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       REPORTABLE

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION

CIVIL APPEAL NO.  4294   OF 2014 (Arising out of SLP (C) No.27829 of 2012)

Manmohan Sharma       …Appellant

Versus

State of Rajasthan & Ors. …Respondents

With  

CIVIL APPEAL NO. 4295    OF 2014 (Arising out of SLP (C) No.28259 of 2012)

CIVIL APPEAL NO. 4296  OF 2014 (Arising out of SLP (C) No.28410 of 2012)

CIVIL APPEAL NO. 4297   OF 2014 (Arising out of SLP (C) No.28542 of 2012)

CIVIL APPEAL NO. 4298   OF 2014 (Arising out of SLP (C) No.28633 of 2012)

CIVIL APPEAL NO.  4299    OF 2014 (Arising out of SLP (C) No.28793 of 2012)

CIVIL APPEAL NO.  4300  OF 2014 (Arising out of SLP (C) No.31756 of 2012)

CIVIL APPEAL NO.  4301  OF 2014 (Arising out of SLP (C) No.31793 of 2012)

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CIVIL APPEAL NO. 4302   OF 2014 (Arising out of SLP (C) No.31818 of 2012)

CIVIL APPEAL NO.  4303   OF 2014 (Arising out of SLP (C) No.31819 of 2012)

CIVIL APPEAL NO. 4304   OF 2014 (Arising out of SLP (C) No.31820 of 2012)

CIVIL APPEAL NO. 4305   OF 2014 (Arising out of SLP (C) No.31821 of 2012)

CIVIL APPEAL NO.  4306   OF 2014 (Arising out of SLP (C) No.33511 of 2012)

CIVIL APPEAL NO. 4307   OF 2014 (Arising out of SLP (C) No.33830 of 2012)

CIVIL APPEAL NO. 4309  OF 2014 (Arising out of SLP (C) No.33969 of 2012)

CIVIL APPEAL NO. 4310  OF 2014 (Arising out of SLP (C) No.34934 of 2012)

CIVIL APPEAL NOs. 4311-4312  OF 2014 (Arising out of SLP (C) Nos.38305-38306 of 2012)

CIVIL APPEAL NO. 4313    OF 2014 (Arising out of SLP (C) 9159/2014 [@ CC No.21960/2012])

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CIVIL APPEAL NO. 4314    OF 2014 (Arising out of SLP (C) No.35 of 2013)

CIVIL APPEAL NO. 4315   OF 2014 (Arising out of SLP (C) No.40008 of 2012)

CIVIL APPEAL NO. 4316   OF 2014 (Arising out of SLP (C) No.9154 of 2013)

CIVIL APPEAL NO. 4317  OF 2014 (Arising out of SLP (C) No.4600 of 2013)

CIVIL APPEAL NO. 4318   OF 2014 (Arising out of SLP (C) No.9153 of 2013)

CIVIL APPEAL NO. 4319-4320  OF 2014 (Arising out of SLP (C) Nos.1478-1479 of 2013)

CIVIL APPEAL NO. 4321  OF 2014 (Arising out of SLP (C) No.4472 of 2013)

CIVIL APPEAL NO. 4322   OF 2014 (Arising out of SLP (C) No.8279 of 2013)

CIVIL APPEAL NO. 4323  OF 2014 (Arising out of SLP (C) No.9463 of 2013)

CIVIL APPEAL NO.  4324  OF 2014 (Arising out of SLP (C) No.9754 of 2013)

CIVIL APPEAL NO.  4325   OF 2014

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(Arising out of SLP (C) No.5320 of 2013)

CIVIL APPEAL NO. 4326   OF 2014 (Arising out of SLP (C) No.11173 of 2013)

CIVIL APPEAL NO. 4327  OF 2014 (Arising out of SLP (C) No.1272 of 2013)

CIVIL APPEAL NO. 4328-4329  OF 2014 (Arising out of SLP (C) Nos.8328-8329 of 2013)

CIVIL APPEAL NO. 4330  OF 2014 (Arising out of SLP (C) No.15454 of 2013)

CIVIL APPEAL NO. 4331  OF 2014 (Arising out of SLP (C)9161/2014 [@CC No.7758/2013])

 CIVIL APPEAL NO. 4332  OF 2014

(Arising out of SLP (C) No.28106 of 2012)

CIVIL APPEAL NO. 4333   OF 2014 (Arising out of SLP (C) No.3962 of 2014)

CIVIL APPEAL NO. 4334-4337  OF 2014 (Arising out of SLP (C) Nos.35440-35443 of 2012)

AND

CIVIL APPEAL NO. 4338  OF 2014 (Arising out of SLP (C) No.35449 of 2012)

J U D G M E N T

T.S. THAKUR, J.

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1. Delay condoned.

