Page 1

1

REPORTABLE

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA

CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION

CRIMINAL APPEAL NO. 63 OF 2006

Mahipal Singh Rana, Advocate     ….Appellant                      

        VERSUS

State of Uttar Pradesh     ....Respondent

J U D G M E N T

ANIL R. DAVE, J.

1. The present appeal is preferred under Section 19 of the

Contempt  of  Courts  Act,  1971 (hereinafter  referred  to  as

“the Act”) against the judgment and order dated 02.12.2005

delivered by the High Court of Judicature at Allahabad in

Criminal  Contempt  Petition  No.  16 of  2004,  whereby  the

High Court found the appellant guilty of Criminal Contempt

for  intimidating  and  threatening  a  Civil  Judge  (Senior

Division),  Etah in his  Court on 16.4.2003 and 13.5.2003

and sentenced him to simple imprisonment of two months

Page 2

2

with a fine of Rs. 2,000/- and in default of payment of the

fine,  the  appellant  to  undergo  further  imprisonment  of  2

weeks. The High Court further directed the Bar Council of

Uttar  Pradesh  to  consider  the  facts  contained  in  the

complaint  of  the  Civil  Judge  (Senior  Division)  Etah,  and

earlier contempt referred to in the judgement and to initiate

appropriate  proceedings  against  the  appellant  for

professional misconduct.

Reference to larger Bench and the Issue

2. On 27th January, 2006, this appeal was admitted by

this Court and that part of the impugned judgment, which

imposed the  sentence,  was stayed and the appellant  was

directed  not  to  enter  the  Court  premises  at  Etah  (U.P.).

Keeping  in  view  the  importance  of  the  question  involved

while  admitting the appeal  on 27th January,  2006, notice

was  directed  to  be  issued  to  the  Supreme  Court  Bar

Association  as  well  as  to  the  Bar  Council  of  India.   The

matter was referred to the larger Bench.  Learned Solicitor

General of India was requested to assist the Court in the

matter.     

Page 3

3

3. On  6th March,  2013  restriction  on  entry  of  the

appellant into the court premises as per order dated 27th

January, 2006 was withdrawn.  Thereby, the appellant was

permitted to enter the court premises. The said restriction

was, however, restored later.  On 20th August, 2015, notice

was issued to the Attorney General on the larger question

whether on conviction under the Contempt of Courts Act or

any  other  offence  involving  moral  turpitude  an  advocate

could be permitted to practise.

4. Thus following questions arise for consideration:

(i) Whether  a  case  has  been  made  out  for interference  with the  order  passed by  the  High Court  convicting  the  appellant  for  criminal contempt  and  sentencing  him  to  simple imprisonment  for  two  months  with  a  fine  of Rs.2,000/-  and  further  imprisonment  for  two weeks  in  default  and  debarring  him  from appearing in courts in judgeship at Etah; and

(ii) Whether on conviction for criminal contempt, the appellant can be allowed to practise.  

The facts and the finding of the High Court  

5. The facts of the present appeal discloses that the Civil

Judge  (Senior  Division),  Etah  made  a  reference  under

Section  15  (2)  of  the  Act  to  the  High  Court  through the

Page 4

4

learned District  Judge,  Etah (U.P.)  on 7.6.2003 recording

two  separate  incidents  dated  16.4.2003  and  13.5.2003,

which had taken place in his Court in which the appellant

had  appeared  before  him  and  conducted  himself  in  a

manner  which  constituted  “Criminal  Contempt”  under

Section 2 (c) of the Act.  

6. The said letter was received by the High Court along

with a forwarding letter of the District Judge dated 7.6.2003

and the letters were placed before the Administrative Judge

on  7.7.2003,  who  forwarded  the  matter  to  the  Registrar

General  vide  order  dated 18.6.2004 for  placing  the  same

before the Hon’ble Chief Justice of the High Court and on

11.7.2004,  the  Hon’ble  Chief  Justice  of  the  High  Court

referred  the  matter  to  the  Court  concerned  dealing  with

contempt cases and notice was also issued to the appellant.

7. Facts denoting behaviour of the appellant, as recorded

by the Civil Judge (Senior Division), Etah, can be seen from

the contents of his letter addressed to the learned District

Judge, Etah.  The letter reads as under:-

Page 5

5

“Sir,

It is humbly submitted that on 16.4.2003, while I was hearing the 6-Ga-2 in Original Suit No.114/2003 titled  as  “Yaduveer  Singh  Chauhan  vs.  The  Uttar Pradesh Power Corporation”, Shri Mahipal Singh Rana, Advocate  appeared  in  the  Court,  and,  while  using intemperate language, spoke in a loud voice:

“How did you pass an order against my client in the  case  titled  as  “Kanchan  Singh  vs.  Ratan Singh”?  How did  you dare  pass  such an  order against my client?

I tried to console him, but he started shouting in a state of highly agitated mind:  

“Kanchan Singh is my relative and how was this order  passed  against  my  relative?  No  Judicial Officer has, ever, dared pass an order against me. Then, how did you dare do so? When any Judicial officer  passes  an  order  on  my  file  against  my client,  I  set  him right.  I  shall  make a  complaint against  you  to  Hon’ble  High  Court”,  and  he threatened me: “I will not let you remain in Etah in future,  I  can  do  anything  against  you.  I  have relations with highly notorious persons and I can get you harmed by such notorious persons to the extent I want to do, and I myself am capable of doing any deed (misdeed) as I wish, and I am not afraid of any one. In the Court compound, even my shoes  are  worshipped  and  I  was  prosecuted  in two murder cases.  And I  have made murderous assaults on people and about 15 to 20 cases are going on against me. If you, in future, dare pass an order on the file against my client in which I am a counsel, it will not be good for you”.  

Due to the above mentioned behaviour of Shri Mahipal Singh Rana, Advocate, the judicial work was hindered

Page 6

6

and aforesaid act of Shri Mahipal Singh falls within the ambit of committing the contempt of Court.  

In  this  very  succession,  on  13.5.2003,  while  I  was hearing 6-Ga-2 in the O.S. No. No. 48/2003 titled as “Roshanlal  v Nauvat Ram”, Shri  Mahipal  Singh Rana Advocate appeared in the Court  and spoke in a loud voice: “Why did you not get the OS No. 298/2001 title as  ‘Jag  Mohan  vs.  Smt.  Suman’  called  out  so  far, whereas  the  aforesaid  case  is  very  important,  in  as much  as  I  am  the  plaintiff  therein”.  I  said  to  Shri Mahipal Singh Rana, Advocate: “Hearing of a case is going on.  Thereafter,  your  case will  be  called out  for hearing”, thereupon he got enraged and spoke: “That- case will be heard first which I desire to be heard first. Nothing is done as per your desire. Even an advocate does not dare create a hindrance in my case. I shall get the case decided which I want and that case will never be decided, which I do not want. You cannot decide any case against my wishes”. Meanwhile when the counsel for  Smt.  Suman in  O.S.  No.  298/2001 titled  as  “Jag Mohan vs. Smt. Suman” handed some papers over to Shri  Mahipal  Singh  Rana,  Advocate  for  receiving  the same,  he  threw those  papers  away and misbehaved with the counsel for Smt. Suman. Due to this act of Shri Mahipal  Singh Rana,  the  judicial  work was hindered and  his  act  falls  within  the  ambit  of  committing  the contempt of Court.

Your good self  is  therefore requested that  in order to initiate proceedings relating to committing the contempt of  Court  against  Shri  Mahipal  Singh Rana,  Advocate, my report may kindly be sent to the Hon’ble High Court by way of REFERENCE”.

With regards,”

8. On  the  same  day,  the  learned  Civil  Judge  (Senior

Division) also wrote another letter to the Registrar-General

Page 7

7

of  the  High  Court,  giving  some  more  facts  regarding

contemptuous behaviour of the appellant with a request to

place the facts before the Hon’ble Chief Justice of the High

Court  so  that  appropriate  action  under  the  Act  may  be

taken against the appellant. As the aforestated letters refer

to the facts regarding behaviour of the appellant, we do not

think it necessary to reiterate the same here.  

9. Ultimately,  in pursuance of  the  information given to

the  High  Court,  proceedings  under  the  Act  had  been

initiated against the appellant.  

10. Before the High Court, it was contended on behalf of

the appellant that it was not open to the Court to proceed

against  the  appellant  under  the  provisions  of  the  Act

because if the behaviour of the appellant was not proper or

he had committed any professional misconduct, the proper

course was to take action against the appellant under the

provisions  of  the  Advocates  Act,  1961.   It  was  also

contended that summary procedure under the Act could not

have  been  followed  by  the  Court  for  the  purpose  of

punishing the appellant.  Moreover, it was also submitted

Page 8

8

that the appellant was not at all present before the learned

Civil  Judge  (Senior  Division),  Etah  on  16.4.2003  and

13.5.2003.

