MALLELLA SHYAMSUNDER Vs STATE OF A.P.
Bench: VIKRAMAJIT SEN,KURIAN JOSEPH
Case number: Crl.A. No.-001381-001381 / 2011
Diary number: 27999 / 2008
Advocates: GAURAV AGRAWAL Vs
D. BHARATHI REDDY
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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA
CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION
CRIMINAL APPEAL NO. 1381 OF 2011
Mallella Shyamsunder … Appellant (s)
Versus
State of Andhra Pradesh … Respondent (s)
J U D G M E N T
KURIAN, J.:
1. Nemo moriturus praesumitur mentire literally means no
one at the point of death is presumed to lie. Nobody normally
may lie and die for fear of meeting his maker.
2. Acceptability and reliability of statement made by a person
who is about to die, which statement, in common parlance, is
known as dying declaration, has been the subject matter of
several reported decisions of this Court and, therefore, it is not
necessary to add one more to the same. However, for the
purpose of understanding the first principles, we shall refer to a
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REPORTABLE
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Constitution Bench decision in Laxman v. State of
Maharashtra1, wherein at paragraph-3, it is held as follows:
“3. The juristic theory regarding acceptability of a dying declaration is that such declaration is made in extremity, when the party is at the point of death and when every hope of this world is gone, when every motive to falsehood is silenced, and the man is induced by the most powerful consideration to speak only the truth. Notwithstanding the same, great caution must be exercised in considering the weight to be given to this species of evidence on account of the existence of many circumstances which may affect their truth. The situation in which a man is on the deathbed is so solemn and serene, is the reason in law to accept the veracity of his statement. It is for this reason the requirements of oath and cross- examination are dispensed with. Since the accused has no power of cross-examination, the courts insist that the dying declaration should be of such a nature as to inspire full confidence of the court in its truthfulness and correctness. The court, however, has always to be on guard to see that the statement of the deceased was not as a result of either tutoring or prompting or a product of imagination. The court also must further decide that the deceased was in a fit state of mind and had the opportunity to observe and identify the assailant. …”
3. Appellant is the first accused in Sessions Case No. 197 of
2002 on the file of the Court of Second Additional Sessions
Judge, Mahabubnagar, Andhra Pradesh. He was sentenced to
undergo rigorous imprisonment for life under Section 302 of the
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(2002) 6 SCC 710
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Indian Penal Code (45 of 1860) (hereinafter referred to as ‘IPC’).
He was also sentenced to undergo rigorous imprisonment for
one year under Section 498A of IPC. The second accused who is
the mother of the first accused, was convicted under Section
498A of IPC and sentenced to undergo one year rigorous
imprisonment. The High Court, however, taking note mainly of
the age of the second accused, maintaining the conviction
under Section 498A of IPC, reduced the sentence to the period
already undergone.
4. The victim, Smt. Kalyani, since deceased, was married to
the appellant on 26.04.2000. The allegation is that on account
of non-payment of balance of the promised dowry, she was
being ill treated and harassed by both the accused. On
23.08.2001, the appellant sent her out of the matrimonial home
demanding the balance amount of dowry. However, PW-1-
mother of the deceased took her to the house of the accused
and gave him Rs.1,000/-, gold ear studs, gold ring and returned;
but the second accused took the postela chain (mangalsutra) of
the deceased and when PW-1 requested to return the same, he
replied that the same would be returned when PW-1 pays the
balance of the dowry. On 31.08.2001, PW-1 received a
telephone call from the appellant to the effect that the
deceased had set fire to herself and she was admitted in 3
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Srinivasa Hospital, Nagar Kurnool. In the hospital, PWs- 1 and 2
were told by the deceased that the appellant had beaten her
and set her on fire after pouring kerosene. At about 10.35 a.m.,
PW-10, Sub-Inspector of Police visited the hospital and recorded
the statement of the deceased marked as Exhibit-P5 and, on
the basis of it, he registered Crime No. 104 of 2001 and he also
sent Exhibit-P-6-requisition for JFCM for recording dying
declaration. On 31.08.2001 itself, PW-13, JFCM, Nagar Kurnool
visited the hospital and recorded the dying declaration marked
as Exhibit-P10. Thereafter, the deceased was shifted to
Osmania General Hospital. However, she died on 09.09.2001.
PW-10, who investigated the case, recorded the statement of
PWs- 1 to 4 and others, visited the scene of offence, prepared
scene observation report-Exhibit-P7, seized the kerosene
tin(MO-1), the match box-(MO-2) and the burnt towel and the
saree-(MOs-3 and 4, respectively) and got the scene of offence
photographed. PW-11-Assistant Professor, Department of
Medicine, Osmania Medical College, conducted the autopsy and
opined that the cause of death was due to 70% burns on the
body. The post-mortem report is marked as Exhibit-P8.
