MANAGING DIRECTOR CHHATTISGARH STATE CO OPERATIVE BANK MARYADIT Vs ZILA SAHKARI KENDRIYA BANK MARYADIT
Bench: HON'BLE DR. JUSTICE D.Y. CHANDRACHUD, HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE AJAY RASTOGI
Judgment by: HON'BLE DR. JUSTICE D.Y. CHANDRACHUD
Case number: C.A. No.-001961-001961 / 2020
Diary number: 36304 / 2018
Advocates: VIKRANT SINGH BAIS Vs
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1
REPORTABLE
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA
CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION
Civil Appeal No. 1961 of 2020
(Arising out of SLP (C) No 28165 of 2018)
Managing Director Chhattisgarh State Co-Operative ...Appellant Bank Maryadit
Versus
Zila Sahkari Kendriya Bank Maryadit & Ors. ...Respondent(s)
J U D G M E N T
Dr Dhananjaya Y Chandrachud, J
1 This appeal has arisen from a judgment of a Division Bench of the High
Court of Chhattisgarh dated 7 August 2018. Allowing a Letters Patent Appeal, the
Division Bench set aside the judgment of a Single Judge dated 19 January 2018.
The Division Bench held that the appointment made by the appellant on 11
2
August 2017 of the Chief Executive Officer 1 of the first respondent bank and its
subsequent ratification by the Registrar of Cooperative Societies, were without
the authority of law. Consequently, the decision of the appellant was held to be
not binding on the first respondent.
2 The appellant – Chhattisgarh State Cooperative Bank - is the apex body of
cooperative banks in the State of Chhattisgarh. The first respondent is a District
Central Cooperative Bank which is governed by the provisions of the
Chhattisgarh Co-Operative Societies Act 1960 2 .
3 The CEO of the first respondent bank was arrested on 9 August 2017 by
the Economic Offences Wing of the State of Chhattisgarh on charges of
corruption, under the Prevention of Corruption Act 1988 3 . Upon being produced
before the designated Court, he was remanded to custody and placed under
suspension from his office of the CEO.
4 On 10 August 2017, the seventh respondent was appointed as an interim
CEO by the Chairperson of the first respondent, pending a formal decision by the
Board of Directors 4 . On 11 August 2017, the appellant appointed the sixth
respondent, who was discharging duties as a „Special Class Managing Director‟
at Raipur, as the CEO of the first respondent. The appellant purported to take this
action as the first respondent had been appointed an interim CEO and the person
appointed did not fulfill the eligibility criteria prescribed by the Reserve Bank of
1 “CEO”
2 “1960 Act”
3 “PC Act”
4 “BoD”
3
India 5 . The appellant also sought to justify its action of appointing the sixth
respondent as the CEO of the first respondent with reference to Section 54(3) of
the 1960 Act.
5 The sixth respondent was not given charge as the CEO of the first
respondent on the ground that a meeting of the BoD was scheduled to be
convened on 16 August 2017. On 16 August 2017, the BoD of the first
respondent approved the appointment of the seventh respondent, who was
initially serving as the interim CEO, as the CEO. The first respondent instituted a
Writ Petition 6 before the High Court of Chhattisgarh challenging the legality of the
order dated 11 August 2017, by which the appellant had appointed the sixth
respondent as the CEO. Essentially, the case of the first respondent is that the
appointment of its CEO lies solely within its discretion and neither the appellant
as the apex society nor the Registrar has the power to appoint a CEO. The BoD
of the first respondent bank sought a clarification from the Registrar of
Cooperative Societies on 17 August 2017 regarding the appointment of the sixth
respondent as the CEO. By his communication dated 21 August 2017, the
Registrar stated that the appointment made by the appellant of the sixth
respondent was in accordance with law and that the order of appointment should
be complied with.
6 On 25 August 2017, the BoD of the first respondent resolved to accept the
appointment of the sixth respondent and directed that the seventh respondent
shall hand over charge of the post of the CEO to the sixth respondent.
5 “RBI”
6 W.P (C) 3875 of 2017
4
7 A learned Single Judge of the Chhattisgarh High Court by a judgment
dated 19 January 2018 dismissed the Writ Petition filed by the first respondent
holding that the appointment of the sixth respondent was in terms of the
provisions of Section 54(3) of the 1960 Act and was legally sustainable. The
Single Judge also noted that the appointment had been ratified by the Registrar
of Cooperative Societies and that the appointment had also been accepted at a
meeting of the BoD of the first respondent.
8 Aggrieved by the order of the learned Single Judge, the first respondent
filed a Writ Appeal 7 before the Division Bench, which was allowed by the
impugned order dated 7 August 2018. The Division Bench held that under the
amended provisions of Section 54(3), which were incorporated with effect from
14 December 2016, the appellant had no role in the appointment of the CEO. In
the view of the Division Bench, the power to appoint a CEO could only be
exercised by the Registrar upon the failure of the District Central Cooperative
Bank to make an appointment within a specified time period. This, the Division
Bench held, flows from clause (b) of Section 54(3). The Division Bench was of
the view that there was no failure on the part of the first respondent in making an
ad-interim arrangement, pending the meeting of the BoD on 16 August 2017 to
appoint a regular CEO. The Division Bench found fault with the appellant for
having stepped-in to fill a vacuum when none existed. Holding that this was a
case of the usurpation of power by the Apex Body, the Division Bench held that
the ratification of the appointment by the Registrar of Cooperative Societies was
of no consequence. The judgment of the learned Single Judge was accordingly
7 Writ Appeal No. 96 of 2018
5
set aside.
9 Before we note the rival submissions, it is necessary to advert to the
relevant provisions of law, as applicable to the present dispute.
10 Section 49-E of the 1960 Act deals with the appointment of a Managing
Director and CEO, as its marginal notes indicates, “in certain circumstances”.
Section 49-E provides as follows:
“49-E. Appointment of Managing Director and Chief Executive
Officer in certain circumstances.-
(1)(a) Notwithstanding anything contained in this Act or
rules or byelaws made thereunder for any Apex
Society where the State Government has contributed
to its share capital or has given loans or financial
assistance or has guaranteed the repayment of loans
granted in any other form, there shall be a Managing
Director, not below the rank of a Class I Officer, who
shall be selected by a committee constituted at the
State level consisting of the Agriculture Production
Commissioner, Chairman of the Apex Society,
Registrar Co-operative Societies and one Director
nominated by the Board of Apex Society:”
Provided that if the committee fails to select the
Managing Director unanimously, the matter shall be
referred to the State Government whose decision
thereon shall be final.
(b) The Managing Director shall be ex-officio member of
the committee.
(c) The Managing Director shall be the Chief Executive
Officer of the society and shall perform such duties
and exercise such powers as may be prescribed.
