07 September 2012
Supreme Court
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MARUTI NIVRUTTI NAVALE Vs STATE OF MAHARASHTRA

Bench: P. SATHASIVAM,RANJAN GOGOI
Case number: Crl.A. No.-001376-001376 / 2012
Diary number: 30247 / 2011
Advocates: SHIVAJI M. JADHAV Vs ASHA GOPALAN NAIR


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REPORTABLE        

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA

CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION

CRIMINAL     APPEAL     NO.       1376       OF     2012   (Arising out of SLP (Crl.) No. 7337 of 2011

Maruti Nivrutti Navale         .... Appellant(s)

Versus

State of Maharashtra & Anr.                 .... Respondent(s)

J     U     D     G     M     E     N     T      

P.     Sathasivam,     J.   

1) Leave granted.

2) This appeal is directed against the final order dated  

19.09.2011 passed by the High Court of Judicature at Bombay  

in Criminal Application No. 786 of 2011 whereby the High  

Court dismissed the application for anticipatory bail filed by  

the appellant herein.

3) Brief facts:

(a) The appellant is the Founder President and Managing  

Trustee of Sinhgad Technical Education Society, Pune (in  

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short ‘the Society’).  The Society is engaged in imparting formal  

and informal education by establishing various schools,  

colleges and institutions in the State of Maharashtra.  

Respondent No.1 is the State and Chainsukh Sobhachand  

Gandhi-Respondent No.2 herein is the original Complainant  

and is a Trustee of Pawan Gandhi Charity Trust (in short ‘the  

Trust’) working for the upliftment of economically and socially  

impoverished sections of the society.   

(b) Respondent No. 2 was running a school on land bearing  

Survey No.154/6/1 admeasuring 57 acres situated at  

Ambavet, Tal. Mulshi, Dist. Pune, on which a building in the  

area of 650 sq. mts. was constructed.  In the year 2008, it was  

decided to run the School with the help of other educational  

institutions by leasing out the property.  Respondent No. 2  

approached the appellant herein for the same.  The appellant  

herein has also shown interest in acquiring lease hold rights  

in order to run school activities in the said property.  Pursuant  

to the same, negotiations took place and it was offered to lease  

out the said school building for a period of 87 years and to sell  

the other property, viz., land bearing Survey No. 165/1  

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admeasuring 8500 sq. mts., Survey No. 162 admeasuring  

7600 sq. mts., Survey No. 160/1 admeasuring 1900 sq. mts.  

and Survey No. 161 admeasuring 21300 sq. mts. situated at  

Ambavet, Tal. Mulshi, Dist. Pune for a consideration of Rs.  

3,50,00,000/-.   

(c) Accordingly, two separate Memorandums of  

Understanding (MoUs) were executed on 10.05.2008.  Both the  

memorandums were duly notarized and registered.  On  

13.05.2008, in order to realize the object, the Trust leased out  

the said property to the Society for a period of 2 years and 11  

months commencing from 15.04.2008 and expiring on  

09.03.2011 by way of an interim arrangement for an amount  

of Rs. 1/- towards lease fee for the entire duration of the lease  

granted.  This deed was duly registered with the office of sub-

Registrar, Mulshi (Paud) at S.No. 3701/2008.   

(d) On 19.02.2011, the appellant-Society received a legal  

notice to remove the dead stock and articles kept in the school  

within 4 days and further to vacate the school and to  

handover the possession in favour of the Trust alleging breach  

of the clauses mentioned in lease deed dated 13.05.2008. By  

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reply dated 07.03.2011, the appellant-Society denied the said  

allegations.   

(e) The Trust filed an application under Section 41E of the  

Bombay Public Trust Act, 1950 before the Joint Charity  

Commissioner, Pune seeking prohibitory orders against the  

appellant-Society.

(f) Aggrieved by the inaction of the Trust, the appellant-

Society also filed two separate suits bearing Special Civil Suit  

bearing Nos. 1146 and 1147 of 2011 before the Civil Court,  

Pune.   

