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REPORTABLE

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA

CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION

CRIMINAL APPEAL NO. 696 OF 2009

Mangat Ram .. Appellant

Versus

State of Haryana .. Respondent

J U D G M E N T

K. S. Radhakrishnan, J.

1. The  appellant  Mangat  Ram,  a  member  of  SC  

community, married the deceased Seema, a member of the  

Aggarwal community on 13.7.1993 at Ambala. Few months  

after  the  marriage,  on  15.9.1993,  according  to  the  

prosecution,  the  appellant  sprinkled  kerosene  oil  on  the  

body of the deceased and set her on fire, having failed to  

meet  the  dowry  demand.   On  hearing  the  hue  and  cry,  

neighbours assembled and took her to the Civil  Hospital,  

Gohana and, later, she was shifted to the Medical College  

and Hospital, Rohtak, where she died on 17.9.1993.   The

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appellant, along with his parents and sister, were charge-

sheeted for the offences punishable under Sections 498-A  

and 304-B IPC.    

2. The prosecution, in order to bring home the offences,  

examined  PWs  1  to  7  and  also  produced  various  

documents.   On  the  side  of  defence,  DWs  1  to  5  were  

examined and the accused appellant got himself examined  

as DW6.   After the evidence was closed, the accused was  

questioned  under  Section  313  of  the  Code  of  Criminal  

Procedure  (Cr.P.C.),  who  denied  all  the  incriminating  

statements  made  against  him.    The  trial  Court,  after  

appreciating the oral and documentary evidence, came to  

the conclusion that an offence under Section 498-A IPC was  

made out against the appellant, but not against the other  

three accused persons. The trial Court also found that no  

offence under Section 304-B IPC was made out against the  

accused persons, including the appellant.  However, it was  

held that an offence under Section 306 IPC was made out  

against the appellant, though no charge was framed under  

that  section.   After  holding the appellant  guilty,  the trial  

Court convicted the appellant under Section 498-A IPC and

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sentenced  him to  undergo  imprisonment  for  three  years  

and  to  pay  a  fine  of  Rs.1,000/-,  in  default,  to  further  

undergo rigorous imprisonment (RI) for six months.   The  

appellant  was  also  convicted  under  Section  306 IPC  and  

sentenced to undergo imprisonment for a period of seven  

years and to pay a fine of Rs.4,000/-, in default, to further  

undergo RI for two years.

3. Aggrieved by the conviction and sentence awarded by  

the trial Court, the appellant preferred Criminal Appeal No.  

592-SB of 1997, which when came up for hearing before  

the Division Bench of the High Court on 3.5.2007, the Court  

passed the following order:

“Present:  Mrs. Ritu Punj, DAG, Haryana

Mrs. Harpreet Kaur Dhillon, Advocate is appointed as Amicus Curiae.

Heard

Dismissed, reasons to follow.”

4. Aggrieved by the said order,  the appellant preferred  

SLP (Criminal) No. 7578 of 2007 which was later converted  

into Criminal Appeal No. 182 of 2008.  The criminal appeal  

came up for hearing before this Court on 25.1.2008 and this

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Court deprecated the practice of the High Court in disposing  

of the criminal appeals without recording reasons in support  

of its decision.   Placing reliance on the judgments of this  

Court in  State of Punjab and others v. Jagdev Singh  

Talwandi (1984) 1 SCC 596, State of Punjab and others  

v.  Surinder Kumar and others (1992) 1  SCC 489 and  

Zahira Habibulla H. Sheikh and another v. State of   

Gujarat and others (2004) 4 SCC 158, this Court set aside  

the judgment of the High Court and directed the High Court  

to hear the appeal on merits.

5. The High Court then considered the criminal appeal and  

dismissed  the  same  on  merits  vide  its  judgment  dated  

27.5.2008 confirming the conviction and sentence awarded  

against  the accused by the trial  Court.  Aggrieved by the  

same, this appeal has been preferred.

