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       REPORTABLE  IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA

               CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION                  CRIMINAL APPEAL NO. 775 OF 2013

Manoj Kumar Sharma & Ors. .... Appellant(s)

Versus

State of Chhattisgarh & Anr.                   .... Respondent(s)

                  J U D G M E N T

R.K. Agrawal, J.

1) This  appeal  has  been  filed  against  the  judgment  and

order  dated  27.09.2012  passed  by  the  High  Court  of

Chhattisgarh at  Bilaspur  in  Criminal  Miscellaneous Petition

No.  765 of  2011 whereby learned single  Judge of  the  High

Court dismissed the petition filed by the appellants herein.   

2) Brief facts:

(a) Manoj  Kumar  Sharma-the  appellant-accused,  who  was

serving  in  the  Indian  Air  Force  at  the  relevant  time,  got

married  to  one  Nandini  on  27.04.1999.   On  20.09.1999,

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Nandini  Sharma  (since  deceased)  committed  suicide  at  her

matrimonial home. The information with regard to the same

was lodged by the Security Officer of the Indian Air Force at

Police Station Mulana, District Ambala.  On 22.09.1999, post

mortem was conducted on the body of the deceased and the

body was handed over to the relatives for performing last rites.

(b) On 22.09.1999, the officer in-charge of the investigation,

P.S. Mulana submitted a report being No. 26 stating that there

was no sign of foul play in the occurrence.  On the basis of the

investigation,  on 24.01.2000,  a  Final  Report  was  submitted

before  the  sub-Divisional  Magistrate  which  got  accepted  on

19.02.2000.  Simultaneously, a Court of Inquiry (CoI) was also

convened  to  investigate  into  the  alleged  role  of  the

appellant-accused but after completion of the Inquiry the case

was finally closed on 25.07.2000.  

(c) After five years of the closing of the above case, a fresh

First  Information  Report  (FIR),  being  No.  194  dated

29.05.2005  was  got  registered  by  Shri  Shashi  Bhushan

Sharma (Respondent No. 2 herein) – brother of the deceased

against  Manoj  Sharma-  appellant  No.  1  herein,  Heera  Lal

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Sharma,  Mahaveer  Prasad  Sharma  and  Smt.  Hem  Lata

Sharma-the father, uncle and mother of the appellant No. 1

herein respectively at P.S. Bhillai Nagar, District Durg under

Sections 304B, 498A and Section 34 of the Indian Penal Code,

1860 (in short ‘the IPC’).

(d)  Being  aggrieved  by  the  filing  of  the  FIR,  the  appellants

herein filed a Writ Petition being No. 2890 of 2005 before the

High Court.  The Division Bench of the High Court, vide order

dated  25.07.2005,  directed  for  the  continuance  of  the

investigation of the alleged offence.   

(e) On  04.04.2007,  the  said  writ  petition  was  withdrawn

with  the  leave  of  the  court  and  the  appellants  herein  filed

Criminal Miscellaneous Petition being No. 612 of 2007 before

the  High Court  under  Section 482 of  the  Code of  Criminal

Procedure, 1973 (in short ‘the Code’) for quashing of the FIR.

Learned  single  Judge  of  the  High  Court,  vide  order  dated

17.10.2011,  allowed  the  proceedings  to  continue  with  a

direction to the police to hold fair and proper investigation to

ensure  logical  conclusion  of  the  same without  unnecessary

delay.   

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(f) An  application  for  modification  being  Criminal  Misc.

Petition No. 732 of 2011 was filed for modification of the order

dated 17.10.2011 in Criminal  Miscellaneous Petition 612 of

2007 on the ground that during the pendency of the judgment

in the matter, the chargesheet came to be filed by the police

before  the  court  which  was  allowed  vide  order  dated

17.11.2011.  

(g) Further,  the  appellants  herein  filed  Criminal  Misc.

Petition being No. 765 of 2011 under Section 482 read with

Section 397 of the Code before the High Court for quashing of

charge  sheet  and  cognizance  taken  thereof  by  the  Judicial

Magistrate  First  Class,  Durg  dated  03.09.2011  and

13.10.2011  respectively  in  Criminal  Proceeding  No.  805  of

2011 arising out of Crime No. 194 of 2005 registered at P.S.

Bhilai Nagar, District Durg. Learned single Judge of the High

Court, vide order dated 27.09.2012 dismissed the petition filed

by the appellants herein.    

(h) Aggrieved  by  the  abovesaid  order,  the  appellants  have

preferred this appeal by way of special leave before this Court.