2. Leave granted.  

3. The fate of these appeals by special leave, turn on a  

true and correct understanding of an order passed by this  

Court in  Kailash Chand Sharma v. State of Rajasthan  

and Ors. (2002) 6 SCC 562. This Court was, in that case  

examining  whether  award  of  bonus  marks  to  candidates  

seeking appointment as primary school teachers under Zila  

Parishads in the State of Rajasthan based on the domicile of  

the candidates  was legally  permissible.  A similar  question  

was earlier examined and answered in the negative by a Full  

Bench of the High Court of  Rajasthan in  Deepak Kumar  

Suthar  v.  State  of  Rajasthan  (1999)  2  Raj  LR  692  

[W.P. (C) No.1917 of 1995], which arose out of selection  

of Grade II and III teachers borne in the State cadre under  

the  administrative  control  of  the  State  Government.  The  

High Court had in Deepak Kumar’s case (supra) held that  

although  award  of  bonus  marks  was  not  constitutionally  

valid, no relief could be given to the writ-petitioners in that  

case as they did not stand a chance even if award of bonus  

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marks to the successful candidate was disregarded and inter  

se merit of the candidates determined without taking such  

marks into consideration. The operative portion of the order  

passed in Deepak Kumar’s case (supra) is as under:

“Instead  of  sending  the  matter  to  the  appropriate Bench, we think it proper to dispose of   this  petition with a  direction that no relief  can be   granted to the petitioners as they could not succeed  to get the place in the merit list even by getting 10   bonus  marks  being  residents  of  urban  area,  for   which they are not certainly entitled.  More so, the   petitioners have not impleaded any person from the   select  list,  not  even  the  last  selected  candidate.   Thus, no relief can be granted to them in spite of the   fact that the appointments made in conformity with   the impugned circular have not been in consonance   with law.  However, we clarify that any appointment   made earlier shall not be affected by this judgment   and it would have prospective application.”

4. When selection process for filling up posts of primary  

school  teachers  in  six  different  districts  in  the  State  of  

Rajasthan commenced in the year 1998-99, award of bonus  

marks based on the domicile of the candidates once again  

came under challenge before the High Court. The immediate  

provocation  for  the  challenge  was  provided  by  a  Circular  

dated 10th June, 1998 issued by the Department of  Rural  

Development  and  Panchayati  Raj  which  prescribed  the  

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procedure  to  be  followed  for  making  selections  and  

appointments against the available vacancies including the  

method  for  determination  of  merit  based  on  educational  

qualifications of the candidates and award of bonus marks  

depending upon whether the candidates were domiciled in  

Rajasthan and residents  of  an urban or  rural  area of  the  

State.  The circular said:

“This  year,  determination  of  merit  has  been   amended and determination of merit will be done as   follows:

I. Marks for educational qualification

Sl. No. Qualification Weightage

1. Secondary  Examination

50%

2. Senior  Secondary  Examination

20%

3. STC/Bed 30%

II. Fixation of bonus marks for domiciles

Sl. No. Qualification

Domiciles  of  Rajasthan

10 marks

Resident of district 10 marks

Resident  of  rural   area of district

5 marks

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5. Some of the candidates  who hailed from outside the  

districts  hence not  eligible  for  the award of  bonus marks  

filed  writ  petitions  before  the  High  Court  of  Rajasthan  

challenging the circular in so far as the same provided for  

the award of bonus marks. Those petitions when referred to  

a Full Bench for an authoritative pronouncement, culminated  

in  the  decision  of  the  High  Court  in  Kailash  Chand  

Sharma’s  case (supra) in which the High Court held that  

the question  of  constitutional  validity  of  the bonus marks  

was no longer res integra in view of the judgment of the first  

Full  Bench in  Deepak Kumar’s  case (supra). The second  

Full  Bench  in  Kailash  Chand  Sharma’s  case  (supra)  

accordingly  disposed  of  the  writ  petitions  challenging  the  

circular and the award of bonus marks on the same terms as  

were stated in the order passed by the first Full Bench in  

Deepak Kumar’s case (supra). The Court said:

“The Full Bench of this court in Full Bench reference   in  Writ  Petition  No.1917/95  has  already  answered   the question that  arises for  consideration in  these  matters also.  These cases are to be disposed of for   the very reasons stated in the Full Bench judgment   aforementioned  and  in  the  same terms  making  it   clear  that  the  employment  in  the  case  on  hand   relates  to  Panchayat  as  well  as  Education. Merely  

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because the employment relates to Panchayat, that  does not make any difference in the light of the law   laid  down  in  the  full  bench  judgment   aforementioned.  Ordered accordingly.”  