(2)(a) Notwithstanding anything contained in this Act, or the
Rules or byelaws made thereunder for every Central
society where the State Government has contributed
to its share capital or has given loans or financial
assistance or has guaranteed the repayment of loans,
debentures, or advances or has given grants in any
other form, there shall be a Managing Director or a
General Manager not below the rank of a Class II
Officer who shall be the Chief Executive Officer of the
society and ex-officio member of the committee:
(b) The Chief Executive Officer shall be appointed:
(i) from among the Officers of the cadre maintained
under Section 54 if such a cadre has been created;
6
(ii) in other cases with the prior approval of the
Registrar.
(c) The Chief Executive Officer shall perform such duties
and exercise such powers as may be prescribed.”
11 Sub-section (1) of Section 49-E deals with the appointment of the
Managing Director and CEO of an Apex Society. The expression „Apex Society‟
is defined in Section 2(a-i) to mean
“a society whose principal object is to provide facilities for the
operation of other societies affiliated to it and whose area of
operation extends to the whole State…”
Sub-section (2) deals with the appointment of a Managing Director or a General
Manager who shall be the CEO of a Central Society. The expression „Central
Society‟ is defined in Section 2(c-i) as follows:
““Central Society” means a Co-operative Land Development
Bank or any other society whose area of operation is confined
to a part of the State and which has as its principal object the
promotion of the principal objects and the provision of
facilities for the operation of same type of societies and for
other societies affiliated to it and not less than five members
of which are societies.”
12 Sub-section (1) applies to an Apex Society while sub-section (2) applies to
a Central Society. Sub-section (2), with which we are concerned, applies to a
Central Society to which the State Government has: (i) contributed the share
capital; or (ii) granted loans or financial assistance; or (iii) guaranteed the
repayment of loans, debentures, or advances; or (iv) given grants in any other
form. Sub-section (2)(b) provides that the CEO of every Central Society shall be
appointed from among the officers of the cadre maintained under Section 54, if
such a cadre has been created and, in other cases, with the prior approval of the
7
Registrar.
13 Section 49-E(2)(b)(i) refers to the cadre of officers maintained under
Section 54. Section 54 is in the following terms:
“54. Appointment of Managers, Secretaries and other
officers.-(1) No society shall appoint a Manager, Secretary,
Accountant or other paid officer unless he holds such
qualifications as may be prescribed.
(2) The Apex and Central Societies shall maintain such
cadres of officers and other servants as the State
Government may, by order, direct and the conditions of
service of members of such cadre shall be such as the
Registrar may, by order, determine.
(3) The State Government may, by notification, specify the
class of societies which shall employ officers from such
cadres maintained by the Apex or Central Societies under
sub-section (2) as may be specified therein and it shall be
obligatory on the part of such class of societies to accept and
appoint such cadre officers on the cadre posts as and when
deputed by the Apex or Central Societies.”
Sub-section (1) of Section 54 provides that a society shall not appoint a Manager,
Secretary, Accountant or other paid officer unless the person holds such
qualifications as are prescribed. Under sub-section (2), Apex and Central
Societies have to maintain such cadres of officers and other servants as the
State Government may, by order, direct. Under sub-section (3), the State
Government is empowered to issue a notification specifying the class of societies
which shall employ officers from the cadres maintained by the Apex or Central
Societies. Sub-section (3) also makes it obligatory upon such class of societies to
accept and appoint cadre officers on cadre posts, as and when they are deputed
by the Apex or Central Societies.
8
14 In exercise of the power conferred by sub-section (3) of Section 54, a
notification was issued by the State of Madhya Pradesh (prior to its
reorganisation) on 12 January 1971. The notification is extracted below:
“Notification No. 258-413-Fifteen-1.71 dated 12.01.1971
By exercising powers under sub-section 3 of section 54 of
Madhya Pradesh Cooperative Societies Act 1960 (No. 17
of 1961), The State Govt. vide this notification notifies that
the cooperative societies mentioned in column 3 of the
schedule given below shall appoint officers from the cadre
constituted by the Apex Cooperative Society mentioned in
column 2 of the schedule given below in front of them as
per their availability.
SCHEDULE
Sl.
No
.
Name of Apex
Cooperative Society
Name of Cooperative
Society
(1) (2) (3)
1 M.P. State Cooperative
Bank Ltd.
Central Cooperative Bank
2 Madhya Pradesh State
land Development Bank
Primary Cooperative Land
Development Bank
3 Madhya Pradesh State
Cooperative Marketing
Federation
Primary Cooperative
Marketing Societies and
Process Committee
(Published in part-1 of Gazette of M.P. dated 19.02.1971)”
15 In terms of the above notification, it was stipulated that a cooperative
society specified in column (3) of the Schedule shall appoint officers from the
cadre constituted by the Apex Cooperative Societies mentioned in column (2) of
the Schedule. The first entry in the Schedule specifies the Madhya Pradesh State
Cooperative Bank Ltd. as the Apex Cooperative Society and the Central
9
Cooperative Bank as the Cooperative Society. In other words, the Central
Cooperative Bank is required to appoint officers from the cadre constituted by the
State Cooperative Bank. This notification, it is not in dispute, applies to the State
of Chhattisgarh.
16 The provisions of Section 54(3) were amended by the Chhattisgarh
Cooperative Societies (Amendment) Act 2016 8 , with effect from 14 December
2016. The following provisions were inserted at the end of Section 54(3):
“(a) The eligibility criteria to hold the office of Chief
Executive Officer of any Co-operative Bank shall be as such
as may be prescribed by the Reserve Bank in this regard.
(b) If the concerning Co-operative Bank fails to appoint
the Chief Executive Officer under the eligibility criteria within a
specified period, in such a condition the Registrar may
appoint such eligible officer of the Bank.”
17 The present dispute has been occasioned by the insertion of clauses (a)
and (b) in Section 54(3) of the 1960 Act by virtue of the Amending Act of 2016.