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(3) Heard Mr. Sushil Kumar, learned senior counsel for the

appellants-accused and Mr. Atul Jha, learned counsel for the

respondent-State.

Rival Submissions:

(4) Mr.  Sushil  Kumar,  learned  senior  counsel  for  the

appellants  vehemently  contended  that  since  the  place  of

incident is Haryana, the FIR and the cognizance of the offence

could not have been taken at Durg.  Learned senior counsel

further submitted that the earlier or the first information in

regard to the commission of a cognizable offence satisfies the

requirement of Section 154 of the Code and there cannot be

second  FIR  or  fresh  investigation  of  any  subsequent

information in respect  of  the same cognizable  offence.   The

investigation was carried out at Durg in Chhattisgarh and the

deceased never resided at  the said place after  the marriage

thus the court at Durg had no jurisdiction to proceed with the

prosecution.   Learned senior  counsel  finally  contended that

the present charge sheet is a sheer abuse of the process and

has been filed without any basis on an FIR which was lodged

after 5 (five) years that too on the basis of anonymous letters.

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(5) Per  contra,  learned  counsel  for  the  respondent-State

submitted that no FIR was lodged at Mulana Police Station nor

was there any investigation carried out into any allegation of

commission  of  a  cognizable  offence,  but  upon  receipt  of

information regarding death, the police had conducted inquiry

under Section 174 of the Code and submitted a report to the

sub-Divisional Magistrate.  He further submitted that it is not

a  case  where  the  police  registered  FIR,  carried  out

investigation and submitted a report under Section 173 of the

Code rather the case was closed stating that no offence was

found to be committed and accepted by the court of competent

jurisdiction.  It is further submitted that the FIR was lodged

for the first time in the P.S. Bhilai Nagar and it cannot be said

to be the second FIR of the same incident.  The reports of the

Office  of  the  Scene  of  Crime  Unit,  Durg  and  the  Director,

Medico Legal Institute, the contents of the FIR, the case diary

statements are  prima facie sufficient for initiation of criminal

proceedings for the offence under Sections 304B and 498A of

the IPC.   Learned counsel further submitted that as regards

the question of territorial jurisdiction is concerned; the part of

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cause of action arose within the territorial jurisdiction of the

court at Durg.  He finally submitted that a full enquiry into the

cause of death of the deceased should be made and the ends

of justice would be best served when the accused would be

found guilty for her unnatural death.  

(6) We have carefully  perused the entire records including

depositions  and  documents  and  considered  the  rival

contentions.

Discussion:

(7) Nandini (since deceased) was married to appellant No. 1

herein  on  27.04.1999  at  Durg.   On  20.09.1999,  she  died

under suspicious circumstances at her matrimonial home at

Ambala.  As per the initial investigation, the cause of death

was  hanging.  Upon  receipt  of  information,  P.S.  Ambala

proceeded to hold an inquiry under Section 174 of the Code.

During  investigation,  no  offence  was  found  to  have  been

committed.   It  may  be  mentioned  here  that  Shri  R.P.

Sharma-father of the deceased and other relatives were also

present during the investigation.  A report of the inquiry made

under  Section  174  of  the  Code  was  forwarded  to

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sub-Divisional  Magistrate,  Ambala  which  was  accepted  and

the case was finally closed.  Simultaneously, an inquiry was

also conducted by the Indian Air Force which resulted in the

closure of the case while holding that no foul play is suspected

in the case.   

(8) After about 5 years, on the basis of anonymous letters

received  by  the  brother  of  the  deceased-Respondent  No.  2

herein, wherein the death was described a planned murder,

FIR being No. 194 of 2005 dated 29.05.2005 was registered

against the appellants herein under Sections 304B and 498A

of the IPC.  The FIR, in substance, recorded that the deceased

was meted out with cruelty at her matrimonial home on the

behest of appellants for the demand of dowry.  On 20.09.1999,

the deceased informed Respondent No. 2 over phone regarding

the quarrel with the appellant No. 1 herein and she was found

dead on the very same date.    During investigation, the police

at Durg found that she was actually subjected to cruelty in

connection with the  demand of  dowry by her  in-laws.   The

appellant No. 1 herein was arrested for the alleged involvement

in the offence.  Being aggrieved by the filing of the FIR, the

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appellant  No.  1  herein  filed  a  writ  petition  before  the  High

Court  which  got  dismissed  as  withdrawn  vide  order  dated

04.04.2007.  A fresh petition under Section 482 of the Code

was also filed before the High Court  wherein learned single

Judge  of  the  High  Court,  vide  order  dated  17.10.2011

dismissed  the  petition  filed  by  the  appellants  herein  while

directing  the  police  to  complete  the  investigation  speedily.