   (emphasis supplied)

6. It is evident that even when the Full Bench held the  

award  of  bonus  marks  to  be  unconstitutional  the  writ-

petitioners in reality got no relief from the Court. The matter  

did not rest there, for after the Full Bench judgment, one  

more batch of writ petitions came to be disposed of by a  

learned Single Judge of the High Court by his order dated  

26th February, 2001 directing preparation of a fresh merit list  

of  candidates  appointed  on  or  before  21st October,  1999  

without regard to bonus marks. An appeal filed by the State  

Government against that direction failed and was dismissed  

by a Division Bench of the High Court by its order dated 13th  

April, 2001.  

7. Aggrieved by the order passed by the Full Bench of the  

High Court in  Kailash Chand Sharma’s  case (supra) the  

writ-petitioners appealed to this Court. The State also filed  

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an appeal against the judgment of the High Court directing  

preparation of a fresh merit list. The civil  appeals filed by  

Kailash Chand Sharma and others and that filed by the State  

of  Rajasthan  in  Naval  Kishore’s  case  were  heard  and  

disposed of by this Court by an order dated 30th July, 2002  

whereby  this  Court  affirmed  the  view  taken  by  the  High  

Court holding in no uncertain terms that the award of bonus  

marks or weightage based on the place of residence or birth  

was not legally permissible in the absence of any scientific  

study  and  considerations  germane  to  the  constitutional  

guarantee of equality. Having said that, this Court examined  

whether  the  judgment  holding  that  the  weightage/bonus  

marks  is  constitutionally  impermissible  ought  to  be  given  

prospective effect so that appointments made prior to the  

second Full Bench judgment in  Kailash Chand Sharma’s  

case (supra) i.e. 18th November, 1999 are left unaffected.  

This Court noted that there were several  instances where  

the  past  actions  and  transactions  including  appointments  

and  promotions  though  made  contrary  to  the  law  

authoritatively  declared by this  Court were left  untouched  

either  on  the  principle  of  prospective  overruling  or  by  

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invoking the powers of the Court under Article 142 of the  

Constitution. Invoking the doctrine of prospective overruling  

this Court observed that selections and promotions had in  

the  past  been  made  by  awarding  bonus  marks  to  the  

residents of the districts concerned and that award of such  

weightage was upheld even by the High Court of Rajasthan.  

This Court also noted that the law on the subject was during  

the relevant period in a state of flux as was evident from a  

review  of  the  decisions  rendered  by  the  Rajasthan  High  

Court from time to time. Taking note of these aspects this  

Court recognised the need to balance competing claims by  

invoking the doctrine of prospective overruling and confining  

the relief to only the writ-petitioners who had moved to the  

High Court. Appointments made on or after 18th November,  

1999 i.e. the date on which Kailash Chand Sharma’s case  

(supra) was decided by the High Court, alone were made  

subject to the claims of the appellants. We shall presently  

refer to the operative portion of the order passed by this  

Court  in  Kailash  Chand Sharma’s case  (supra)  for  as  

observed earlier, the controversy in this case rests entirely  

on a true and correct interpretation of the said order. But  

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before we do so, we consider it necessary to complete the  

factual narrative to place the controversy before us in proper  

perspective.   

8. In compliance with the directions issued by this Court  

in  Kailash  Chand  Sharma’s  case  (supra),  the  State  

Government  issued  an  order  dated  10th October,  2002  

whereby it identified cases in which the writ-petitioners had  

to  be  considered  for  appointment  as  teachers  vis-à-vis  

candidates appointed or enlisted for appointment on or after  

18th November, 1999. The State Government identified 23  

different cases in which candidates were found eligible for  

such  consideration.  In  the  meantime,  some  of  the  

candidates  who  considered  themselves  eligible  for  

consideration in terms of the directions issued by this Court  

in Kailash Chand Sharma’s case (supra) issued notices to  

the State Government threatening the latter with contempt  

proceedings  for  their  failure  to  implement  the  directions  

issued  by  this  Court.  The  result  was  that  several  

appointment  orders  came  to  be  issued  in  purported  

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obedience of the directions issued by this Court in Kailash  

Chand Sharma’s case (supra).  

9. The  State  Government  during  the  period  started  

receiving complaints  inter alia alleging that fraudulent and  

irregular appointments in several districts of the State had  

been made in breach of the spirit underlying the directions  

issued  by  this  Court  in  Kailash  Chand  Sharma’s  case  

(supra).  Taking  note  of  these  complaints,  the  State  

Government issued a general order dated 23rd April,  2005  

asking the Chief Executive Officers of the District Councils  

concerned to issue show-cause notices to such fraudulently  

and irregularly appointed candidates and to take action for  

termination  of  their  services  after  affording  them  an  

opportunity  of  being  heard  in  the  matter.  Show-cause  

notices  were  accordingly  issued  to  the  candidates  who,  

according  to  the  authorities  concerned,  had  been  

fraudulently appointed. Personal hearing was also afforded  

to  such  affected  candidates.  Secretary  to  Government,  

Department of Education, submitted a report dated 4th April,  

2011  stating  that  the  directions  issued  by  this  Court  in  

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Kailash Chand Sharma’s case (supra) were limited to only  

such  candidates  as  were  parties  before  this  Court.  The  

appointing officers were accordingly directed to take action  

and terminate the services of candidates who did not satisfy  

that  condition.  Services  of  several  such  persons  were  

accordingly  terminated,  aggrieved  whereof  the  affected  

candidates  approached  the  High  Court  by  way  of  writ  

petitions in which certain interim orders were also passed  

protecting such appointees from ouster.  