18 The appellant has urged the following submissions:
(i) The CEO of the first respondent (which is a District Central Cooperative
Bank) is a paid officer whose appointment is regulated by Section
54(1), which mandates the appointment of only persons who possess
the prescribed qualifications. The appointment which was made by the
first respondent was of a person who did not fulfill the prescribed
qualifications;
(ii) Section 54(2) mandates the first appellant to maintain cadre of officers
as the State Government may, by order, direct. In exercise of the power
8 “2016 Amendment Act”
10
conferred by Section 54(3), the State Government issued a notification
dated 12 January 1971 which stipulated that the Central Cooperative
Bank must appoint officers from the cadre constituted by the State
Cooperative Bank. By virtue of Section 54(3) and the notification dated
12 January 1971, the first respondent (as a District Central Cooperative
Bank) is obligated to accept and appoint the officer deputed by the
appellant (as the Apex Society) as the CEO. In the present case, the
person who was appointed by the first respondent did not fulfill the
prescribed eligibility criteria. Hence, the sixth respondent was appointed
as CEO in exercise of the appellant‟s authority under Section 54(3) to
make that appointment;
(iii) Pursuant to Section 54(3), a notification was issued on 26 June 1971
under which all Central Cooperative Banks in the state were permitted
to maintain cadres of officers from whom appointments to Village
Cooperative Societies, including Large Sized Agricultural Credit
Societies would be made. By another notification dated 26 June 1971
also under Section 54(3), Central Cooperative Banks were permitted to
maintain cadres of employees from whom managers for rural
cooperative societies would be appointed. Thus, all Central
Cooperative Banks in the State of Chhattisgarh have to maintain a
cadre of employees in terms of the above notifications dated 26 June
1971 and all Village Cooperative Societies including Large Sized
Agricultural Credit Societies shall employ officers only from the said
cadres;
11
(iv) Sub-section (2) of Section 49-E specifically deals with the appointment
of the Managing Director or a General Manager who shall be the CEO
of Central Societies to which the State Government has made a
contribution of share capital, furnished loans or granted financial
assistance or any other grant. Sub-clause (b)(i) of sub-section (2)
clearly stipulates that the CEO shall be appointed from among officers
in the cadre constituted under Section 54;
(v) Rule 3 of the Central Cooperative Bank Staff Services Rules 1982
stipulates that appointments to all posts classified as Class-I posts shall
be made by the Apex Bank from the list of cadre officers maintained by
it. The Bye-laws of the first respondent stipulate that appointments to
the post of Managing Director/General Manager/Manager shall be from
the cadre of officers maintained by the Apex Bank. If a cadre officer is
not available due to unforeseen circumstances, a temporary
appointment may be made by the first respondent with the prior
permission of the appellant, subject to such terms and conditions as
may be imposed;
(vi) The 2016 Amendment Act which amended Section 54(3) must be read
together with other provisions and not independently. The amendment
in sub-section (3) only deals with the eligibility criteria and is equally
applicable to both the Apex Society and to any Central Society. Both
the appellant and the first respondent are cooperative banks. The
appellant is an Apex Society while the first respondent is a Central
Society;
12
(vii) Under sub-section (2) of Section 54, both Apex Societies and Central
Societies have to maintain cadres of officers and other servants as the
State Government may, by order, direct. Sub-section (3) makes it
obligatory on the first respondent (which is a Central Society) to accept
and appoint a cadre officer to a cadre post as and when deputed by the
appellant (which is the Apex Society). It is only if the CEO is not
appointed within a specified period, that the Registrar is empowered to
appoint an eligible officer as the CEO.
(viii) In the present case, the earlier CEO of the first respondent was
arrested on a charge of corruption under the PC Act. The Chairperson
of the first respondent appointed a Manager as an interim CEO, who
was not from the cadre of officers maintained by the Apex Bank.
Hence, the appellant in exercise of its powers under Section 54(3) read
with the notification dated 12 January 1971, deputed the sixth
respondent as CEO of the first respondent on 11 August 2017 which
appointment, the first respondent was bound to accept. On a
clarification sought by the BoD of the first respondent, the Registrar of
Cooperative Societies, by his reply dated 21 August 2017 observed that
the appointment made by the appellant was in accordance with law.
Consequently, the BoDs accepted the appointment of the sixth
respondent at a meeting on 25 August 2017. The order deputing the
sixth respondent as CEO was ratified by the Registrar and accepted by
the BoD of the first respondent; and
(ix) The learned Single Judge correctly dismissed the Writ Petition filed by
13
the first respondent. The Division Bench allowed the Writ Appeal on an
erroneous appreciation of the applicable legal regime. In the case of all
Central Cooperative Banks in Chhattisgarh, the CEO is an officer drawn
from the cadre maintained by the Apex Bank. This is in consonance
with Sections 49-E and 54(3) of the 1960 Act and notifications issued
from time to time. The consequence of the impugned decision would be
to deprive the Apex Bank of its authority to monitor the affairs of Central
Cooperative Societies. Financial control can be maintained through the
power to appoint CEOs. Such a position was occasioned as huge
amounts of public funds is at stake. The view of the Division Bench will
have far-reaching repercussions in the cooperative set up and the
beneficial purpose of the legislation would be defeated resulting in
mismanagement and misappropriation of public funds.
19 On the other hand, learned counsel appearing on behalf of the first
respondent urged that:
(i) Section 57-B of the 1960 Act was inserted by the Chhattisgarh
Cooperative Societies (Amendment) Act 2012 9 . Sub-section (19) of
Section 57-B provides that the CEO of State Cooperative Banks and
Central Cooperative Banks shall be appointed by the members of the
board of the State Cooperative Bank and the Central Cooperative Bank, as
the case may be, from among a panel of names not exceeding three
persons eligible to hold the office of CEO in accordance with the criteria
stipulated by the RBI. The aforesaid panel was to be recommended by a
9 “2012 Amendment Act”
14
selection board consisting of the following persons, all of whom shall be
the members of the Board of the State Cooperative Bank or the Central
Cooperative Bank, as the case may be:
a) The nominee of the State government on the board;
b) The nominee of the National Bank on the board; and
c) One other member of the board, whether elected or co-opted.