Further,  a  petition  was  filed  by  the  appellants  herein  for

quashing of charge sheet and cognizance taken of the offence

dated 03.09.2011 and 13.10.2011 respectively in Crime No.

194  of  2005  registered  at  P.S.  Bhilai  Nagar,  District  Durg

which  also  got  dismissed  vide  High  Court’s  order  dated

27.09.2012.   

9) Learned senior counsel for the appellants submitted that

the earlier or the first information in regard to the commission

of a cognizable offence satisfies the requirement of Section 154

of  the  Code  and  there  cannot  be  second  FIR  or  fresh

investigation of any subsequent information in respect of the

same  cognizable  offence.   Learned  senior  counsel  further

stressed upon that when the police had conducted inquiry on

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the  information  and  closed  the  case  there  is  no  point  in

re-opening  the  case  by  filing  FIR  that  too  on  the  basis  of

anonymous  letters  received  by  the  brother  of  the  deceased

after a lapse of 5 (five) years.  In view of the above claim of

learned senior counsel for the appellants, it is imperative to

discuss the scope of ‘Inquiry’ under Section 174 of the Code in

order  to  ascertain  as  to  whether  the  ‘information’  received

under  Section 174 of  the  Code satisfies  the  requirement  of

Section 154 of the Code.

Scope of ‘Inquiry’ under Section 174 of the Code:

10) The proceedings under Section 174 have a very limited

scope.  The object of  the proceedings is merely to ascertain

whether a person has died under suspicious circumstances or

an unnatural death and if so what is the apparent cause of the

death.   The  question  regarding  the  details  as  to  how  the

deceased was assaulted or who assaulted him or under what

circumstances he was assaulted is foreign to the ambit and

scope  of  the  proceedings  under  Section  174  of  the  Code.

Neither in practice nor in law was it necessary for the police to

mention those details in the inquest report.  It is, therefore,

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not necessary to enter all the details of the overt acts in the

inquest report.  The procedure under Section 174 is for the

purpose of discovering the cause of death, and the evidence

taken was very short.  When the body cannot be found or has

been buried, there can be no investigation under Section 174.

This section is intended to apply to cases in which an inquest

is necessary.  The proceedings under this Section should be

kept  more  distinct  from  the  proceedings  taken  on  the

complaint.   Whereas the starting point of the powers of police

was changed from the power of the officer in charge of a police

station  to  investigate  into  a  cognizable  offence  without  the

order of a Magistrate, to the reduction of the first information

regarding  commission  of  a  cognizable  offence,  whether

received  orally  or  in  writing,  into  writing.  As  such,  the

objective of such placement of provisions was clear which was

to ensure that the recording of the first information should be

the  starting  point  of  any  investigation  by  the  police.  The

purpose of registering FIR is to set the machinery of criminal

investigation into motion, which culminates with filing of the

police report and only after registration of FIR, beginning of

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investigation  in  a  case,  collection  of  evidence  during

investigation  and  formation  of  the  final  opinion  is  the

sequence which results in filing of a report under Section 173

of the Code. In George and Others vs. State of Kerala and

Another (1998)  4  SCC  605,  it  has  been  held  that  the

investigating officer is not obliged to investigate, at the stage of

inquest,  or  to  ascertain  as  to  who  were  the  assailants.   A

similar view has been taken in  Suresh Rai and Others vs.

State of Bihar (2000) 4 SCC 84.

11) In this view of the matter, Sections 174 and 175 of the

Code  afford  a  complete  Code  in  itself  for  the  purpose  of

“Inquiries” in cases of accidental or suspicious deaths and are

entirely distinct from the “investigation” under Section 157 of

the Code wherein if an officer in-charge of a police station has

reason to suspect the commission of an offence which he is

empowered to investigate, he shall proceed in person to the

spot to investigate the facts and circumstances of the case. In

the case on hand, an inquiry under Section 174 of the Code

was convened initially in order to ascertain whether the death

is  natural  or  unnatural.   Learned  senior  counsel  for  the

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appellants  claims  that  the  earlier  information  regarding