10. In  Suresh  Chandra  Sharma  &  Ors.  v.  State  of   

Rajasthan SLP No.21377 of 2009 arising out of a judgment  

and order dated 25th March, 2009 passed by the High Court  

of  Rajasthan  at  Jaipur,  the  appellants  had  unsuccessfully  

claimed  a  mandamus from the  High  Court  directing  their  

appointment. The appellants’ case in that petition was that  

although the relief granted by this Court in Kailash Chand  

Sharma’s case (supra) was limited to the writ-petitioners, a  

large number of persons who were not covered by the order  

passed  in  that  case  were  appointed  as  Assistant  Teacher  

Grade II in the Zila Parishad schools of different districts. On  

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behalf of the State it was submitted that while some persons  

including those mentioned by the appellants were appointed  

by  the  respondents,  but  such  illegally  appointed  persons  

were sought to be removed by the State against which the  

aggrieved persons had moved the High Court and secured  

interim orders in their  favour. Since the picture as to the  

total number of persons appointed contrary to the directions  

issued by this Court and the steps taken by the Government  

for  removal  of  those  responsible  for  making  such  

appointments  was  not  clear,  this  Court  directed  the  

Secretary  to  the  Government  of  Rajasthan,  In  charge,  

Department of Education, to hold an inquiry and submit a  

report as to the number of appointments made contrary to  

the order of this Court in  Kailash Chand Sharma’s  case  

(supra) and to furnish particulars  of  such persons as had  

been  appointed,  the  steps  taken  by  the  Government  of  

Rajasthan  for  their  removal  and  action,  if  any,  initiated  

against those responsible for making such appointments.  

11. When the matter came up again on 30th August, 2012,  

the report of the Secretary to Government was filed and it  

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was submitted on behalf of the State Government that the  

State  Government  had  terminated  the  services  of  50  

persons  who  were  according  to  it  illegally  appointed  as  

teachers.  It  was also submitted that  such employees had  

questioned the order of termination before the High Court of  

Rajasthan at Jodhpur in writ petitions which are pending and  

in which the High Court had passed various orders staying  

the operation of their termination.  

12. It was in the above backdrop that this Court requested  

the High Court of Rajasthan to club the pending matters and  

hear them on an early date. The High Court has accordingly  

heard the matters and passed the orders impugned in these  

appeals which are separate but similar in content.  The High  

Court has dismissed the writ petitions filed by the candidates  

who  are  said  to  have  obtained  fraudulent  appointment  

orders in their favour. The High Court has recorded a finding  

that those appointed and removed in terms of the directions  

issued  by  the  State  Government  did  not  qualify  for  such  

appointment on a true and proper interpretation of the order  

passed  by  this  Court  in  Kailash  Chand  Sharma’s  case  

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(supra). The High Court has drawn support from the decision  

of  this  Court  in  Girdhar  Kumar  Dadhich  and  Anr.  v.   

State of Rajasthan (2009) 2 SCC 706, and found that the  

candidates  concerned  had  either  suppressed  or  

misrepresented  material  facts  only  to  secure  fraudulent  

appointments  in  their  favour.  Such  candidates  were  not,  

therefore,  entitled  to  continue  in  service  nor  were  they  

entitled to any relief  from the Court. The present appeals  

assail the correctness of the said judgments and orders of  

the High Court as already noticed above.  

13. We  have  heard  learned  counsel  for  the  parties  at  

considerable length who were at pains to take us through  

the judgment  of  this  Court  in  Kailash Chand Sharma’s  

case (supra) over and over again. That was so because the  

entitlement  of  the  appellants  to  any  relief  in  these  

proceedings  depends  entirely  upon  whether  the  same  is  

permissible in terms of the directions issued by this Court in  

Kailash Chand Sharma’s  case (supra). As noticed earlier  

in  Kailash  Chand  Sharma’s  case  (supra)  this  Court  

invoked the doctrine of prospective overruling primarily for  

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two reasons. Firstly, this Court observed that for nearly one  

decade selections had been made by awarding bonus marks  

to residents of the districts concerned and the rural areas  

falling therein which method was upheld by the High Court  

in several decisions. Till the time the selection process in the  

present  case  was  initiated  and completed  these  decisions  

were holding the field.  The correctness of  those decisions  

was, however, doubted when writ petitions filed by Kailash  

Chand  Sharma and  others  came up  for  hearing  before  a  

learned Single Judge with the result that the matters were  

referred  to  a  larger  Bench.  By  the  time  the judgment  in  

those writ petitions came to be delivered, the selection list of  

candidates  had been published in  many districts.  The law  

was thus in a state of flux which justified invocation of the  

doctrine of prospective overruling. This Court said:

“In  the  present  case,  the  legality  of  the  selection process with the addition of bonus marks   could not have been seriously doubted either by the  appointing authorities or by the candidates in view of   the judicial precedents. A cloud was cast on the said   decisions  only  after  the  selection  process  was  completed and the results were declared or about to   be declared. It is, therefore, a fit case to apply the   judgment of the Full Bench rendered subsequent to   the selection prospectively.”