(ii) Section 57-B of the 1960 Act was omitted by the 2016 Amendment Act and
clauses (a) and (b) were inserted in sub-section (3) of Section 54 of the
1960 Act, whereby the power was given to the Cooperative Bank to
appoint the CEO within a specified time period and in default, the Registrar
is empowered to appoint such eligible officer of the bank as the CEO;
(iii) The language of the 1960 Act indicates that the CEO of Cooperative
Societies, be it a Primary Cooperative Society, Central Cooperative
Society or State Cooperative Society, can be appointed by that
Cooperative Society only. A plain reading of Section 54(3) (a) and (b)
makes it crystal clear that the power to appoint a CEO lies with the
Cooperative Society and not with the Apex Society. It is also clear from the
reading of the provision that the CEO of the Cooperative Bank shall be
appointed from the eligible officers of the said Cooperative Bank. This can
also be inferred from the fact that the said power was earlier given under
section 57-B of the 1960 Act but by the 2016 Amendment Act, Section 57-
B was omitted and the provision of appointment was inserted in Section
54(3)(b);
15
(iv) Clause (b) of sub-section (2) of Section 49-E enumerates that a CEO shall
be appointed from among the Officers of the cadre maintained under
Section 54, if such a cadre has been created. Section 54(1) provides that
the “no society shall appoint a Manager, Secretary, Accountant and other
paid officer unless he holds such qualifications as may be prescribed”. The
word “Society” mentioned in sub-section (1) of Section 54 includes
Primary Cooperative Societies, Central Cooperative Societies and State
Cooperative Societies, which means that every society shall appoint its
Manager, Secretary, Accountant and other paid officers;
(v) The notification dated 12 January 1971 issued by the State Government
under Section 54(3) will be considered to be nullified by the 2012
Amendment Act and subsequently by the 2016 Amendment Act. The said
notification is not applicable in appointing a CEO in view of the omission of
Section 57-B of the 1960 Act and the subsequent insertion of Section
54(3)(a) and (b). The 1960 Act does not mention that the CEO of the
Central Cooperative Bank shall be appointed by the State Cooperative
Bank from the cadre officers of the State Cooperative Bank. What is not
provided in the statute cannot be read into it. This is more so when the
language of section 54(3)(b) is plain, clear and unambiguous that the
Cooperative Society shall appoint the CEO;
(vi) It is settled law that if the language of the statute is clear, plain and
unambiguous and admits of only one meaning, then no question of
interpretation arises. The appellant cannot be permitted to add words in
the statute to make it workable for it; and
16
(vii) The action of the State Cooperative Bank in appointing the CEO of the
Central Cooperative Bank is arbitrary and illegal as it is beyond the powers
of the State Cooperative Bank under the 1960 Act.
20 The rival submissions now fall for consideration.
21 Section 54 contains provisions for the appointment of Managers,
Secretaries and other officers of societies. Sub-section (1) stipulates that a
Manager, Secretary, Accountant or other paid officer shall be appointed only if
they possess the prescribed qualifications. A reading of the sub-section denotes
that the power to make appointments vests with the society itself.
22 Sub-section (2) of Section 54 casts an obligation upon Apex and Central
Societies to maintain such cadre of officers as the State Government may, by
order, direct. The Registrar is empowered to frame the conditions of service of
the members of the cadre so constituted.
23 Section 49-E of the 1960 Act deals specifically with the appointment of
Managing Directors and Chief Executive Officers in certain circumstances. The
provision deals only with the appointment of the Managing Director and the CEO.
It covers appointments “in certain circumstances,” which are specified therein.
Sub-section (1) of Section 49-E deals with the appointment of the Managing
Director of an Apex Society. Sub-section (2) deals with the appointment of the
Managing Director (who shall be the CEO) of Central Societies. Section 49-E
applies to a situation where the State Government has:
(i) contributed to the share capital; or
17
(ii) given loans or financial assistance; or
(iii) guaranteed the repayment of loans, debentures or advances; or
(iv) given grants in any other form.
The provisions of both sub-sections (1) and (2) of Section 49-E begin with an
overriding non-obstante stipulation. The provisions operate notwithstanding
anything contained to the contrary in the 1960 Act, rules thereunder or bye-laws
of the society. Section 49-E thus carves out an exception to the power vested in
societies to make appointments under Section 54(1). Sub-section (2)(a)
stipulates that for every Central Society, there shall be a Managing Director not
below the rank of a Class-II officer, who shall be the CEO of the society. Clause
(b) of Section (2) stipulates that the CEO would be appointed from among the
officers of the cadre maintained under Section 54, if such a cadre has been
constituted and in all other cases, with the prior approval of the Registrar of
Cooperative Societies. Thus, for Central Societies which fall within the purview of
Section 49-E(2), the source of appointment for the Managing Director or the
General Manager (who shall be the CEO) must be from the officers drawn from
the cadre constituted under Section 54, if such cadre has been constituted. In all
other cases, the Central Society may appoint the Managing Director or General
Manager with the prior approval of the Registrar of Cooperative Societies.
24 A pre-requisite to bring a Central Society within the fold of Section 49-E(2)
is that the State Government has contributed to its share capital, given loans or
financial assistance, guaranteed the repayment of loans, debentures or advances
or has given grants in any other form. Evidently, this provision has been
18
introduced by the legislature as an effort to maintain regulatory control over
Central Societies to whom financial assistance has been extended by the State
Government in the terms set out in the provision. For this reason, where the
society is a Central Society that satisfies the requirements of Section 49-E(2), the
general power vested in it to appoint its CEO under Section 54(1) is limited to
appointment from the cadres constituted and maintained under Section 54.
25 Sub-section (3) of Section 54 empowers the State Government to specify,
by notification, the class of societies which shall employ officers from cadres
maintained by Apex or Central Societies as specified therein. The provision
stipulates that upon the issuance of such notification, it shall be obligatory for the
class of societies notified therein to accept and appoint such cadre officers on
cadre posts as and when deputed by the Apex or Central Society, as the case
may be. Upon the issuance of a notification under Section 54(3), an exception is
carved to the power of appointment conferred upon the notified class of societies
under Section 54(1). Where a class of societies has been notified by the State
Government to employ officers from cadres constituted by the Apex or Central
Society, the power of appointment vests with the Apex or Central Society, as
specified in the notification. The notified class of societies is under an obligation
to accept and appoint cadre officers deputed to cadre posts by the Apex or
Central Society, as the case may be.
26 The present dispute has arisen by virtue of the 2016 Amending Act which
inserted clauses (a) and (b) in Section 54(3) of the 1960 Act. Clause (a) of sub-
section (3) stipulates that the eligibility criteria for the post of CEO of a
19
Cooperative Bank are those prescribed by the RBI in this regard. Clause (b)
stipulates that if the concerned Cooperative Bank fails to appoint a CEO under
the eligibility criteria within a specified period, the Registrar may appoint an
eligible officer of the Bank. The submission of the first respondent, which has
found acceptance with the Division Bench of the High Court, is that as a result of
the amendment which was made in 2016, the exclusive jurisdiction to appoint a
CEO of a Cooperative Bank vests with the Bank itself. However, according to the
submission, the CEO must fulfill the eligibility criteria prescribed by the RBI.
Moreover, it is only where the Cooperative Bank fails to appoint an eligible CEO
within a specified period, that clause (b) of Section 54(3) empowers the Registrar
of Cooperative Societies to appoint an eligible officer of the bank.
27 In the submission of the first respondent, clauses (a) and (b) are special
provisions enacted for Cooperative Banks and are intended to have an overriding
effect over: (i) the power of the State Government to issue a notification in
exercise of its powers under Section 54(3); and (ii) Section 49-E(2) which
mandates that Central Societies shall appoint their CEOs from the cadre
constituted under Section 54. Clauses (a) and (b) of Section 54(3), it was
contended, vests with Cooperative Banks the absolute power to appoint their
CEOs, notwithstanding any other provision in the 1960 Act. The effect of the
amended provision may be considered in two parts: first, its effect on the power
of the State Government to issue a notification in pursuance of the power
conferred upon it under Section 54(3); and second, its effect on Section 49-E(2).