11. Ultimately,  after  hearing  the  parties  concerned,  the

High Court did not accept the defence of the appellant and

after  considering  the  facts  of  the  case,  it  delivered  the

impugned judgment whereby punishment has been imposed

upon the appellant. The High Court observed:

“22.  Extraordinary  situations  demand  extraordinary remedies. The subordinate courts in Uttar Pradesh are witnessing  disturbing  period.  In  most  of  the subordinate courts, the Advocates or their groups and Bar  Associations  have  been  virtually  taken  over  the administration of justice to ransom. These Advocates even  threaten  and  intimidate  the  Judges  to  obtain favourable orders. The Judicial Officers often belonging to different districts are not able to resist the pressure and  fall  prey  to  these  Advocates.  This  disturbs  the equilibrium between Bar and the Bench giving undue advantage  and  premium  to  the  Bar.  In  these extraordinary  situations  the  High  Court  can  not abdicate its constitutional duties to protect the judicial officers.  

xxxxx

24.  ……………The  criminal  history  of  the  contemnor, the acceptance of facts in which his actions were found contumacious  and  he  was  discharged on  submitting apologies  on  two  previous  occasions,  and  the allegations  against  him  in  which  he  was  found  to continue  with  intimidating  the  judicial  officers

Page 9

9

compelled  us  to  issue  interim  orders  restraining  his entry of the contemnor in the judgeship at Etah. The Bar  Council  of  Uttar  Pradesh,  is  fully  aware  of  his activities but has chosen not to take any action in the matter. In fact the Bar Council hardly takes cognizance of such matters at all. The Court did not interfere with the  statutory  powers  of  the  Bar  Council  of  Uttar Pradesh to  take appropriate  proceedings against  the contemnor with regard to his right of practice, and did not take away right of practice vested in him by virtue of  his registration with the Bar Council.  He was not debarred  from  practice  but  was  only  restrained  to appear in the judgeship at Etah in the cases he was engaged as an Advocate. The repeated contumacious conduct, without any respect to the Court committed by him repeatedly by intimidating and brow beating the judicial  officers,  called  for  maintaining  discipline, protecting  the  judicial  officers  and  for  maintaining peace  in  the  premises  of  judgeship  at  Etah.  

25.  Should  the  High  Court  allow  such  advocate  to continue to terrorise, brow beat and bully the judicial officers? It is submitted that he has a large practice. We are not concerned here whether the contemnor or such  advocates  are  acquiring  large  practice  by intimidating judicial officers. These are questions to be raised  before  the  Bar  Council.  We,  however,  must perform our constitutional duty to protect our judicial officers. This is one such case illustrated in para 78, of the Supreme Court Bar Association's case (supra),  in which  the  occasion  had  arisen  to  prevent  the contemnor  to  appear  before  courts  at  Etah.  The withdrawal  of  such  privilege  did  not  amount  to suspending or  revoking his  licence to  practice  as an advocate  in  other  courts  or  tribunal,  drafting  the petitions and advising his clients. It only prevented him from intimidating the judicial officers and from vitiating the atmosphere conducive for administration of justice in the judgeship at Etah.

Page 10

10

31.  The  Supreme  Court  held  that  Section  20  of  the Contempt  of  Courts  Act,  has  to  be  construed  in  a manner  which  would  avoid  anomaly  and  hardships both  as  regards  the  litigant  as  also  by  placing  a pointless fetter on the part of the court to punish for its contempt.  In  Pallav  Seth  the  custodian  received information  of  the  appellant  having  committed contempt of taking over benami concerns, transferring funds to these concerns and operating their accounts, from a letter dated 5.5.1998, received from the Income Tax  Authorities.  Soon  thereafter  on  18.6.1998  a petition was filed for initiating action in contempt and notices  were  issued  by  the  Court  on  9.4.1999.  The Supreme Court found that on becoming aware of the forged  applications  the  contempt  proceedings  were filed on 18.6.1998 well within the period of limitation prescribed by Section 20 of the Act. The action taken by  the  special  court  by  its  order  dated  9.4.1999 directing the applications to be treated as show cause notice,  was thus valid  and that  the  contempt  action was not barred by Section 20 of the Act.  

32.  In  the  present  case  the  alleged  contempt  was committed in the court of Shri Onkar Singh Yadav, Civil Judge  (Senior  Division)  Etah  on  16.4.2003  and 13.5.2003.  The  officer  initiated  the  proceedings  by making reference to the High Court through the District Judge  vide  his  letters  dated 7.6.2003,  separately  in respect of the incidents. These letters were received by the  Court  with  the  forwarding  letter  of  the  District Judge  dated  1.6.2003  and  were  placed  before Administrative  Judge on 7.7.2003,  who returned the matter to the Registrar General with his order dated 18.6.2004 to be placed before Hon'ble the Chief Justice and that  by  his  order  dated 11.7.2004,  Hon'ble  the Chief  Justice  referred  the  matter  to  court  having contempt  determination.  Show  cause  notices  were issued by the court to the contemnor on 28.10.2004. In view of the law as explained in Pallav Seth (supra) the

Page 11

11

contempt proceedings would be taken to be initiated on 7.6.2003  by  the  Civil  Judge  (Senior  Division)  Etah, which was well within the period of one year from the date of the incidents prescribed under Section 20 of the Act.  

xxxxxx

36.  We do not  find that  the contemnor Shri  Mahipal Singh Rana is suffering from any mental imbalance. He is fully conscious of his actions and take responsibility of the same. He suffers from an inflated ago, and has a tremendous superiority complex and claims himself to be a champion for the cause of justice, and would not spare  any  effort,  and  would  go  to  the  extent  of intimidating  the  judges  if  he  feels  the  injustice  has been done to his client. We found ourselves unable to convince him that the law is above every one, and that even  if  he  is  an  able  lawyer  belonging  to  superior caste, he could still abide by the dignity of court and the decency required from an advocate appearing in any court of law.  

37. The due administration of law is of vastly greater importance  than  the  success  or  failure  of  any individual, and for that reason public policy as well as good morals require that every Advocate should keep attention to his conduct. An Advocate is an officer of the  Court  apart  of  machinery  employed  for administration of justice, for meeting out to the litigants the exact measure of their legal rights. He is guilty of a crime if he knowingly sinks his official duty, in what may  seem  to  be  his  own  or  his  clients  temporary advantage.  

38. We find that the denial of incidents and allegations of malafides against Shri Onkar Singh Yadav, the then Civil Judge (Senior Division) Etah have been made only to save himself from the contumacious conduct.

Page 12

12

39.  Shri  Mahipal  Singh  Rana,  the  contemnor  has refused  to  tender  apologies  for  his  conduct.  His affidavit in support of stay vacation/modification and supplementary affidavit do not show any remorse. He has justified himself again and again, in a loud and thundering voice.  

40. We find that Shri Mahipal Rana the contemnor is guilty  of  criminal  contempt  in  intimidation  and threatening  Shri  Onkar  Singh  Yadav  the  then  Civil Judge (Senior Division) Etah in his court on 16.4.2003 and  13.5.2003  and  of  using  loud  and  indecent language both in court and in his pleadings in suit No. 515/2002.  He  was  discharged  from  proceeding  of contempt  in  Criminal  Contempt  Petition No.  21/1998 and Criminal Contempt No. 60 of 1998 on his tendering unconditionally apology on 3.8.1999 and 11.11.2002 respectively.  He  however  did  not  mend  himself  and has rather become more aggressive and disrespectful to  the  court.  He  has  virtually  become  nuisance  and obstruction  to  the  administration  of  justice  at  the Judgeship at Etah. We are satisfied that the repeated acts of criminal contempt committed by him are of such nature that these substantially interfere with the due course of justice. We thus punish him under Section 12 of the Contempt of Courts Act 1971, with two months imprisonment and also impose fine of Rs. 2000/- on him.  In  case  non-payment  of  fine  he  will  undergo further  a  period  of  imprisonment  of  two  weeks. However, the punishment so imposed shall be kept in abeyance  for  a  period  of  sixty  days  to  enable  the contemner Shri Rana to approach the Hon'ble Supreme Court, if so advised.  

41. We also direct the Bar Council of Uttar Pradesh to take  the  facts  constituted  in  the  complaints  of  Shri Onkar  Singh  Yadav,  the  then  Civil  Judge  (Senior Division)  Etah,  the  two  earlier  contempts  referred  in

Page 13

13

this judgment,  and to draw proceedings against him for professional misconduct.  

42. Under the Rules of this Court, the contemnor shall not be permitted to appear in courts in the Judgeship at Etah, until he purges the contempt.  