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14. The second reason which this Court gave for invoking  

the  doctrine  of  prospective  overruling  was  that  all  those  

selected and appointed and selected for appointment on the  

basis  of  the  impugned  selection  process  had  not  been  

impleaded as parties  to the writ  proceedings.   This Court  

observed:

“One more aspect  which is  to  be taken  into   account is  that in almost all  the writ  petitions the   candidates appointed, not to speak of the candidates   selected,  were  not  made  parties  before  the  High   Court. Maybe, the laborious and long-drawn exercise   of serving notices on each and every party likely to   be affected need not have been gone through.  At   least,  a  general  notice  by  newspaper  publication   could have been sought for or in the alternative, at   least a few of the last candidates selected/appointed   could have been put on notice; but,  that was not   done  in  almost  all  the  cases.  That  is  the  added   reason  why  the  judgment  treading  a  new  path  should not as far as possible result in detriment to   the  candidates  already  appointed.  We  are  not  so   much on the question whether the writ  petitioners   were  legally  bound  to  implead  all  the  candidates   selected/appointed  during  the  pendency  of  the   petitions having regard to the fact that they were  challenging the notification or the policy decision of   general application; but, we are taking this fact into   consideration to lean towards the view of the High   Court  that  its  judgment  ought  to  be  applied   prospectively, even if the non-impleadment is not a   fatal flaw.”

15. This Court next examined the extent  of  prospectivity  

that could be given to the declaration of law vis-à-vis the  

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selection and appointment process under challenge. A three-

fold  argument  was  noticed  by  this  Court  in  that  regard.  

Firstly, the Court noted the contention that those selected  

and/or  appointed  should  remain  unaffected  of  the  law  

declared in  Kailash Chand Sharma’s  case (supra)  for  it  

would be more rational and logical to apply the judgment to  

future selections. The fortuitous circumstance of not being in  

a position to securing appointment orders for a variety of  

administrative  reasons  could  not  stand  in  the  way  of  

candidates already appointed or to be appointed after the  

date of the judgment. The rival contention urged on behalf  

of  the  respondents  that  there  was  no  legal  or  moral  

justification  for  making  further  appointments  after  18th  

November,  1999  when  Kailash  Chand  Sharma’s  case  

(supra)  was  decided  was  also  noticed  by  this  Court.  

Reference was also made to the decision of  this  Court in  

Madan Lal and Ors. v. State of J & K and Ors. (1995) 3   

SCC  486 and  other  cases   relied  upon  by  the  selected  

candidates in support of the contention that writ-petitioners  

having  taken  a  chance  and  participated  in  the  selection  

process could not turn around and question the said process  

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upon their failure to secure an appointment. It was in the  

backdrop of all  these submissions that this Court moulded  

the  relief  suitably  and  issued  directions.  This  Court,  it  is  

evident, considered it just and proper to confine the relief  

only  to  such  of  the  candidates  as  were  writ-petitioners  

before  the High Court  with  a  direction  that  appointments  

made on or after 18th November, 1999 in any of the districts  

shall remain subject to the claims of such appellants. Para  

46  of  the  judgment  of  this  Court  in  Kailash  Chand  

Sharma’s  case  (supra)  which  holds  the  key  to  several  

questions raised before us may, at this stage, be extracted:

“46.   Having due regard to the rival  contentions   adverted to above and keeping in view the factual   scenario  and  the  need  to  balance  the  competing   claims  in  the  light  of  acceptance  of  prospective   overruling in principle, we consider it just and proper   to  confine  the  relief  only  to  the  petitioners  who  moved the High Court  and to  make appointments   made on or after 18-11-1999 in any of the districts   subject to the claims of the petitioners. Accordingly,   we direct:

1. The  claims  of  the  writ  petitioners  should  be   considered afresh in the light of this judgment vis-à- vis the candidates appointed on or after 18-11-1999  or  those  in  the  select  list  who  are  yet  to  be   appointed.  On  such  consideration,  if  those  writ   petitioners are found to have superior merit in case   the bonus marks of 10% and/or 5% are excluded,   they should be offered appointments, if necessary,   by displacing the candidates appointed on or after   18-11-1999.

