NON-REPORTABLE

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA

CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION

CIVIL APPEAL NO. 7389 OF 2011  [ARISING OUT OF SLP (CIVIL) NO.9211 OF 2010]

Man Singh … Appellant

Versus

Maruti Suzuki India Ltd. & Another … Respondents

O R D E R

1. Leave granted.

2. The relationship of employer and workman between the appellant  

and the respondent – company was brought to end in terms of a voluntary  

retirement scheme (in short “VRS”) introduced by the management of the  

company in September,  2011.  The appellant,  however, alleged that he  

was made to take voluntary retirement under duress and, in reality, his  

removal from service was illegal and unjustified.  On those allegations he

raised an  industrial  dispute.   The appropriate  Government  referred the  

dispute  for  adjudication  before  the  Labour  Court,  Gurgaon,  vide order  

dated December 4, 2006.  The reference is in the following terms:

“Whether the termination of service of Shri Man Singh  on  the  basis  of  VRS  Scheme  by  the  Management  was  justified and correct, if not, to what relief is he entitled?”

3. The respondent – company challenged the competence and validity  

of  the  reference  in  a  Writ  Petition  (CWP  No.3358/2009)  before  the  

Punjab and Haryana High Court.  On behalf of the respondent – company,  

it was contended that having accepted the full monetary benefits under the  

VRS, it was no longer open to the appellant to question or challenge his  

termination of service and, in any case, any adjudication on the dispute  

raised by the appellant should not be allowed to proceed while he retained  

all the monetary benefits collected by him under the scheme.  

4. A learned single Judge of the High Court upheld the respondent’s  

contention and  while  disposing of the Writ  Petition by judgment and  

order dated November 23, 2009 made the  following directions:-

“To make the scales even, the Labour Court will undertake  the  adjudication  on  the  reference,  if  only  the  workman  deposits the amount which he has received into Court with  interest  from the date when he has received to the date of  deposit calculated at 7.5% per annum.  If the deposit is not  made within 60 days from the date when reference was issued  

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to  him,  the reference made by the Government  shall  stand  annulled.  

The writ petition is disposed of in the above terms.”

5. The appellant challenged the order passed by the single Judge in an  

intra-court appeal but a Division Bench of the High Court dismissed his  

appeal [(L.P.A. No.82 of 2010)(O & M)] by a brief order, dated January  

21, 2010.  

6. The appellant has now brought this matter to this Court.  On behalf  

of the appellant, it is submitted that the High Court in exercise of its writ  

jurisdiction could not interfere with the reference made by the appropriate  

Government and the direction to deposit in court the amount received by  

him under the VRS along with interest at the rate of 7.5% per annum as  

the  condition  for  the  reference  to  proceed,  was  quite  unreasonable,  

inequitable and illegal.  

7. The submission made on behalf  of the appellant is fully answered  

by an earlier decision of this Court in Ramesh Chandra Sankla and others   

versus  Vikram  Cement  and  others  (2008)  14  SCC  58.   In  Ramesh  

Chandra Sankla a number of workmen of Vikram Cement Company who  

had ceased to be the employees of Company after accepting full benefits  

under the scheme of voluntary retirement moved the Labour Court under  

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section 31 of the Madhya Pradesh Industrial Relations Act, 1960 making  

the same allegations against the Company as the appellant in this case.  In  

that case, the Labour Court declined to decide certain issues framed at the  

instance  of  the  management  as  preliminary  issues.  The  management’s  

appeal against the decision of the Labour Court not to decide those issues  

as  preliminary  issues  was  rejected  by  the  Industrial  Court.   The  writ  

petition filed by the management was dismissed by a learned single Judge  

on the ground that the orders passed by the Labour Court and affirmed by  

the Industrial Court were interlocutory in nature.  The management took  

the matter before the Division Bench which held that the writ petitions  

filed by the Company were under Article 227 of the Constitution and the  

single  Judge was exercising supervisory jurisdiction;  hence,  intra-court  

appeals were not maintainable and the appeals filed by the Company were  

liable to be dismissed on that score alone.  Even while holding that the  

management’s appeals were liable to be dismissed as not maintainable,  

the  Division  Bench  went  on  to  hold  that  since  the  workmen  had  

approached the Labour Court after having received the benefits under the  

scheme, it would be equitable to direct the concerned employees to return  

the benefits so received to the employer subject to the undertaking by the  

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Company  that  in  the  event  the  Labour  Court  allowed  the  claim  and  