6. Mr. Satinder S. Gulati,  learned counsel appearing for  

the  appellant,  took  us  elaborately  through  the  oral  and  

documentary  evidence  adduced  by  the  parties  and  

submitted that the judgment of the trial Court as well as the  

High Court is based on conjunctures, full of contradictions

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and surmises and there is no evidence to substantiate the  

charges  levelled  against  the  accused.  Learned  counsel  

submitted that there was a complete misreading of the oral  

and documentary evidence and, at every stage, the Courts  

below adopted its  own strange  reasoning  which  was  not  

brought out from the deposition of the witnesses.  Learned  

counsel pointed out that, throughout the judgment of the  

trial Court as well as the High Court, one can notice that the  

Courts  below were  prejudiced  to  the  accused  for  having  

entered into an inter-caste marriage and opined that the  

plight  of  such  marriages  would  be  discontentment  and  

unhappiness.  Learned  counsel  pointed  out  that  there  is  

sufficient  evidence  to  conclude  that  the  deceased  was  

suffering from Epilepsy for the last few years of the incident  

and that death might have been caused by accident and, in  

any view,  it  was not  a homicidal  death.   Further,  it  was  

pointed out that the prosecution could not prove that the  

appellant was at home when the incident had happened.  

Learned  counsel  also  submitted  that  the  trial  Court  has  

committed an error in altering the offence to that of Section  

306 IPC after finding the accused not guilty under Section

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304-B  IPC.   Learned  counsel  pointed  out  that  the  

ingredients of the offence under Section 304-B as well as  

Section 306 IPC are entirely different and the trial Court has  

committed a grave error in convicting the appellant under  

Section  306  IPC.   Learned counsel  also  pointed  out  that  

there is absolutely no evidence of dowry demand and the  

conviction recorded under Section 498-A IPC is also without  

any material.  In support of his various contentions, learned  

counsel also made reference to few judgments of this Court,  

which we will deal in the latter part of this judgment.

7. We did not have the advantage of hearing any counsel  

on  the  side  of  the  State,  even  though,  the  hearing  was  

going on for a couple of days.  Learned counsel appearing  

for  the  appellant  took  us  through the  depositions  of  the  

witnesses examined on the side of the prosecution as well  

as the defence, as also the documentary evidence placed  

before the Court.

8. We  may  first  examine  whether  an  offence  under  

Section 498-A IPC has been made out against the appellant.  

Admittedly,  the  marriage between  the  appellant  and the

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deceased was an inter-caste love marriage and, after few  

months  of  the  marriage,  she  died  of  burn  injuries  on  

17.9.1993  at  her  matrimonial  home.   The  question  is  

whether immediately before and during the period between  

the date of marriage and the date of incident,  was there  

any dowry demand on the side of the accused.  In order to  

establish  the  ingredients  of  Section  498-A  IPC,  the  

prosecution  examined PW4,  the  maternal  grand-father  of  

the deceased, who had brought up her on the demise of her  

parents.  On a plain reading of the deposition of PW4, it is  

clear that he was against the inter-caste marriage of her  

grand-daughter  with  the  appellant,  who  belonged  to  the  

Scheduled Caste community, while the deceased belonged  

to the Aggarwal community.  PW4, in his cross-examination,  

stated  that  he  had  agreed  for  the  marriage  since  the  

deceased was adamant to marry the appellant.  PW4 also  

stated that he had not participated in Tikka ceremony held  

in  the  house  of  accused  appellant.  Further,  it  was  also  

stated that he had not contacted any other member of the  

family  of  the accused before the marriage.   PW4,  in  the  

cross-examination, stated that he had gone to Madhuban

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prior  to  the  marriage  to  dissuade  the  appellant  from  

entering into such a marriage and, for the said purpose, he  

met the DSP, Madhuban, who then called Mangat Ram, but  

he was adamant to marry Seema.  We have to appreciate  

the evidence of PW4 in the light of the fact that he was  

totally  against  the  inter-caste  marriage  between  the  

accused and the deceased.   PW4 also deposed that the  

accused persons had demanded a dowry of Rs.10,000/- and  

a scooter and, on 14.8.1993, PW4 gave Rs.10,000/- in cash  

to  the  accused  and  had  also  promised  to  make  

arrangement for the purchase of a scooter.   

