REPORTABLE IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA

CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION

CIVIL APPEAL NOs.5094 OF 2005

Mahadev Govind Gharge & others  ..Appellant(s)

- Versus -

The Special Land Acquisition Officer, Upper Krishna Project, Jamkhandi,  Karnataka .. Respondent(s)

WITH

CIVIL APPEAL NO. 5113 OF 2005

The Special Land Acquisition Officer, Upper Krishna Project, Jamkhandi .. Appellant(s)

- Versus -

Mahadev Govind Gharge & others  ..Respondent(s)

J U D G M E N T

GANGULY, J.

1. Interesting questions involving interpretation of Order XLI  

Rule 22 of the Civil Procedure Code (hereinafter “CPC”) fall for  1

decision in  this  case  in  which the  relevant  facts  are  that  a  

preliminary  notification  under  section  4(1)  of  the  Land  

Acquisition Act, 1894 (hereinafter referred to as ‘the Act’) was  

issued  on  24.4.1997,  for  acquisition  of  land  in  Survey  No.  

616/1/1  measuring  2  acres  29  guntas  and  in  Survey  No.  

616/1B/1 measuring 1 acre 2 guntas. The award was passed  

by  the  Special  Land  Acquisition  Officer  on  13.04.1999;  he  

considered  the  land  acquired  to  be  dry  land  and  fixed  

compensation amount at the rate of Rs.31,650/- per acre.

2. Aggrieved,  the  claimants  (landowners)  filed  references  

under  section  18 of  the  Act.  The Reference  Court  enhanced  

compensation  to  Rs.3,50,000/-  per  acre,  along  with  all  

statutory benefits.

3. The respondents filed an appeal against the judgment of  

the  Reference  Court  to  the  High  Court  of  Karnataka  on  

12.09.2001. The landowners were on a caveat. The High Court  

admitted the appeal on the same day and directed the office to  

post the same for hearing immediately after LCR were received.

On 19.11.2002, the appellants filed cross-objections before the  

High Court, under Order XLI, Rule 22 of CPC, along with an  

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application for condonation of delay of 404 days in filing the  

cross-objections.  

4. On 22.10.2003, the High Court, vide the first impugned  

judgment, dismissed the appeal of the State holding that the  

point for consideration in the appeal was squarely covered by  

the judgment of that court dated 12.8.2003 in M.F.A. No. 3278  

of  2001,  as  a  result  of  which  the  appeal  was  liable  to  be  

dismissed. The High Court also held that the landowners were  

entitled to interest with effect from the date of the award, i.e.  

from 13.4.1999. Against the said judgment, the State came up  

in  the  present  appeal  before  this  court  i.e.  Civil  Appeal  No.  

5113 of 2005.

5. On  the  same  day,  the  High  Court,  vide  the  second  

impugned judgment, also dismissed the cross objections filed  

by  the  landowners.  In  the  appeal  dismissing  the  cross  

objections,  two  points  came  up for  consideration  before  the  

High Court:  

(i) Whether  the  limitation  period  of  one  month  prescribed under Order XLI Rule 22 (1) of CPC  shall  run  from  12.9.2001  as  contended  by  learned government advocate or from the date  

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of service of notice of date of hearing of appeal  fixed by the court, as contended by the learned  advocate of the landowner.

(ii) If the limitation of one month prescribed under  Order XLI Rule 22(1)  of  CPC did not begin to  run  with  effect  from  12.9.2001,  whether  the  alternative  argument  by  way  of  explanation  offered by the cross objectors would constitute  ‘sufficient  cause’  warranting  condonation  of  delay in filing the cross objection?

6. The  High  Court  stated  that  the  Division  Bench  had  

admitted  the  appeal  on  12.9.2001  and  had  also  stayed  the  

operation  of  the  impugned  award  subject  to  the  land  

acquisition  officer  depositing  50%  of  the  enhanced  

compensation with statutory benefits.  On the same day,  the  

Division Bench had directed the office to list the appeal for final  

hearing after the records were received. Accordingly, the office  

called  for  the  records  and  they  were  received  by  the  office.  