43.  The Registrar  General  shall  draw the order  and communicate it to the Bar Council of Uttar Pradesh and Bar  Council  of  India  within  a  week.  The  contemnor shall  be  taken  into  custody  to  serve  the  sentence immediately of  the sixty days if  no restrain order is passed by the appellate court.”

Rival Contentions:

12. The learned counsel appearing for the appellant before

this Court specifically denied the instances dated 16.4.2003

and 13.5.2003 and further submitted that the appellant had

not even gone to the Court of the learned Civil Judge (Senior

Division), Etah on the aforestated two days and therefore,

the entire case made out against the appellant was false and

frivolous. The learned counsel, therefore, submitted that the

High Court had committed an error by not going into the

fact as to whether the appellant had, in fact, attended the

Court of the learned Civil Judge (Senior Division), Etah on

16.4.2003  and  13.5.2003.   The  learned  counsel  further

Page 14

14

submitted that the High Court ought to have considered the

fact that the appellant had filed several complaints against

the learned Judge who was the complainant and therefore,

with  an  oblique  motive  the  entire  contempt  proceedings

were initiated against the appellant.   The said complaints

ought to have been considered by the High Court.  It was

further  submitted that  contempt proceedings were barred

by limitation.  The incidents in question are dated 16th April,

2003 and 13th May,  2003 while notice was ordered to be

issued on 28th April, 2004.   

13. The learned counsel, thus, submitted that the action

initiated against the appellant was not just and proper and

the  impugned  judgment  awarding  punishment  to  the

appellant  under  the  Act  is  bad  in  law  and  therefore,

deserved to be set aside.  In the alternative, it is submitted

that the appellant was 84 years of age and keeping that in

mind, the sentence for imprisonment may be set aside and

instead, the fine may be increased.   

14. On the other hand, the learned counsel appearing for

the  State  of  Uttar  Pradesh  submitted  that  the  impugned

Page 15

15

judgment  was  just,  legal  and  proper  and  the  same  was

delivered after due deliberation and careful consideration of

the relevant facts.  He submitted that looking at the facts of

the case, the High Court rightly came to the conclusion that

the appellant was not only present in the Court on those

two days i.e. on 16.4.2003 and 13.5.2003, but the appellant

had also misbehaved and misconducted in such a manner

that  his  conduct  was  contemptuous  and  therefore,  the

proceedings under the Act had to be initiated against him.

The learned counsel also drew attention of the Court to the

nature of the allegations made by the appellant against the

learned Judge and about  the  contemptuous  behaviour  of

the  appellant.   The  learned counsel  also  relied  upon the

report  submitted  to  the  learned  District  Judge  and

submitted that  the  impugned judgment is  just,  legal  and

proper.   He  also  submitted  that  the  misbehaviour  and

contemptuous act of the appellant was unpardonable and

therefore, the High Court had rightly imposed punishment

upon the appellant.

Page 16

16

15. In response to the notice issued by this Court on 20th

August, 2015 in respect of the question framed, the learned

counsel  appearing for the Bar Council  of  India submitted

that Section 24A of the Advocates Act, 1961 provides for a

bar against admission of a person as an advocate if he is

convicted  of  an  offence  involving  moral  turpitude,  apart

from  other  situations  in  which  such  bar  operates.  The

proviso however, provides for the bar being lifted after two

years of release.  However, the provision did not expressly

provide  for  removal  of  an  advocate  from  the  roll  of  the

advocates  if  conviction  takes  place  after  enrollment  of  a

person as an advocate.  Only other relevant provision under

which  action  could  be  taken  is  Section  35  for  proved

misconduct.  It is further stated that though the High Court

directed  the  Bar  Council  of  Uttar  Pradesh  to  initiate

proceedings for professional misconduct on 2.12.2005, the

consequential action taken by the Bar Council of the State

of Uttar Pradesh was not known.  It is further stated that

the  term  moral  turpitude  has  to  be  understood  having

regard to the nature of the noble profession of law which

Page 17

17

requires a person to possess higher level of integrity.  Even

a  minor  offence  could  be  termed as  an  offence  involving

moral  turpitude  in  the  context  of  an  advocate  who  is

expected to be aware of the legal position and the conduct

expected from him as a citizen is higher than others. It was

further submitted that  only the State Bar Council  or Bar

Council of India posses the power to punish an advocate for

“professional misconduct” as per the provisions of Section

35 of the Advocates Act, 1961 and reiterated the law laid

down by this  Court  in  Supreme Court Bar Association

versus Union of India1. In addition, the counsel submitted

that  a  general  direction  to  all  the  Courts  be  given  to

communicate about conviction of an advocate for an offence

involving  moral  turpitude  to  the  concerned  State  Bar

Council  or  the  Bar  Council  of  India  immediately  upon

delivering the  judgment  of  conviction  so that  proceedings

against such advocates can be initiated under the Advocates

Act, 1961.  

16.  The  Learned  Additional  Solicitor  General  of  India

appearing  on  behalf  of  Union  of  India,  submitted  that 1 (1998) 4 SCC 409

Page 18

18

normally  in  case of  all  professions,  the  apex body of  the

professionals  takes  action  against  the  erring  professional

and in case  of  legal  profession,  the  Bar  Council  of  India

takes  disciplinary  action  and  punishes  the  concerned

advocate if he is guilty of any misconduct etc. Reference was

made to Architects Act, 1972,  Chartered Accountants Act,

1949,  Company Secretaries Act, 1980,  Pharmacy Practice

Regulations,  2015,   Indian  Medical  Council  (Professional

Conduct Etiquettes and Ethics) Regulations, 2002, National

Council for Teacher Education Act, 1993, Cost and Works

Accountants  Act,  1959,  Actuaries  Act,  2006,  Gujarat

Professional  Civil  Engineers  Act,  2006,  Representation  of

Peoples Act, 1951, containing provisions for disqualifying a

person  from  continuing  in  a  regulated  profession  upon

conviction  for  an  offence  involving  moral  turpitude.

Reference was also made to Section 24A of the Advocates

Act which provides for a bar on enrolment as an advocate of

a person who has committed any offence involving moral

turpitude.   It  was  further  submitted  that  if  a  person  is

disqualified from enrolment, it could not be the intention of

Page 19

19

the  legislature to  permit  a person already enrolled  as  an

advocate to continue him in practice if he is convicted of an

offence involving moral turpitude.  Bar against enrolment

should also be deemed to be bar against continuation.  It

was further submitted that Article 145 of the Constitution

empowers the Supreme Court to make rules for regulating

practice  and  procedure  including  the  persons  practicing

before  this  Court.   Section  34  of  the  Advocates  Act

empowers the High Courts to frame rules laying down the

conditions  on  which  an  advocate  shall  be  permitted  to

practice in courts.  Thus, there is no absolute right of an

advocate  to  appear  in  court.  Appearance  before  Court  is

subject to such conditions as are laid down by this Court or

the  High  Court.   An  Advocate  could  be  debarred  from

appearing  before  the  Court  even  if  the  disciplinary

jurisdiction for misconduct was vested with the Bar Council

as laid down in  Supreme Court Bar Association (supra)

and  as  further  clarified  in  Pravin  C.  Shah versus  K.A.

Mohd.  Ali2,  Ex-Captain Harish Uppal  versus Union of

India3,  Bar  Council  of   India  versus  High  Court  of 2 (2001) 8 SCC 650 3 (2003) 2 SCC 45

Page 20

20

Kerala4 and  R.K.  Anand versus Registrar,  Delhi  High

Court5. Thus, according to the counsel, apart from the Bar

Council taking appropriate action against the appellant, this

Court could debar him from appearance before any court.

17. Shri  Dushyant  Dave,  learned  senior  counsel  and

President of the Supreme Court Bar Association supported

the  interpretation  canvassed  by  the  learned  Additional

Solicitor General.  He submitted that image of the profession

ought  to  be  kept  clean  by  taking  strict  action  against

persons failing to maintain ethical standards.

18. We have heard the learned counsel appearing for the

parties and have perused the judgments cited by them.

Consideration of the questions

We may now consider the questions posed for consideration:

Re: (i)

19. Upon going through the impugned judgment, we are of

the  view  that  no  error  has  been  committed  by  the  High

4 (2004) 6 SCC 311 5 (2009) 8 SCC 106

Page 21

21

Court while coming to the conclusion that the appellant had

committed contempt of  Court under the provisions of  the

Act.

20. We do not agree with the submissions of the learned

counsel for the appellant that the appellant did not appear

on those two days before the Court.  Upon perusal of the

facts found by the High Court and looking at the contents of

the  letters  written  by  the  concerned  judicial  officers,  we

have no doubt about the fact that the appellant did appear

before  the  Court  and  used  the  language  which  was

contemptuous in nature.