unnatural death amounted to FIR under Section 154 of the

Code which was investigated by the police and thereafter the

case was closed.  On a careful scrutiny of materials on record,

the  inquiry  which  was  conducted  for  the  purpose  of

ascertaining whether the death is natural or unnatural cannot

be categorized under information relating to the commission of

a cognizable offence within the meaning and import of Section

154 of the Code.  On information received by P.S. Mulana, the

police made an inquiry as contemplated under Section 174 of

the Code.  After holding an inquiry, the police submitted its

report  before  the  sub-Divisional  Magistrate,  Ambala  stating

therein that it was a case of hanging and no cognizable offence

is found to have been committed. In the report,  it  was also

mentioned that the father of the deceased-R.P. Sharma (PW-1)

does not want to take any further action in the matter. In view

of the above discussion, it clearly goes to show that what was

undertaken by the police was an inquiry under Section 174 of

the  Code  which  was  limited  to  the  extent  of  natural  or

unnatural  death  and  the  case  was  closed.   Whereas,  the

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condition precedent for recording of FIR is that there must be

an  information  and  that  information  must  disclose  a

cognizable offence and in the case on hand, it leaves no matter

of doubt that the intimation was an information of the nature

contemplated under Section 174 of the Code and it could not

be categorized as information disclosing a cognizable offence.

Also,  there  is  no  material  to  show  that  the  police  after

conducting investigation submitted a report under Section 173

of the Code as contemplated, before the competent authority,

which accepted the said report and closed the case.    

12) In  view  of  the  above,  we  are  of  the  opinion  that  the

investigation on an inquiry under Section 174 of the Code is

distinct from the investigation as contemplated under Section

154 of the Code relating to commission of a cognizable offence

and in the case on hand there was no FIR registered with the

P.S.  Mulana neither  any investigation nor any report under

Section 173 of the Code was submitted.  Therefore, challenge

to impugned FIR under Crime No. 194 of 2005 registered by

P.S. Bhilai Nagar could not be assailed on the ground that it

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was second FIR in the  garb of  which investigation or  fresh

investigation of the same incident was initiated.     

Territorial Jurisdiction:

13) Learned  senior  counsel  for  the  appellants  vehemently

contended that the P.S. Bhilai Nagar, Durg had no territorial

jurisdiction to investigate  the matter  alleging commission of

offence  under  Sections  304B and 498A of  the  IPC because

none of the part of the alleged offence was committed within

the territorial jurisdiction of P.S. Bhilai Nagar, Durg.  It is true

that  territorial  jurisdiction  also  is  prescribed  under

sub-section (1) of Section 156 to the extent that the officer can

investigate  any  cognizable  case  which  a  court  having

jurisdiction over the local area within the limits of such police

station  would  have  power  to  enquire  into  or  try  under  the

provisions of Chapter XIII. However, sub-section (2) makes the

position  clear  by  providing  that  no  proceeding  of  a  police

officer  in  any  such  case  shall  at  any  stage  be  called  in

question on the  ground that  the  case  was one which such

officer was not empowered to investigate. After investigation is

completed, the result of such investigation is required to be

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submitted  as  provided  under  Sections  168,  169  and  170.

Section 170 specifically provides that if, upon an investigation,

it  appears to the officer  in charge of  the police station that

there is sufficient evidence or reasonable ground of suspicion

to justify the forwarding of the accused to a Magistrate, such

officer  shall  forward  the  accused  under  custody  to  a

Magistrate empowered to take cognizance of the offence upon

a  police  report  and  to  try  the  accused  or  commit  for  trial.

Further,  if  the investigating officer arrives at the conclusion

that  the  crime  was  not  committed  within  the  territorial

jurisdiction of the police station, then FIR can be forwarded to

the police station having jurisdiction over the area in which

the crime is committed. But this would not mean that in a

case which requires investigation, the police officer can refuse

to record the FIR and/or investigate it.   Chapter XIII  of  the

Code  provides  for  “jurisdiction  of  the  criminal  courts  in

inquiries  and trials”.  It  is  to  be stated that  under  the  said

Chapter there are various provisions which empower the court

for  inquiry  or  trial  of  a  criminal  case  and that  there  is  no

absolute  prohibition  that  the  offence  committed beyond the

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local territorial jurisdiction cannot be investigated, inquired or

tried. This would be clear by referring to Sections 177 to 188.

For our purpose, it would suffice to refer only to Sections 177

and 178 which are as under:

“177.  Ordinary place of enquiry and trial.—Every offence shall ordinarily be inquired into and tried by a Court within whose local jurisdiction it was committed.