9. PW5, a distant relative of PW4, also stated that after  

15-20 days of the marriage, the deceased came along with  

the accused to the residence of PW4 and, at that time, the  

deceased had told PW4 and others that the accused was  

harassing her since she had not brought dowry.  PW5 also  

deposed that articles like cooler,  fridge,  sofa,  double bed  

were given to the accused by way of dowry.  PWs 4 and 5  

had deposed that a demand of dowry was made not only by  

the  accused  Mangat  Ram,  but  also  by  his  parents  and  

sister.   The  trial  Court  recorded  a  clear  finding  that  the

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prosecution had failed to bring home the guilt as against  

the parents and sister of the accused under Section 498A,  

304-B IPC, which was not questioned by the prosecution.  

However, if that part of the evidence of PWs 4 and 5 could  

not be believed against the rest of the accused, then we fail  

to  see  how  it  could  be  put  against  the  accused  alone,  

especially when PWs 4 and 5 had stated that the demand  

for dowry was made by all the accused on 13.8.1993.  The  

evidence of PWs 4 and 5 has to be appreciated in the light  

of the fact that they were against the inter-caste marriage,  

since  the  appellant  belonged  to  Scheduled  Caste  

community  and  the  deceased  belonged  to  Aggarwal  

community, a forward community.  Alleged dowry demand  

of Rs.10,000/- and the demand of scooter, stated to have  

been made by the accused, could not be established not  

only  against  the  other  three  accused  persons,  but  also  

against the appellant as well.   

10. We may now examine, apart from the dowry demand,  

had the appellant  treated the deceased with  cruelty  and  

abetted  the  deceased  in  committing  suicide.   We  have  

already  found  on  facts  that  the  prosecution  could  not

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establish that there was any dowry demand from the side of  

the appellant.  Once it is so found, then we have to examine  

what was the cruelty meted out to the deceased so as to  

provoke her to end her life.   It has come out in evidence  

that  when  the  deceased  sustained  burn  injuries,  the  

accused was not at home.  In this connection, we may refer  

to  para  25  of  the  trial  Court  judgment,  which  reads  as  

follows:

“25. Secondly, Seema died un-natural death.  The  most crucial point which the prosecution was  bound  to  establish,  whether  Seema  was  subjected  to  cruelty  and  harassment  on  account of paucity of dowry or there was a  fresh  demand  of  dowry,  there  is  no  such  evidence on the file that she was subjected to  cruelty  and  harassment.   Bidhi  Chand  and  Avinash  Chander  both  appeared.   They  did  not state that Seema was subjected to cruelty  and harassment for paucity of dowry given at  the time of marriage........”

[Emphasis Supplied]

11. The  trial  Court  itself  says  that  there  was  no  such  

evidence on the file that she was subjected to cruelty or  

harassment. But, in para 26 of its judgment, the trial Court,  

adopted a strange reasoning to hold that the accused had  

treated the deceased with cruelty, which is as follows:

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“26. .......  An educated girl of business community  was left in a village life and in the house of a  lower community people whose way of living,  whose  way  of  talking,  whose  way  of  behaviour  is  not  at  par  with  the  family  members of Seema, since deceased.  As such,  Seema was feeling perplexed agitated.   She  expected from Mangat Ram that she must be  kept with him at his place of posting and not  to be left in a village life in the company of  rustic persons and that appeared the cause of  discontentment  and  unhappiness.   It  has  been experienced that such marriage meets  ill fate, like the present one.  From statement  of Bidhi  Chand and letters Ex.PE and PF an  inference  can  be  easily  drawn  that  Seema  was  fully  unhappy  and  dis-contended  from  the behaviour of Mangat Ram accused, since  he had left her in village life at the mercy of  her mother-in-law Jiwni and that is why, she  had been calling her grand maternal father to  come  for  her  rescue,  but  Bidhi  Chand,  as  explained by  him,  could  not  rush  to  village  Baroda because his son and his wife met with  an  accident  at  Chandigarh  and  he  went  there.”