5. The accused took a defence of total denial.
6. On behalf of the prosecution, PWs-1 to 13 were examined,
Exhibits-P1 to P10 were marked apart from MOs-1 to 4. 4
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7. The High Court, after elaborately considering the evidence
on record, maintained the conviction and sentence of the
appellant. However, while maintaining the conviction of the
second accused under Section 498A of IPC, the Court reduced
the sentence to the period already undergone. There is no
appeal by the second accused.
8. Having regard to the evidence on record, the High Court
confirmed the finding of the Sessions Court that it is a case of
homicide. For connecting the appellant solely to the homicide,
mainly Exhibits-P5 and P10 – dying declarations were relied on
in addition to the oral evidence of PWs-1 to 4.
9. There is no eye-witness. However, according to PW-4, the
landlord, where the appellant and his deceased wife stayed as
tenants in the adjacent room, has given evidence to the effect
that on 31.08.2001, at about 08.00 or 08.30 a.m., he heard a
galata (quarrel) at the residence of appellant and some time
later, he saw the deceased coming out in flames. The deceased
tried to douse the fire by pouring water on herself and the
accused also did the same. When he reprimanded the
appellant, the appellant brought an autorickshaw and shifted
her to the hospital. PW-1-mother of the deceased, PW-2-son-in-
law of PW-1, PW-3-neighbour of PW-2, all had visited the
deceased in the hospital and, according to them, the deceased 5
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had told them that the appellant had set her on fire on account
of non-payment of balance dowry. However, PW-9-Dr. Narhari,
working in Government Hospital, where the deceased was taken
immediately after the burns and who administered first aid to
the deceased, had a version that on his inquiry from the
deceased, she had told him that the injuries were self-inflicted.
10. Exhibit-P5 is the first dying declaration recorded by the
Sub-Inspector of Police based on which the First Information
Report was registered. According to her, on 30.08.2001 also,
there was a quarrel between the appellant and the deceased
regarding non-payment of the balance dowry. On 31.08.2001,
at 08.30 a.m., when she tried to wake the appellant up, he beat
her with chappal on her back and, immediately thereafter, he
poured kerosene on her and set her on fire. Exhibit-P10 is the
dying declaration recorded by JFCM, Nagar Kurnool at around
01.25 p.m. on 31.08.2001. With regard to the incident, there is
no major inconsistency.
11. Learned Counsel for the appellant submits that the case is
entirely based on circumstantial evidence and there is no direct
evidence to connect the appellant. It is not necessary to refer in
extenso to this argument for the following reasons:
a. Exhibits-P5 and P10 – dying declarations are confidence
bearing, truthful, consistent and credible. There was no 6
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room or chance for tutoring or prompting. Nor is there a
case that it is the product of her imagination. Though no
corroboration is necessary, yet, there is evidence of PWs-1
to 3 to whom also, the deceased is said to have narrated
the incident. There is no serious attempt in defence to
shake the credibility and reliability of the dying
declarations.
b. We have seen the scene mehazar and photograph of the
scene. It is a small rented accommodation and the picture
of the kitchen shows that there was LPG gas connection
and, therefore, it was not normally required to keep
kerosene in such quantity.
c. The post-mortem report refers to the following injuries:
“9. Injuries: Ante mortem dermo epidermal burns present
over lower half of face, neck, chest, upper third of abdomen, both upper extremities, both thighs, part of back of both legs and part of back of trunk amounting to 70% of total body surface area.
Skin peeled off at many places over burnt area and peeled off areas are red in colour.
Part of the burns are infected.” (Emphasis supplied)
It is very significant to note that the antemortem
dermo epidermal burns are over lower half of face, neck
and then down the body to the legs. If one is to pour
kerosene on oneself, it is the normal human conduct to
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pour it over the head, and in any case, not to pour it on
the face sparing the head.
d. The indifferent conduct of the appellant, as spoken about
by PW-4, in not taking prompt action to move the
deceased to the hospital is also a situation to be taken
note of.
e. There was nobody else in the house and, hence, it was for
the appellant to offer explanation as to the cause of death.
His theory of suicide, on the face of overwhelming
evidence to the contrary, is not at all acceptable.
f. Only PW-9 has given a different version regarding the
injury being self-inflicted. His version cannot be believed at
all in the background of the overwhelming evidence we
have discussed above and particularly in the background
of the injuries noted in the post-mortem report.
12. Learned Counsel for the appellant has also made a
submission that the charge be reduced to one under Section
304 Part II.
13. As rightly held by the Sessions Court and the High Court,
setting fire on another person after pouring kerosene is an act
likely to cause death of such person. It is a matter of simple and
common knowledge that in the process, the victim is likely to
suffer death on account of the burns. Therefore, the offence of 8
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murder is complete and, hence, we have no hesitation in our
mind in reaffirming the conviction of the appellant under
Section 302 of IPC.
14. Hence, we find no merit in the appeal and it is accordingly
dismissed.
..………………………J. (VIKRAMAJIT SEN)
....……………………J. (KURIAN JOSEPH)
New Delhi; October 29, 2014.
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