MAHENDRA PRASAD SINGH @ MAHENDRA SINGH Vs STATE OF BIHAR .
Bench: MUKUNDAKAM SHARMA,ANIL R. DAVE, , ,
Case number: C.A. No.-003131-003131 / 2011
Diary number: 30990 / 2008
Advocates: T. MAHIPAL Vs
KRISHNANAND PANDEYA
NON-REPORTABLE
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA
CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION
CIVIL APPEAL NO. 3131 OF 2011 (Arising out of S.L.P.(C) No.28448 of 2008)
Mahendra Prasad Singh @ Mahendra Singh .....Appellant.
Versus
State of Bihar & Ors. …..Respondents
J U D G M E N T
ANIL R. DAVE, J.
1. Leave granted.
2. Being aggrieved by the Judgment and Order dated 26th
June, 2008 delivered in LPA No.978 of 2007 by the High Court
of Judicature at Patna, this appeal has been filed by the
original petitioner-appellant herein.
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3. The appellant was appointed as a constable and while
undergoing training at Commandant Training Centre, B.M.P.-
1, Ranchi he was placed under suspension. During the period
of suspension he had absconded from the Training Centre,
Ranchi without giving any intimation to any authority.
Thereafter, he had returned to Palamu Headquarters and had
reported his arrival. Thus, he had unauthorizedly remained
absent for 105 days. In view of his above stated misconduct,
the departmental inquiry had been conducted and as a result
of inquiry proceeding, by an order dated 14th September, 1977,
his services had been brought to an end by way of punishment.
4. Being aggrieved by the order of punishment, the
appellant filed an appeal before the Deputy Inspector General
of Police, S.C.R., Ranchi, who did not find any substance in the
appeal and, therefore, dismissed the same.
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5. Thereafter, the appellant made a representation to the
Director General & Inspector General of Police, Bihar at
Patna for his reinstatement on 7th January, 1989. The said
representation was also turned down by the Director General
& Inspector General of Police, Bihar. It appears from the
order dated 28th July, 1989, passed by the Director General &
Inspector General of Police, Bihar, that the appellant had also
made a representation earlier but the said representation had
been rejected.
6. The appellant was not aggrieved by the order of
punishment but he was aggrieved because no pension was paid
to him. Therefore, after about 10 years, he filed C.W.J.C.
No.1971/2000 in the High Court of Judicature at Patna. In the
said petition a direction was given to the concerned authorities
to look into the grievance of the petitioner. By giving such
direction, the petition was disposed of on 29th February, 2000.
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7. In pursuance of the aforestated order passed by the High
Court, the concerned authorities considered the case of the
appellant and came to the conclusion that he was not entitled
to any pension as he was removed from service. Final decision
was communicated to the appellant by the Superintendent of
Police, Palamu on 10.6.2001.
8. Being aggrieved by the Order dated 10th June, 2001, the
appellant filed C.W.J.C. No.8260 of 2002. After hearing the
concerned parties, the said petition was rejected on 28th
September, 2007.
9. Being aggrieved by the Order rejecting the petition, the
appellant filed L.P.A. No.978 of 2007 which was also dismissed
on 26th June, 2008 and, therefore, the appellant filed the
present appeal wherein the order dated 26th June, 2007
dismissing the Letters Patent Appeal has been challenged.
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10. Leaned senior counsel Mr. Nagendra Rai appearing for
the appellant has very fairly submitted that the appellant was
not aggrieved by the order whereby his service was terminated
but he was aggrieved as he was not being paid pension. He
submitted that according to Rule 46 of Bihar Pension Rules,
1950 (hereinafter referred to as ‘the Rules’), unless an
employee has been dismissed or removed from service for
misconduct, insolvency or inefficiency, the employee would get
pension upon termination of his service. He further submitted
that the appellant had neither been dismissed nor been
removed but he had been discharged from service by the order
dated 14th September, 1977 and, therefore, the appellant was
entitled to get pension. So as to substantiate his case, he relied
upon the following judgments: (1) Raghunandan Mishra v.
State of Bihar and others, 1985 BLJ 721; (2) Fagoo Paswan v.
The State of Bihar & ors., 1999(1) PLJR210 and (3) Vijoy
Narain Jha v. The State of Bihar & others, 2000(1) BLJ 452.
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11. On the other hand, the learned counsel appearing for the
State supported the orders passed by the authorities below and
the High Court and submitted that the appellant is not entitled
to get any pension for the reason that he had been dismissed
from service by virtue of the order dated 14th September, 1977.
He very fairly submitted that a mistake had been committed by
the Superintendent of Police who had passed the order
terminating the service while using the word ‘discharge’
instead of ‘dismiss’. He took us through the said order which
gives details about the circumstances in which the
departmental proceedings had been initiated against the
appellant and upon finding him guilty, the order of
punishment had been passed by the Superintendent of Police.
