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Reportable

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA

CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION

CIVIL APPEAL No. 2812 OF 2015        

Maharao Bhim Singh of Kota Thr. Maharao Brij Raj Singh, Kota …….Appellant(s)

VERSUS

Commissioner of Income-tax, Rajasthan-II, Jaipur ……Respondent(s)

                 J U D G M E N T

Abhay Manohar Sapre, J.

1. This appeal is filed against the final order dated

26.03.2014 passed by the High Court of Rajasthan at

Jaipur in D.B. Income Tax Reference No. 64 of 1986

relating to  the Assessment Year 1978-79 whereby the

Full  Bench of the High Court answered the question of

law referred to it against the appellant herein.

2. In order to appreciate the issue involved in the

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appeal,  it  is  necessary  to  state  the  relevant  facts  in

brief infra.

3. The appellant was the Ruler of the princely State

of Kota, now a part of State of Rajasthan. He owned

extensive properties which, inter alia, included his two

residential palaces known as   "Umed Bhawan Palace"

and   "City  Palace“.   The  appellant  is  using  Umed

Bhawan  Palace  for  his  residence.    So  far  as  this

appeal is concerned, the issue involved herein centers

around "Umed Bhawan Palace".

4. In  exercise  of  the  powers  conferred  by  Section

60A of the Indian Income Tax Act, 1922 (XI of 1922),

the Central  Government issued an order  called "The

Part  B  States  (Taxation  Concessions)  Order,  1950"

(hereinafter referred to as "The Order").  It was issued

essentially to grant exemptions, reductions in rate of

tax and the modifications in relation to specified kinds

of income earned by the persons (Ruler and his family

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members)  from various  sources  as  specified  therein.

The  Order  was  published  in  the  Gazette  of  India,

extraordinary, on 02.12.1950.  

5. Paragraph  15  of  the  Order  deals  with  various

kinds of exemptions.  Item (iii) of  Paragraph 15, which

is relevant for this appeal, provides that the bona fide

annual value of the residential palace of the Ruler of a

State which is situate within the State and is declared

by the Central Government as his inalienable ancestral

property  would  be  exempt  from  payment  of

Income-tax.  

6. In pursuance of the powers conferred under item

(iii)  of  Paragraph  15  of  the  Order,  the  Central

Government,  Ministry  of  Finance(Revenue  Division)

issued  a  notification  bearing  No.  S.R.O.1619  dated

14.05.1954  declaring  the  appellant's  aforementioned

two palaces, viz., Umed Bhawan and City Palace as his

official residences (Serial no. 21 of the Table).  

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7. On  20.09.1976,  the  Ministry  of  Defence

requisitioned  portion  of  the  Umed  Bhawan  Palace

(918.26 Acres of the land including houses and other

construction standing on the land) for their own use

and  realized  Rs.80,000/-   as  rent  by  invoking  the

provisions of Requisition and Exhibition of Immovable

Property Act, 1952.   According to the appellant, the

period for which the land was requisitioned expired in

1993 though the land still continues to remain in the

occupation of the Ministry of Defence.  

8. With the aforementioned factual background, the

question  arose  in  the  appellant's  income-tax

assessment  proceedings  regarding  taxability  of  the

income derived by the appellant (assesse) from the part

of the property requisitioned by the Defence Ministry,

which was a portion of the appellant's official residence

(Umed Bhawan Palace). The question was whether the

rental  income  received  by  the  appellant  from  the

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requisitioned property by way of rent is taxable in his

hands.  In other words, the question was as to whether

the  appellant  is  entitled  to  get  full  benefit  of  the

exemption granted to him under Section 10 (19A) of

the Income Tax Act 1961 (for short, "the I.T. Act") from

payment of  income-tax or it  is confined only to that

portion of palace which is in his actual occupation as

residence and the rest which is in occupation of the

tenant would be subjected to payment of tax.  

9. The  Commissioner  of  Income  Tax(Appeals)

Rajasthan-II by order dated 23.02.1984 in Appeal No.