21. So far as the allegations made by the appellant with

regard  to  the  complaints  made  by  him  against  the

complainant judge, after having held that the appellant had

appeared  before  the  Court  and  had  made  contemptuous

statements,  we  are  of  the  opinion  that  those  averments

regarding  the  complaints  are  irrelevant.   The  averments

regarding  the  complaints  cannot  be  a  defence  for  the

appellant.   Even if we assume those averments about the

complaints  to  be correct,  then also,  the  appellant  cannot

Page 22

22

use such contemptuous language in the Court against the

presiding Judge.

22. There is  no merit  in the contention of  the appellant

that there was delay on the part of the complainant Judge

in  sending  the  reference  and  he  could  have  tried  the

appellant under Section 228 of the Indian Penal Code and

the procedure prescribed under Code of Criminal Procedure.

It  is for the learned judge to decide as to whether action

should be taken under the Act or under any other law.  

23. The  High  Court  has  rightly  convicted  the  appellant

under the Act after having come to a conclusion that denial

of  the  incidents  and  allegations  of  malafides  against  the

complainant Judge had been made by the appellant to save

himself  from  the  consequences  of  contempt  proceedings.

The appellant had refused to tender apology for his conduct.

His affidavit  in support  of  stay vacation/modification and

supplementary affidavit did not show any remorse and he

had justified himself again and again, which also shows that

he had no regards for the majesty of law.

Page 23

23

24. It is a well settled proposition of law that in deciding

whether contempt is serious enough to merit imprisonment,

the  Court  will  take  into  account  the  likelihood  of

interference  with  the  administration  of  justice  and  the

culpability of the offender. The intention with which the act

complained of is done is a material  factor in determining

what punishment, in a given case, would be appropriate. In

the case at hand, the High Court has rightly held that the

appellant was guilty of criminal contempt. We are however,

inclined to set aside the sentence for imprisonment in view

of advance age of the appellant and also in the light of our

further direction as a result of findings of question No. (ii)

Re: (ii)

Court’s jurisdiction vis a vis statutory powers of the Bar Councils

25. This Court, while examining its powers under Article

129 read with Article 142 of the Constitution with regard to

awarding  sentence  of  imprisonment  together  with

suspension  of  his  practice  as  an  Advocate,  in  Supreme

Court  Bar  Association  (supra),  the  Constitution  Bench

held  that  while  in  exercise  of  contempt  jurisdiction,  this

Page 24

24

Court  cannot  take  over  jurisdiction  of  disciplinary

committee of the Bar Council6 and it is for the Bar Council

to punish the advocate by debarring him from practice or

suspending his licence as may be warranted on the basis of

his having been found guilty of contempt, if the Bar Council

fails  to  take  action,  this  Court  could invoke its  appellate

power under Section 38 of the Advocates Act7.  In a given

case,  this  court  or  the  High  Court  can  prevent  the

contemnor advocate from appearing before it or other courts

till he purges himself of the contempt which is different from

suspending  or  revoking  the  licence  or  debarring  him  to

practise8.   

26. Reference may be made to the following observations

in SCBA case (supra):

“79. An advocate who is found guilty of contempt of court  may  also,  as  already  noticed,  be  guilty  of professional misconduct in a given case but it  is for the Bar Council of the State or Bar Council of India to punish  that  advocate  by  either  debarring  him  from practice  or  suspending  his  licence,  as  may  be warranted,  in  the  facts  and  circumstances  of  each case. The learned Solicitor General informed us that there have been cases where the Bar Council of India

6 Paras 43, 57, 78 7 Para 79 8 Para 80

Page 25

25

taking  note  of  the  contumacious  and  objectionable conduct  of  an  advocate,  had  initiated  disciplinary proceedings against him and even punished him for “professional misconduct”, on the basis of his having been found guilty of committing contempt of court. We do not entertain any doubt that the Bar Council of the State  or  Bar  Council  of  India,  as  the  case  may be, when  apprised  of  the  established  contumacious conduct of an advocate by the High Court or by this Court,  would  rise  to  the  occasion,  and  take appropriate action against  such an advocate.  Under Article 144 of the Constitution “all authorities, civil and judicial, in the territory of India shall act in aid of the Supreme Court”.  The  Bar  Council  which  performs a public  duty  and  is  charged  with  the  obligation  to protect  the  dignity  of  the  profession  and  maintain professional standards and etiquette is also obliged to act “in aid of the Supreme Court”. It must, whenever facts warrant, rise to the occasion and discharge its duties uninfluenced by the position of the contemner advocate.  It  must  act  in  accordance  with  the prescribed procedure, whenever its attention is drawn by  this  Court  to  the  contumacious  and  unbecoming conduct  of  an  advocate  which  has  the  tendency  to interfere  with  due  administration  of  justice.  It  is possible for the High Courts also to draw the attention of the Bar Council of the State to a case of professional misconduct  of  a  contemner  advocate  to  enable  the State Bar Council to proceed in the manner prescribed by the Act and the Rules framed thereunder. There is no justification to assume that the Bar Councils would not  rise  to  the  occasion,  as  they  are  equally responsible to uphold the dignity of the courts and the majesty  of  law and prevent  any interference  in  the administration  of  justice.  Learned  counsel  for  the parties present before us do not dispute and rightly so that  whenever a court  of  record records its findings about the conduct of  an advocate while finding him guilty of committing contempt of court and desires or refers the matter to be considered by the Bar Council

Page 26

26

concerned, appropriate action should be initiated by the  Bar  Council  concerned  in  accordance  with  law with a view to maintain the dignity of the courts and to  uphold  the  majesty  of  law  and  professional standards and etiquette. Nothing is more destructive of  public  confidence  in  the  administration  of  justice than  incivility,  rudeness  or  disrespectful  conduct  on the part of a counsel towards the court or disregard by the court of the privileges of the Bar. In case the Bar Council,  even  after  receiving  “reference”  from  the Court,  fails  to  take  action  against  the  advocate concerned,  this  Court  might  consider  invoking  its powers under Section 38 of the Act by sending for the record of  the  proceedings from the Bar Council  and passing appropriate orders.  Of  course,  the appellate powers under Section 38 would be available to this Court only and not to the High Courts. We, however, hope that such a situation would not arise.

80. In a given case it may be possible, for this Court or the High Court, to prevent the contemner advocate to  appear  before  it  till  he  purges  himself  of  the contempt but that is much different from suspending or revoking his licence or debarring him to practise as an  advocate.  In  a  case  of  contemptuous, contumacious, unbecoming or blameworthy conduct of an  Advocate-on-Record,  this  Court  possesses jurisdiction, under the Supreme Court Rules itself, to withdraw  his  privilege  to  practice  as  an Advocate-on-Record because that privilege is conferred by  this  Court  and  the  power  to  grant  the  privilege includes  the  power  to  revoke  or  suspend  it.  The withdrawal  of  that  privilege,  however,  does  not amount  to  suspending  or  revoking  his  licence  to practice as an advocate in other courts or tribunals.

81. We are conscious of the fact that the conduct of the contemner in V.C. Mishra case [(1995) 2 SCC 584] was highly contumacious and even atrocious. It was unpardonable. The contemner therein had abused his

Page 27

27

professional  privileges  while  practising  as  an advocate. He was holding a very senior position in the Bar  Council  of  India  and  was expected  to  act  in  a more  reasonable  way.  He  did  not.  These  factors appear to have influenced the Bench in that case to itself punish him by suspending his licence to practice also  while  imposing  a  suspended  sentence  of imprisonment  for  committing  contempt  of  court  but while  doing  so  this  Court  vested  itself  with  a jurisdiction  where  none  exists.  The  position  would have been different had a reference been made to the Bar  Council  and  the  Bar  Council  did  not  take  any action against the advocate concerned. In that event, as  already  observed,  this  Court  in  exercise  of  its appellate jurisdiction under Section 38 of the Act read with  Article  142  of  the  Constitution  of  India,  might have  exercised  suo  motu  powers  and  sent  for  the proceedings  from  the  Bar  Council  and  passed appropriate  orders  for  punishing  the  contemner advocate for professional misconduct after putting him on  notice  as  required  by  the  proviso to  Section  38 which reads thus:

“Provided  that  no  order  of  the  Disciplinary Committee  of  the  Bar  Council  of  India  shall  be varied by the Supreme Court so as to prejudicially affect the person aggrieved without giving him a reasonable opportunity of being heard.”

But it could not have done so in the first instance.”

27. In  Pravin C.  Shah (supra) this  Court  held  that  an

advocate found guilty of contempt cannot be allowed to act

or  plead in any court till  he purges himself  of  contempt.