Subsequently, on 25.1.2002, the Division Bench permitted the  

cross objectors to move for an early hearing of the appeal. It  

held as follows:

“Therefore, it is quite clear that on 12.9.2001 itself,  the Division Bench thought it appropriate to hear  the  appeals  out  of  turn and accordingly  directed  the  office  to  post  the  appeal  for  hearing  

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immediately  after  the  records  are  received.  The  submission  of  Sri  Kalagi  that  since  the  Division  Bench did not fix a particular date for final hearing  of the appeal, it would not satisfy the requirement  of Order XLI Rule 22(1) CPC, is not acceptable to  us. We can take judicial notice of the fact that quite  often courts direct the final hearing of the matters  out  of  turn or  in regular  course without fixing a  specific  date  for  final  hearing  of  cases.  Once  an  order is  made by the court for  final  hearing,  the  registry,  in  compliance  with  the  direction  and  having  regard  to  the  workload  of  the  court  concerned,  would  post  cases  for  final  hearing.  Therefore,  it  could  not  be  said  that  the  Division  Bench did not direct final hearing of the appeal on  12.9.2001.  The  language  implied  by  the  Division  Bench  would  go  to  show  that  the  High  Court  wanted  the  registry  to  post  the  appeal  for  final  hearing out of turn immediately after the records  were received. It is quite apparent from the records  that the cross objection was not filed either within  one month from the date of fixing the date of the  appeal  or from the date  the records of  the  lower  court  were received by the  registry  of  this  court.  Therefore, the cross objectors’ contention based on  the  provisions  of  Order  XLI  Rule  22(1)  CPC  is  misconceived and untenable.”

7. On the second point, the High Court was of the opinion  

that the explanation offered by the cross objectors for the delay  

of 404 days was vague and did not amount to sufficient cause  

so as to condone the delay. Consequently, the cross objections  

were dismissed.

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8. Thus,  the  landowners  (cross  objectors)  approached  this  

court  by  filing  Civil  Appeal  No.  5094  of  2005  against  the  

impugned judgment of the High Court.

9. Both the appeals were heard together by this Court.

10. Before  this  court,  the  landowners  in  their  appeal  (Civil  

Appeal No. 5094 of 2005), raised the following contentions:

a. The limitation period of one month, prescribed  under  Order  XLI  Rule  22,  would not  begin to  run till an actual date was fixed for hearing by  the High Court and notice of it was served on  the cross objectors, i.e. landowners.

b. Powers  of  an  Appellate  Court  are  very  wide  under  Order  XLI  Rule  33  and  relief  could  be  granted to the landowners even under the said  provision.

c. The landowners had shown sufficient cause for  the delay.

d. Land  of  the  landowners  was  compulsorily  acquired  and  the  court  was  duty  bound  to  award just compensation to the landowners.

11. The State, in its appeal (Civil Appeal No. 5113 of 2005),  

contended as follows:

a. The High Court wrongly dismissed the appeal by  relying on M.F.A. No. 3278 of 2001 since there  was absence of evidence to show that the land  

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in  question  and the  land covered by  the  said  judgment were similar in all respects.

b. The High Court erred in awarding interest from  the  date  of  the  award  and  the  same  was  contrary to section 28 of the Act.

12. We have heard the parties and perused the material on  

record.  

13. Rule 22(1) makes it clear that the limitation for filing a  

cross-objection is one month from the date of service of notice  

of date fixed for the hearing of appeal. The relevant provision  

read as follows:

22.  Upon  hearing  respondent  may  object  to  decree as if he had preferred a separate appeal-  (1)  Any  respondent,  though  he  may  not  have  appealed from any part of the decree, may not only  support  the  decree  but  may  also  state  that  the  finding against him in the court below in respect of  any issue ought to have been in his favour; and may  also take any cross-objection to the decree which he  could have taken by way of appeal provided he has  filed such objection in the Appellate  Court  within  one month from the date of service on him or his  pleader  of  notice  of  the  day  fixed  for  hearing  the  appeal, or within such further time as the Appellate  Court may see fit to allow.    

Explanation- A respondent aggrieved by a finding of  the  court  in  the  judgment  on  which  the  decree  appealed against is based may, under this rule, file  cross-objection in respect of the decree in so far as  it is based on that finding, notwithstanding that by  

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reason of  the  decision  of  the  court  on  any  other  finding  which  is  sufficient  for  the  decision  of  the  suit, the decree, is, wholly or in part, in favour of  that respondent.

14. Notice  of  this  Court  was  drawn  to  the  judgments  of  

different High Courts where the provisions of Order XLI Rule  

22 of CPC came up for consideration.  

