MANOJ KUMAR Vs THE STATE OF HIMACHAL PRADESH
Bench: HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE N.V. RAMANA, HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE S. ABDUL NAZEER
Judgment by: HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE N.V. RAMANA
Case number: Crl.A. No.-000795-000795 / 2011
Diary number: 17323 / 2010
Advocates: SHIV RAM SHARMA Vs
VARINDER KUMAR SHARMA
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1
REPORTABLE
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION
CRIMINAL APPEAL NO. 795 OF 2011
MANOJ KUMAR APPELLANT
VERSUS
STATE OF HIMACHAL PRADESH RESPONDENT
WITH
CRIMINAL APPEAL NO. 796 OF 2011
SURINDER SINGH APPELLANT VERSUS
STATE OF HIMACHAL PRADESH RESPONDENT
CRIMINAL APPEAL NO. 797 OF 2011
RANGEEL SINGH APPELLANT
VERSUS
STATE OF HIMACHAL PRADESH RESPONDENT
JUDGMENT N.V. RAMANA, J.
2
1. These appeals by special leave are directed
against the judgment dated 20th November, 2009
passed by the High Court of Himachal Pradesh in
Criminal Appeal No. 312 of 2006 whereby the
High Court upheld the conviction and sentence
against the appellants as awarded by the learned
Sessions Judge for the offences punishable under
Sections 302, 341 and 323 read with Section 34
of the Indian Penal Code (IPC).
2. The facts necessary to deal with these appeals, as
culled out from the prosecution case, are that as
per the revenue records one Jaram Singh (PW1)
and others are the owners of land bearing
Khata/Khatauni No. 164/220, Khasra No. 605.
The said Jaram Singh (PW1) had mortgaged the
aforesaid land with one Krishan Lal and Subhash
Chand, but the land remained in the possession
of Prem Dass (deceased). Disturbed with the
interference of the appellants in the said land,
PW1—Jaram Singh and the deceased Prem Dass
3
filed a civil suit against the appellants and
thereby restrained the appellants from raising any
construction in the disputed land. 3. On 24th March, 2004 at about 8.30 p.m. Jeewan
(PW12)—complainant left his house in search of
his father Prem Dass who went to a nearby
village, and found his father Prem Dass in the
company of Yashwant Singh (PW13) and Narso
Ram (DW1) near a village called Chhedu. All of
them while returning to their village, they came
across the disputed land where they found the
appellants and their family members, seven
persons in all. Suddenly at once, they attacked
Prem Dass. Manoj Kumar (A4) was wielding a
spade (belcha), Surinder Kumar (A3) was carrying
a Drat (sickle) and other accused were armed with
sticks. Manoj Kumar (A4) gave a belcha (spade)
blow on the head of Prem Dass and accused
Surinder Singh struck him with a blow of sickle
causing injury on the right hand index finger of
4
Prem Dass while other accused were beating him
with sticks. In order to save their lives the
deceased Prem Dass, Yashwant Singh (PW13),
Narso Ram (DW1) and the complainant Jeewan
(PW12) ran from the scene helter-skelter, while
the accused Rangeel Singh (A1) was declaring that
Prem Dass will have to lose his life. By adopting
another route, Jeewan (PW12) reached the shop of
Yashwant Singh (PW13) where he found his father
Prem Dass in semiconscious condition with
bleeding profusely. They called the driver Ashok
Kumar (PW2) with his Maruti Van and took the
injured Prem Dass to the police post at Sinhunta
and lodged a report. Accordingly, FIR No. 45 of
2004 (Ext. PW.6/A) was registered.
4. Police sent the injured Prem Dass to Primary
Health Centre, Sihunta where Dr. Parveen Kumar
(PW4) attended him and issued Medico Legal
Certificate (Ext. PW4/A). As his condition was
getting deteriorated, he was referred to Rajinder
5
Prasad Medical College (RPMC), Dharmshala for
better treatment, however, on the way it was
noticed that the victim was not responding to the
calls of his son Jeevan. Sensing something wrong,
he was brought back to Dr. Praveen Kumar (PW4),
who on examination, declared him to have
succumbed to the injuries.
5. The Investigating Officer, PW18—Partap Singh,
upon receiving the information of death of the
deceased, called the photographer to get the
snaps of the deceased, conducted inquest (Ext.