[Emphasis Supplied]

12. Further, in para 31, the trial Court has stated that the  

conduct  of  Mangat  Ram  keeping  and  leaving  Seema  in  

Baroda  at  his  home  amounted  to  causing  cruelty  and  

harassment to Seema.   In para 32, the trial Court has also  

recorded a very strange reasoning, which is as follows:

“32. Accused was very safely entered into defence  and  led  defence  evidence  that  Seema  had  been  suffering  from  epilepsy  prior  to  her  marriage. In case, if this fact would have been

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in  the knowledge of Mangat Ram, he would  have never solemnised marriage with Seema.  After  enjoying  sex  with  her,  he  must  have  deserted this lady...........”

13. We  fail  to  see  how  the  Court  can  come  to  the  

conclusion that having known the deceased was suffering  

from Epilepsy, he would not have married the deceased.  If  

the Court’s reasoning is  accepted,  then nobody would or  

could  marry  a  person  having  Epilepsy.  Another  perverse  

reasoning  of  the  trial  Court  which,  according  to  the  trial  

Court, led to the act of suicide, is as follows:

“33. ......  She has been brought up by her grand  maternal  father  Bidhi  Chand  and  he  contracted a love marriage with her.  But in  spite of that, he quenched his lust of sex by  enjoying Seema and then left her in a rustic  life of village.  Seema, out of frustration and  discontentment, wanted to get rid of that life.  When her maternal grand father did not reach  for  her  rescue,  she  being  fully  harassed,  sprinkled kerosene oil on her body and took  her life. ...............”

[Emphasis Supplied]

14. The  underlined  portion  indicates  that  the  deceased  

had  committed  suicide  out  of  frustration  and  

discontentment and due to the reason that her  maternal  

grandfather did not reach for her rescue.  Reference to few  

letters sent by the deceased to her maternal grand father in

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this  respect  is  apposite.   In  her  letter  dated  18.8.1993  

(Annexure P-17) to PW4, there is absolutely no indication of  

any  harassment  or  dowry  demand by the  accused.   The  

letter  would  only  indicate  that  she  was  home-sick  and  

wanted very much to see her grand father, the operative  

portion of the same reads as follows :

“…. But you should come it is very important work.  If you will not come on 25th or 26th then I will give  my life.  Therefore both of you should come. Even  if  Somnath  mama  will  say  no  for  you  to  go  to  Baroda  but  both  of  you  should  come,  it  is  important work.   If  you will  not  come then your  daughter  will  give her life.   What more should I  write you are wise enough.  If there is any mistake  in the letter then forgive me.  I  sent a letter  to  Bandoi  also.   That  day we reached Baroda at  3  O’clock.  Both of us wish Namaste to all  of you.  Give love to Rahul, Sahul.  I miss all of you a lot.  Daddyji after getting my letter come to Baroda on  25th or 26th immediately, it is important work.  If  you will not come I will give my life therefore you  and mamaji should come.  I am closing my letter.  I am writing again that Daddyji you should come.  It is very important work.  If you will not come on  25th or 26th then on 27th you will get a telephone  call of my death. ….”