20
28 By virtue of the 2012 Amendment Act, Section 57-B was introduced as a
new Chapter V-A with provisions for short term Co-operative Credit Structure
Societies. The term „short term Co-operative Credit Structure Societies‟ was
defined as including “the State Co-operative Bank, a Central Co-operative Bank
and a Primary Agricultural Credit Co-operative Society”. Section 57-B(19)
stipulated that the Chief Executive Officer of the State Co-operative Bank and a
Central Co-operative Bank, shall be appointed by the members of the Board of
the State Co-operative Bank or the Central Co-operative Bank, as the case may
be. The appointment was to be made from a panel of names eligible to hold the
post in accordance with the criteria stipulated by the RBI. The constitution of the
Selection Board was also set out in sub-section (19). By virtue of this provision,
an exception was carved out for the appointment of the CEO of Central Co-
operative Banks and State Co-operative Banks, subject to the conditions
prescribed therein.
29 By the 2016 Amendment Act, Section 57-B was deleted and clauses (a)
and (b) were inserted in Section 54(3). Significantly, sub-section (3) of Section 54
is not confined only to Cooperative Banks. Section 54(3) empowers the State
Government to specify, by notification, the class of societies which shall employ
officers from cadres maintained by Apex or Central Societies. The term „class of
societies‟ employed in Section 54(3) includes any type of society covered by the
provisions of the 1960 Act, including Cooperative Banks (as resource societies).
This view is strengthened by Section 10 of the 1960 Act which mandates that the
Registrar of Cooperative Societies shall classify all societies under one or more
of the following heads:
21
(i) Consumer Society;
(ii) Farming Society;
(iii) Housing Society;
(iv) Marketing Society;
(v) Multipurpose Society;
(vi) Producer‟s Society;
(vii) Processing Society;
(viii) Resource Society;
(ix) General Society; and
(x) Industrial Society.
Section 10 also empowers the Registrar to further classify societies falling under
any of the above classifications into:
(i) Apex Society;
(ii) Central Society; and
(iii) Primary Society.
30 The 1960 Act covers a myriad of societies under its ambit. Though the
term „class of societies‟ includes within its ambit Cooperative Banks, the learned
counsel for the first respondent has contended that clause (a) and (b) of Section
54(3) were intended to carve out Cooperative Banks from the enabling power
conferred upon the State Government and vest with them the exclusive power to
appoint their CEOs. It was been urged that were this Court to hold that there is an
obligation upon a Cooperative Bank, as a notified society under Section 54(3), to
accept from the Apex or Central Society as specified in the notification a deputed
22
cadre officer as its CEO, clauses (a) and (b) would be rendered otiose.
31 It is a settled principle of law that where two provisions of an enactment
appear to conflict, courts must adopt an interpretation which harmonises, to the
best extent possible, both provisions. Justice G P Singh in his seminal work
Principles of Statutory Interpretation states:
“To harmonise is not to destroy. A familiar approach in all
such cases is to find out which of the two apparently
conflicting provisions in more general and which is more
specific and to construe the more general one as to exclude
the more specific…The principle is expressed in the maxims
Generalia specialibus non derogant and Generalibus
specialia.”
Similarly, Craies in Statute Law states:
“The rule is, that whenever there is a particular enactment
and a general enactment in the same statute, and the latter,
taken in its most comprehensive sense, would overrule the
former, the particular enactment must be operative, and the
general enactment must be taken to affect only the other
parts of the statute to which it may properly apply.”
Where two provisions conflict, courts may enquire which of the two provisions is
specific in nature and whether it was intended that the specific provision is carved
out from the application of the general provision. The general provision operates,
save and except in situations covered by the specific provision. The rationale
behind this principle of statutory construction is that were there appears a conflict
between two provisions, it must be presumed that the legislature did not intend a
conflict and a subject-specific provision governs those situations in exclusion to
the operation of the general provision.
23
32 In an early decision of this Court in JK Cotton Spinning and Weaving
Mills Co Ltd v State of Uttar Pradesh 10
, a three judge Bench of this Court
considered whether the principle applied to conflicts within the same enactment.
Clause 5(a) of the Government Order dated 10 May 1948 conferred upon, inter
alia, any employee or a registered trade union of employers the right to move the
Board constituted under the Order to initiate an enquiry into an industrial dispute.
Clause 23 stipulated that where an enquiry is pending before the Regional
Conciliation Officer, notwithstanding the pendency of a case before the Board or
Industrial Court, no employer shall discharge or dismiss any workman. Under
Clause 24, an order of the Board, unless modified in appeal, was final and
conclusive. The appellant, representing the employer‟s union, contended that
once an order is made under Clause 5(a), Clause 23 has no application and the
employer may proceed to dismiss the workmen. The Court rejected the
contention noting that any employer could defeat the provisions of Clause 23
merely by an application under Clause 5(a). The Court held that Clause 23 was
made with a definite purpose. Consequently, where an enquiry was pending
under Clause 23, an application under Clause 5(a) was barred. The Court held:
“9…We reach the same result by applying another well-
known rule of construction that general provisions yield to
special provisions. The learned Attorney-General seemed to
suggest that while this rule of construction is applicable to
resolve the conflict between the general provision in one Act
and the special provision in another Act, the rule cannot apply
in resolving a conflict between general and special provisions
in the same legislative instrument. This suggestion does
not find support in either principle or authority. The rule
that general provisions should yield to specific
provisions is not an arbitrary principle made by lawyers
and Judges but springs from the common understanding
of men and women that when the same person gives two
10
AIR 1961 SC 1170
24
directions one covering a large number of matters in
general and another to only some of them his intention is
that these latter directions should prevail as regards
these while as regards all the rest the earlier direction
should have effect.
10. Applying this rule of construction that in cases of conflict
between a specific provision and a general provision the
specific provision prevails over the general provision and the
general provision applies only to such cases which are not
covered by the special provision, we must hold that clause
5(a) has no application in a case where the special provisions
of clause 23 are applicable.”
This Court affirmed that the principle that the general excludes the specific is a
tool of statutory interpretation even in cases of conflict within the same
enactment. Where one of the conflicting provisions is general in nature and the
other is specific, „common understanding‟ dictates that the specific provision is
given effect, while the general provision continues to apply to all other situations.