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2. The  appointments  made  up  to  17-11-1999   need not be reopened and reconsidered in the light   of the law laid down in this judgment.

3. Writ Petition No.542 of 2000 filed in this Court   under Article 32 is hereby dismissed as it was filed   nearly one year after the judgment of the High Court   and  no  explanation  has  been  tendered  for  not   approaching the High Court under Article 226 at an   earlier point of time.”

16. A careful  reading of  the above leaves  no manner  of  

doubt that (a) this Court invoked the doctrine of prospective  

overruling which implies that the law declared by this Court  

would apply only to future selections and appointments, (b)  

that although prospective overruling left  the appointments  

made  before  18th November,  1999  untouched,  the  writ-

petitioners  who  had  moved  the  High  Court  had  to  be  

considered afresh vis-à-vis candidates appointed on or after  

18th November,  1999  or  those  in  the  select  list  without  

giving to such appointed/selected candidates the benefit of  

bonus  marks  under  the  circular,  and  (c)  that  upon  such  

consideration of the writ-petitioners if they are found to be  

superior in merit than those appointed after 18th November,  

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1999 they shall  be offered appointments, if  necessary, by  

removing the latter.   

17. It  was strenuously  contended by learned counsel  for  

the  appellants  that  the  expression  “the  appellants  who  

moved the High Court” appearing in para 46 (supra) was  

wide enough and actually covered not only such of the writ-

petitioners  as  had approached  the  High  Court  in  the  two  

batch  of  cases  decided  by  this  Court  in  Kailash  Chand  

Sharma’s case (supra) but also all such candidates as may  

have filed writ petitions at any time after  18th November,  

1999 including those who filed such petition after 30th July,  

2002  when  this  Court  decided  the  appeals  in  Kailash  

Chand Sharma’s case (supra) and connected matters.

18. We find it difficult to accept that contention. There is  

nothing in  the judgment  of  this  Court  in  Kailash Chand  

Sharma’s case (supra) or the directions that were issued in  

para  46  thereof  to  suggest  that  this  Court  was  either  

conscious of  or informed of pendency of any writ  petition  

filed before the High Court after 18th November, 1999. There  

is  also  nothing  to  suggest  that  this  Court  intended  the  

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benefit granted in terms of direction (1) under para 46 to  

extend not only to the writ-petitioners who had moved the  

High Court in Kailash Chand Sharma’s case (supra) and in  

the writ petition filed by Naval Kishore and others but the  

same has intended to benefit all those who had or may have  

moved the High Court at any point of time. On the contrary  

there is positive indication of the fact that the Court did not  

intend  to  extend  the  benefit  to  any  appellant  who  had  

challenged  the  award  of  bonus  marks  and  the  selection  

process  on  the  basis  thereof  at  any  stage  after  18th  

November,  1999.  This  is  evident  from the  fact  that  Writ  

Petition No.542 of 2000 filed in this Court under Article 32 of  

the  Constitution  of  India  was  dismissed  by  this  Court  in  

terms of direction (3) under para 46 on the ground that the  

same had been filed nearly one year after the judgment of  

the High  Court. The expression “as it has been filed after  

the judgment of the High Court” appearing in direction (3)  

under Para 46 clearly suggest that for the grant of relief this  

Court  had  only  petitions  filed  before  the  judgment  in  

Kailash Chand Sharma’s  case  (supra)  in  mind  and  not  

those  filed  after  18th November,  1999  when  the  said  

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judgment  was  pronounced.  The  observation  of  this  Court  

that the writ-petitioners had offered no explanation for not  

approaching  the  High  Court  under  Article  226  of  the  

Constitution at an earlier point of time too has two distinct  

facets, namely, (1) that the writ-petitioners in Writ Petition  

No.542 of 2000 should have ordinarily approached the High  

Court and (2) They should have done so at an earlier point  

of time. The latter of these reasons again emphasized the  

importance this Court attached to the delay in the filing of  

the petitions in the matter of grant of relief for those who  

did not challenge the selection process in good time were  

not granted any relief.

19. Judged in the above backdrop the present appeals can  

be  classified  into  two  categories,  namely,  Category  I  

comprising  writ  petitions  that  were  filed  after  18th  

November,  1999  and  before  30th July,  2002  as  was  the  

position in Writ Petition No.542 of 2000 filed under Article 32  

and dismissed by this Court and Category II comprising writ  

petitions that were filed after 30th July, 2002.  While there is  

nothing that could be logically argued in regard to Category  

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II  cases  for  extending  the  benefit  of  the  judgment  in  

Kailash  Chand  Sharma’s  case  (supra)  to  those  cases,  

even  in  regard  to  Category  I  cases  the judgment  of  this  

Court  holds  no  hope  for  the  appellants.  All  that  was  

contended by learned counsel for the appellants in Category  

I  cases  was  that  writ  petition  in  Naval  Kishore  Sharma’s  

batch was filed after the pronouncement of the Full Bench  

judgment of the High Court in  Kailash Chand Sharma’s  

case (supra). Grant of benefit to appellants in Naval Kishore  

Sharma’s  batch  of  writ  petitions  and  refusal  of  a  similar  

treatment to the writ-petitioners who had similarly filed their  

petitions no matter later in point of time would be unfair and  

inequitable.  They  contended  that  the  relief  given  by  this  

Court to Naval Kishore Sharma and others (supra) ought  

to  be  extended  even  to  other  similarly  situated  writ-

petitioners  by  construing  the  directions  of  this  Court  in  

Kailash Chand Sharma’s case (supra) liberally.   