He submitted that looking to the tenor of the said order, it is
clear that the Superintendent of Police, Palamu, considered
seriousness of the misconduct of the appellant and he observed
in the order that looking to the misconduct, the appellant must
be dismissed from the service but somehow in the last
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paragraph, instead of word ‘dismissed’ the word ‘discharged’
was used. The learned counsel further submitted that, in fact,
there is no punishment of discharge in the police manual. He
referred to the relevant provisions of the Bihar Police Manual,
which deals with the punishments which can be inflicted upon
police personnel, and he also submitted that there is no
punishment of ‘discharge from service’.
12. He further submitted that even according to Rule 46 of
the Rules, if anyone has been dismissed or removed from
service because of any misconduct, the said employee would
not be entitled to get any pension. He further submitted that
upon perusal of the order imposing punishment, it was clear
that the appellant was dismissed from service, though the term
‘discharge’ was used in the impugned order. He, therefore,
submitted that the appeal be dismissed as the appellant is not
entitled to pension.
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13. We heard learned counsel at length. It is pertinent to
note that though the order of punishment was passed on 14th
September, 1977, which had been confirmed on 4th April, 1978,
by the Deputy Inspector General of Police, S.C.R., Ranchi, the
appellant filed a petition making a grievance regarding non
payment of pension in 2000. As the appellant had made a
prayer for pension, the High Court gave a direction for
considering the appellant’s case for payment of pension. The
concerned authorities considered the appellant’s case and
looking to the provisions of the Rules, came to the conclusion
that the appellant was not liable to get any pension and his
request for pension was rejected. Thereafter another petition
was filed by the appellant, which was also rejected and,
therefore, he filed an L.P.A., which was also dismissed and,
therefore, the present appeal was filed.
14. In our opinion, the authorities and the High Court were
right in coming to the conclusion that as the appellant was
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removed from service by way of dismissal on account of his
misconduct, the appellant was not entitled to get any pension
as per Rule 46 of the Rules.
15. It is pertinent to note that according to the provisions of
Rule 107 of the Rules, there can be four types of pensions as
narrated in the said Rule – i) Compensation pensions (ii)
Invalid pensions (iii) Superannuation pensions and (iv)
Retiring pensions. The appellant could not make out any case
for entitlement of any of the pensions referred to hereinabove.
The learned counsel appearing for the appellant also could not
point out any provision enabling the appellant to get pension.
16. In view of the fact that the service of the appellant had
been terminated by way of punishment on account of his
misconduct, in our opinion, the High Court rightly dismissed
the appeal filed by the appellant. We agree with the view
expressed by the High Court.
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17. Upon examining the order of punishment, we find that
the Superintendent of Police, Palamu, who had passed the
order of punishment had discussed the gravity of the
misconduct of the appellant and ultimately he passed the order
of punishment dated 14th September, 1977, whereby service of
the appellant was terminated. Though in the said order the
Superintendent of Police, Palamu inflicted punishment of
‘discharge’ from service, as stated hereinabove, there is no
punishment like ‘discharge’ from service. We are in
agreement with the submission made on behalf of the learned
counsel appearing for the Authorities that a mistake was
committed by the Superintendent of Police by stating that the
appellant was discharged from service. In fact, he ought to
have stated that the appellant was dismissed from service. An
order is to be read in entirety and upon such reading, the
intention behind passing of the order is to be understood. The
order is not to be read by taking notice of only one or two
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words of the order. If one reads the present order in entirety,
there could be no two opinions that it is an order of removal
from service by way of dismissal. Upon reading the said order
of punishment, we are also of the view that the Superintendent
of Police had duly considered the gravity of the misconduct
and also mentioned in the body of the order that the appellant
deserved dismissal but in the final operative portion of the
order some mistake was committed. Such a mistake would not
enable the appellant to get pension which otherwise he was not
entitled to. Even the Hindi word used by the Superintendent
of Police “Seva Samapta” if read in the context of the facts
would mean that on account of the misconduct of the appellant
he was dismissed from service as there is no punishment of
‘discharge’ from service in the Bihar Police Manual.
18. In our opinion, provisions of Rule 46 of the Rules would
not help the appellant especially because his service was
terminated due to his misconduct. It is an admitted fact that
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due to his misconduct, his service was terminated or he was
removed from service and, therefore, also, in our opinion, the
appellant would not be entitled to any pension.
19. For the aforestated reasons, we do not see any reason to
interfere with the just and proper order passed by the High
Court. Therefore, this appeal is dismissed with no order as to
costs.
………………................................J. (Dr. MUKUNDAKAM SHARMA)
……...........................................J. (ANIL R. DAVE) New Delhi April 8, 2011
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