33 In Commercial Tax Officer, Rajasthan v M/s Binani Cements Ltd.,
11 the
question concerned whether the respondent-assessee was entitled for the grant
of an eligibility certificate for exemption from payment of Central Sales Tax and
Rajasthan Sales Tax under Entry 4 in Annexure „C‟ of the Sales Tax New
Incentive Scheme for Industries, 1989. Annexure „C‟ to the Scheme was titled the
„Quantum of Sales Tax Exemption under the new Scheme‟. Entry 4 of the
Annexure stipulated that „Prestigious Units‟ would be entitled to a 75% exemption
from tax liability with 100% in terms of Fixed Capital Investment. By an
amendment, Entry 1E was inserted which covered „new cement units‟ and
stipulated that large-scale units would be entitled 25% tax exemption. A two
judge Bench of this Court held: 11
Civil Appeal No. 336 of 2003, decided on 19 February 2014.
25
“27. Before we deal with the fact situation in the present
appeal, we reiterate the settled legal position in law, that is, if
in a Statutory Rule or Statutory Notification, there are two
expressions used, one in General Terms and the other in
special words, under the rules of interpretation, it has to be
understood that the special words were not meant to be
included in the general expression. Alternatively, it can be
said that where a Statute contains both a General Provision
as well as specific provision, the later must prevail.
29…It is well established that when a general law and a
special law dealing with some aspect dealt with by the
general law are in question, the rule adopted and applied is
one of harmonious construction whereby the general law, to
the extent dealt with by the special law, is impliedly repealed.
This principle finds its origins in the latin maxim of generalia
specialibus non derogant...”
The Court held that where two provisions are in question – one of general
application and the other specific in nature, a harmonious interpretation would
mean that the general law, to the extent it is dealt with by the special law, is
impliedly repealed. This Court, relying on the principle generalia specialibus non
derogant held that Item 1E is a “subject specific provision”. The Court noted that
the amendment removed “new cement industries” from the non-eligible Annexure
„B‟ and placed it into Annexure „C‟ amongst the eligible industries. Consequently,
the Court rejected the contention of the respondent-assessee and held that as
Item 1E concerned the more specific unit, it was excluded in its application from
other general entries.
The principle that the general provision excludes the more specific has been
consistently applied by this Court in South Indian Corporation (P) Ltd. v
Secretary, Board of Revenue 12
, Paradip Port Trust v Their Workmen 13
,
12
AIR 1964 SC 207 13
AIR 1977 SC 36
26
Maharashtra State Board of Secondary and Higher Education v Paritosh
Bhupesh Kumar Sheth 14
, CCE v Jayant Oil Mills, 15
P S Sathappan v Andhra
Bank Ltd 16
, Sarabjit Rick Singh v Union of India 17
and Pankajakshi v
Chandrika 18
.
34 While sub-section (3) of Section 54(3) deals with a class of societies,
clauses (a) and (b), as inserted by the 2016 Amendment Act are specific in their
application to only Cooperative Banks. Furthermore, while Section 54(3) deals
with the appointment of deputed cadre officers on cadre posts, clauses (a) and
(b) deal only with the appointment of the CEOs of Cooperative Banks. Clause (a)
contemplates that the eligibility guidelines prescribed by the RBI will apply to
officers holding the post of the CEO of a Cooperative Bank. Significantly, clause
(b) of Section 54(3) beings with the words “if the concerning co-operative Bank
fails to appoint” which denotes an intention to vest with Cooperative Banks the
power to appoint their CEO. The provision also stipulates that where the
Cooperative Bank fails to appoint the CEO within a specified period, the Registrar
may appoint an eligible officer of the bank. The stipulation that in the case of
default, the CEO shall be an officer of the bank and not an officer from the cadre
as notified under Section 54(3) demonstrates the intention of the legislature to
vest with Cooperative Banks the power to appoint their CEO.
35 Evidently, by virtue of the 2016 Amendment Act, clauses (a) and (b) were
inserted as specific provisions for the appointment of the CEO of Cooperative
14
(1984) 4 SCC 27 15
(1989) 3 SCC 343 16
(2004) 11 SCC 672 17
(2008) 2 SCC 417 18
(2016)6SCC157
27
Banks, vesting in them the power of appointment. Where two interpretations of
potentially conflicting provisions are possible, courts must adopt the interpretation
that furthers the intention of the legislature as encapsulated in the maxim Verba
ita sunt intelligenda ut res magis valeat quam pereat. Craies on Legislation
states:
“…if two constructions of a provision are possible on its face,
and one would clearly advance the legislative purpose and
the other would clearly achieve little or nothing, the former is
to be preferred.”
36 In this view of the matter, a harmonious construction of Section 54(3) and
clauses (a) and (b) of the 2016 Amendment Act leads to the conclusion that
clauses (a) and (b) are special provisions concerning the appointment of the CEO
of Cooperative Banks which are carved out of power of the State Government to
issue a notification under Section 54(3). We are strengthened in this view by the
deletion of Section 57-B(19) and the simultaneous insertion of clauses (a) and (b)
in Section 54(3).
37 The difficulty in the present matters arises from the contention of the first
respondent that the exception carved out by clauses (a) and (b) of Section 54(3)
also applies to Central Societies that fall within the ambit of Section 49-E(2) of the
1960 Act. In this submission, where a Cooperative Bank as a Central Society has
received funds from the State Government in the manner stipulated in Section
49-E(2), such Central Banks may independently appoint a CEO and would not be
obligated to appoint its CEO from the cadre constituted under Section 54, even if
such cadre has been constituted.
28
38 As we have noted, both sub-section (2) and sub-section (3) of Section 54
are not provisions confined only to Cooperative Banks. However, clauses (a) and
(b) of sub-section (3) specifically deal with the appointment of CEOs of
Cooperative Banks. While introducing clauses (a) and (b) into sub-section (3) of
Section 54 by the 2016 Amendment Act, the legislature has nonetheless left
intact the provisions of Section 49-E. Section 49-E(2) stipulates that the CEO
shall be appointed from among the officers of the cadre maintained under Section
54, where such cadre has been constituted. Section 49-E is a provision
governing Apex and Central Societies to whom financial assistance has been
extended by the State Government in the forms stipulated therein. The
expression “Central Society” is defined to mean a Cooperative Land
Development Bank or any other society whose operation is confined to a part of
the State, as noticed earlier in Section (2)(c-i). The provisions contained in
Section 49-E are intended to bring about regulatory control of the State
Government by requiring the appointment of the CEO from among the officers of
the cadre maintained under Section 54. The 2016 Amendment Act which brought
in the provision of clauses (a) and (b) of sub-section (3) has not affected the
operation of Section 49-E. Hence, the appointment of a CEO of Central Society
governed by Section 49-E(2) has to be from the officers of the cadre maintained
under Section 54. Significantly, sub-section (2) of Section 49-E contains a non-
obstante stipulation. As a consequence, notwithstanding the 2016 Amendment
Act, the CEO of a Central Society falling within the description of sub-section (2)
of Section 49-E has to be appointed from among the officers of the cadre
maintained under Section 54, if such cadre has been constituted.