This direction was issued having regard to Rule 11 of the

Rules framed by the High Court of Kerala under Section 34

Page 28

28

(1) of the Advocates Act and also referring to observations in

para 80 of the judgment of this Court in  Supreme Court

Bar Association (supra).  It was explained that debarring a

person from appearing in Court was within the purview of

the  jurisdiction  of  the  Court  and  was  different  from

suspending or terminating the licence which could be done

by the Bar Council  and on failure of  the Bar Council,  in

exercise  of  appellate  jurisdiction  of  this  Court.   The

observations are:

16. Rule 11 of the Rules is not a provision intended for the Disciplinary Committee of the Bar Council  of the State or the Bar Council of India. It is a matter entirely concerning the dignity and the orderly functioning of the  courts.  The  right  of  the  advocate  to  practise envelops  a  lot  of  acts  to  be  performed  by  him  in discharge  of  his  professional  duties.  Apart  from appearing in the courts  he can be consulted by his clients, he can give his legal opinion whenever sought for, he can draft instruments, pleadings, affidavits or any  other  documents,  he  can  participate  in  any conference involving legal discussions etc. Rule 11 has nothing to do with all the acts done by an advocate during his practice except his performance inside the court. Conduct in court is a matter concerning the court and  hence  the  Bar  Council  cannot  claim  that  what should happen inside the court could also be regulated by  the  Bar  Council  in  exercise  of  its  disciplinary powers. The right to practise, no doubt, is the genus of which the right  to appear and conduct cases in the court  may be a specie.  But  the right  to appear and conduct cases in the court is a matter on which the

Page 29

29

court must have the major supervisory power. Hence the  court  cannot  be  divested  of  the  control  or supervision of the court merely because it may involve the right of an advocate.

17. When  the  Rules  stipulate  that  a  person  who committed  contempt  of  court  cannot  have  the unreserved right to continue to appear and plead and conduct  cases  in  the  courts  without  any  qualm  or remorse,  the  Bar  Council  cannot  overrule  such  a regulation  concerning  the  orderly  conduct  of  court proceedings. Courts of law are structured in such a design  as  to  evoke  respect  and  reverence  for  the majesty  of  law  and  justice.  The  machinery  for dispensation of justice according to law is operated by the  court.  Proceedings  inside  the  courts  are  always expected to be held in a dignified and orderly manner. The very sight of an advocate, who was found guilty of contempt of court on the previous hour, standing in the  court  and  arguing  a  case  or  cross-examining  a witness  on  the  same  day,  unaffected  by  the contemptuous behaviour he hurled at the court, would erode the  dignity  of  the court  and even corrode the majesty of it besides impairing the confidence of the public in the efficacy of the institution of the courts. This necessitates vesting of power with the High Court to formulate rules for regulating the proceedings inside the  court  including  the  conduct  of  advocates  during such proceedings. That power should not be confused with the right to practise law. While the Bar Council can  exercise  control  over  the  latter,  the  High  Court should be in control of the former.

18. In  the  above  context  it  is  useful  to  quote  the following observations made by a Division Bench of the  Allahabad  High  Court  in  Prayag  Das v.  Civil Judge, Bulandshahr {AIR 1974 All 133] : (AIR p. 136, para 9)

Page 30

30

“The  High  Court  has  a  power  to  regulate  the appearance  of  advocates  in  courts.  The  right  to practise and the right to appear in courts are not synonymous. An advocate may carry on chamber practice or even practise in courts in various other ways,  e.g.,  drafting  and filing  of  pleadings  and vakalatnama for  performing those acts.  For  that purpose  his  physical  appearance  in  courts  may not  at  all  be  necessary.  For  the  purpose  of regulating his appearance in courts the High Court should be the appropriate authority to make rules and on a proper construction of  Section 34(1)  of the Advocates Act it must be inferred that the High Court has the power to make rules for regulating the  appearance  of  advocates  and  proceedings inside the courts. Obviously the High Court is the only  appropriate  authority  to  be  entrusted  with this responsibility.”

xxxxx  

24. Purging  is  a  process  by  which  an  undesirable element is expelled either from one’s own self or from a society.  It  is  a cleaning process.  Purge is  a word which  acquired  implications  first  in  theological connotations. In the case of a sin, purging of such sin is  made  through  the  expression  of  sincere  remorse coupled with doing the penance required. In the case of a guilt, purging means to get himself cleared of the guilt. The concept of purgatory was evolved from the word “purge”, which is a state of suffering after this life  in  which  those  souls,  who depart  this  life  with their deadly sins, are purified and rendered fit to enter into heaven where nothing defiled enters (vide Words and Phrases, Permanent Edn., Vol. 35-A, p. 307). In Black’s Law Dictionary the word “purge” is given the following meaning:  “To cleanse; to clear.  To clear or exonerate from some charge or imputation of guilt, or from a contempt.” It is preposterous to suggest that if the convicted person undergoes punishment or if  he

Page 31

31

tenders  the  fine  amount  imposed on  him the  purge would be completed.

xxxxx

27. We cannot therefore approve the view that merely undergoing  the  penalty  imposed  on  a  contemnor  is sufficient to complete the process of purging himself of the  contempt,  particularly  in  a  case  where  the contemnor  is  convicted  of  criminal  contempt.  The danger in giving accord to the said view of the learned Single  Judge  in  the  aforecited  decision  is  that  if  a contemnor is sentenced to a fine he can immediately pay it and continue to commit contempt in the same court, and then again pay the fine and persist with his contemptuous conduct. There must be something more to be done to get oneself purged of the contempt when it is a case of criminal contempt.

28. The Disciplinary Committee of the Bar Council of India highlighted the absence of any mode of purging oneself of the guilt in any of the Rules as a reason for not following the interdict contained in Rule 11. Merely because  the  Rules  did  not  prescribe  the  mode  of purging oneself of the guilt it does not mean that one cannot purge the guilt at all. The first thing to be done in that direction when a contemnor is found guilty of a criminal contempt is to implant or infuse in his own mind real remorse about his conduct which the court found  to  have  amounted  to  contempt  of  court.  Next step is  to seek pardon from the court  concerned for what  he  did  on  the  ground  that  he  really  and genuinely repented and that  he has resolved not  to commit any such act in future. It is not enough that he tenders  an  apology.  The  apology  tendered  should impress  the  court  to  be  genuine  and sincere.  If  the court, on being impressed of his genuineness, accepts the apology then it could be said that the contemnor has purged himself of the guilt.”

Page 32

32

28. In  Bar  Council  of   India  versus  High  Court  of

Kerala9,   constitutionality of Rule 11 of the Rules framed

by  the  High  Court  of  Kerala  for  barring  a  lawyer  from

appearing  in  any  court  till  he  got  himself  purged  of

contempt  by  an  appropriate  order  of  the  court  was

examined.  This  Court  held  that  the  rule  did  not  violate

Articles 14 and 19 (1) (g) of the Constitution nor amounted

to  usurpation  of  power  of  adjudication  and  punishment

conferred on the Bar Councils and the result intended by

the application of the rule was automatic.  It was further

held that the rule was not in conflict with the law laid down

in  the  SCBA  judgment  (supra).   Referring  to  the

Constitution Bench judgment in  Harish Uppal (supra), it

was held that  regulation of  right  of  appearance in courts

was within the jurisdiction of the courts.  It was observed,

following Pravin C. Shah (supra), that the court must have

major supervisory power on the right to appear and conduct

in the court.  The observations are:

“46. Before a contemner is punished for contempt, the court is bound to give an opportunity of hearing to him. Even such an opportunity of hearing is necessary in a

9 (2004) 6 SCC 311

Page 33

33

proceeding under Section 345 of the Code of Criminal Procedure.  But  if  a  law  which  is  otherwise  valid provides for the consequences of such a finding, the same by itself would not be violative of Article 14 of the  Constitution of  India inasmuch as only because another opportunity of hearing to a person, where a penalty  is  provided  for  as  a  logical  consequence thereof, has been provided for. Even under the penal laws  some  offences  carry  minimum  sentence.  The gravity  of  such offences,  thus,  is  recognised by the legislature. The courts do not have any role to play in such a matter.”