PW11/A) and sent the dead body for postmortem.
Thereafter, he prepared the site plan (Ext.
PW18/A), got the injured Yashwant Singh (PW 13)
medically examined and seized his bloodstained
shirt (Ext.PW13/B). During the course of
investigation, the I.O. visited the place of
occurrence and collected bloodstained earth,
stones (Ext. PW16/A), belcha (Ext.P2) and
recovered one sickle (Ext.P1) and sticks (Ext.P3)
6
from the possession of A5 vide seizure memo
Ext.PW17/A. From the possession of appellant—
accused No. 1 (Rangeel Singh) his bloodstained
clothes were recovered vide Ex.PW14/A and sent
the same for forensic examination.
6. On completion of investigation, the case was
presented to the learned SDJM, Dalhousie who in
turn committed the same to the Court of learned
Sessions Judge, Chamba who framed charges
against the accused for the offences punishable
under Sections 147/149, 148/149, 341/149,
323/149, 302/149 and 506/149, IPC. Rangeel
Singh (accused no. 1), Mohinder Singh (accused
no. 2) Surinder Singh (accused no. 3), Manoj
Kumar (accused no. 4), Rekha Devi (accused no.
5), Veena Devi (accused no. 6) and Biaso Devi
(accused no. 7) pleaded not guilty and claimed to
be tried. To bring home the guilt of the accused,
prosecution has examined as many as 18
witnesses and there was one witness for the
7
defence. Carrying out a full fledged trial, learned
Sessions Judge formed the opinion that the
accused were proved to be guilty of the offences
with which they were charged except for the
charge against Section 506/149, IPC.
Accordingly, they were convicted and sentenced
as indicated below, with the direction that all
sentences were to run concurrently.
NAME OF THE ACCUSED
SECTIONS PUNISHMENT
All the accused 302 r/w. 149 ofIPC
Imprisonment for life and fine of Rs. 10,000/- each. In case of default in
payment of fine, each one of them would be liable to suffer further imprisonment of two
years.
All the accused 147 of IPC
Rigorous imprisonment for a period of six months and fine of Rs. 1000/- each. In
case of default in payment of fine, each one of them would be liable to suffer further
imprisonment of two months.
All the accused 148 of IPC
Rigorous imprisonment for a period of six months and fine of Rs. 1000/- each. In
case of default in payment of fine, each one of them would be liable to suffer further
imprisonment of two months.
All the accused 323 r/w. 149 ofIPC
Rigorous imprisonment for a period of six months and fine of Rs. 1000/- each. In
case of default in payment of fine, each one of them would be liable to suffer further
imprisonment of two months. All the accused 341 r/w, 149 of
IPC Simple imprisonment for one month and
fine of Rs. 500/- each. In default of payment of fine, each one of them shall
undergo simple imprisonment for a period
8
of seven days more.
7. It would be relevant to state the brief reasoning of
the trial court which led to the conviction of the
accused-appellant herein- i. That the witnesses having interest in the property or
being a close friend of the deceased, would not qualify them as interested witnesses.
ii. Non-examination of two witnesses, who are alleged to have accompanied the deceased, is not fatal for the case of the prosecution.
iii. That the DW-1 has not denied the incident wherein the deceased was beaten by the accused.
iv. The court cannot place reliance on the theories introduced by DW-1, as his statements are contradictory.
v. That the blood stains found on the Belcha (alleged weapon used) is indicative of the occurrence of the crime.
vi. That no alcohol was found in the viscera of the deceased.
vii. That the prosecution was able to prove the case beyond reasonable doubt.
8. The aggrieved accused preferred appeal before the
High Court against their conviction and sentence
passed by the trial Court. By the judgment
impugned herein, the High Court while partly
allowing their appeal, acquitted the accused
9
Mohinder Singh (A2), Biaso Devi (A7), Rekha Devi
(A5) and Veena Devi (A6) extending them the
benefit of doubt. However, the High Court
affirmed the conviction and sentence passed by
the trial Court against Rangeel Singh (A1),
Surinder Kumar (A3) and Manoj Kumar (A4) on
the following grounds-
i. That the motive of the crime was due to the prior land dispute.
ii. That the statement of DW-1 was not believable.
iii. That the blood group found on the clothes of accused no. 1 matched with that of the deceased.
iv. That the High Court, accepted that the prosecution case was exaggerated to the extent of roping other unconnected family members.