CIT(A)/JPR/8/81-82  answered  the  question  in

appellant's  favour  and held  that  since  the  appellant

was  in  occupation  of  part  of  his  official  residence

during  the  assessment  year  in  question,  he  was

entitled to claim full benefit of the exemption for his

official residence as provided under Section 10 (19A) of

the I.T. Act notwithstanding the fact that portion of the

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residence  is  let  out  to  the  Defence  Ministry.   The

Revenue, felt  aggrieved,  carried the matter in appeal

before the Income Tax Appellate Tribunal.   By order

dated 11.07.1985, the Tribunal affirmed the order of

the  Commissioner  of  Income Tax and dismissed the

Revenue's  appeal.   The  Tribunal,  however,  on  an

application made by the Revenue under Section 256(1)

of the I.T. Act referred the following question of law to

the High Court of Rajasthan for answer.

"Whether  on  the  facts  and  in  the circumstances of the case, the Tribunal was  justified  in  holding  that  the  rental income  from  Umed  Bhawan  Palace  was exempt  under  Section  10(19A)  of  the  IT Act,1961."

10. The  Division  Bench  of  the  High  Court  while

hearing the reference noticed cleavage of  opinion on

the  question  referred  in  this  case  in  two  earlier

decisions of the High Court of Rajasthan.  One was in

the  case  of  Maharawal  Laxman  Singh  vs. C.I.T.,

(1986)  160  ITR  103(Raj.)  and  another  was  in

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appellant’s own case,  C.I.T.  vs. H.H. Maharao Bhim

Singhji, (1988)173 ITR 79(Raj.).  So far as the case of

Maharwal  Laxman  Singh  (supra)  is  concerned,  the

High Court had answered the question in favour of the

Revenue and against the assesse, wherein it was held

that  in  such  factual  situation  arising  in  the  case,

annual  value  of  the  portion  which  was  in  the

occupation of the tenant is not exempt from  payment

of Income-tax and, therefore, income derived therefrom

is  required  to  be  added  to  the  total  income  of  the

assessee,  whereas  in  case  of  H.H.  Maharao  Bhim

Singhji (supra), the High Court answered the question

against  the  Revenue  and  in  favour  of  the  assesse

holding therein that in such a situation, the assessee

is  entitled  to  claim full  exemption in relation to  his

palace  under  Section  10(19A)  of  the  I.T.  Act

notwithstanding the fact that portion of the palace is

let out to a tenant.  It was held that any rental income

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derived  from  the  part  of  his  rental  property  is,

therefore,  not  liable  to  tax.   The  Division  Bench,

therefore,  referred  the  matter  to  the  Full  Bench  to

resolve the conflict arising between the two decisions

and answer the referred question on merits.   

11. By impugned order dated 26.03.2014, the High

Court  answered  the  question  against  the  appellant

(assessee)  and  in  favour  of  the  Revenue.  While

referring to various authorities of this Court and the

High Courts,  it  was  held  that  the  law laid  down in

C.I.T.  vs. H.H. Maharao Bhim Singhji,  (supra) does

not lay down correct principle of law whereas the law

laid  down  in  Maharawal  Laxman  Singh  vs. C.I.T.

(supra) lays down the correct principle of law.  It was

held that so long as the assessee continues to remain

in occupation of his official residential palace for his

own  use,  he  would  be  entitled  to  claim  exemption

available  under  Section  10(19A)  of  the  I.T.  Act  but

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when he is found to have let out any part of his official

residence  and  at  the  same  time  is  found  to  have

retained  its  remaining  portion  for  his  own  use,  he

becomes  disentitle  to  claim  benefit  of  exemption

available under Section 10(19A) for the entire palace.

It was held that in such circumstances, he is required

to pay income-tax on the income derived by him from

the portion let out in accordance with the provisions of

the  I.T.  Act  and  the  benefit  of  exemption  remains

available only to the extent of portion which is in his

occupation as residence. It  is against this order, the

assessee has filed this appeal.        

12. Heard  Mr.  Gopal  Subramaniam,  learned  senior

counsel,  for  the  appellant  (assessee)  and  Mr.  Y.P.

Adhyaru,  learned senior  counsel,  for  the  respondent

(Revenue).

13. Mr.  Gopal  Subramaniam  while  assailing  the

legality  and  correctness  of  the  impugned  order

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contended that the reasoning and conclusion arrived

at  by  the  High  Court  is  not  legally  sustainable  for

various reasons.