29. Reference was also made to the following observations

in Harish Uppal (supra):

“34………The right to practise, no doubt, is the genus of which the right to appear and conduct cases in the court  may be a specie.  But  the right  to appear and conduct cases in the court is a matter on which the court  must  and  does  have  major  supervisory  and controlling power. Hence courts cannot be and are not divested of control or supervision of conduct in court merely  because  it  may  involve  the  right  of  an advocate. A rule can stipulate that a person who has committed  contempt  of  court  or  has  behaved unprofessionally and in an unbecoming manner will not have the right to continue to appear and plead and conduct  cases  in  courts.  The  Bar  Councils  cannot overrule  such  a  regulation  concerning  the  orderly conduct of court proceedings. On the contrary, it will be their duty to see that such a rule is strictly abided by. Courts of law are structured in such a design as to evoke respect and reverence to the majesty of law and justice.  The  machinery  for  dispensation  of  justice according to law is operated by the court. Proceedings inside the courts are always expected to be held in a dignified  and orderly  manner.  The  very  sight  of  an advocate,  who  is  guilty  of  contempt  of  court  or  of

Page 34

34

unbecoming or unprofessional conduct, standing in the court  would erode the dignity of  the court  and even corrode its majesty besides impairing the confidence of the public in the efficacy of the institution of the courts. The power to frame such rules should not be confused with the right to practise law. While the Bar Council can exercise control over the latter, the courts are in control of the former. This distinction is clearly brought out by the difference in language in Section 49 of the Advocates Act on the one hand and Article 145 of the Constitution  of  India  and  Section  34(1)  of  the Advocates  Act  on  the  other.  Section  49  merely empowers the Bar Council to frame rules laying down conditions subject to which an advocate shall have a right to practise i.e. do all the other acts set out above. However,  Article  145  of  the  Constitution  of  India empowers  the  Supreme  Court  to  make  rules  for regulating  this  practice  and  procedure  of  the  court including  inter  alia  rules  as  to  persons  practising before  this  Court.  Similarly  Section  34  of  the Advocates Act empowers High Courts to frame rules, inter alia to lay down conditions on which an advocate shall be permitted to practise in courts. Article 145 of the  Constitution  of  India  and  Section  34  of  the Advocates Act clearly show that there is no absolute right to an advocate to appear in a court. An advocate appears in a court subject to such conditions as are laid down by the court. It must be remembered that Section 30 has not been brought into force and this also shows that there is no absolute right to appear in a court.  Even if  Section 30 were  to  be  brought  into force  control  of  proceedings  in  court  will  always remain  with  the  court.  Thus  even  then  the  right  to appear  in  court  will  be  subject  to  complying  with conditions laid down by courts just as practice outside courts would be subject to conditions laid down by the Bar Council of India. There is thus no conflict or clash between other provisions of the Advocates Act on the one  hand  and  Section  34  or  Article  145  of  the Constitution of India on the other.”

Page 35

35

30. In  R.K. Anand (supra)  it was held that even if there

was no rule framed under Section 34 of the Advocates Act

disallowing  an  advocate  who  is  convicted  of  criminal

contempt  is  not  only  a  measure  to  maintain  dignity  and

orderly function of courts, it may become necessary for the

protection of the court and for preservation of the purity of

court proceedings.  Thus, the court not only has a right but

also an obligation to protect itself and save the purity of its

proceedings  from being  polluted,  by  barring  the  advocate

concerned  from  appearing  before  the  courts  for  an

appropriate  period  of  time10.  This  court  noticed  the

observations about the decline of  ethical  and professional

standards of the Bar, and need to arrest such trend in the

interests of administration of justice.  It was observed that

in absence of unqualified trust and confidence of people in

the bar,  the judicial  system could not work satisfactorily.

Further observations are that the performance of the Bar

Councils  in  maintaining  professional  standards  and

enforcing discipline did not match its achievements in other

10 Paras 238, 239, 242

Page 36

36

areas.  This Court expressed hope and expected that  the

Bar Council will take appropriate action for the restoration

of high professional standards among the lawyers, working

of their position in the judicial system and the society.  It

was further observed:

“331. The other important issue thrown up by this case  and  that  causes  us  both  grave  concern  and dismay  is  the  decline  of  ethical  and  professional standards  among lawyers.  The  conduct  of  the  two appellants  (one  convicted  of  committing  criminal contempt  of  court  and  the  other  found  guilty  of misconduct as Special Public Prosecutor), both of them lawyers  of  long  standing,  and  designated  Senior Advocates, should not be seen in isolation. The bitter truth is that the facts of the case are manifestation of the general erosion of the professional values among lawyers at all levels. We find today lawyers indulging in  practices  that  would  have  appalled  their predecessors  in  the  profession  barely  two  or  three decades  ago.  Leaving  aside  the  many  kinds  of unethical  practices  indulged  in  by  a  section  of lawyers  we  find  that  even  some  highly  successful lawyers seem to live by their own rules of conduct.

xxxxxxxx

333. We  express  our  concern  on  the  falling professional  norms  among  the  lawyers  with considerable  pain  because  we  strongly  feel  that unless  the  trend  is  immediately  arrested  and reversed, it will have very deleterious consequences for  the  administration  of  justice  in  the  country.  No judicial  system  in  a  democratic  society  can  work satisfactorily  unless  it  is  supported  by  a  Bar  that enjoys  the  unqualified  trust  and  confidence  of  the

Page 37

37

people,  that  shares  the  aspirations,  hopes  and  the ideals  of  the  people  and  whose  members  are monetarily accessible and affordable to the people.

xxxxxxxx

335. Here we must also observe that the Bar Council of India and the Bar Councils of the different States cannot  escape  their  responsibility  in  this  regard. Indeed the Bar Council(s) have very positively taken up  a  number  of  important  issues  concerning  the administration  of  justice  in  the  country.  It  has consistently  fought  to  safeguard  the  interests  of lawyers and it has done a lot of good work for their welfare.  But  on  the  issue  of  maintaining  high professional  standards  and  enforcing  discipline among lawyers  its  performance  hardly  matches  its achievements in other areas. It has not shown much concern even to see that lawyers should observe the statutory norms prescribed by the Council itself. We hope and trust that the Council will at least now sit up and pay proper attention to the restoration of the high professional  standards among lawyers worthy of  their  position  in  the  judicial  system  and  in  the society.”

31. In Re: Sanjiv Dutta & Ors.11, it was observed that the

members  of  legal  profession  are  required  to  maintain

exemplary conduct in and outside of the Court.  The respect

for the legal system was due to role played by the stalwarts

of the legal profession and if there was any deviation in the

said  role,  not  only  the  profession  but  also  the

11 (1995) 3 SCC 619

Page 38

38

administration of  justice as a whole would suffer.  In this

regard, relevant observations are :

“20.  The  legal  profession  is  a  solemn  and  serious occupation.  It  is  a  noble  calling  and  all  those  who belong to it are its honourable members. Although the entry to the profession can be had by acquiring merely the qualification of technical competence, the honour as a professional has to be maintained by the its members by  their  exemplary  conduct  both  in  and  outside  the court.  The  legal  profession  is  different  from  other professions  in  that  what  the  lawyers  do,  affects  not only  an  individual  but  the  administration  of  justice which is the foundation of the civilised society. Both as a leading member of the intelligential of the society and as  a  responsible  citizen,  the  lawyer  has  to  conduct himself as a model for others both in his professional and in  his  private  and public  life.  The society  has a right to expect of him such ideal behavior. It must not be forgotten  that  the  legal  profession  has  always  been held in high esteem and its members have played an enviable role in public life. The regard for the legal and judicial systems in this country is in no small measure due to the tiredness role played by the stalwarts in the profession  to  strengthen  them.  They  took  their profession  seriously  and  practised  it  with  dignity, deference and devotion. If the profession is to survive, the judicial system has to be vitalised. No service will be  too  small  in  making the  system efficient,  effective and  credible.  The  casualness  and  indifference  with which  some  members  practise  the  profession  are certainly  not  calculated to achieve that  purpose or  to enhance the prestige either of the profession or of the institution they are serving. If people lose confidence in the profession on account of the deviant ways of some of its members, it is not only the profession which will suffer but also the administration of justice as a whole. The present trend unless checked is likely to lead to a stage  when  the  system  will  be  found  wrecked  from

Page 39

39

within before it  is  wrecked from outside.  It  is  for the members of  the profession to introspect  and take the corrective steps in time and also spare the courts the unpleasant duty. We say no more.”

32. In Bar  Council  of  Maharashtra  versus  M.V.

Dabholkar12 following observations have been made about

the vital role of the lawyer in administration of justice.

