APPEAL NO.  314/2011

M/S MARMAGOA STEEL LTD.& ORS.  Appellant(s)

                               VERSUS STATE OF GOA  Respondent(s)

CRIMINAL APPEAL NO.  313/2011

T. NAGARAJAN   Appellant(s)

VERSUS STATE OF GOA                                 Respondent(s)

CRIMINAL APPEAL NO.  312/2011

KATREDDI VENKATA SAHAYA KRISHNAKUMAR   Appellant(s)

                               VERSUS STATE OF GOA                         Respondent(s)

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CRIMINAL APPEAL NO.  311/2011

M/S GLASS FIBRE DIVISION   Appellant(s) (A Division of Binani Zinc Ltd.) presently known as M/S GOA GLASS FIBRE LTD.

                               VERSUS

STATE OF GOA                       Respondent(s)

JUDGMENT

N.V. RAMANA,  J.

1. These Criminal Appeals, by way of special leave, are filed

by the appellants against a common order dated 26th October, 2007

passed by the High Court of Bombay at Goa in Criminal Revision

Application Nos. 3, 10, 19, 21 and 22 of 2007, whereby the High

Court while setting aside the charges framed by the learned Special

Judge,  Panaji  against  the  accused—appellants  for  the  offences

punishable under Sections 120-B, 409, 420, 465 and 471, IPCand

directed to frame charges against them under Sections 13 (1)(d)(i)

and 13(1)(d)(ii) of the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988 read with

Section 120-B, IPC.

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2. In  a  nutshell,  the  genesis  of  the  dispute  in  all  these

appealspertains to a Notification dated 30thSeptember, 1991 issued

by the Government of Goa, duly approved by the Cabinet, according

to which those industrial units who apply for bona fide use of High

Tension  or  Low  Tension  power  supply  to  their  industrial  units

would be eligible for a rebate of 25% in their tariff for a period of five

years. The appellant in Criminal Appeal No. 315 of 2011 (Accused

No. 1) was the Minister of Power for the State of Goa during the

period  22-12-1994  to  29-07-1998  whereas  the  appellant  in

Criminal Appeal No. 313 of 2011 (Accused No. 2) was also a public

servant at that time being Chief Electrical Engineer.Accused Nos. 3

and 4 were Managing Director and Executive Director, respectively,

of the appellant Company in Criminal Appeal 314 of 2011 (Accused

No.  6),  while  the  appellant  in  Criminal  Appeal  No.  312 of  2011

(Accused No. 5) was the General Manager of appellant Company in

Criminal Appeal No. 311 of 2011 (Accused No. 7).

3. The Government of Goa, during the tenure of accused No.

1 as Minister of Power, with the consent of Cabinet, issued another

Notification  dated  31-03-1995  cancelling  the  earlier  Notification

dated 30-09-1991 without assigning any reason for its cancellation.

Afterwards, it is alleged that another Notification dated 15-5-1996

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was issued,  without approval  of  the Cabinet introducing another

category of ‘Extra High Tension’ power supply and after that one

more  Notification  dated  01-08-1996  was  issued,  again  without

Cabinet  approval,  restoring  the  benefit  of  25%  rebate,  at  the

instance  of  accused  No.  1,  only  to  benefit  accused  nos.  6  &  7

Companies.

4. Acting upon a complaint lodged by an M.L.A., the State

levelled allegations against the accused individuals that by entering

into a criminal conspiracy they provided wrongful gains to both the

appellant  Companies  (Accused Nos.  6  & 7)  and favored the  two

Companies for availing 25% rebate on power tariff by illegal means

and thereby caused huge loss of Rs.4,52,77,856/- to the exchequer

of Government of Goa.