20. There is,  in  our  opinion,  no merit  in  that  contention  

either.  In Category I cases none of the writ petitions were  

filed earlier than the date on which writ petition in  Naval  

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Kishore Sharma’s case (supra) was filed. At any rate, the  

argument that some writ petitions had been filed around the  

same time  when  Naval  Kishore  Sharma’s case  (supra)  

was decided may be no reason for us to enlarge the scope of  

the  direction  issued  in  Kailash  Chand  Sharma’s  case  

(supra) which is on true and proper construction limited to  

the writ-petitioners who had moved the High Court in those  

cases. We need to remind ourselves that we are not hearing  

a review petition in Kailash Chand Sharma’s case (supra)  

nor can we modify  the order  passed in that  case.   What  

cannot be done directly by us, cannot also be done indirectly  

by placing what is described as a liberal  interpretation by  

learned counsel for the appellants.       

21. Mr.  Bali,  learned  counsel  appearing  for  some  of  the  

appellants in Category II strenuously argued that although  

the appellants  in  those cases were not  writ-petitioners  at  

any point of time before the pronouncement of the judgment  

of  this  Court  in  Kailash  Chand  Sharma’s  case  (supra)  

some of the appellants could and were indeed appointed as  

teachers upon consideration of their  inter se merit vis-à-vis  

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candidates  who had been  appointed  after  18th November,  

1999.  It was submitted that the right of such candidates to  

make a grievance against appointment of persons lower in  

merit with bonus marks awarded to them was not and could  

not be taken away by the judgment of this Court in Kailash  

Chand Sharma’s case (supra). This would imply that even  

independent of the said judgment if the writ-petitioners were  

higher in merit than those appointed at any time after 18th  

November, 1999, the appellants could make a grievance and  

seek  redress  from  the  Government.   Inasmuch  as  such  

appointments have been made in a few cases falling under  

Category II, the same could not be faulted only because the  

writ petitions were filed after the judgment in the  Kailash  

Chand Sharma’s case (supra) was pronounced.  

22. On behalf of the respondents Mr. Shiv Mangal Sharma,  

Additional  Advocate  General  for  the  State  of  Rajasthan  

submitted that the appointment of  Category II  cases was  

clearly illegal and impermissible in the light of the judgment  

of  this  Court  in  Kailash  Chand  Sharma’s  case  (supra).  

The contention that some of the appellants in Category II  

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were better in merit even without deletion of bonus marks  

was wholly unsustainable and without any basis whatsoever.  

No such case has been made out by the appellants in their  

respective writ petitions.  An affidavit filed by the State has,  

in that regard, clarified the position that candidates falling in  

Category II not yet appointed are lower in merit with bonus  

marks  loaded  to  their  merit  than  the  last  candidate  

appointed  under  the  open  general  category  to  which  the  

appellants also belonged.

23. There is considerable merit in the contention urged by  

Mr. Sharma. The case sought to be argued at the Bar was  

never  set  up  in  the  writ  petitions  filed  by  the  appellants  

before the High Court.  It was not even remotely suggested  

that  the  appellants  were  appointed  on  account  of  their  

superior merit without deletion of the bonus marks.  Indeed  

if anyone with lesser merit had been appointed writ-petitions  

challenging such appointment should have been filed quickly  

thereafter  and  not  belatedly  as  was  the  position  in  the  

instant  case.  That  apart,  the  affidavit  filed  by  the  

respondents  satisfactorily  refutes  the  contention  urged  at  

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the Bar by Mr. Bali.  The merit position without deletion of  

bonus  marks  did  not  justify  the  appointment  of  anyone  

falling  under  Category II  as  they were all  lesser  in  merit  

than  the  last  candidate  appointed  in  the  open  general  

category. We have, therefore, no hesitation in rejecting the  

contention  that  the  appointments  of  those  falling  under  

Category II were justifiable on any ground independent of  

the  directions  issued  by  this  Court  in  Kailash  Chand  

Sharma’s case (supra).  It is noteworthy that some of those  

appointed had even filed affidavits  stating that they were  

parties  before  this  Court  which  in  fact  was  not  the  true  

position.   

