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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA                                CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION

CRIMINAL APPEAL NO. 549  OF 2016 (Arising out of S.L.P. (Criminal) No. 5032 of 2015)

MAHESHWAR PERI & OTHERS            …        APPELLANT(S)                                   VERSUS

HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE AT ALLAHABAD THROUGH REGISTRAR GENERAL   … RESPONDENT(S)

J  U  D  G  M  E  N  T

KURIAN, J.:

Leave granted.  

2. What is the period of limitation for  suo motu initiation of con-

tempt proceedings,  is  the short  question for  consideration in  this

case.

3. The Outlook Magazine, in its 10.11.2008 edition, published an

article authored by the third appellant, which mainly dealt with the

infamous Provident Fund Scam. The names of the Judges, who are

allegedly involved in the case, were published.

4. On 18.11.2008, one Mr. Manoj Kumar Srivastava and Mr. Veer

Singh, Advocates practicing in the High Court of Allahabad, filed Mis-

cellaneous Application No. 21 of 2008 with the following prayer:

“It  is,  therefore,  most  respectfully  prayed  that  this Hon’ble Court may graciously be pleased to proceed

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REPORTABLE

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for  initiating  Criminal  Contempt  proceedings  on  its own  motion  against  aforesaid  opposite  parties  and they be punished accordingly under Article 215 of the Constitution of India and or to pass any other order which this Hon’ble Court may deem fit and proper.”

5. According to them, the article “has caused great insult to the

Higher Judiciary. The remarks are derogatory and have lowered the

authority of the Higher Judiciary.” Learned Counsel appearing for the

respondent/High Court of Allahabad submits that the petition was

placed before a Single Judge of the High Court, and thereafter, be-

fore the Chief Justice. It appears, for about four years, nothing hap-

pened in the matter until it was listed before the Division Bench of

the High Court leading to the impugned order dated 28.04.2015. It

was held in the impugned order that:

“… The publication dated 10.11.2008 at page 56, 57, 58, 59 as mentioned above has caused great insult  to  the  higher  Judiciary.  The  remarks  are derogatory and lower the authority of the higher Judiciary. Hence, it is a fit case to take ‘suo motu’ action  by  this  Court.  Accordingly,  we  take  ‘suo motu’ action. Hence the name of the petitioner is not to be shown in the cause list.”

xxx xxx xxx xxx

“Let  a  notice  be  issued  to  contemnor  opposite party no. 2,3,4,  namely, Mr.  Maheshwer Peri,  Mr. Bishwadeep  Moitra,  Sushri  Chandrani  Benerji through  Chief  Judicial  Magistrate  Ghaziabad  to show  cause  why  the  charges  be  not  framed against  them  for  committing  contempt  of  this Court and to punish them in accordance with law. They shall also appear in person on the next date.”

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6. Aggrieved, appellants are before this Court.

7. As we propose to deal with the legal contention on limitation, it

is not necessary for us to go into the question as to whether the arti-

cle actually constitutes contempt.

8. The main contention advanced by the learned Counsel for the

appellants is that the High Court, having initiated action only after

four  years  of  the  alleged  contempt,  the  whole  proceedings  are

barred by Section 20 of The Contempt of Courts Act, 1971 (here-

inafter referred to as ‘the Act’) which has prescribed the period of

limitation of one year for initiating any proceedings of contempt, be

it suo motu or otherwise.  Section  20 of the Act reads as follows:

“20. Limitation for actions for contempt.—No court  shall  initiate any proceedings of contempt, either on its own motion or otherwise, after the ex- piry of a period of one year from the date on which the contempt is alleged to have been committed. "

9. Learned Counsel appearing for the High Court, however, con-

tends that being an action initiated by the High Court under Article

215 of the Constitution of India and since the genesis of the initia-

tion of the contempt is the application dated 18.11.2008 filed by Mr.

Manoj Kumar Srivastava and Mr. Veer Singh, Advocates, and since

the High Court had considered the application within one year and

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had taken action by issuing notice, though after six years, it is within

time.

10. Our attention is invited to a three-Judge Bench decision of this

Court in Pallav Sheth v. Custodian and others1 and particular to

paragraphs-39 and 40.  Paragraphs 39 and 40 reads as follows:

“39. In  the  case  of  criminal  contempt  of  a subordinate court, the High Court may take action on a reference made to it by the subordinate court or on a motion made by the Advocate-General or the Law Officer of the Central Government in the case of a Union Territory. This reference or motion can conceivably commence on an application be- ing filed by a person whereupon the subordinate court or the Advocate-General if it is so satisfied may refer the matter to the High Court. Proceed- ings for civil contempt normally commence with a person  aggrieved  bringing  to  the  notice  of  the court the wilful disobedience of any judgment, de- cree, order etc. which could amount to the com- mission of the offence. The attention of the court is drawn to such a contempt being committed only by a person filing an application in that behalf. In other words, unless a court was to take a suo motu action,  the  proceeding  under  the  Contempt  of Courts Act, 1971 would normally commence with the filing of an application drawing the attention of the court to the contempt having been committed. When the judicial  procedure requires an applica- tion being filed either before the court or consent being sought by a person from the Advocate-Gen- eral or a Law Officer, it must logically follow that proceedings for  contempt are initiated when the applications are made.