5. Taking  note  of  the  allegations  levelled  against  the

accused,  the  Special  Judge,  Panaji  by  order  dated  8thDecember,

2006  framed  charges  against  the  accused—appellants  for  the

offences punishable under Sections 120-B, 409, 420, 465, 468 and

471, IPC and also under Section 13(1)(d)(i) and 13(1)(d)(ii) read with

Section  13(2)  of  the  Prevention  of  Corruption  Act,  1988.  The

aggrieved appellants approached the High Court by way of Criminal

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Revision  Applications.  The  High  Court  on  the  analysis  of  facts,

arrived at the conclusion that the facts of the case do not disclose

an offence of cheating and there was no offence of criminal breach

of  trust.  Accordingly,  the  appellants  were  discharged  from  the

offences punishable under Sections 120-B, 409, 420, 465, 468 and

471, IPC. However, the High Court observed that there is sufficient

prima  facie  material  against  the  accused  for  framing  charges

against  them  under  Section  13(1)(d)(i)  and  13(1)(d)(ii)  read  with

Section  120-B,  IPC.  Feeling  aggrieved  thereby,  the  accused—

appellants are before us in these appeals.

6. We have heard Mr. M.L. Varma, learned Senior counsel

appearing for the appellant in Criminal Appeal No.315/2011, Ms.

Binu  Tamta,  learned  counsel  appearing  for  the  appellant  in

Criminal Appeal No.311 of 2011, Ms. Asha Gopalan Nair, learned

counsel appearing for the appellant in Criminal Appeal No.313 of

2011 and alsothe learned counsel appearing for the State of Goa at

length.

7. Learned  senior  counsel  for  the  appellant  in  Criminal

Appeal  No.  315 of  2011 relying  upon this  Court’s  order  in  Civil

Appeal  Nos.  3206-3217 of  1999,  passed on 13th February,  2001

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while dealing with the same Notifications, submitted that there is

no  need  to  continue  further  criminal  proceedings  against  the

appellants herein. The said order reads thus:

“The High Court by the impugned judgment has held that the  circular  dated  31st  March,  1998  issued  by  the Government of Goa suspending the release of rebate with immediate effect as well as suspension of rebate agreed to be governed in sixty monthly installments has no legal efficacy  and is,  therefore,  invalid.  The  High  Court  has further held that the notification dated 24th July, 1998 is legal  and  valid.  Consequently  the  High  Court  directed that  the  writ  petitioners  are  entitled  to  25% rebate  in power  tariff  till  26th  July,  1998.  This  has  been challenged by means of the present appeals. Second set of appeals have been filed by the writ petitioners against the judgment of the High Court whereby and whereunder the High Court has held that notification dated 27th July 1998 is valid.

We have heard counsel for the parties and perused the record. The High Court has taken the aforesaid view after taking into consideration overall facts and circumstances and inasmuch as public interest which, according to us, is very balanced view of the matter. We, therefore, are not inclined to  interfere  with the  matters  Both the  sets  of appeals fail and are accordingly dismissed. There shall be no order as to costs”.

8. It is further argued before us that the High Court erred in

not taking into account the factum that the complaint against the

accused—appellants was filed by political opponent of the appellant

whohad foisted the charges which are mala fide, misconceived and

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concocted  with  a  view to  score  political  vendetta.Whereas  power

rebate policy was existing in the State since 1991 and in 1993, out

of the High Tension category an Extra High Tension category was

carved  out  by  the  Government  for  the  purpose  of  providing

additional benefit to industrial consumers. Drawing our attention to

a judgment of this Court in MRF Limited vs. Manohar Parrikar &

Others, (2010) 11 SCC 374, learned senior counsel submitted that

this Court has already considered the Notifications in question, in

an  earlier  round  of  litigation  and  expressed  the  view  that  the

decision taken by the appellant herein—accused No. 1 as a Minister

was balanced.  

9. Ms.  Binu  Tamta,  learned  counsel  appearing  for  the

appellantsin Criminal Appeal Nos. 311 & 312 of  2011 submitted

that  as  a  matter  of  fact,  the  complaint  in  question was  already

closed on 2.2.1999, but to meet the political will of the complainant

when he came to power in the State, the complaint was reopened at

his  instance.  The  view  taken  by  the  Courts  below  in  framing

charges against the accused is entirely wrong inasmuch as the trial

Court  made  an  observation  that  the  circumstances  give  rise  to

suspicion that accused Nos. 1 to 5 conspired to extend benefit to

the  accused  Nos.  6  &  7  Companies.  Mere  suspicion  does  not

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warrant framing of charges against the appellants. learned counsel

wrongly  placed reliance on a decision of  this  Court  in  Hira Lal

Hari Lal Bhagwati Vs.  CBI, New Delhi,  (2003) 5 SCC 257 and

submitted that by virtue of the Notifications in question, no benefit

was got by the appellant and whatever amount had to be paid, has

already  been  paid,  and  accordingly  the  charges  against  the

appellant should be dropped.