24. On behalf of the appellant in Civil Appeal arising out of  

SLP No.31818 of 2012 it was argued that the termination of  

the services was unjustified having regard to the fact that  

the  said  appellant  was  a  writ-petitioner  before  the  High  

Court  alongwith  Naval  Kishore  Sharma  and  others.  Writ  

Petition No.2200 of 2000 filed by Danveer Singh was allowed  

by the learned Single Judge of the High Court along with  

Naval  Kishore’s  case  by  a  common  order  dated  26th  

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February, 2001. That order was challenged by the State in  

Writ  Appeal  No.130  of  2001  but  only  qua other  writ-

petitioners comprising the batch. The order passed in the  

writ  petition  filed  by  Danveer  Singh  never  came  under  

challenge  before  the  Division  Bench  of  the  High  Court.  

Consequently the order passed by the Division Bench did not  

pertain  to  the  said  appellant  nor  was  he  impleaded  as  a  

party before this  Court  in the appeals  filed  by the State.  

That being so, the termination of the services of Danveer  

Singh on the basis that he was not a writ-petitioner before  

the High Court was not justified argued the learned counsel.  

It was contended that what was important was whether the  

appellant was the writ-petitioner before the High Court out  

of  which  the  judgment  in  Naval  Kishore’s case  (supra)  

arose. The fact that the State had not chosen to challenge  

the order passed in favour of Danveer Singh could not place  

the said appellant in a more disadvantageous position than  

those  against  whom the  State  had  filed  the  appeal  first  

before the Division Bench of the High Court and later before  

this Court.   

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25. There  is,  in  our  opinion,  considerable  merit  in  the  

submission  made  by  learned  counsel  for  the  appellant  

Danveer Singh. Even Mr. Mangal Sharma appearing for the  

respondent  fairly  conceded  that  on  a  true  and  proper  

construction of the order of  this  Court in  Kailash Chand  

Sharma’s  case  (supra),  the  benefit  of  appointment  to  

Danveer  Singh  could  not  be  denied  merely  because  the  

order  passed  in  his  favour  had not  been  assailed  by  the  

State or because he had not been impleaded as respondent  

in the Supreme Court in the appeal filed by the State. The  

termination of services of Danveer Singh cannot in that view  

be sustained.   

26. It  was  lastly  contended  by  learned  counsel  for  the  

appellants  that  the  appellants  were  appointed  and  have  

served  the  schools  to  which  they  have  been  posted  for  

nearly a decade.  Their appointments having been made on  

a  bona fide error in the interpretation of the order of this  

Court  but  so  long  as  there  was  no  fraud  played  by  the  

appellants there was no reason why they should be deprived  

of the benefit of such a long period of service. Alternatively,  

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it  was submitted that  since the appellants  have, by now,  

crossed the upper age limit for recruitment as teachers, this  

Court could consider issuing a direction for consideration of  

their  cases in future recruitments in relaxation of the age  

bar.  

27. The appellants had been appointed and have served for  

nearly  a  decade  but  there  are  allegations  that  such  

appointments were obtained by mis-representation of facts  

and fraudulently.  We do not consider it necessary to go into  

that  aspect  as  we are  informed that  criminal  cases  have  

already been registered against appellants.  Any observation  

made by us whether or not the appointments were obtained  

by  mis-representation  or  by  playing  fraud  upon  the  

authorities concerned is bound to cause serious prejudice to  

the appellants. All that we need say is that in the facts and  

circumstances of the case we do not consider the appellants  

to be entitled to the relief of regularization of their services  

as prayed for by them. Having said that we cannot ignore  

the fact that the appellants will be left without any alternate  

avenues of employment at this stage of their lives. Subject  

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to any finding that may be recorded by a competent Court,  

as  regards  the  alleged  fraudulent  nature  of  the  

appointments secured by the appellants, we direct that such  

of the appellants as were appointed as teachers and as have  

now been terminated may be given a one-time concession of  

relaxation of the upper age limit and considered in the next  

selection process in relaxation of rules regarding such age  

limit  prescribed for  appointment  as teachers.  We make it  

clear that the above shall be a one-time relaxation for the  

appellants to try their luck in the next selection process. The  

appellants or such of them as wish to avail of this concession  

shall  file  an  undertaking  before  the  appointing  authority  

concerned to the effect  that the fresh appointment if  any  

given to  them pursuant to  the age relaxation  shall  stand  

terminated in case they are found guilty and sentenced to  

imprisonment in the criminal case registered against them  

for obtaining a fraudulent appointment.    Beyond that we do  

not consider the appellants to be entitled to any relief from  

this  Court.  The  appeals  are  with  the  above  directions  

disposed of leaving the parties to bear their own costs.

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………………………………….…..…J.        (T.S. THAKUR)

     …………………………..……………..J.       (C. NAGAPPAN)

New Delhi April 1, 2014

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