14. In the first  place,  learned senior  counsel  urged

that  when the question involved in this  appeal,  was

already  decided  in  favour  of  the  appellant  in  all

previous assessment  years (1973-74 to  1977-78),  by

this  Court,  there  was  no  justifiable  reason  for  the

Revenue to have pursued the same question again only

for the assessment year in question (1978-79) to the

High Court.  Learned counsel urged that in any event,

the High Court should have taken note of this fact and

answered the reference in appellant's favour by placing

reliance  on  the  earlier  decision  in  the  case  of H.H.

Maharao  Bhim Singhji  (supra).   In  support  of  this

submission,  learned  counsel  placed  reliance  on  the

decisions of this Court in  M/s Radhasoami Satsang,

Saomi Bagh, Agra vs. Commissioner of Income Tax,

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(1992) 1 SCC 659,  The Parashuram Pottery Works

Co. Ltd. vs. The Income Tax Officer, Circle-I, Ward

‘A’  Rajkot,  Gujarat,  (1977)  1  SCC  408  and

Commissioner of Income Tax  vs. Excel Industries

Ltd., (2014) 13 SCC 459.

15. In the second place, learned counsel  contended

that since the issue involved herein pertains to grant of

exemption to the assessee from payment of income-tax

under  Section  10(19A)  of  the  I.T.  Act  read  with

paragraph 15 of the Order, such provisions should be

regarded  as  exception  and  construed  liberally  in

appellant’s  favour  unlike  the  charging  provisions,

which are interpreted strictly. Reliance was placed on

the decision of this Court  in  the case of  Union of

India & Ors.  vs. Wood Papers Ltd. & Anr., (1990) 4

SCC 256  and other decisions.

16. In  the  third  place,  learned  counsel  contended

that  the  High  Court  was  not  justified  in  placing

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reliance on Section 5(iii)  of  the Wealth Tax Act,1957

while interpreting Sections 10(19A), 22 and 23 of the

I.T.  Act  and  Paragraph  15  of  the  Order.  Learned

counsel  pointed out that  Section 5(iii)  of  the Wealth

Tax Act and Section 23 of the I.T. Act are neither  in

pari  materia with  each  other  and  nor  identically

worded.  Learned counsel pointed out the difference in

the  language  employed  in  both  the  aforementioned

sections in support of  his submission.  

17. In  the  fourth  place,  learned  counsel  contended

that the question involved in this appeal has already

been answered by the M.P. High Court in the case of

Commissioner  of  Income-tax  vs. Bharatchandra

Banjdeo, (1985) 154 ITR 236(MP) = 1986 (27) Taxman

456 (M.P.) in favour of the assessee.  It was urged that

there was no justifiable reason for the High Court to

have departed from the view taken by the M.P. High

Court. Learned counsel urged that the reason given for

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distinguishing the view taken by the M.P. High Court

is not well founded and more so when it has already

been relied on by the Rajasthan High Court in  H.H.

Maharao  Bhim  Singhji  (supra)  in  appellant’s  own

case.

18. In the fifth place, learned counsel contended that

there  is  a  significant  departure  in  the  wordings  of

Section  10(19A)  and  Section  23  of  the  I.T.  Act.

Learned counsel pointed out that Section 10(19A) does

not use the same expression which occurs in Section

23(2), namely, "annual value of such house or part of

the house".  According to learned counsel, absence of

these words in Section 10(19A) of the I.T. Act goes to

show that the appellant is entitled to claim exemption

applicable to the entire palace even though the part of

palace is in occupation of  tenant.  It was urged that

splitting of palace is not permissible under Section 10

(19A) of the I.T. Act though it is permissible in ‘house”.

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19.  It is these submissions, which were elaborated

by the learned counsel with reference to case law and

interpretative process of the relevant provisions of the

I.T. Act and Order.

20. In  reply,  learned  counsel  for  the  respondent

(Revenue) supported the reasoning and the conclusion

arrived  at  by  the  High  Court  and  prayed  for  its

upholding.

21. Having heard learned counsel for the parties and

upon perusal of the record of the case and the written

submissions, we find force in the submissions urged

by the learned counsel for the appellant (assessee).