granted benefits to the workmen, the same would be restored to them by  

the Company with interest at the rate of 6% per annum.   

8. The workmen challenged the order of the Division Bench before  

this Court inter alia on the ground that having held that the management’s  

appeals were not maintainable, the Division Bench had no jurisdiction to  

make the impugned direction. This  Court  repelled  the  workmen’s  

contention  and  in  paragraphs  100  and  101  of  the  decision  held  and  

observed as follows:-

“100. Even otherwise, according to the workmen, they were  compelled  to  accept  the  amount  and  they  received  such  amount  under  coercion  and  duress.   In  our  considered  opinion,  they  cannot  retain  the  benefit  if  they  want  to  prosecute claim petitions instituted by them with the Labour  Court. Hence, the order passed by the Division Bench of the  High Court as to refund of amount cannot be termed unjust,  inequitable  or  improper.   Hence,  even  if  it  is  held  that  a  “technical”  contention  raised  by  the  workmen  has  some  force,  this  Court  which  again  exercises  discretionary  and  equitable jurisdiction under Article 136 of the Constitution,  will not interfere with a direction which is in consonance with  the doctrine of equity.  It has been rightly said that a person  “who seeks equity must do equity”. Here the workmen claim  benefits as workmen of the Company, but they do not want to  part with the benefit they have received towards retirement  and severance of relationship of master and servant. It simply  cannot  be permitted.   In  our  judgment,  therefore,  the final  direction issued by the Division Bench needs no interference,  

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particularly  when  the  Company  has  also  approached  this  Court under Article 136 of the Constitution.

101.  For  the  foregoing  reasons,  in  our  opinion,  the  order  passed by the Division Bench of the High Court deserves to  be confirmed and is hereby confirmed.  The payment which  is required to be made as per the said order should be made  by the applicants intending to prosecute their claims before  the Labour Court, Mandsour. In view of the fact, however,  that the said period is by now over, ends of justice would be  served if we extend the time so as to enable the applicants to  refund the amount.  We, therefore, extend the time up to 31- 12-2008 to make such payment.  We may, however, clarify  that the claim petitions will not be proceeded with till such  payment  is  made.   If  the  payment  is  not  made within  the  period  stipulated  above,  the  claim  petitions  of  those  applicants  will  automatically stand dismissed.   The Labour  Court will take up the claim petitions after 31-12-2008.”

 The  present  case  is  squarely  covered  by the  decision of  this  Court  in  

Ramesh  Chandra  Sankla  (supra).   We,  thus,  find  no  merit  in  the  

submission made on behalf of the appellant that the High Court had no  

jurisdiction to make a direction for refund of the entire amount received  

by the appellant as a condition precedent for the reference to proceed.

9. We, however, feel that the imposition of interest at the rate of 7.5%  

per annum was a little harsh and unwarranted.  Having regard to the fact  

that the appellant is no longer in service, we feel that the ends of justice  

would meet if the direction for refund is confined only to the principal  

amount received by the appellant under VRS.  We, accordingly, modify  

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the order of the High Court to this limited extent and direct the appellant  

to refund the amount received by him under VRS, without any interest. In  

case the amount, as directed, is deposited by the appellant by November  

30, 2011, the reference shall proceed in accordance with law, otherwise it  

would stand quashed.   

10. The appeal stands disposed of subject to the above observations and  

directions.  

……………………………J. (Aftab Alam)

……………………………J. (R.M. Lodha)

New Delhi; August 26, 2011.   

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