15. Reference may also be made to another letter dated  

11.9.1997 sent by her to PW4.  In that letter also, there was  

no complaint of any harassment or dowry demand.   On the  

other hand, the letter would further reemphasize that she

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was home-sick and very much wanted to see her maternal  

grand father,  the operative portion of the letter reads as  

follows:

“…. Daddyji you may not come for a night but you  should come to meet me for an hour or two.   It is  very  important  work.   Daddyji  you  keep  on  replying  to  my  letter  I  feel  very  happy.   I  miss  Rahul, Sahul, Raju, Sonu, Shalu and Rachit, Sapna,  Aarti and all of you.  I keep on crying the whole  day and whole night by remembering you.  I want  to  meet  all  of  you.  Nanaji  come  to  Baroda  immediately after reading my letter on 17th or 18th  date,  it  is  very important  work.   If  you love me  then you should come.  Daddy if you will not come  even after reading my letter then I take your vow  that  I  will  give  my  life.   Reply  to  the  letter  on  getting it.  From my side and from my mother in  law’s  side  and  from  Mangat’s  side  we  wish  Namaste  to  all  of  you.   Give  love  to  children.  Writer of letter your daughter.  (Seema)”

16. The  picture  that  emerges  from  the  conduct  of  the  

deceased  was  that  she  was  very  home-sick  at  her  

matrimonial home and was very much attached to PW4 and  

her friends and relatives at her home. The accused being a  

Police Constable had to serve at various places away from  

his village and, then necessarily he had to leave his wife at  

his home in the care and protection of his parents.   Not  

taking  the  wife  along  with  him,  itself  was,  however,  

commented  upon  by  the  trial  Court  stating  that  the

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accused had left his wife, an educated girl belonging to a  

business  community,  in  a  village  and  in  the  house  of  a  

lower community people, whose way of life, whose way of  

talking, whose way of behaviour would not be at par with  

the family members of the deceased.  On this reasoning,  

the  trial  Court  concluded  that  the  deceased  was  feeling  

perplexed, agitated and expected that  the accused would  

take her at his place of posting, rather than leaving in a  

village in the company of rustic persons which, according to  

the Court, led to discontentment and unhappiness.    

17. We fail  to  understand how a judicially  trained mind  

would come out with such a reasoning and, at least,  we  

expected  that  the  High  Court  would  have  set  right  that  

perverse reasoning, but we are surprised to note that the  

High Court adopted yet another strange reasoning, which  

reads as follows:

“When deceased had contracted marriage with the  appellant-accused on her own accord against the  wish of her maternal grandfather then, deceased  was not expected to commit suicide because she  was to stay with the appellant-accused.   On the  other  hand,  appellant-accused  being  employee  had not kept the deceased with him at the place of  his  posting.   Deceased  was  staying  with  the  parents of the appellant-accused.  So, actions of

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the  appellant-accused  abetted  the  deceased  to  commit suicide.”

18. We fail to see how the failure of a married person to  

take  his  wife  along  with  him  to  the  place  where  he  is  

working  or  posted,  would  amount  to  cruelty  leading  to  

abetment of committing suicide by the wife.  Taking wife to  

place  of  posting  depends  upon  several  factors,  like  the  

convenience of both, availability of accommodation and so  

many factors.   In the instant case, the accused had left the  

wife in the matrimonial home in the company of his parents  

and  we  fail  to  see  how  that  action  would  amount  to  

abetment to commit suicide.  

19. We  may  point  out  that  the  High  Court  itself  after  

placing reliance on the letters – Exh. PE and PF - written by  

the deceased to her maternal grandfather, has noted that  

there was no reference at all in these letters of the demand  

of dowry by the accused, but stated that the deceased was  

unhappy  and  upset  over  the  behaviour  of  the  accused,  

having left  her  in the company of  his  parents.   We have  

gone through those letters  and,  in  those letters,  there is  

nothing  to  show  that  the  deceased  was  upset  by  the

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behaviour of the accused.  On the other hand, the letters  

only expose that  the deceased was extremely  home sick  

and wanted the company of her maternal grandfather.  We  

are surprised to note that the High Court found fault with  

the accused for leaving the deceased “at the mercy of his  

parents”.   Again,  the  High  Court  made  another  strange  

reasoning, which reads as follows:

“Immediately  after  marriage,  two  letters  were  written in the months of August and September,  1993.   Appellant-accused being employee should  have kept the deceased with him.   No prudent  man is to commit suicide unless abetted to do so.  Actions  of  the  appellant-accused  amounts  to  cruelty  compelling  the  deceased  to  commit  suicide.  Conviction  under  Section  306  IPC  was  rightly recorded by the trial Court.  No question of  interference.    If  husband  is  given  a  benefit  of  doubt on the allegation that no direct evidence, no  circumstantial  evidence,  when the marriage was  inter-caste, then what type of evidence deceased  or complainant was to collect.     .”

[Emphasis Supplied]

20. We find it difficult to comprehend the reasoning of the  

High  Court  that  “no  prudent  man  is  to  commit  suicide  

unless abetted to do so.”  A woman may attempt to commit  

suicide  due  to  various  reasons,  such  as,  depression,  

financial  difficulties,  disappointment  in  love,  tired  of  

domestic worries, acute or chronic ailments and so on and

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need not be due to abetment.  The reasoning of the High  

Court  that  no  prudent  man  will  commit  suicide  unless  

abetted to do so by someone else, is a perverse reasoning.  

21. We fail  to see how the High Court can say that the  

accused being a police man should have kept his wife with  

him at his workplace.  Further, the High Court then posed a  

wrong question to itself  stating that  if  there is  no direct  

evidence,  no  circumstantial  evidence,  then  what  type of  

evidence the deceased or complainant was to collect, when  

the marriage is inter-caste, a logic we fail to digest.    

22. We are sorry to state that the trial Court as well as the  

High  Court  have  not  properly  appreciated  the  scope  of  

Sections  498-A  and  306  IPC.   Section  498-A  IPC,  is  

extracted below for an easy reference:

“498-A.  Whoever, being the husband or the  relative of the husband of a woman, subjects such  woman  to  cruelty  shall  be  punished  with  imprisonment  for  a  term  which  may  extend  to  three years and shall also be liable to fine.   

Explanation.- For the purposes of this section,  ‘cruelty’ means-

(a) any  wilful  conduct  which  is  of  such  a  nature as is likely to drive the woman to  commit suicide or to cause grave injury

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or danger to life, limb or health (whether  mental or physical) of the woman; or

(b) harassment  of  the  woman where  such  harassment  is  with  a  view to  coercing  her or any person related to her to meet  any unlawful  demand for  any property  or  valuable  security  is  on  account  of  failure by her or any person related to  her to meet such demand.”

23. Explanation  to  Section  498-A  gives  the  meaning  of  

‘cruelty’, which consists of two clauses.   To attract Section  

498-A, the prosecution has to establish the wilful conduct  

on the part of the accused and that conduct is of such a  

nature as is likely to drive the wife to commit suicide.   We  

fail to see how the failure to take one’s wife to his place of  

posting, would amount to a wilful conduct of such a nature  

which is likely to drive a woman to commit suicide.   We fail  

to see how a married woman left at the parental home by  

the husband would by itself amount to a wilful conduct to  

fall within the expression of ‘cruelty’, especially when the  

husband is having such a job for which he has to be away  

at the place of his posting.  We also fail to see how a wife  

left  in  a  village life  “in  the  company of  rustic  persons”,  

borrowing language used by the trial Court, would amount

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to  wilful  conduct  of  such  a  nature  to  fall  within  the  

expression of ‘cruelty’.  In our view, both the trial Court as  

well as the High Court have completely misunderstood the  

scope of Section 498-A IPC read with its explanation and we  

are clearly of the view that no offence under Section 498-A  

has been made out against the accused appellant.   