22. Section  10(19A)  of  the  I.T.  Act  and  Paragraph

15(iii)  of the Order,  which are relevant for this case,

read as under:

Section 10(19A) of the I.T. Act

“Section  10.   Incomes  not  included  in total  income.-In  computing  the  total income of a previous year of any person,

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any  income  falling  within  any  of  the following clauses shall not be included- 1 to 19……………………………………………… (19A) The annual value of any one palace in  the  occupation  of  a  Ruler,  being  a palace,  the  annual  value  whereof  was exempt  from  income-tax  before  the commencement  of  the  Constitution (Twenty-sixth  Amendment)  Act,  1971,  by virtue  of  the  provisions  of  the  Merged States (Taxation Concessions) Order, 1949, or  the  Part  B  States  (Taxation Concessions) Order, 1950, or, as the case may be, the Jammu and Kashmir (Taxation Concessions) Order, 1958:

Provided  that  for  the  assessment year commencing on the 1st day of April, 1972,  the  annual  value  of  every  such palace  in  the  occupation  of  such  Ruler during the relevant previous year shall be exempt from income-tax;]”

Paragraph 15 of the Order

15. Exemptions-Any income falling within the following classes shall be exempt from income-tax and super-tax and shall not be included in the total income or total world income of the person receiving them: (i)……………………………………………….. (ii)………………………………………………. (iii)  The  bona  fide annual  value  of  the residential palace of the Ruler of a State which  is  situate  within  the  State  and  is declared by the Central Government as his inalienable ancestral property.”

23. Section 10 provides that in computing the total

income of a previous year of any person, any income

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falling  within  any  of  the  sub-clauses  of  Section  10

shall not be included. Sub-clause (19A) says that the

annual value of any one palace which is in occupation

of a Ruler and whose annual value was exempt from

income-tax  before  the  commencement  of  the

Constitution  (Twenty-sixth  Amendment)  by  virtue  of

the  provisions  of  the  Merged  States  (Taxation

concessions)  Order,  1949  or  the  Part  B  States

(Taxation Concessions), Order 1950 would be exempt

from payment of income-tax.  

24. As  mentioned  above,  Paragraph  15  (iii)  grants

exemption  to  the  bona  fide  annual  value  of  the

residential  palace  of  the  Ruler  of  a  State,  which  is

declared  by  the  Central  Government  to  be  Rulers

ancestral property from payment of income-tax.

25. In  order  to  claim  exemption  from  payment  of

income-tax on the residential palace of the Ruler under

Section 10(19A), it is necessary for the Ruler to satisfy

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that first, he owns the palace as his ancestral property;

second,  such  palace  is  in  his  occupation  as  his

residence;  and  third,  the  palace  is  declared  exempt

from payment of income-tax under Paragraph 15 (iii) of

the Order, 1950 by the Central Government.

26. Now, the question arises that where part of the

residential palace is found to be in occupation of the

tenant and remaining is in occupation of the Ruler for

his  residence,  whether  in  such  circumstances,  the

Ruler is entitled to claim exemption for the whole of his

residential  palace  under  Section  10(19A)  or  such

exemption would confine  only  to  that  portion of  the

palace  which  is  in  his  actual  occupation.  In  other

words, whether the exemption would cease to apply to

let out portion thereby subjecting the income derived

from let out portion to payment of income-tax in the

hands of the Ruler.

27. This  very  question  was  examined  by  the  M.P.

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High  Court  in  the  case  of  Bharatchandra  Banjdeo

(supra) in detail.   It was held that no reliance could be

placed on Section 5(iii)  of  the  Wealth  Tax  Act  while

construing  Section  10(19A)  for  the  reason  that  the

language employed in Section 5(iii) is not identical with

the language of Section 10(19A) of the I.T. Act. Their

Lordships  distinguished  the  decision  of  Delhi  High

Court rendered in the case of Mohd Ali Khan vs. CIT,

(1983)140  ITR  948(Delhi),  which  arose  under  the

Wealth Tax Act.  It was held that even if the Ruler had

let  out  the  portion  of  his  residential  palace,  yet  he

would continue to enjoy the exemption in respect of

entire  palace  because  it  is  not  possible  to  split  the

exemption in two parts, i.e., the one in his occupation

and the other in possession of the tenant.  

28. Justice  G.L.  Oza,  the  learned  Chief  Justice  (as

His Lordship then was), speaking for the Bench held as

under:

“8.  It  is,  therefore,  clear that under this

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order the income from all the palaces of a Ruler which are declared to be the official residence were exempt. Under clause (19A) of  Section 10,  only  one  palace  in occupation  has  been  exempted  and  it appears  that  similarly  in  the  W.T.  Act instead  of  using  the  word  "palace"  they have  used  the  words  "one  building  in occupation  of  a  Ruler"  which  has  been exempted from tax.