15. In  the  case  of Rashida  Begum (since  deceased now  

represented through LRs) v. Union of India reported in 91  

(2001)  Delhi  Law  Times  664  (DB),  the  High  Court  while  

considering other judgments of the same High Court in Union  

of India v. Jhutter Singh [46 (1992) DLT 364] and Union of  

India v. Shibu  Ram Mittal [1999  (49)  DRJ  166]  held  that  

limitation for the purpose of filing cross objection under Order  

XLI, Rule 22 will run only after the appellate court has fixed  

the date of hearing of the appeal and notice thereof has been  

served on the respondent or his pleader.  In coming to the said  

conclusion, the courts sought to make a distinction between  

the date of hearing of the appeal under Order XLI, Rule 11 and  

date for hearing of the appeal under Order XLI, Rule 12.  

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16. In  Shibu Ram Mittal (supra), the Division Bench of the  

Delhi High Court specifically held as follows:

“9.  A  bare  perusal  of  the  relevant  provisions  contained in Sub-Rule (1) of Rule 22 of Order XLI  C.P.C makes it clear that the limitation would begin  to  run  from  the  date  of  service  of  notice  on  the  respondent  or  his  pleader  of  the  day  fixed  for  hearing  of  the  appeal.  A  notice  informing  the  respondent  that  an  appeal  has  been  admitted  against him and intimating a Farzi (tentative) date  of hearing cannot be taken as the notice envisaged  under  this  provision.  The  provision  is  specific-  "notice of the date fixed for hearing the appeal". A  Farzi date cannot be said to be the date fixed for  hearing  the  appeal.  Simply  because  a  counsel  appeared for the respondents does not displace the  requirement  of  service  of  notice  of  actual  date  of  hearing  of  appeal.  The  emphasis  on  the  words  "notice of date fixed for hearing an appeal" cannot  be allowed to be diluted. The provision ensures that  the appellant has advance notice before the hearing  of  the  appeal  about  the  cross  objections  by  the  respondent.”

17. In  the  case  of Karnataka  State  Road  Transport  

Corporation v. R. Sethuram & Anr.  ,   reported in AIR 1996  

Karnataka 380, the Karnataka High Court has taken a similar  

view  by  holding  that  the  provisions  of  limitation  are  to  be  

strictly  construed  and the  rule  does  not  speak of  limitation  

from  the  date  of  knowledge  of  appeal,  rather  it  speaks  of  

limitation  from  the  date  of  service  of  notice  which  would  

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indicate the date of fixation of hearing of appeal by the High  

Court.

18. However,  a  different  view  has  been  taken  by  the  

Rajasthan High Court in the case of  The East India Hotels  

Ltd. v. Smt. Mahendra Kumari and another, reported in AIR  

2008 Raj. 131. In the said case, the cross objector has put in  

his appearance before the High Court and a caveat had been  

lodged even before admission of the appeal. It also appears that  

the counsel was present and the appeal was admitted in his  

presence. Under those circumstances, the High Court held that  

notice  prescribed  under  Order  XLI,  Rule  14  was  not  be  

essential to be served upon the respondents who participated  

in the proceedings.  

19. De  hors  the  facts  of  the  present  case,  it  will  be  

appropriate for us to examine the legislative scheme as well as  

the principles governing the application of Order XLI and its  

various rules of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 (in short the  

‘Code’).  The Code is a law relating to procedure and procedural  

law is always intended to facilitate the process of achieving the  

ends  of  justice.   The  Courts  would  normally  favour  the  

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interpretation which will achieve the said object.  In the case of  

Sardar  Amarjit  Singh Kalra (dead)  by  LRs.,  v.  Pramod  

Gupta (Smt.) (dead) by LRs. and others  [2003 (3) SCC 272],  

a Constitution Bench of this court held, “laws of procedure are  

meant to regulate effectively, assist and aid the object of doing  

substantial  and  real  justice  and  not  to  foreclose  even  an  

adjudication  on  merits  of  substantial  rights  of  citizen  under  

personal, property and other laws.  Procedure has always been  

viewed as the handmaid of justice and not meant to hamper the   

cause of justice or sanctify miscarriage of justice.”