9. Aggrieved by the impugned judgment of the High
Court, Manoj Kumar (Criminal Appeal No. 795
of 2017), Surinder Singh (Criminal Appeal No.
796 of 2011) and Rangeel Singh (Criminal
Appeal No. 797 of 2011) are in appeal before this
Court. We propose to dispose of these appeals by
10
this common order as all the accused-appellants
are challenging the same impugned common
judgment.
10. While taking us through the evidence on
record vis-a-vis the portions of the findings of trial
court as well as the High Court, the Ld. counsel
for the appellants argued that the entire case of
the prosecution rests on the motive of pending
civil litigations between the parties and there is
absolutely no proof that the appellants have
pre-meditated to attack the deceased and his
party at the given place and given time as
propounded by the prosecution. According to him
the occurrence has taken place near the disputed
property which is not on the way to the village
proceeded by the deceased and this would show
that the deceased had arrived at the disputed
property to attack the appellants or to cause
damage or otherwise destroy the property of
appellants. He then, maintains the stand that
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where several accused persons attacked the
deceased with multiple weapons and with
intention to do away with his life, presence of
negligible simple injuries found on the body of
deceased does not support the presence of
intention to cause death of deceased so as to
attract punishment under Sec. 300 read with Sec.
302 IPC. The Ld counsel relied upon the medical
evidence also to buttress this argument.
11. On the other hand, the learned counsel
appearing on behalf of the State has supported
the judgment of the High Court and sought
dismissal of these appeals before this Court.
12. Heard the arguments on either side and
perused the material available on record. A mixed
question of law and fact which falls for our
consideration is whether the accused-herein are
liable to be punished for the offence of culpable
homicide amounting to murder or not?
12
13. PW-1 (Jaram Singh), states that he is the
brother of the deceased. He is not an eyewitness
to the incident and his evidence is not an
important piece of evidence, being the hearsay
evidence. The only aspect which can be looked
into is the existence of dispute over the landed
property. He states that the accused had forcibly
constructed shops over the disputed land and he
had filed a civil suit for eviction before the
Dalhousie Court.
14. PW-4 (Dr. Parveen Kumar) was the Doctor
when the deceased (Prem Dass) was referred to
the hospital. He states that the referred patient
was calm, conscious and well-oriented to time and
place. He further states that injury no. 1 and 2
appears to have been caused by sharp weapon,
while the third injury on the sacral region was
opined to have been caused by a blunt weapon.
He states that the patient was thereafter referred
to RPMC Dharamshala, for further treatment.
13
After two-two and half hours, deceased was
declared as brought dead.
15. In the cross examination he accepts that his
advice for an x-ray, to RPMC Dharamshala is not
reflected anywhere in the OPD records. It is of
some significance to note that PW-4 accepts that
the deceased was brought to the health center in
a private van and the deceased returned to his
house in the same vehicle. Although he has
denied later that the patient returned to the home
instead of going to RPMC Dharamshala. On the
aspect of treatment, he states that the condition
of the patient was not so serious.
16. PW-5 (Dr. Arvind Kanwar), stated the nature of
injuries on opening of the scalp in the following
manner- On opening the scalp cap extradural and sub-Dural hematoma seen in the right parietal temporal region. Extensive in size. The brain was congested, no fracture was seen on the scalp.
It may be relevant to note his cross examination
14
Self stated that injury No. 2 on scalp was grievous in nature which caused brain hemorrhage. It is correct to suggest that there was no facture on the head injury. It is correct that Dr. Modi is authority on medical jurisprudence. I have seen the 18th
edition of Dr. Modi in which, at page 229, he has defined the grievous injury, I agree with this definition. I did not see the weapon of the offence at the time of post mortem examination. The injury No. 2 can be caused by blade of the Dr at Ex. P-1 shown to me in the court. It is correct that the injury No. 2 can be caused by striking with sharp-edged object but it depends on force and speed. … I have not mentioned the depth of the scalp injury in post mortem report. It is correct that without ascertaining the depth of the scalp injury, it was not possible to opine that it was grievous injury.