“15.  Now to  the  legal  issue  bearing  on  canons  of professional conduct. The rule of law cannot be built on  the  ruins  of  democracy,  for  where  law  ends tyranny begins. If such be the keynote thought for the very  survival  of  our  Republic,  the  integral  bond between the  lawyer  and  the  public  is  unbreakable. And the  vital  role  of  the  lawyer  depends upon (his probity and professional life style. Be it remembered that the central function of the legal profession is to promote the administration of justice. If the practice of law is thus a public utility of great implications and a monopoly  is  statutorily  granted  by  the  nation,  it obligates  the  lawyer  to  observe  scrupulously  those norms which make him worthy of the confidence of the community in him as a vehicle of justice-social justice. The Bar cannot behave with doubtful scruples or strive to  thrive  on litigation.  Canons of  conduct  cannot  be crystallised into  rigid  rules  but  felt  by the  collective conscience of the practitioners as right:

It must be a conscience alive to the proprieties and the improprieties  incident  to  the  discharge  of  a  sacred public trust. It must be a conscience governed by the rejection of self-interest and selfish ambition. It must be a conscience propelled by a consuming desire to play  a  leading  role  in  the  fair  and  impartial administration  of  justice.  to  the  end  that  public

12 (1976) 2 SCC 291

Page 40

40

confidence may be kept undiminished at all times in the belief that we shall always seek truth and justice in  the  preservation of  the rule  of  law. It  must  be a conscience,  not  shaped  by  rigid  rules  of  doubtful validity, but answerable only to a moral code which would drive irresponsible judges from the profession. Without such a conscience, there should be no judge. and, we may add, no lawyer.

Such is the high standard set for professional conduct as  expounded  by  courts  in  this  country  and elsewhere.”

33. In  Jaswant Singh versus Virender Singh13,  it  was

observed :

“36.  ………….  An  advocate  has  no  wider  protection than  a  layman  when  he  commits  an  act  which amounts to contempt of court. It is most unbefitting for an advocate  to  make imputations against  the  Judge only  because  he  does  not  get  the  expected  result, which  according  to  him  is  the  fair  and  reasonable result available to him. Judges cannot be intimidated to  seek  favorable  orders.  Only  because  a  lawyer appears as a party in person, he does not get a license thereby  to  commit  contempt  of  the  Court  by intimidating the Judges or scandalising the courts. He cannot use language, either in the pleadings or during arguments,  which  is  either  intemperate  or unparliamentary.  These  safeguards  are  not  for  the protection of any Judge individually but are essential for maintaining the dignity and decorum of the Courts and  for  upholding  the  majesty  of  law.  Judges  and courts are not unduly sensitive or touchy to fair and reasonable criticism of their judgments. Fair comments, even if,  out-spoken, but made without any malice or attempting to impair the administration of justice and made in good faith in proper language do not attract

13 1995 Supp.(1) SCC 384

Page 41

41

any punishment for contempt of court. However, when from  the  criticism  a  deliberate,  motivated  and calculated  attempt  is  discernible  to  bring  down  the image of judiciary in the estimation of the public or to impair the administration of justice or tend to bring the administration of justice into disrepute the courts must bistre  themselves  to  uphold  their  dignity  and  the majesty  of  law.  The  appellant,  has,  undoubtedly committed  contempt  of  the  Court  by  the  use  of  the objectionable and intemperate language. No system of justice can tolerate such unbridled licence on the part of  a  person,  be  he  a  lawyer,  to  permit  himself  the liberty of scandalising a Court by casting unwarranted, uncalled for and unjustified aspersions on the integrity, ability,  impartiality  or  fairness  of  a  Judge  in  the discharge of his judicial functions as it amounts to an interference with the dues course of administration of justice.”

34. In  Subrata Roy Sahara v. Union of India14,  it was

observed :

“188. The number of similar litigants, as the parties in this group of cases, is on the increase. They derive their strength from abuse of the legal process. Counsel are available, if the litigant is willing to pay their fee. Their percentage is slightly higher at the lower levels of the judicial hierarchy, and almost non-existent at the level of the Supreme Court. One wonders what is it  that a Judge should be made of,  to deal with such litigants who have nothing to lose. What is the level of merit, grit and composure required to stand up to the pressures of today’s litigants? What is it that is needed to bear the affront, scorn and ridicule hurled at officers presiding over  courts?  Surely  one would need superhumans to handle the emerging pressures on the judicial system. The resultant duress is gruelling. One would hope for support for officers presiding over courts from the legal

14 (2014) 8 SCC 470

Page 42

42

fraternity, as also, from the superior judiciary up to the highest level. Then and only then, will it be possible to maintain equilibrium essential to deal with complicated disputations which arise for determination all the time irrespective  of  the  level  and  the  stature  of  the  court concerned. And also, to deal with such litigants.”

35. In Amit Chanchal Jha versus Registar, High Court

of Delhi15 this Court again upheld the order of debarring

the  advocate  from appearing  in  court  on  account  of  his

conviction for criminal contempt.

36. We may also refer to certain articles on the subject. In

“Raising the Bar for the Legal Profession” published in the

Hindu  newspaper  dated  15th September,  2012,  Dr.

N.R.Madhava Menon wrote:

“……..Being  a  private  monopoly,  the  profession  is organised like a pyramid in which the top 20 per cent command 80 per cent of paying work, the middle 30 per cent managing to survive by catering to the needs of the middle  class  and  government  litigation,  while  the bottom 50 per cent barely survive with legal aid cases and  cases  managed  through  undesirable  and exploitative  methods!  Given  the  poor  quality  of  legal education in the majority of the so-called law colleges (over a thousand of them working in small towns and panchayats  without  infrastructure  and  competent faculty),  what  happened  with  uncontrolled  expansion was  the  overcrowding  of  ill-equipped  lawyers  in  the bottom 50 per cent of the profession fighting for a piece of  the  cake.  In  the  process,  being  too  numerous,  the middle  and  the  bottom  segments  got  elected  to

15 (2015) 13 SCC 288

Page 43

43

professional  bodies which controlled the management of  the  entire  profession.  The  so-called  leaders  of  the profession who have abundant work, unlimited money, respect and influence did not bother to look into what was happening to the profession and allowed it to go its way  —  of  inefficiency,  strikes,  boycotts  and  public ridicule.  This  is  the  tragedy of  the  Indian Bar  today which had otherwise a noble tradition of being in the forefront of the freedom struggle and maintaining the rule of law and civil liberties even in difficult times.

37. In “Browbeating, prerogative of lawyers”, published in

the  Hindu  newspaper  dated  7th June,  2016,  Shri  S.

Prabhakaran,  Co-Chairman  of  Bar  Council  of  India  and

Senior  Advocate,  in  response  to  another  Article  “Do  not

browbeat  lawyers”,   published  in  the  said  newspaper  on

June 03, 2016, writes :

“……The next argument advanced against the rules is that the threat of action for browbeating the judges is intended to silence the lawyers. But the authors have forgotten  very  conveniently  that  (i)  when  rallies  and processions  were  taken  out  inside  court  halls obstructing  the  proceedings,  (ii)  when  courts  were boycotted for all and sundry reasons in violation of the law  laid  down  by  the  Supreme  Court  in Ex-Capt. Harish  Uppal,  (iii)  when two  instances  of  murder  of very  notorious  lawyers  inside  the  Egmore  court complex took place on the eve of elections to the Bar Associations, (iv) when a lady litigant who came to the Family Court in Chennai was physically assaulted by a  group  of  lawyers  who  also  coerced  the  police  to register  a  complaint  against  the  victim,  (v)  when  a group  of  lawyers  barged  into  the  chamber  of  a

Page 44

44

magistrate in Puducherry and wrongfully confined him till he released a lawyer on his own bond in a criminal complaint of sexual assault filed by a lady, (vi) when a group  of  lawyers  gheraoed a  magistrate  for  not granting bail and one of them spat on his face, leading to  strong  protests  by  the  Association  of  Judicial Officers,  and (vii)  when very recently,  a lady litigant was physically  assaulted by a group of  lawyers  for sitting  in  the  chair  intended  for  lawyers  inside  the court hall, lawyers such as the authors of the article under response maintained a stoic silence.

Even lawyers who claim to be human rights activists choose to be silent when the human rights of millions of litigants are affected by boycott of courts. It shows that some lawyers, like the authors of the article under response, have always maintained silence and do not mind being silenced by a few unruly members of the Bar who go on the rampage at times. But they do not want to be silenced by any rule prescribing a decent code  of  conduct  in  court  halls.  The  raison  d'être appears to be that browbeating is the prerogative of the lawyers and it shall be allowed with impunity.”

Undesirability of convicted person to perform important public functions:

38. It may also be appropriate to refer to the legal position

about undesirability of a convicted person being allowed to

perform  important  public  functions.   In  Union  of  India

versus Tulsiram Patel16 it  was observed that it  was not

advisable  to  retain  a  person  in  civil  service  after

conviction.17.  In  Rama Narang versus Ramesh Narang18

16 (1985) 3 SCC 398 17 Para 153 18 (1995) 2 SCC 513

Page 45

45

reference was made to Section 267 of the Companies Act

barring  a  convicted  person  from  holding  the  post  of  a

Managing Director in a company.  This Court observed that

having  regard  to  the  said  wholesome  provision,  stay  of

conviction ought to be granted only in rare cases.  In  Lily

Thomas  versus  UOI19,  this  Court  held  that  an  elected

representative  could  not  continue  to  hold  the  office  after

conviction20.   In  Manoj  Narula  versus  UOI21  similar

observation was made.   In  Election Commission versus

Venkata  Rao22 the  disqualification  against  eligibility  for

contesting election was held to operate for continuing on the

elected post.   