9. It is not in dispute that in this reference the property in question is a palace. It is also not in dispute that a portion of it is in occupation. The only question which has been  raised  by  learned  counsel  for  the Revenue  is  that  if  only  a  portion  of  the palace  is  in  occupation,  the  exemption under clause (19A) of Section 10 would be available only for that part and not for the whole.  The  change brought  about  by  the insertion  under  the  Merged  States (Taxation  Concessions)  Order  is  clearly illustrated  by  the  two  provisions  quoted above. By clause (19A), the exemption has been  limited  only  to  one  palace  in occupation.  If  the  Legislature  intended a further  splitting  up,  it  would  have  been provided in clause (19A) that such portion of  the  palace  in  occupation  is  only exempted, but it appears that the language used  by  the  Legislature  did  not contemplate  a  further  splitting  up.  In Mohd.  Ali  Khan's  case:  [1983]  140  ITR 948(Delhi)  which is a case under the W.T. Act, the only question considered was that if the palace which was declared to be an official  residence  had  a  number  of buildings, as the exemption under the W.T. Act  is  available  only  in  respect  of  one building  which  is  in  occupation  and, therefore,  the assessee's  contention,  that the other buildings which may not be in

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Assessment Years and dismissed the application made

by the Revenue under  Section 256(2)  of  the I.T.  Act

(see-  (Commissioner  of  Income-Tax  vs. H.H.

Maharao Bhim Singh (2002)124 Taxman 26) with the

following observations.

“ 5. In coming to this conclusion, this Court has followed another decision of the Madhya Pradesh High Court in CIT vs. Bharatchanda Banjdeo  (1985)  154  ITR  236  (M.P.).   The decision  of  this  Court  in  CIT  vs.  H.H. Maharao Bhim Singhji (1988) 173 ITR 79, we are informed by the learned counsel, has not been appealed against.

6.  In that view of the matter, we are of the opinion  that  the  application  under  Section 256(1)  has  rightly  been  rejected  by  the Tribunal  and  do  not  deserve  further consideration.”

32. In our considered opinion, the view taken by the

Madhya  Pradesh  High  Court  in  the  case  of

Bharatchandra Banjdeo (supra) and the one taken in

the case of the appellant in  Maharao Bhim Singhji’s

case  (supra)  by  rightly  placing  reliance  on

Bharatchandra Banjdeo’s case  (supra) is the correct

view and we find no good ground to take any other

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view.

33. As  rightly  held  in  the  case  of  Bharatchandra

Banjdeo (supra),  no  reliance  could  be  placed  on

Section 5(iii)  of  the Wealth Tax Act while construing

Section 10(19A) of  the I.T. Act.  It is due to marked

difference in the language employed in both sections. It

is apposite to reproduce Section 5 (iii)  of  the Wealth

Tax Act as under:

“5.  Exemptions  in  respect  of  certain assets-Wealth-tax shall not be payable by an assessee  in  respect  of  the  following  assets and such assets shall not be included in the net wealth of the assessee- (i)………………………………………………………….. (ii)…………………………………………………………. (iii)  any one building in the occupation of a Ruler,  being  a  building  which  immediately before  the  commencement  of  the Constitution (Twenty-sixth Amendment) Act, 1971, was his official residence by virtue of a declaration by the Central Government under paragraph 13 of the Merged States (Taxation Concessions) Order, 1949, or paragraph 15 of the  Part  B  States  (Taxation  Concessions) Order, 1950;”

34. We find that in Section 10(19A) of the I.T. Act, the

Legislature  has  used  the  expression  "palace” for

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considering  the  grant  of  exemption  to  the  Ruler

whereas on the same subject, the Legislature has used

different  expression  namely  "any  one  building"  in

Section 5 (iii) of the Wealth Tax Act. We cannot ignore

this  distinction  while  interpreting  Section  10(19A)

which, in our view, is significant.

35. In  our  considered  opinion,  if  the  Legislature

intended to spilt the Palace in part(s), alike houses for

taxing the subject, it would have said so by employing

appropriate language in Section 10(19A) of the I.T. Act.

We, however, do not find such language employed in

Section 10(19A).