(emphasis supplied)
17. PW-12 (Jeewan), son of the deceased is stated
to be an eye witness to the alleged incident. He
has repeated the prosecution story in entirety to
the effect that in the presence of himself,
Yashwant Singh (PW-13) and Narso Ram (DW1),
the accused-party suddenly attacked the
deceased. When Yashwant Singh intervened to
save the deceased, he was also beaten up by the
15
accused party. As the accused were rushing
towards PW-12 (Jeewan), he ran from the spot.
While running he turned back and saw deceased
(after receiving multiple injuries including a head
injury), Yashwant Singh and Narso Ram were
running from the spot. With respect to the
treatment, he states that the deceased was taken
to the PHC Sihunta wherein he was preliminarily
treated and referred further to the Hospital at
Dharmashala. As the deceased was not
responding, he was brought back to the PHC
Sihunta, wherein he was declared dead.
18. Another important witness, who was alleged to
have been present at the scene of the crime, is
PW-13 (Yashwant Singh). He has re-iterated the
prosecution story. It may be noted that this
witness has specifically stated that the deceased
was taken back to the home after taking
treatment at PHC Sinhunta. As the condition of
the deceased worsened thereafter, he was brought
16
back to the PHC Sinhunta, wherein he was
declared as brought dead.
19. Having observed the prosecution evidence, we
need to concentrate on the defense witness. DW1
—Narso Ram was in fact a prosecution witness
initially and even according to the prosecution
theory, DW1 was the eyewitness. According to
DW1, he was accompanying Yashwant Singh
(PW13) and while they were proceeding towards
village Thukrla, the deceased Prem Dass met them
at a distance of 50 yards and they went to a
liquor shop and nearby the disputed property
wherein certain shop rooms were constructed, the
accused were found closing the shops and at that
time the deceased and PW13 started abusing the
accused persons and he saw accused Surinder
Singh and Manoj Kumar (appellants in Criminal
Appeals No. 796/2011 and 795/2011
respectively) coming from the house with empty
hands.
17
20. The High Court however has disbelieved the
evidence of DW1 to the extent of deceased and
PW13 consuming alcohol since the FSL report (Ex
PW-18/C) does not indicate presence of alcohol in
the intestine of the deceased. Except this, the
High Court has taken into consideration the part
of the statement of DW1. Merely because one part
of the evidence of certain witness is not believed,
it does not mean that his entire evidence shall be
discarded. To the extent that DW1 was present at
the time of occurrence is admitted even according
to the prosecution. His evidence that the deceased
started abusing the appellants’ group who were
present at the relevant time is acceptable for that
reason and this behavior of deceased must have
instigated the appellants to retaliate. This view is
substantiating the plea of the defense to some
extent as propounded by them in their
18
examination under Sec. 313 of the Code of
Criminal Procedure.
21. Having taken into consideration, the statement
of witnesses on questions of fact, it would be
appropriate to have thorough look at the question
of law pertaining to Culpable Homicide. Learned
counsel for the appellants contended that the
defense emerging from the evidence is that the
deceased party arrived at the place of the incident
wherein PW-13 started verbally abusing the
accused which ensued a sudden fight resulting in
the injuries being caused to the deceased and
while so the High Court failed to appreciate that
there was no premeditation on behalf of the
appellant-accused and the entire incident was
due to a sudden fight and the High Court ought to
have invoked Exception 4 to Section 300 IPC.
22. Exception 4 to Section 300 IPC reads as under:
Exception 4.-Culpable homicide is not murder if it is committed without premeditation in a sudden fight in the heat of passion upon a
19
sudden quarrel and without the offender having taken undue advantage or acted in a cruel or unusual manner.
23. There is no dispute about the ingredients of
Exception 4 to Section 300 IPC, the following
conditions are to be satisfied namely:
(i) that the incident happened without premeditation;
(ii) in a sudden fight;
(iii) in the heat of passion;
(iv) upon a sudden quarrel and
(v) without the offender having taken undue advantage or acted in a cruel or unusual manner.