Interpretation  of  Section  24-A:  Need  to  amend  the provision

39. Section 24A of the Advocates Act is as follows:

“24A. Disqualification for enrolment.— (1) No person shall be admitted as an advocate on a State roll— (a) if  he  is  convicted  of  an  offence  involving  moral turpitude; (b) if he is convicted of an offence under the provisions of the Untouchability (Offences) Act, 1955 (22 of 1955); 2[(c) if he is dismissed or removed from employment or

19 (2013) 7 SCC 653  20 Para 28. 21 (2014) 9 SCC 1 22 AIR 1953 SC 210

Page 47

47

3. A corrupt apple cannot become a good apple with passage  of  time.  It  is  for  the  legal  profession  to consider  whether  it  would  like  such  a  provision  to continue to remain on the Statute Book and would like to continue to adroit persons who have been convicted for offences involving moral turpitude and persons who have  been  found  guilty  of  acceptance  of  illegal gratification, rape, dacoits, forgery, misappropriation of public funds, relating to counter felt currency and coins and  other  offences  of  like  nature  to  be  enrolled  as members merely because two years have elapsed after the  date  of  their  release  from  imprisonment.  Does passage  of  2  years  cleanse  such  a  person  of  the corrupt character trait, purify his mind and transform him into a person fit for being enrolled as a member of this noble profession? Enrolled so that widows can go to him, matters pertaining to properties of minors and matters on behalf of workers pitted against rich and influential  persons  can  be  entrusted  to  him  without qualms. Court records can be placed at his disposal, his  word  at  the  Bar  should  be  accepted?  Should  a character  certificate in the form of  a Black Gown be given  to  him  so  that  a  promise  of  probity  and trustworthiness  is  held  out  to  the  unwary  litigants seeking justice? A copy of this order may, therefore, be sent to the appropriate authorities concerned with the administration of the Bar Council of India and the State Bar  Council,  Ministry  of  Law  of  the  Government  of India and Law Commission in  order  that  the  matter maybe examined fully and closely with the end in view to preserve the image of the profession and protect the seekers for justice from dangers inherent in admitting such persons on the rolls of the Bar Council.”

41. Inspite of the above observations no action appears to

have been taken at any level. The result is that a person

convicted of even a most heinous offence is eligible to be

Page 48

48

enrolled as an advocate after expiry of two years from expiry

of his sentence.  This aspect needs urgent attention of all

concerned.

42. Apart from the above, we do not find any reason to

hold that the bar applicable at the entry level is wiped out

after the enrollment.    Having regard to the object of  the

provision,  the said bar certainly  operates post  enrollment

also. However, till a suitable amendment is made, the bar is

operative  only  for  two  years  in  terms  of  the  statutory

provision.

43. In these circumstances, Section 24A which debars a

convicted person from being enrolled applies to an advocate

on the rolls of the Bar Council for a period of two years, if

convicted for contempt.  

44. In  addition  to  the  said  disqualification,  in  view

judgment  of  this  Court  in  R.K. Anand (supra), unless a

person purges himself  of contempt or is permitted by the

Court,  conviction  results  in  debarring  an  advocate  from

appearing  in  court  even  in  absence  of  suspension  or

termination of the licence to practice.  We therefore, uphold

Page 49

49

the directions of the High Court in para 42 of the impugned

order quoted above to the effect that the appellant shall not

be permitted to appear in courts of District Etah until he

purges himself of contempt.

Inaction  of  the  Bar  Councils  –  Nature  of  directions required

45. We may now come to the direction to be issued to the

Bar Council of Uttar Pradesh or to the Bar Council of India.

In the present case, inspite of direction of the High Court as

long back as more than ten years, no action is shown to

have been taken by the Bar Council.  Notice was issued by

this Court to the Bar Council of India on 27th January, 2006

and after all the facts having been brought to the notice of

the  Bar  Council  of  India,  the  said  Bar  Council  has  also

failed  to  take  any action.   In  view of  such failure  of  the

statutory obligation of the Bar Council of the State of Uttar

Pradesh as well as the Bar Council of India, this Court has

to exercise appellate jurisdiction under the Advocates Act in

view of proved misconduct calling for disciplinary action.  As

already  observed,  in  SCBA  case  (supra),  this  Court

observed  that  where  the  Bar  Council  fails  to  take  action

Page 50

50

inspite of reference made to it, this Court can exercise suo

motu powers for punishing the contemnor for professional

misconduct.  The appellant has already been given sufficient

opportunity in this regard.

46.   We may add that what is permissible for this Court by

virtue of statutory appellate power under Section 38 of the

Advocates  Act  is  also  permissible  to  a  High Court  under

Article  226  of  the  Constitution  in  appropriate  cases  on

failure of the Bar Council to take action after its attention is

invited to the misconduct.   

47. Thus,  apart  from  upholding  the  conviction  and

sentence awarded by the High Court to the appellant, except

for  the  imprisonment,  the  appellant  will  suffer  automatic

consequence  of  his  conviction  under  Section  24A  of  the

Advocates  Act  which is  applicable  at  the  post  enrollment

stage also as already observed.   

48. Further,  in  exercise  of  appellate  jurisdiction  under

Section 38 of the Advocates Act, we direct that the licence of

the appellant will stand suspended for a further period of

five years.  He will also remain debarred from appearing in

Page 51

51

any court in District Etah even after five years unless he

purges himself of contempt in the manner laid down by this

Court in  Bar Council  of India (supra)  and  R.K. Anand

(supra)  and as directed by the High Court.  Question (ii)

stands decided accordingly.

49. We thus, conclude:

(i) Conviction  of  the  appellant  is  justified  and  is

upheld;

(ii) Sentence  of  imprisonment  awarded  to  the

appellant is set aside in view of his advanced age

but  sentence  of  fine  and  default  sentence  are

upheld.  Further direction that the appellant shall

not be permitted to appear in courts in District

Etah until he purges himself of contempt is also

upheld;

(iii) Under  Section  24A  of  the  Advocates  Act,  the

enrollment of the appellant will stand suspended

for two years from the date of this order;

Page 52

52

(iv) As a disciplinary measure for proved misconduct,

the  licence  of  the  appellant  will  remain

suspended for further five years.  

An Epilogue

50. While this appeal will stand disposed of in the manner

indicated above, we do feel  it necessary to say something

further  in  continuation  of  repeated  observations  earlier

made  by  this  Court  referred  to  above.   Legal  profession

being  the  most  important  component  of  justice  delivery

system, it must continue to perform its significant role and

regulatory mechanism and should not be seen to be wanting

in taking prompt action against any malpractice.  We have

noticed the inaction of the Bar Council of Uttar Pradesh as

well as the Bar Council of India inspite of direction in the

impugned order of the High Court and inspite of notice to

the  Bar  Council  of  India  by  this  Court.   We  have  also

noticed  the  failure  of  all  concerned  to  advert  to  the

observations made by the Gujarat High Court 33 years ago.

Thus  there  appears  to  be  urgent  need  to  review  the

provisions  of  the  Advocates  Act  dealing  with  regulatory

Page 53

53

mechanism  for  the  legal  profession  and  other  incidental

issues, in consultation with all concerned.   

51.  In a recent judgment of this Court in Modern Dental

College and Research Centre versus State of M.P.  in

Civil  Appeal No.4060 of 2009 dated 2nd May, 2016, while

directing  review  of  regulatory  mechanism for  the  medical

profession, this court observed that there is need to review

of  the  regulatory  mechanism of  the  other  professions  as

well.  The relevant observations are:   

“There is perhaps urgent need to review the regulatory mechanism for other service oriented professions also. We  do  hope  this  issue  will  receive  attention  of concerned authorities,  including the Law Commission, in due course.”

52. In view of above, we request the Law Commission of

India to go into all relevant aspects relating to regulation of

legal  profession  in  consultation  with  all  concerned  at  an

early date.  We hope the Government of India will consider

taking further appropriate steps in the light of report of the

Law Commission within six months thereafter.  The Central

Government may file an appropriate affidavit in this regard

within one month after expiry of one year.  

Page 54

54

53. To  consider  any  further  direction  in  the  light  of

developments that may take place, put up the matter for

further consideration one month after expiry of the period of

one year.

………………………………J. (ANIL R. DAVE)

………………………………J. (KURIAN JOSEPH)

………………………………J. (ADARSH KUMAR GOEL)

New Delhi  July 05, 2016.