178. Place of enquiry or trial.—(a) When it is uncertain in which of several local areas an offence was committed, or (b)  where an offence is committed partly in one local area and partly in another, or (c) where an offence is a continuing one, and continues to be committed in more local areas than one, or (d)  where it consists of several acts done in different local areas, it  may be enquired into or tried by a Court having jurisdiction over any of such local areas.”

A reading of the aforesaid sections would make it clear that

Section 177 provides for “ordinary” place of enquiry or trial.

Section 178,  inter alia,  provides for place of enquiry or trial

when it is uncertain in which of several local areas an offence

was committed or where the offence was committed partly in

one local area and partly in another and where it consisted of

several acts done in different local areas, it could be enquired

into or tried by a court having jurisdiction over any of such

local areas. Hence, at the stage of investigation, it cannot be

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held  that  the  SHO does  not  have  territorial  jurisdiction  to

investigate the crime.  But after the investigation is over, if the

officer arrives at the conclusion that the cause of action for

lodging  the  FIR  has  not  arisen  within  his  territorial

jurisdiction, then he will  forward the case to the Magistrate

concerned empowered to take cognizance of the offence.    

14) In the instant case, the question of territorial jurisdiction

was  just  one  of  the  grounds  for  quashing  the  proceedings

along with the other grounds and, therefore, the High Court

should have examined whether the case was fit to be quashed

on other grounds or not.  Nandini Sharma committed suicide

in her  matrimonial  home at  Ambala.   The information with

regard to the said incident was forwarded to the Police Station

Mulana, District Ambala.  On 22.09.1999, post mortem on the

body was conducted and the case was closed by submitting a

final report before the SDM stating that there was no sign of

foul play in the occurrence.  Since the appellant No. 1 was a

Flying Officer at the relevant time, a Court of Inquiry (CoI) was

also  convened  to  investigate  into  the  alleged  role  of  the

appellant No. 1 herein which was finally closed on 25.07.2000.

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None of the family members of the deceased raised any doubt

on the death of Nandini or named anyone in the appellant’s

family especially when the father, brother and other relatives

of  the  deceased  were  present  at  Ambala  during  the  period

when  the  investigation  was  carried  on.   On  a  correct

appreciation of record, we do not find even a whisper about

the cruelty meted out to her soon before her death.  In fact, it

is on record that the appellant No. 1 visited Durg several times

after the death of Nandini and stayed with in-laws.   

15) The  territorial  jurisdiction  of  a  court  with  regard  to  a

criminal offence would be decided on the basis of the place of

occurrence of the incident.  In the instant case, the suicide

was committed at Ambala.  The Ambala police closed the case

after  fulfilling  the  requirements  of  Section  174 of  the  Code

holding that there was no foul play in the incident and also

there was no requirement of lodging FIR under Section 154 as

none  of  the  family  members  of  the  deceased  raised  any

suspicion  over  the  death  even  though  the  death  was

committed within seven years of marriage.  Also, there is no

evidence of it being a continuing offence.  Hence, the offence

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alleged cannot be said to have been committed wholly or partly

within the local jurisdiction of the Magistrate’s Court at Durg.

Prima facie,  none of the ingredients constituting the offence

can be said to have occurred within the local jurisdiction of

that Court.  

16) In the case on hand, as per the materials on record, in

Crime No. 194 of 2005, charge sheet has been filed and the

Judicial Magistrate First Class, Durg has taken cognizance of

the proceedings.  In the present fact situation, we are of the

considered opinion that the Court at Durg has no territorial

jurisdiction to try the case and the proceedings are liable to be

quashed on the ground of lack of territorial jurisdiction since

the  entire  cause  of  action  for  the  alleged  offence  had

purportedly arisen in the city of Ambala.  

Delay in lodging of FIR

17) In the case on hand, after 5 (five) years of the closing of

the above case under Section 174 of  the Code,  a fresh FIR

being  No.  194  of  2005  was  registered  on  the  basis  of

anonymous  letters  received  by  Respondent  No.  2  herein  –

brother of the deceased at Durg under Sections 304B, 498A

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and Section 34 of the Code stating that the death of Nandini

Sharma was a pre-planned murder.  Even after the death of

Nandini, the relations between the appellant No. 1 herein and

his  in-laws  were  cordial  as  can  easily  be  seen  from  the

evidence on record.  Appellant No. 1 herein met his in-laws

several  times at  Durg.   Neither  at  the time of  the death of

Nandini  nor  before  receiving  of  anonymous  letters  by

Respondent No. 2 herein, was there any iota of doubt in the

minds of the respondents with regard to the appellants herein.