24. It may be relevant to note that in the case of
Sridhar Bhuyan v. State of Orissa, (2004) 11
SCC 395, it was held as under- For bringing in operation of Exception 4 to Section 300 Indian Penal Code, it has to be established that the act was committed without premeditation, in a sudden fight in the heat of passion upon a sudden quarrel without the offender having taken undue advantage and not having acted in a cruel or unusual manner.
The fourth exception of Section 300 Indian Penal Code covers acts done in a sudden
20
fight. The said exception deals with a case of prosecution not covered by the first exception, after which its place would have been more appropriate. The exception is founded upon the same principle, for in both there is absence of premeditation. But, while in the case of Exception 1 there is total deprivation of self-control, in case of Exception 4, there is only that heat of passion which clouds men's sober reason and urges them to deeds which they would not otherwise do. There is provocation in Exception 4 as in Exception 1; but the injury done is not the direct consequence of that provocation. In fact Exception 4 deals with cases in which notwithstanding that a blow may have been struck, or some provocation given in the origin of the dispute or in whatever way the quarrel may have originated, yet the subsequent conduct of both parties puts them in respect of guilt upon equal footing. A "sudden fight" implies mutual provocation and blows on each side. The homicide committed is then clearly not traceable to unilateral provocation, nor in such cases could the whole blame be placed on one side. For if it were so, the exception more appropriately applicable would be Exception 1. There is no previous deliberation or determination to fight. A fight suddenly takes place, for which both parties are more or less to be blamed. It may be that one of them starts it, but if the other had not aggravated it by his own conduct it would not have taken the serious turn it did. There is then mutual provocation and aggravation, and it is difficult to apportion the share of blame which attaches to each fighter. The help of Exception 4 can be invoked if death is
21
caused: (a) without premeditation; (b) in a sudden fight; (c) without the offender's having taken undue advantage or acted in a cruel or unusual manner; and (d) the fight must have been with the person killed. To bring a case within Exception 4 all the ingredients mentioned in it must be found. It is to be noted that the "fight" occurring in Exception 4 to Section 300 Indian Penal Code is not defined in Indian Penal Code. It takes two to make a fight. Heat of passion requires that there must be no time for the passions to cool down and in this case, the parties have worked themselves into a fury on account of the verbal altercation in the beginning. A fight is a combat between two and more persons whether with or without weapons. It is not possible to enunciate any general rule as to what shall be deemed to be a sudden quarrel. It is a question of fact and whether a quarrel is sudden or not must necessarily depend upon the proved facts of each case. For the application of Exception 4, it is not sufficient to show that there was a sudden quarrel and there was no premeditation. It must further be shown that the offender has not taken undue advantage or acted in a cruel or unusual manner. The expression "undue advantage" as used in the provision means "unfair advantage".
25. Thus, the totality of circumstances of the case
on hand would amply show that there was a
sudden verbal quarrel and evidently there was no
pre-meditated plan to attack the deceased. In view
22
of the civil disputes already pending between both
the families, a minor verbal exchange bloated into
a sudden physical attack.
26. In Camilo Vaz vs. State of Goa, (2000) 9 SCC
1, referring to the ambit of Section 304 of the
Code, this Court in similar set of circumstances
held thus:
“This section is in two parts. If analysed the section provides for two kinds of punishment to two different situations. (1) if the act by which death is caused is done with the intention of causing death or causing such bodily injury as is likely to cause death. Here important ingredients is the "intention"; (2) if the act is done with knowledge that it is likely to cause death but without any intention to cause death or such bodily injury as is likely to cause death. When a person hits another with a danda on vital part of the body with such a force that the person hit meets his death, knowledge has to be imputed to the accused. In that situation case will fall in part II of Section 304 IPC as in the present case.”
27. Again, this Court in Deo Nath Rai vs State of
Bihar and Others etc, AIR 2017 SC 5428
observed-
23
“Looking to the totality of the facts and circumstances of the case and the evidence on record, it is clear that it was only the accused - Parsuram Rai who had assaulted Mohan Rai with the help of sword, whose assault resulted grievous injury, and the deceased Mohan Rai ultimately succumbed to the said injury during the course of transit to the hospital.
