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NON-REPORTABLE

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION

CIVIL APPEAL  NO.  15034 OF 2017

MAMTA ROHIT                                    Appellant(s)

                               VERSUS

DR. PRAFULLA RANJAN & ORS.                     Respondent(s)

WITH

DIARY NO. 4994 OF 2018

J U D G M E N T KURIAN, J.

DIARY NO. 4994 OF 2018

1. This petition has been filed with a delay of 240

days and there is no satisfactory explanation for the

gross delay in filing the petition.

2. The  Special  Leave  Petition  is,  accordingly,

dismissed on the ground of delay.

CIVIL APPEAL NO. 15034 OF 2017

1. Heard  Mr.  Ajit  Kumar  Sinha,  learned  senior

counsel  appearing for  the appellant  and Mr.  C. U.

Singh,  learned  senior  counsel  appearing  for

Respondent No. 3 and Mrs. V. Mohana, learned senior

counsel  appearing  for  the  Union  of  India  and  Mr.

Anand  Nandan,  learned  counsel  appearing  for

Respondent Nos. 1 and 2.

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2. The  issue  in  this  appeal  pertains  to  the

appointment  to  the  post  of  Chief  General  Manager

under  the  Pension  Fund  Regulatory  and  Development

Authority  created  in  the  year  2003.   In  2011,

applications were invited for appointment to the two

posts of Chief General Manager.  The appellant was

one  of  the  applicants.   According  to  the  third

respondent,  namely,  the  appointing  authority,  the

appellant did not satisfy the qualification.  It is

also pointed out by the respondents that since the

appellant did not satisfy the qualification, she was

ineligible  even  for  putting  an  application.   The

appointing authority relying on one condition in the

advertisement  regarding  relaxation  of  any

criteria/condition  in  deserving  cases,  it  appears,

relaxed  the  condition  on  qualification,  which

according  to  the  appellant,  was  done  across  the

board, though it is pointed out by the learned senior

counsel appearing for the respondents that it is not

true to facts.

3. There is no dispute that the Board of Directors

of the appointing authority consisted of a nominee of

the Government of India, among others.  On the basis

of the written test and the interview, the appellant

was  offered  appointment  on  31.05.2011  and  the

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appellant joined duty on 01.07.2011.  For the purpose

of  taking  up  the  appointment  under  the  third

respondent, the appellant was required to resign from

the  post  she  was  holding  in  IDBI  Bank  as  Deputy

General  Manager.   After  completing  the  period  of

probation,  the  appellant  was  confirmed  in  service.

Towards  the  end  of  the  year  2013,  some  of  the

candidates who competed along with the appellant, but

were  unsuccessful,  approached  the  Central

Administrative Tribunal (in short, “CAT”) challenging

the appointment of the appellant.  While the matter

was pending before the CAT, the appellant was issued

a  Show  Cause  Notice  on  21.02.2014  pursuant  to  a

letter dated 17.02.2014 from the Ministry of Finance.

Not being satisfied with the reply, the appointment

of the appellant was cancelled on 13.03.2014.

4. The appellant challenged the same before the CAT

in Allahabad.  On the strength of an interim order,

the appellant continued in service till the impugned

order dated 15.03.2017 was passed by the High Court

of  Delhi.   It  is  submitted  that  the  original

application is still pending.  In the meanwhile, CAT,

Delhi, dismissed the applications filed by Respondent

Nos. 1 and 2 herein and allowed the application filed

by another person, whose service was also terminated

along with the appellant.  Respondent Nos. 1 and 2

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challenged the said order dated 29.06.2015 before the

High Court.  As per the impugned Judgment, the same

was set aside and thus the appellant is before this

Court.

5. It is significant to note that though the High

Court set aside the appointment at the instance of

Respondent Nos. 1 and 2, no relief was granted to

them by the High Court.  The High Court, in our view,

has rightly held on the question of law that there

cannot  be  a  deemed  relaxation  since  on  the  very

concept of relaxation, it is to be made on the basis

of proper application of mind as to whether it was a

case fit for relaxation as a case deserving on the

requirements of the appointment.  However, the fact

remains that the appellant was made to resign from

the post she was holding in IDBI as Deputy General

Manager so as to take up the appointment offered to

her by the third respondent, she was found suitable

for  the post  and hence,  was confirmed  in service.

Two annual increments were sanctioned and, thereafter

only,  action has  been taken  to terminate  her from

service on the ground that she did not possess the

required qualification.

6. It is significant to note that there is no case

for any of the respondents that the appellant, in any

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way,  misled  anybody  for  the  purpose  of  the

appointment.   There  is  no  case  for  the  other

contesting  respondents  that  the  appellant  had  not

disclosed her actual qualification.  Having regard to

the experience and the requirements of the post, it

appears,  the  appointing  authority,  at  the  relevant

time, thought it fit to appoint her in service, after

requiring her to resign from the post she was holding

elsewhere.  Now, the appellant is neither here nor

there.

7. In the above peculiar facts and circumstances of

the  case,  we  are  of  the  view  that  this  is  an

eminently fit case for doing complete justice between

the parties.  Though we agree on the question of law

regarding  relaxation  of  qualification  as  raised  by

the learned senior counsel appearing for Respondent

Nos. 3 and 4 and the learned counsel appearing for

the contesting respondents, justice needs to be done

to the appellant.

8. Therefore, without treating it as a precedent and

while agreeing with the question of law as raised by

the  respondents,  we  set  aside  the  order  dated

13.03.2014  cancelling  the  appointment  of  the

appellant and the consequence of termination.

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9. The third respondent is directed to reinstate the

appellant in service forthwith and for all purposes,

she shall be deemed to be reinstated in service with

effect  from  01.10.2018.   Her  services  from  the

original  date  of  appointment  till  the  date  of

reinstatement  on  01.10.2018  shall  be  deemed  to  be

continuous  for  all  purposes;  except  for  actual

backwages.

10.  We also make it clear that since this Judgment

is passed in the peculiar facts and circumstances of

the case, the benefit which we have granted above is

confined only to the appellant in this case.  In case

other vacancies are still available, it will be open

to  Respondent  Nos.  1  and  2  to  make  appropriate

representation before the third respondent, in which

case, the same will be considered in accordance with

law.

11. In view of the above, the appeal is disposed of.

.......................J.               [ KURIAN JOSEPH ]  

.......................J.               [ SANJAY KISHAN KAUL ]  

New Delhi; September 26, 2018.