Even the father of the deceased never raised suspicion on the

conduct of his son-in-law and only after receiving of the above

said letters by Respondent No. 2, after a lapse of 5 (five) years,

he  gave  his  deposition  that  his  daughter  was  subjected  to

cruelty  for  the  demand  of  dowry  on  the  hands  of  the

appellants herein.

18) Delay in lodging the FIR often results in embellishment,

which is a creature of an afterthought.  On account of delay,

the FIR not only gets bereft of the advantage of spontaneity,

danger also creeps in of the introduction of a coloured version

or  exaggerated  story.    In  our  opinion,  such  extraordinary

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delay  in  lodging  the  FIR  raises  grave  doubt  about  the

truthfulness of allegations made by Respondent No. 2 herein

against  the  appellants,  which  are,  in  any  case,  general  in

nature. We have no doubt that by making such reckless and

vague allegations, Respondent No. 2 herein has tried to rope

the  appellants  in  criminal  proceedings.  We  are  of  the

confirmed  opinion  that  continuation  of  the  criminal

proceedings against the appellants pursuant to this FIR is an

abuse  of  the  process  of  law.  Therefore,  in  the  interest  of

justice, the FIR deserves to be quashed.  In this context, it is

apt  to  quote  the  following  decision  of  this  Court  in  Jai

Prakash Singh vs. State of Bihar & Anr. (2012) 4 SCC 379

wherein it was held as under:-

“12. The FIR in a criminal case is a vital and valuable piece of evidence though may not be substantive piece of evidence. The  object  of  insisting  upon  prompt  lodging  of  the  FIR  in respect  of  the  commission  of  an  offence  is  to  obtain  early information  regarding  the  circumstances  in  which  the  crime was committed, the names of the actual culprits and the part played  by  them  as  well  as  the  names  of  the  eye-witnesses present at the scene of occurrence. If there is a delay in lodging the FIR, it loses the advantage of spontaneity, danger creeps in of the introduction of coloured version, exaggerated account or concocted  story  as  a  result  of  large  number  of consultations/deliberations.  Undoubtedly,  the  promptness  in lodging  the  FIR  is  an  assurance  regarding  truth  of  the informant’s version. A promptly lodged FIR reflects the firsthand

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account  of  what  has  actually  happened,  and  who  was responsible for the offence in question.”

19) Whether  an  offence  has  been  disclosed  or  not,  must

necessarily depends on the facts and circumstances of each

case. If on consideration of the relevant materials, the Court is

satisfied  that  an  offence  is  disclosed,  it  will  normally  not

interfere  with  the  investigation  into  the  offence  and  will

generally  allow  the  investigation  into  the  offence  to  be

completed in order to collect materials for proving the offence.

20) In the above backdrop, it is also imperative to discuss the

scope of inherent power of the High Court under Section 482

of the Code.  The appellants before us filed a petition under

Section 482 of the Code for quashing of the FIR on the ground

that  the FIR was filed after  a delay of  5 (five)  years and is

barred by territorial jurisdiction.  The High Court, on the other

hand, after taking note of the fact that the investigation is in

the final stage in the matter and a charge sheet is ready to be

filed before the Judicial Magistrate First Class, ordered for its

continuance without taking into consideration that it is barred

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by law.  The court at Durg did not take notice of the fact that

there is a legal bar engrafted in the matter for its continuance

and the proceedings have been maliciously instituted after a

delay  of  five  years  with  an  ulterior  motive  for  wreaking

vengeance  on  the  appellants.   This  point  has  been  more

clarified in  State of Haryana and Others vs.  Bhajan Lal

and Others (1992) Supp (1) SCC 335, wherein this Court also

stated that  though it  may not  be possible  to  lay down any

precise, clearly defined, sufficiently channelised and inflexible

guidelines or  rigid formulae or  to give  an exhaustive  list  of

myriad kinds of cases wherein power under Section 482 of the

Code for quashing of the FIR should be exercised, there are

circumstances where the Court may be justified in exercising

such jurisdiction.  These are,  where the FIR does not  prima

facie constitute  any  offence,  does  not  disclose  a  cognizable

offence  justifying  investigation  by  the  police;  where  the

allegations are so absurd and inherently  improbable on the

basis  of  which  no  prudent  person  can  ever  reach  a  just

conclusion  that  there  is  sufficient  ground  for  proceeding

against  the  accused;  where  there  is  an expressed legal  bar

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engrafted in any of the provisions of the Code; and where a

criminal  proceeding  is  manifestly  attended  with  mala  fide

and/or where the proceeding is maliciously instituted with an

ulterior  motive  for  wreaking  vengeance on the  accused and

with a view to spite him due to private and personal grudge.