24. We  have  already  indicated  that  the  trial  Court  has  

found that no offence under Section 304-B IPC has been  

made out against the accused, but it convicted the accused  

under Section 306 IPC, even though no charge had been  

framed on that section against the accused.  The scope and  

ambit of Section 306 IPC has not been properly appreciated  

by the Courts below.  Section 306 IPC reads as under:

“306.  If  any  person  commits  suicide,  whoever  abets  the  commission  of  such  suicide,  shall  be  punished with imprisonment of either description  for  a  term which may extend to  ten years,  and  shall also be liable to fine.”

Abetment of suicide is confined to the case of persons  

who  aid  or  abet  the  commission  of  the  suicide.   In  the  

matter of an offence under Section 306 IPC, abetment must  

attract the definition thereof in Section 107 IPC. Abetment  

is constituted by instigating a person to commit an offence

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or engaging in a conspiracy to commit, aid or intentional  

aiding a person to commit it.  It would be evident from a  

plain reading of Section 306 read with Section 107 IPC that,  

in order to make out the offence of abetment or suicide,  

necessary  proof  required  is  that  the  culprit  is  either  

instigating  the  victim to  commit  suicide  or  has  engaged  

himself in a conspiracy with others for the commission of  

suicide, or has intentionally aided by act or illegal omission  

in the commission of suicide.   

25. In  the  instant  case,  of  course,  the  wife  died  few  

months  after  the  marriage  and  the  presumption  under  

Section 113A of the Evidence Act could be raised.  Section  

113A of the Evidence Act reads as follows:

“113A.   Presumption  as  to  abetment  of   suicide by a married woman.- when the question is  whether  the commission of  suicide by a  woman  had been abetted by her husband or any relative  of  her  husband  and  it  is  shown  that  she  had  committed suicide within a period of seven years  from  the  date  of  her  marriage  and  that  her  husband  or  such  relative  of  her  husband  and  subjected her to cruelty, the Court may presume,  having regard to all the other circumstances of the  case, that such suicide had been abetted by her  husband or by such relative of her husband.”

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26. We are of the view that the mere fact that if a married  

woman commits suicide within a period of seven years of  

her marriage, the presumption under Section 113A of the  

Evidence Act would not automatically apply.  The legislative  

mandate  is  that  where a  woman commits  suicide within  

seven  years  of  her  marriage  and  it  is  shown  that  her  

husband or any relative of her husband has subjected her  

to cruelty, the presumption as defined under Section 498-A  

IPC, may attract, having regard to all other circumstances  

of  the  case,  that  such  suicide  has  been  abetted  by  her  

husband or by such relative of her husband.  The term “the  

Court  may  presume,  having  regard  to  all  the  other  

circumstances  of  the  case,  that  such  suicide  had  been  

abetted  by  her  husband”  would  indicate  that  the  

presumption is discretionary.  So far as the present case is  

concerned, we have already indicated that the prosecution  

has  not  succeeded  in  showing  that  there  was  a  dowry  

demand, nor the reasoning adopted by the Courts below  

would be sufficient enough to draw a presumption so as to  

fall  under  Section  113A  of  the  Evidence  Act.   In  this  

connection, we may refer to the judgment of this Court in

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Hans  Raj  v.  State  of  Haryana (2004)  12  SCC  257,  

wherein this Court has examined the scope of Section 113A  

of the Evidence Act and Sections 306, 107, 498-A etc. and  

held  that,  unlike  Section  113B  of  the  Evidence  Act,  a  

statutory presumption does not arise by operation of law  

merely  on  the  proof  of  circumstances  enumerated  in  

Section 113A of the Evidence Act.   This Court held that,  

under Section 113A of the Evidence Act,  the prosecution  

has to first establish that the woman concerned committed  

suicide within a period of seven years from the date of her  

marriage and that her husband has subject her to cruelty.  

Even though those facts are established, the Court is not  

bound to presume that  suicide has been abetted by her  

husband.  Section 113A, therefore, gives discretion to the  

Court to raise such a presumption having regard to all other  

circumstances of  the case,  which  means  that  where the  

allegation is of cruelty, it can consider the nature of cruelty  

to which the woman was subjected, having regard to the  

meaning of the word ‘cruelty’ in Section 498-A IPC.    