The incident had taken place when the deceased was returning from the disputed land and the accused persons were busy in the adjacent field transplanting paddy seedlings from where they saw Mohan Rai crossing their land. There was no premeditation of any kind on the part of the accused to commit the murder of the deceased. However, the eye witnesses have deposed that accused - Wakil Rai came and started quarreling with Mohan Rai when other family members also joined. The quarrel not only suddenly erupted but also escalated without any premeditation. As rightly concluded by the High Court, the whole incident was spontaneous and went out of hand that too within short spell of time.
In the facts and circumstances of the case, though the High Court was justified in altering the conviction of the accused from Section 302 and 302/149 IPC to Section 304 Part-II IPC, it was not justified in imposing lesser sentence on the accused…”
24
28. It is important to have a look at the evidence of
PW 5-Dr. Arvind Kanwar who has conducted Post
mortem and according to him there was an
incised wound on the right parietal region of size
4” and 10” above right ear and another incised
wound of 1” in size on the right index finger. He
has deposed that “the brain was found congested,
yet no fracture was seen on the scalp”. Though in
the cross examination he has stated at one place
that the injury No 2 on the scalp might be
‘grievous’ that caused brain hemorrhage. This
particular fact is not noted in the postmortem
report. Regarding the cause of such injury, PW5
stated that it can be caused by striking with
sharp edged object and the depth of the scalp
injury depends upon the force and speed. He
maintains the stand that it was a ‘scalp injury’
and not ‘skull injury’. Moreover, he did not
measure the depth of the head injury which was
necessary for classification of injury.
25
29. We may note that the injury to the head
resulted in Extra-Dural and Sub-Dural
Hematoma. We are conscious of the fact that such
symptoms of the same may take some hours to
develop in many cases as has happened in this
case at hand.1 We are also apprised that in such
cases a detailed post-mortem may be necessary
and it is important to know the existence of prior
medical history and condition. In this case a
generalized statement by the Doctor conducting
the post-mortem that he had causally enquired
about any existing medical condition with the
deceased. It may further be relevant to note the
extract from the Modi, A Textbook of Medical
Jurisprudence and Toxicology, wherein it is noted
that-
It must be born in mind that a slight injury on the head may cause cerebral hemorrhage in a
1 Modi, A Textbook of Medical Jurisprudence and Toxicology, 25th Eds., p. 701.
26
person previously predisposed to it from age or disease.2
30. The above opinion goes to show that the injury
no. 2 on the scalp resulted in hemorrhage which
has not been duly accounted for. Moreover, the
force and gravity of assault indicates that the
aforesaid assault was carried out with only
sufficient knowledge of likely death of the
deceased in a free fight situation. Had he got
intention to commit the murder of the deceased
by inflicting such injury, he might have used the
weapon with sufficient force and in that case,
definitely it would have caused a deep injury
causing fracture of skull. This court is bound to
show some deference to this particular aspect
while evaluating the facts and circumstances of
this case at hand.
31. In the case on hand, the death is not
instantaneous, but the deceased died after
2 Id. At 704.
27
sometime, due to hemorrhage. When several
persons of the accused group wielding weapons
attacked the deceased, it is surprising to see only
two injuries, that too, two simple injuries alone
are inflicted; of course, one such simple injury
turns out to be fatal sometime later. This
circumstance demonstrates that the appellant
had no intention to cause death, though he has
knowledge that the weapon used by him to inflict
injury on the scalp of the deceased may cause
death. But in the absence of intention to cause
death or to cause such bodily injury as is likely to
cause death, the offence does not fall within the
scope of Section 300, IPC but it will fall within
Section 304, Part II of the IPC.
32. We, therefore, hold that the appellants Manoj
Kumar, Rangeel Singh and Surinder Singh are
guilty for an offence punishable under Section
304 Part II IPC and not for the offence under Sec.
300 IPC. Their conviction under Section 302 IPC
28
is, therefore, set aside. While modifying the
conviction accordingly, the appellants are
sentenced to suffer rigorous imprisonment for a
period of ten years. However, we are informed that
the appellants have already undergone more than
11½ years imprisonment so far, consequently, the
appellants are directed to be released forthwith, if
not required in any other case.
33. Accordingly, these appeals are disposed of in
the above terms.
…………......................J. (N.V. RAMANA)
..................................J. (S. ABDUL NAZEER)
NEW DELHI, MAY 15, 2018.