Despite  stating  these  grounds,  the  Court  unambiguously

uttered  a  note  of  caution  to  the  effect  that  the  power  of

quashing  a  criminal  proceeding  should  be  exercised  very

sparingly and with circumspection and that too, in the rarest

of rare cases; the Court also warned that the Court would not

be justified in embarking upon an enquiry as to the reliability

or genuineness or otherwise of the allegations made in the FIR

or  the  complaint  and  that  the  extraordinary  or  inherent

powers do not confer an arbitrary jurisdiction on the Court to

act  according  to  its  whims  or  caprice.  In  para  102  of  the

judgment, it was held as under:-

“102. In  the  backdrop  of  the  interpretation  of  the  various relevant provisions of the Code under Chapter XIV and of the principles  of  law  enunciated  by  this  Court  in  a  series  of decisions  relating  to  the  exercise  of  the  extraordinary  power under Article 226 or the inherent powers under Section 482 of the Code which we have extracted and reproduced above, we give  the  following  categories  of  cases  by  way  of  illustration

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wherein such power could be exercised either to prevent abuse of the process of any court or otherwise to secure the ends of justice, though it may not be possible to lay down any precise, clearly  defined  and  sufficiently  channelised  and  inflexible guidelines or  rigid formulae and to give an exhaustive  list  of myriad kinds of cases wherein such power should be exercised.

(1)  Where the allegations made in the first  information report or the complaint, even if  they are taken at their face  value  and accepted in their  entirety  do  not  prima facie constitute any offence or make out a case against the accused. (2)  Where the allegations in the first  information report and other materials, if any, accompanying the FIR do not disclose a cognizable offence,  justifying an investigation by police officers under Section 156(1) of the Code except under  an  order  of  a  Magistrate  within  the  purview  of Section 155(2) of the Code. (3) Where the uncontroverted allegations made in the FIR or complaint and the evidence collected in support of the same do not disclose the commission of any offence and make out a case against the accused. (4) Where, the allegations in the FIR do not constitute a cognizable  offence  but  constitute  only  a  non-cognizable offence,  no investigation is permitted by a police officer without an order of a Magistrate as contemplated under Section 155(2) of the Code.  (5) Where the allegations made in the FIR or complaint are so absurd and inherently improbable on the basis of which no prudent person can ever reach a just conclusion that there is sufficient ground for proceeding against the accused. (6) Where there is an express legal bar engrafted in any of the provisions of the Code or the concerned Act (under which  a  criminal  proceeding  is  instituted)  to  the institution  and  continuance  of  the  proceedings  and/or where  there  is  a  specific  provision  in  the  Code  or  the concerned  Act,  providing  efficacious  redress  for  the grievance of the aggrieved party. (7)  Where  a  criminal  proceeding  is  manifestly  attended with mala fide and/or where the proceeding is maliciously instituted with an ulterior motive for wreaking vengeance on  the  accused  and  with  a  view  to  spite  him  due  to private and personal grudge.”

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21) While discussing the scope and ambit of Section 482 of

the Code, a similar view has been taken by a Division Bench of

this  Court  in  Rajiv  Thapar  and  Others vs.  Madan  Lal

Kapoor (2013) 3 SCC 330 wherein it was held as under:-  

“29. The issue being examined in the instant case is the jurisdiction of  the  High Court  under  Section 482 CrPC,  if  it chooses to quash the initiation of the prosecution against an accused  at  the  stage  of  issuing  process,  or  at  the  stage  of committal, or even at the stage of framing of charges. These are all  stages  before  the  commencement  of  the  actual  trial.  The same parameters would naturally be available for later stages as well. The power vested in the High Court under Section 482 CrPC,  at  the  stages  referred  to  hereinabove,  would  have far-reaching  consequences  inasmuch  as  it  would  negate  the prosecution’s/complainant’s  case  without  allowing  the prosecution/complainant  to  lead  evidence.  Such  a determination must always be rendered with caution, care and circumspection.  To  invoke  its  inherent  jurisdiction  under Section 482 CrPC the High Court has to be fully satisfied that the material produced by the accused is such that would lead to the  conclusion  that  his/their  defence  is  based  on  sound, reasonable,  and  indubitable  facts;  the  material  produced  is such as would rule out and displace the assertions contained in the  charges  levelled  against  the  accused;  and  the  material produced  is  such  as  would  clearly  reject  and  overrule  the veracity of the allegations contained in the accusations levelled by the prosecution/complainant. It should be sufficient to rule out,  reject  and  discard  the  accusations  levelled  by  the prosecution/complainant,  without  the  necessity  of  recording any evidence. For this the material relied upon by the defence should  not  have  been  refuted,  or  alternatively,  cannot  be justifiably  refuted,  being  material  of  sterling  and  impeccable quality. The material relied upon by the accused should be such as  would  persuade  a  reasonable  person  to  dismiss  and condemn the actual basis of the accusations as false. In such a