27. We are of the view that the circumstances of the case  

pointed out  by the prosecution are  totally  insufficient  to

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hold  that  the  accused  had  abetted  his  wife  to  commit  

suicide and the circumstances enumerated under Section  

113A of the Evidence Act have also not been satisfied.  In  

Pinakin Mahipatray Rawal v. State of Gujarat (2013)  

10 SCC 48, this Court has examined the scope of Section  

113A of the Evidence Act, wherein this Court has reiterated  

the legal position that the legislative mandate of Section  

113A  of  the  Evidence  Act  is  that  if  a  woman  commits  

suicide within seven years of her marriage and it is shown  

that  her  husband  or  any  relative  of  her  husband  had  

subjected her to cruelty, as per the presumption defined in  

Section 498-A IPC, the Court may presume, having regard  

to all  other  circumstances of  the case,  that such suicide  

had been abetted by the husband or  such person.   The  

Court held that, though a presumption could be drawn, the  

burden of proof of showing that such an offence has been  

committed by the accused under Section 498-A IPC is on  

the prosecution.  The Court held that the burden is on the  

prosecution  to  establish  the  fact  that  the  deceased  

committed  suicide  and  the  accused  abetted  the  suicide.  

In the instant case, there is no evidence to show whether it

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was  an  accidental  death  or  whether  the  deceased  had  

committed suicide.   

28. We have every reason to believe that, in the instant  

case, the death was accidental, for the following reasons.

- Though  not  proved  in  her  dying  declaration,  it  has  

come out in evidence that the deceased was suffering  

from  Epilepsy  for  the  last  three  years  i.e.  before  

15.3.1993, the date of incident.  This fact is fortified  

by the evidence of Dr. Kuldeep, who was examined as  

DW1.   He deposed that the deceased was suffering  

from  Epilepsy  and  was  under  his  treatment  from  

23.12.1992 to 2.4.1993 at Kuldeep Hospital,  Ambala  

City.   His  evidence  was  brushed  aside  by  the  trial  

Court  on  the  ground  that  Dr.  Kuldeep  was  not  a  

Psychiatrist.   It  may be noted that Epilepsy is not a  

Psychiatrist problem.  It is a disease of nerves system  

and  a  MD  (Medicine)  could  treat  the  patient  of  

Epilepsy.  The reasoning given by the trial Court for  

brushing  aside  the  evidence  of  DW1  cannot  be  

sustained.   Therefore, the possibility of an accidental  

death, since she was suffering from Epilepsy, cannot

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be ruled out.   Evidently, she was in the kitchen and,  

might  be,  during  cooking  she  might  have  suffered  

Epileptic  symptoms and fell  down on the gas stove  

and  might  have  caught  fire,  resulting  her  ultimate  

death.  

- DW2, ASI Ram Mohan, the Investigating Officer of the  

case, deposed that he had recorded the statements of  

the  deceased wherein  she had stated that  she was  

suffering from Epilepsy for the last three years before  

the  incident  and  that  on  15.9.1993  while  she  was  

preparing meals on stove,  she had an attack of fits  

and fell on the stove and caught fire.  She had also  

deposed at that time that her husband was away at  

duty at Madhuban, Karnal.  In our view, the evidence  

of DW2 has to be appreciated in the light of overall  

facts and circumstances of the case.    

29. Taking into consideration all aspects of the matter, we  

are of the view that the prosecution has not succeeded in  

establishing the offence under Section 498-A and Section  

306 IPC against the appellant.  Consequently, the appeal is

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allowed and the conviction and sentence awarded by the  

trial Court and confirmed by the High Court, are set aside.

…………………………J. (K. S. Radhakrishnan)

…………………………J. (Vikramajit Sen)

New Delhi, March 27, 2014.