10. Learned counsel appearing for the appellant in Criminal

Appeal  No.313  of  2011,  Ms.  Asha  G.  Nair,  submitted  that  the

appellant  in  his  official  capacity  had  only  made  submissions  in

accordance  with  the  instructions  received  by  superiors  in  the

normal course of discharging his official duties. By any stretch of

imagination, the appellant cannot be equated as conspirator when

the deciding authorities were the Secretary and the Minister. She

has further submitted that the appellant has already retired from

his  service  and  virtually  he  has  no  role  to  play  in  the  alleged

conspiracy and the allegation that he is close to Minister does not

form a ground for levelling charges against him.

11. Learned  counsel  for  the  State  while  supporting  the

impugned judgment, submitted that there was enough material on

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record to establish that accused Nos. 1 & 2, being public servants

at  the  relevant  time,  had  entered  into  a  criminal  conspiracy  to

facilitate  wrongful  gains  to  accused  Nos.  6  &  7  Companies  in

collusion with their officials (accused Nos. 3 & 4). In pursuit of their

criminal conspiracy, they abused their positions and caused huge

loss to the public exchequer and benefited accused Companies by

illegal means. It is also vehemently argued that accused No. 1 while

abusing his official capacity prepared a false document giving an

appearance of genuine one and deceived the Government in taking

policy decision and enabled the accused Companies to avail 25%

rebate  on  power  supply.  He  ultimately  made  a  submission  that

taking note of misdeeds of all the accused, the High court has in

clear terms expressed the opinion that there is sufficient prima facie

material to frame charges against all the accused, hence there is no

occasion for this Court to interfere and revisit the matter.

12. At  the  outset  it  would  be  pertinent  to  note  the  law

concerning the framing of charges and the standard which courts

must apply while framing charges.  It  is  well  settled that a court

while framing charges under Section 227 of the Code of Criminal

Procedure  should  apply  the  prima  facie standard.  Although  the

application of this standard depends on facts and circumstance in

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each case, a prima facie case against the accused is said to be made

out when the probative value of the evidence on all the essential

elements in the charge taken as a whole is such that it is sufficient

to induce the court to believe in the existence of the facts pertaining

to such essential elements or to consider its existence so probable

that a prudent man ought to act upon the supposition that those

facts existed or did happen. However, at this stage, there cannot be

a roving enquiry into the pros and cons of the matter and weigh the

evidence as if he was conducting a trial. [Refer  Sajjan Kumar v.

CBI, (2010) 9 SCC 368;  State v. A. Arun Kumar, (2015) 2 SCC

417; State by the Inspector of Police, Chennai vs. S. Selvi and

Ors., (2018) 1 SCALE 5.]

13. Having thoughtfully considered the arguments advanced

by respective learned counsel and upon going through the record,

particularly  the  impugned judgment,  in  the  light  of  sequence  of

events, prima facie, it cannot be said that no case can be made out

against the accused—appellants. Allegedly, the Notifications dated

15-5-1996  and  1-8-1996  were  issued  without  the  approval  of

Cabinet and by violation of rules. Looking at the facts of the case in

a holistic manner, we do not think it necessary to go into the aspect

of thorough examination of merits of the case, particularly when the

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issue is still  at the stage of framing of charges only. There is no

error in framing charges,  as suggested by the High Court,  when

presumably the material on record obligated the Court to do so.  

14. In  light  of  the  above  discussion,  we  do  not  see  any

illegality  in the impugned order.  Therefore,  we find no reason to

interfere with the order passed by the High Court. However, learned

counsel appearing for the appellants, at this stage wants to place

before  the  trial  Court,  the  material,  judgments  and  the  earlier

passed order of this Court which are referred before us. We grant

liberty to the learned counsel to do so.  

15. With the above observations, the appeals are disposed of.

..................................J.    (N.V. RAMANA)

..................................J.           (S. ABDUL NAZEER)

NEW DELHI, JANUARY 17, 2018.