40. In other words, the beginning of the ac- tion prescribed for  taking cognizance of  criminal contempt under Section 15 would be initiating the proceedings for contempt and the subsequent ac- tion taken thereon of refusal or issuance of a no-

1 (2001) 7 SCC 549 4

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tice or punishment thereafter are only steps follow- ing or succeeding such initiation. Similarly, in the case of  a  civil  contempt,  filing of  an application drawing the attention of the court is necessary for further steps to be taken under the Contempt of Courts Act, 1971.”

11. We are afraid, the contentions advanced by the learned Coun-

sel for the appellants cannot be appreciated. Be it an action initiated

for contempt under Article 129 of the Constitution of India by the

Supreme Court or under Article 215 of the Constitution of India by

the High Court, it is now settled law that the prosecution procedure

should be in consonance with the Act, as held by this Court in Pallav

Sheth case (supra).

12. And thus, the dispute boils down to the question of limitation

only.

13. Under the Act,  the action for  contempt is taken by only two

courts, either the Supreme Court or the High Court. The procedure is

prescribed under Section 15 of the Act, which reads as follows:

“15.  Cognizance  of  criminal  contempt  in other cases.—(1) In the case of a criminal con- tempt, other than a contempt referred to in sec- tion 14, the Supreme Court or the High Court may take  action  on  its  own  motion  or  on  a  motion made by—

(a) the Advocate-General, or (b) any other person, with the consent in writ- ing to (sic of) the Advocate-General, or (c) in relation to the High Court for the Union territory of Delhi, such Law Officer as the Cen- tral  Government  may,  by notification in  the Official Gazette, specify in this behalf, or any

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ceeding under The Contempt of Courts Act,  1971 would normally

commence with the filing of an application drawing the attention of

the court to the contempt having been committed. “The application

is the motion provided under Section 15 of The Contempt of Courts

Act, 1971. Such a motion, by any person other than Advocate Gen-

eral, can be made only with the consent in writing of the Advocate

General.  In other words,  any other application made by a person

without the consent of the Advocate General, is not an application in

the eyes of law.”

15. This  aspect  has  been succinctly  discussed and subtly  distin-

guished in paragraph-44 of the Pallav Sheth case (supra). To quote

paragraph-44:

“44. Action for contempt is divisible into two categories, namely, that initiated suo motu by the court  and  that  instituted  otherwise  than  on  the court’s own motion. The mode of initiation in each case would necessarily be different.  While in the case of suo motu proceedings, it is the court itself which must initiate by issuing a notice, in the other cases initiation can only be by a party filing an ap- plication. In our opinion, therefore, the proper con- struction to be placed on Section 20 must be that action must be initiated, either by filing of an appli- cation  or  by  the  court  issuing  notice  suo  motu, within a period of one year from the date on which the contempt is alleged to have been committed.”

16. Coming  to  the  factual  matrix  of  the  present  case,  the  High

Court is clear in its mind that the action under Section 15 of the Act

is initiated suo motu by the High Court. To make it abundantly clear 7

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in the impugned order, it is said that the name of the petitioner is

not to be shown in the cause list.  Apparently, it  can only be  suo

motu because the application filed by the advocates, and which is

referred to in the impugned order, is without the consent in writing

of the Advocate General. The only application other than by the Ad-

vocate General,  contemplated under Section 15 of the Act,  is the

motion made by any person with the consent in writing of the Advo-

cate General. Being a jurisdiction which, when exercised, is fraught

with serious consequences, the Parliament has thought it justifiably

fit to provide for such safeguards. Thus, the impugned article, hav-

ing been published on 10.11.2008 and the High Court having initi-

ated the suo motu action only on 28.04.2015, the same is hit by the

limitation of one year prescribed under the Act.

17. In that view of the matter, it has become unnecessary for us to

deal with the submissions on merits as to whether the contents of

the article would constitute criminal contempt or not.

18. Accordingly, the appeal is allowed and the impugned order is

set aside.

...................................J.                (KURIAN JOSEPH)

........………………………………J.       (ROHINTON FALI NARIMAN)

New Delhi; June 30, 2016.   

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