(g) On 20.07.2011, respondent No.2 filed a complaint with  

the Deccan Police Station, Pune under Sections 420, 465, 468  

and 471 read with Section 34 of the Indian Penal Code, 1860  

which was registered as S.No. 168 of 2011.   

(h) Against the said complaint, the appellant filed an  

application bearing No. 2651 of 2011 before the Court of  

Additional Sessions Judge, Pune for grant of anticipatory bail.  

By order dated 29.08.2011, the Sessions Judge dismissed the  

said application.   

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(i) Aggrieved by the said order, the appellant preferred  

Criminal Application No. 786 of 2011 before the High Court.  

By impugned order dated 19.09.2011, the High Court  

dismissed the said application.  Against the said order, the  

appellant has filed this appeal by way of special leave petition.

4) Heard Mr. Mukul Rohtagi and Mr. Ranjit Kumar, learned  

senior counsel for the appellant and Mr. Chinmoy Khaldkar,  

learned counsel for Respondent No.1-State and Mr. Prashant  

Bhushan, learned counsel for Respondent No. 2-Complainant.  

5) The only point for consideration in this appeal is whether  

the appellant has made out a case for grant of anticipatory  

bail under Section 438 of the Code of Criminal Procedure,  

1908 (in short ‘the Code’).  

6) Inasmuch as the Additional Sessions Judge, Pune in the  

order dated 29.08.2011 and the High Court in the impugned  

order dated 19.09.2011 adverted to all the factual details  

relating to the appellant-accused and the Respondent No. 1-

State and Respondent No. 2-Complainant, there is no need to  

traverse the same once again except certain aspects which are  

essential for the disposal of the present appeal.  According to  

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the Complainant/respondent No.2 herein –  Pawan Gandhi  

Charity Trust had been established in the memory of his son  

and the Trust had a land on which a building was constructed  

for running a school.  The appellant claims to be the founder  

President and Managing Trustee of the said Society and the  

Trust had a land bearing Survey No. 154/6/1 admeasuring 57  

acres on which building in the area of 650 sq. mts. was  

constructed.  An English Medium School was started in the  

building in 2005 known as Loyala School.  In March, 2008, it  

was offered to lease out the said school building for a period of  

87 years and also to sell other property of the Trust to the  

Society.  Based on the negotiations, two separate  

Memorandum of Understandings (MoUs) dated 10.05.2008  

were signed between the parties.  

7) It is the claim of the Complainant-respondent No.2  

herein that on 13.05.2008, a lease deed for a period of 35  

months w.e.f. 15.04.2008 was executed and registered  

between the parties and it was agreed not to act upon the two  

MoUs.  On the expiry of the lease period i.e. on 09.03.2011,  

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the Society was to handover the possession of the said  

building and the land to the Trust.  

8) It is the stand of the first respondent-State and the  

second respondent-Complainant that the present appellant  

made a forgery in further lease deed dated 07.03.2011  

pertaining to the granting of lease for 87 years without the  

consent of the Complainant.  It is also stated that on the same  

date, the appellant also made a forgery by making  

additions/alterations in the original draft agreement for lease  

which was prepared at the time of executing the MoU and got  

it franked.  It is also their grievance that the document was  

notarized in the year 2008 and even in the said notarized  

document, forgery was committed by the appellant.  It is the  

contention of the Complainant that on the basis of the forged  

document, the appellant asserted his claim over the property.  

9) During the course of hearing, Mr. Rohtagi, learned senior  

counsel for the appellant by taking us through the MoUs and  

lease deed and also the corrections in those documents  

submitted that those corrections have been made with the  

consent of the Complainant and according to him, no forgery  

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has been committed as claimed by the respondents.  He  

pointed out that inasmuch as the sale deed could not take  

place and the property of the Trust could be leased out for a  

period of more than 3 years without the permission of the  

Charity Commissioner, the lease deed for a period of 35  

months was executed and registered as stop-gap arrangement  

with an understanding that the Trust would approach the  

concerned Assistant Charity Commissioner for necessary  

permission and, thereafter, the lease deed for a period of 87  

years in respect of the school building and the sale deed about  

the larger property could be executed and registered.   