36. As  rightly  pointed  out  by  the  learned  senior

counsel for the appellant, Section 23(2) and (3), uses

the  expression  “house  or  part  of  a  house”.   Such

expression does not  find place in Section 10(19A) of

the  I.T.  Act.   Likewise,  we  do  not  find  any  such

expression in Section 23, specifically dealing with the

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cases relating to  “palace”.  This significant departure

of  the  words  in  Section  10(19A)  of  the  I.T.  Act  and

Section 23 also suggest  that  the  Legislature did not

intend to tax portion of the “palace” by splitting it in

parts.   

37. It  is  a  settled  rule  of  interpretation  that  if  two

Statutes  dealing with the same subject  use different

language  then  it  is  not  permissible  to  apply  the

language  of  one  Statute  to  other  while  interpreting

such Statutes.  Similarly, once the assessee is able to

fulfill  the conditions specified in section for claiming

exemption under the Act then provisions dealing with

grant  of  exemption  should  be  construed  liberally

because  the  exemptions  are  for  the  benefit  of  the

assessee.     

38. In  the  light  of  these  reasonings,  we  are  of  the

considered  opinion  that  the  view  taken  by  the  M.P.

High Court in Bharatchandra Banjdeo’s case (supra)

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and the Rajasthan High Court in H.H. Maharao Bhim

Singhji’s case (supra) is a correct view.   

39. We also notice that the question involved in this

case  had  also  arisen  in  previous  Assessment  Years’

(1973-74 till 1977-78) and was decided in appellant's

favour when Special Leave Petition(c) No. 3764 of 2007

filed by the Revenue was dismissed by this Court on

25.08.2010  by  affirming  the  order  of  the  Rajasthan

High Court referred supra.

40. In  such  a  factual  situation  where  the  Revenue

consistently lost the matter on the issue then, in our

view, there was no reason much less justifiable reason

for the Revenue to have pursued the same issue any

more in higher courts.

41. Though principle of res judicata does not apply to

income-tax proceedings and each assessment year is

an independent year in itself, yet, in our view, in the

absence of any valid and convincing reason, there was

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no  justification  on  the  part  of  the  Revenue  to  have

pursued the same issue again to higher Courts. There

should  be  a  finality  attached  to  the  issue  once  it

stands decided by the higher Courts on merits. This

principle, in our view, applies to this case on all force

against the Revenue. [see  M/s Radhasoami Satsang,

Saomi Bagh, Agra’s case (supra)].   

42. Learned  Counsel  for  the  respondent  (Revenue)

though made sincere attempt to persuade us to uphold

the view taken by the High Court but in the light of

what we have held above, we are unable to accept his

submissions.

43. In  the  light  of  foregoing  discussion,  in  our

considered opinion, the reasoning and the conclusion

arrived at by the High Court in the impugned order

including the view taken by the Rajasthan High Court

in Maharaval Lakshmansingh’s case (supra) does not

lay  down  correct  principle  of  law  whereas  the  view

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taken  by  the  M.P.  High  Court  in  cases  of

Bharatchandra  Bhanjdeo (supra),  Commissioner  of

Income-Tax  vs. Bharatchandra Bhanjdev  (1989)176

ITR  380  (MP)  and   H.H.  Maharao  Bhim  Singhji

(supra) lays down correct principle of law.     

44. This takes us to the last submission of learned

counsel for the appellant who made a feeble attempt to

question the legality  and propriety of  the requisition

proceedings  initiated  by  the  Central  Government

(Ministry of Defence) in relation to portion of land.  It

was  urged  that  even  after  expiry  of  the  period  of

requisition, the Defence Ministry, continues to remain

in  possession  of  the  land  to  the  detriment  of  the

interest of appellant. To say the least, in our view, this

submission  is  wholly  misplaced  in  this  appeal.  The

appellant,  in  our  view,  has  to  raise  this  issue  in

appropriate  proceedings  before  competent  Fora  for

their adjudication and not in this appeal which arises

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out of income-tax proceedings and has nothing to do

with requisition proceedings of the land.     

45. In  view  of  foregoing  discussion,  the  appeal

succeeds  and  is  accordingly  allowed.  The  impugned

order  is  set  aside.  As  a  consequence,  the  question

referred to the High Court in the reference proceedings

out of which this appeal arises is answered in favour of

the appellant (assessee) and against the Revenue.   

  ….……...................................J.                     [RANJAN GOGOI]                  

                    ………..................................J.                      [ABHAY MANOHAR SAPRE]

New Delhi, December 05, 2016.

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