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situation,  the  judicial  conscience  of  the  High  Court  would persuade it  to exercise its power under Section 482 CrPC to quash such criminal proceedings, for that would prevent abuse of process of the court, and secure the ends of justice.

30. Based  on  the  factors  canvassed  in  the  foregoing paragraphs, we would delineate the following steps to determine the veracity of a prayer for quashment raised by an accused by invoking the power vested in the High Court under Section 482 CrPC:

30.1. Step  one:  whether  the  material  relied  upon  by  the accused is sound, reasonable, and indubitable i.e. the material is of sterling and impeccable quality?

30.2. Step  two:  whether  the  material  relied  upon  by  the accused would rule out the assertions contained in the charges levelled  against  the  accused  i.e.  the  material  is  sufficient  to reject  and  overrule  the  factual  assertions  contained  in  the complaint  i.e.  the  material  is  such  as  would  persuade  a reasonable person to dismiss and condemn the factual basis of the accusations as false?

30.3. Step three:  whether the material  relied upon by the accused has not been refuted by the prosecution/complainant; and/or the material is such that it cannot be justifiably refuted by the prosecution/complainant?

30.4. Step  four:  whether  proceeding  with  the  trial  would result in an abuse of process of the court, and would not serve the ends of justice?

30.5. If the answer to all the steps is in the affirmative, the judicial  conscience  of  the  High  Court  should  persuade  it  to quash such criminal proceedings in exercise of power vested in it  under  Section  482  CrPC.  Such exercise  of  power,  besides doing justice to the accused, would save precious court time, which would otherwise be wasted in holding such a trial (as well as proceedings arising therefrom) specially when it is clear that the same would not conclude in the conviction of the accused.”

Conclusion:

22) In view of the above discussion, we are of the considered

opinion that  the allegations made in the FIR are inherently

improbable and the evidence collected in support of the same

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do not disclose the commission of any offence and make out a

case  against  the  appellants  herein.   Further,  to  invoke

inherent jurisdiction under Section 482 of the Code, the High

Court must be fully satisfied that the material  produced on

record is based on sound, justifiable and reasonable facts.  In

the case on hand, malicious prosecution was instituted by the

brother of the deceased after a period of five years that too on

the  basis  of  anonymous  letters.   There  was  no  accusation

against the appellants before filing of the FIR.  The allegations

are  vague  and  do  not  warrant  continuation  of  criminal

proceedings against the appellants.  Also, the court at Durg

has no territorial jurisdiction because cause of action, if any,

has  arisen  in  Ambala.   The  criminal  proceeding  is  grossly

delayed and a result of belated afterthought.  The High Court

failed to apply the test whether the uncontroverted allegations

as made  prima facie, establish the offence.  It is also for the

court  to  take  into  consideration  any  special  features  which

appear in a particular case to consider whether it is expedient

and  in  the  interest  of  justice  to  permit  the  prosecution  to

continue.  The High Court did not apply its mind judiciously

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and  on  an  incorrect  appreciation  of  record,  ordered  for

continuance of the investigation on a petition under Section

482 of the Code.  This power must be exercised judiciously

and  not  capriciously  or  arbitrarily,  as  any  improper  or

capricious  exercise  of  such  power  may  lead  to  undesirable

results.     

23) In view of the foregoing discussion,  FIR No. 194 dated

29.05.2005  is  hereby  quashed  and  the  criminal  proceeding

against  the  appellants  is  dropped  for  want  of  prosecution.

Consequently, the appeal is allowed.

...…………….………………………J.                (MADAN B. LOKUR)                                  

.…....…………………………………J.         (R.K. AGRAWAL)                         

NEW DELHI; AUGUST 23, 2016.  

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