10) In the course of argument, learned counsel appearing for  

the State vehemently opposed the claim of anticipatory bail  

and contended that custodial interrogation of the appellant is  

necessary because he has forged several documents and also  

submitted false information to the Education Department  

while obtaining permission for running the school.  It is  

further pointed out that he has also produced copies of false  

document.  It is his claim that unless custodial interrogation  

of the appellant is granted, it would not be possible to seize all  

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those documents from him.  In other words, according to the  

State, the appellant has committed not only the offence of  

forgery in respect of private documents but also made false  

representations and committed offence of cheating by giving  

false information to the Education Department, thus  

committed an offence not only against the State but also  

against the public in general.

11) Like the counsel appearing for the State, Mr. Prashant  

Bhushan, learned counsel for the second respondent-

Complainant by drawing our attention to various materials  

including corrections in the documents and several  

communications with the Educational Authorities as well as  

the letter dated 04.07.2012 of the Deputy Collector, Maval  

Sub-division, Pune addressed to Senior Police Inspector,  

Bundgarden Police Station, Pune submitted that in view of the  

conduct and involvement in various heinous offences, the  

appellant is not entitled indulgence by this Court for any relief.

12) As observed above, all the three counsel appearing for  

the parties took us through MoUs, lease deed and other  

correspondence/communications with the Educational  

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Authorities as well as the report of the Deputy Collector, Pune,  

to Senior Police Inspector, Bundgarden Police Station, Pune.  

It is also relevant to point out that all these materials were  

scrutinized/analyzed by the Additional Sessions Judge, Pune  

and the High Court while considering the application for  

anticipatory bail.  It is true that the parties have also  

approached the Civil Court for various reliefs.  At the same  

time, as pointed out by counsel for the State and the second  

respondent-Complainant, considering the seriousness relating  

to corrections/additions/alterations made in various  

documents, information furnished to the Educational  

Authorities which, according to them, are incorrect, we are of  

the view that in order to bring out all the material information  

and documents, custodial interrogation is required, more  

particularly, to ascertain in respect of the documents which  

were alleged to have been forged and fabricated.  In the said  

documents and other materials which are in the possession of  

the appellant and the allegation against him that he has made  

false representation before the Public Authority on the basis of  

those documents for obtaining necessary permission, as  

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pointed out by the State, in order to secure possession of  

those documents, custodial interrogation is necessary.  For  

this reason, the Additional Sessions Judge and the High Court  

rejected the claim for anticipatory bail.   

13) In addition to the same, it is stated by the respondents  

that after the order of this Court dated 23.09.2011 granting  

interim protection, the appellant has misused his liberty in  

creating hindrance to the investigation and continues to  

scuttle it and also intimidating and pressurizing the  

Complainant as well as the prosecution witnesses.  

14) In the light of the above discussion and in view of the  

mandate prescribed in Section 438 of the Code, we fully agree  

with the conclusion arrived at by the Additional Sessions  

Judge and the High Court in rejecting the relief of anticipatory  

bail.  Consequently, the appeal fails and the same is  

dismissed.   

15) In view of our order dismissing the appeal, the interim  

protection granted by this Court on 23.09.2011 shall stand  

vacated and the appellant is granted two weeks time from  

today to surrender and seek regular bail.  It is also made clear  

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that the conclusion arrived at by the courts below including  

the present order relates only to eligibility or otherwise of the  

relief of anticipatory bail and the trial Court is free to decide  

the bail application de hors to the above observation and in  

accordance with law.            

 

...…………….…………………………J.            (P. SATHASIVAM)                                  

..…....…………………………………J.    (RANJAN GOGOI)  

NEW DELHI; SEPTEMBER 7, 2012.  

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