29
39 It is necessary here to note that Section 49-E(2) is not a self-contained
provision. Section 49-E(2)(b)(i) merely stipulates that the CEO of a Central
Society that falls within its ambit, shall be appointed from among the officers of
the cadres maintained under Section 54. Thus, where a cadre under Section 54
has been constituted, a Central Society falling within the ambit of Section 49-E(2)
is obligated to appoint its officer from such cadre. Neither Section 49-E nor
Section 54(2) specify whether the appointment is to be made from the cadre of
the Apex Society or Central Society as constituted under Section 54(2). Section
54(3) empowers the State Government to issue a notification specifying the class
of societies which shall employ officers from such cadres maintained by Apex or
Central Societies as may be specified therein. In addition to conferring upon the
State Government the general power to notify the class of societies which would
employ officers from the cadres maintained by Apex or Central Societies, the
notification under Section 54(3) operationalizes the regulatory control of the State
Government envisaged in Section 49-E(2) in the manner specified therein.
40 This is evident in the notification dated 12 January 1971 issued by the
State Government in exercise of the power conferred upon it which stipulated that
the first respondent (as a District Central Cooperative Bank) is obligated to
accept and appoint the officer deputed by the appellant (as the Apex Society) as
the CEO. Had Section 49-E(2) an inbuilt mechanism for the determination of the
officer who would be appointed as the CEO, no difficulty would arise given the
use of a non-obstante provision therein. The difficulty arises precisely because of
the link between Section 49-E and the notification issued by the State
Government under Section 54(3). To hold that clauses (a) and (b) vest in
30
Cooperative Banks which are Central Societies falling within the ambit of Section
49-E(2) the overriding power to appoint their CEO would render the provision
inoperative. This would defeat the salient purpose of ensuring the regulatory
control of the State Government over Societies to which it has made a financial
contribution. On the other hand, to hold that a Cooperative Bank which is a
Central Society within the ambit of Section 49-E(2) must accept and appoint the
cadre officer deputed by the Apex Society, defeats the special provision inserted
for Cooperative Banks in clauses (a) and (b) of Section 54(3). Both Section 49-
E(2)(b) and clauses (a) and (b) of Section 54(3) deal with the appointment of a
CEO.
41 As we have noted before, it is settled principal of law that where two
provisions of an enactment appear to conflict, courts must adopt an interpretation
which harmonises, to the best extent possible, both provisions. Justice G P
Singh in his seminal work Principles of Statutory Interpretation states:
“…It is the duty of the court to avoid “a head on clash”
between two sections of the same Act and, “whenever it is
possible to do so, to construe provisions which appear to
conflict so that they harmonise.”
Francis Benion in his work Statutory Interpretation states:
“Inconsistent enactments – A common application of the
principle is in relation to contradictory enactments within the
same Act. Enactment A may in itself be clear and
unambiguous. So may enactment B, located elsewhere in the
Act. But if they contradict each other, they cannot both be
applied literally. A undoes B, and B undoes A. The court must
do the best it can to reconcile them, but this can be achieved
only by giving one or both a strained construction.”
31
Where two provisions of an enactment appear to be in conflict, courts do not
readily presume an „either/or‟ situation. Courts must construe the provisions
harmoniously to ensure, as far as possible, the effective operation of both
provisions in a manner that furthers the purpose of the enactment. Every
provision, phrase, clause and word must be interpreted in a manner to further the
object of the enactment. No word or part of a statute can be construed in
isolation. Courts must be mindful that an interpretation which renders either
provision otiose must be avoided unless the conflict does not yield any possible
reconciliation.
42 In Krishan Kumar v State of Rajasthan, 19
the Rajasthan State Road
Transport Corporation, Jaipur proposed a scheme in 1977 under Section 68-C of
the Motor Vehicles Act 1939 20
for the exclusive operation of the disputed road.
Upon the enactment of the Motor Vehicles Act 1988 21
, a Writ Petition was filed
contending that due to undue delay in notifying the scheme under 1939 Act, the
scheme was not saved by the 1988 Act. Section 100(4) of the 1988 Act stipulated
that a draft scheme must be finalized within one year from the date of its
publication, failing which it would lapse. Section 217(2)(e) stipulated that
notwithstanding the repeal of the 1939 Act, a scheme proposed under Section
68-C, if pending immediately before the commencement of the 1988 Act, shall be
finalised in accordance with the provisions of Section 100 of the 1988 Act. The
Court noted that, contrary to legislative intent, no scheme under the 1939 Act
would be saved if schemes under that Act were to be assessed with reference to
19
(1991) 4 SCC 258 20
“1939 Act” 21
“1988 Act”
32
the date of their publication. Noting the apparent conflict between the two
provisions, a two judge Bench of this Court interpreted both provisions
harmoniously and held:
“10. There appears to be some apparent conflict between
Section 100(4) and Section 217(2)(e) of the Act. While
Section 217(2)(e) permits finalisation of a scheme in
accordance with Section 100 of the new Act sub-section (4) of
Section 100 lays down that a scheme if not finalised within a
period of one year shall be deemed to have lapsed. If the
appellant's contention is accepted then Section 217(2)(e) will
become nugatory and no scheme published under Section
68-C of the old Act could be finalised under the new Act. On
the other hand if the period of one year as prescribed under
Section 100(4) is not computed from the date of publication of
the scheme under Section 68-C of the old Act and instead the
period of one year is computed from the date of
commencement of the Act both the provisions could be given
full effect.
11. It is settled principle of interpretation that where there appears to be inconsistency in two sections of the same Act, the principle of harmonious construction should be followed in avoiding a head on clash. It should not be lightly assumed that what the Parliament has given with one hand, it took away with the other. The provisions of one section of statute cannot be used to defeat those of another unless it is impossible to reconcile the same.”
The Court held that where the Parliament confers a benefit, it must not be readily
assumed that it intends to withdraw a benefit at the same time. Furthermore, the
provisions of one section cannot be used to defeat another, unless there is no
possibility of reconciling the two conflicting provisions.
43 In British Airways Plc v Union Of India
22 , the appellant was an aircraft
carrier engaged in the business of international air transport of passengers and
cargo. It was contended that as they were not a “person-in-charge” as defined in
Section 2(31) of the Customs Act 1962, no penalty can be imposed upon them
22
(2002) 2 SCC 95
33
under Section 116 for shortages in offloading the quantity of goods consigned.
Section 42 required an officer under the Act to issue a written order for the
conveyance of the goods from the customs house. Clause (e) of sub-section (2)
of Section 42 prescribes that no such order shall be given until the person-in-
charge of the conveyance has satisfied the proper officer that no penalty is
leviable on them under Section 116 or the payment of any penalty that may be
levied upon them under that section has been secured by such guarantee or
deposit of such amount as the proper officer may direct. The appellant contended
that once a clearance order is issued, no liability can be imposed on them.
44 A two judge Bench of this Court noted held that while Section 42 operated
to expedite the clearance of goods, Section 116 operated to ensure the
protection of cargo. Consequently, the two provisions subserved different
purposes. Further, by an amendment in Section 148 which was a provision for
the liability of an agent of the person in charge, sub-section (2) was inserted
which stipulated that any person who represents himself to any officer of customs
as an agent of any such person-in-charge, and is accepted as such by that
officer, shall be liable for the fulfillment of any obligation of the person-in-charge.
The Court held that effect must be given to the amendment, which would be
rendered redundant if the contention of the appellant was accepted. Relying on
the principle of harmonious interpretation, the Court held:
“It is a cardinal principle of construction of a statute that effort
should be made in construing the different provisions so that
each provision will have its play and in the event of any
conflict a harmonious construction should be given. The well-
known principle of harmonious construction is that effect shall
be given to all the provisions and for that any provision of the
statute should be construed with reference to the other
34
provisions so as to make it workable. A particular provision
cannot be picked up and interpreted to defeat another
provision made in that behalf under the statute. It is the duty
of the court to make such construction of a statute which shall
suppress the mischief and advance the remedy.”
This Court held that courts must ensure that every provision is construed in a
manner to render seemingly contradictory provisions workable. In interpreting two
provisions of a statute, courts must adopt the interpretation which does not defeat
either provision and advances the remedy envisaged by their enactment.
45 In this view, this Court must ensure that neither provision – Section 49-E(2)
nor Sections 54(3)(a) and (b) is reduced to a dead letter of law. It cannot be said
that the carving out of Cooperative Banks for the appointment of their CEO from
the enabling power conferred upon the State Government under Section 54(3)
applies in equal measure to those Cooperative Banks that are Central Societies
within the ambit of Section 49-E(2). We hold that the State Government is
empowered to issue a notification under Section 54(3) for Cooperative Banks
which are Central Societies falling within the ambit of Section 49-E(2) specifying
that the Cooperative Bank shall appoint its CEO from the cadre constituted by the
Apex Society. At the same time, to ensure that clauses (a) and (b) of Section
54(3) are given effect, the notified Apex Society shall forward to the concerned
Cooperative Bank a panel of officers from which the it shall appoint its CEO,
subject to the officer satisfying the eligibility criteria prescribed by the RBI.
46 In the view which we have taken, the regulatory control of the State
Government over Cooperative Banks which have received state funding in the
manner specified in Section 49-E(2) is retained, which furthers the object of the
35
provision. The High Court was in error in holding that in the matter of an
appointment of the CEO, “the Apex Body or the Central Society have no power or
role to play”. The decision of the High Court will have serious ramifications in
terms of divesting the regulatory control over the affairs of Central Societies. At
the same time, conferring the power to the Cooperative Bank to appoint its CEO
from a panel gives effect to the special provision inserted by virtue of clauses (a)
and (b) in Section 54(3). This view is strengthened by virtue of the fact that prior
to its deletion, Section 57-B(19) was a provision in Chapter VA of which sub-
section (1) read thus:
“Notwithstanding anything contained in this Act or Rules
framed there under or bylaws of any registered society or
orders issued there under, the provisions of this chapter shall
have overriding effect.”
(Emphasis supplied)
Section 57-B(19), which was intended to have overriding effect, was deleted and
clauses (a) and (b) were inserted in Section 54(3) of the 1960 Act. The absolute
power conferred upon Cooperative Banks to appoint the CEO was deleted. In this
view, Section 49-E(2) and clauses (a) and (b) of Section 54(3) are to be read
harmoniously in the manner noted above.
47 The position of law that emerges from the above discussion is thus:
(i) Clauses (a) and (b) of Section 54(3), as special provisions for the
appointment of the CEO of Cooperative Banks confer upon them the
power to appoint their CEO, subject to such officer satisfying the
eligibility criteria prescribed by the RBI in this regard. The term „class of
societies‟ in Section 54(3) excludes Cooperative Banks for the limited
purpose of the appointment of their CEO;
36
(ii) However, where a Cooperative Bank is a Central Society within the
ambit of Section 49-E(2), the CEO shall be appointed from among the
officers of the cadre constituted and maintained under Section 54,
where such cadre has been constituted. The State Government is
empowered to issue a notification in pursuance of the power conferred
upon it under Section 54(3) specifying that such Cooperative Bank shall
appoint its CEO from the cadre maintained by the Apex Society as
notified therein. The notified Apex Society shall forward to the
concerned Cooperative Bank a panel of officers, from which the
Cooperative Bank shall appoint its CEO, subject to such officer
possessing the eligibility criteria as stipulated by the RBI; and
(iii) Where no cadre has been constituted under Section 54, the CEO of a
Cooperative Bank which is a Central Society under Section 49-E(2)
shall be appointed with the prior approval of the Registrar as stipulated
in Section 49-E(2)(b)(ii).
48 In the present case, it was not disputed that the first respondent is a
Central Society falling within the ambit of Section 49-E(2) of the 1960 Act. In
exercise of the power conferred by Section 54(3) of the 1960 Act, the State
Government issued a notification dated 12 January 1971 specifying that Central
Cooperative Banks were obligated to employ officers, according to their
availability, only from the cadres created by the State Cooperative Bank. A similar
notification was issued on 26 June 1971 in terms of which, Central Cooperative
Banks were permitted to maintain cadres of officers and, it was stipulated that
Village Cooperative Societies including Large Sized Agricultural Credit Societies
37
would have to employ officers drawn only from the cadres maintained by the
Central Cooperative Bank. Similarly, by another notification dated 26 June 1971,
Central Cooperative Banks were directed to maintain cadres of officers for the
appointment of managers in rural cooperative societies including Large Sized
Agricultural Credit Societies.
49 The seventh respondent is not an officer from the cadre maintained by the
appellant. Consequently, the action of the first respondent in seeking to appoint
the seventh respondent as the CEO is not sustainable in law. The appointment of
the sixth respondent as CEO was ratified by the Registrar of Societies by his
reply dated 21 August 2017 and accepted by the BoD of the first respondent on
25 August 2017.
50 We accordingly allow the appeal and set aside the impugned judgment
and order of the High Court dated 7 August 2018. In consequence, we uphold the
order of the learned Single Judge dismissing the Writ Petition, though for the
reasons that we have indicated above. There shall be no order as to costs.
…………...…...….......………………........J. [Dr Dhananjaya Y Chandrachud]
…..…..…....…........……………….…........J. [Ajay Rastogi]
New Delhi; March 04, 2020.