20. Similar views are also expressed by this Court in the case  

of The State of Punjab and another v. Shamlal Murari and  

another  [(1976) 1 SCC 719] where the Court held as under: -

“…We must always remember that processual  law is not to be a tyrant but a servant, not an  obstruction but an aid to justice. It has been  wisely  observed  that  procedural  prescriptions  are  the  handmaid  and  not  the  mistress,  a  lubricant, not a resistant in the administration  of  justice.  Where  the  non-compliance,  tho’  procedural, will thwart fair hearing or prejudice  doing  of  justice  to  parties,  the  rule  is  mandatory. But, grammar apart, if the breach  can  be  corrected  without  injury  to  a  just  disposal of the case, we should not enthrone a  

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regulatory  requirement  into  a  dominant  desideratum. After all, courts are to do justice,  not  to  wreck  this  end  product  on  technicalities...”

21. Order XLI of  the Code deals with appeals from original  

decrees.  Rules 1 and 2 give the right to file an appeal against a  

decree in the  manner  and on the  grounds specified therein.  

Rule 3 provides for  rejection of  the memorandum of  appeal.  

Rule 3A which was added by the Amendment Act 104 of 1976  

(w.e.f.  February  1,  1977)  provides  for  application  for  

condonation  of  delay  where  the  appeal  is  filed  beyond  the  

period of limitation.  Rule 5 defines power of the Court to grant  

stay,  conditional  or  otherwise,  of  the  decree  under  appeal.  

Rule 11 is an important provision which requires the Appellate  

Court to fix a day for hearing the appellant or his pleader and,  

on hearing, it may even dismiss the appeal at that very stage.  

The expression ‘after fixing a date for hearing the appellant’ is  

of some significance.  It obviously means that the Court should  

fix a date for hearing the appellant on the merits of the appeal.  

The  hearing  contemplated  under  Rule  11  is  not  an  empty  

formality  but  denotes  the  substantive  right  of  being  heard,  

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available to the appellant(s).  The Court has to apply its mind  

to the merits of the appeal and then alone the Court can pass  

an order of dismissal. In terms of Rule 12, unless the Appellate  

Court dismisses the appeal under Rule 11, it shall fix a day for  

hearing of the appeal.  The hearing contemplated under Rule  

12  is  normally  called  ‘final  hearing’.   Between  the  day  of  

hearing fixed under Rule 11 and that fixed under Rule 12 there  

is a requirement to issue notice to the respondent(s).  Besides  

this two other aspects need to be highlighted.  First is that Rule  

11A of the Code requires the Court to hear the appeal under  

Rule  11  as  expeditiously  as  possible  and  to  conclude  such  

hearing  within  60  days  from  the  date  on  which  the  

memorandum of appeal is filed.  Second is that the fixation of  

the appeal for hearing under Rule 12 would be on such day  

which the court may fix with reference to the current business  

of the court.  As is evident, the intention of the legislature is to  

ensure expeditious disposal of the appeals keeping in mind the  

heavy burden on the courts.   The Appellate  Court  is  vested  

with very wide powers including framing of additional issues,  

permitting additional evidence, remanding a case, pronouncing  

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judgments  in  accordance  with  law  and  even  admitting  an  

appeal  for  re-hearing  where  the  appeal  was  dismissed  in  

default.  The provisions of Rule 22 which have been reproduced  

by us above gives right to a respondent to file cross-objections  

to the decree under appeal which he could have taken by way  

of an appeal.  This right is available to the respondent provided  

he had filed such objections in the Appellate Court within one  

month from the date of service on him or his pleader of notice  

of the day fixed for hearing the appeal, or within such further  

time as the Appellate Court may see fit to allow.

22. A bare reading of the provisions of Rule 22 clearly show  

that  they  do  not  provide  for  any  consequences,  leave  any  

adverse  consequence,  in  the  event  the  respondent-cross  

objector  defaults  in  filing  the  cross  objections  within  the  

statutory period of one month.  On the contrary they provide  

that the cross objections can be filed within such further time  

as the Court may see fit to allow.  The expression ‘or within  

such further  time  as  the  court  may  see  fit  to  allow’  clearly  

shows that wide judicial discretion is vested in the courts to  

permit the filing of the cross-objections even after the expiry of  

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30 days or for that matter any period which, in the facts and  

circumstances of the case, is found to be just and proper by  

the Court.   

23. Rule 22 is  not only silent  on the consequences flowing  

from such default from filing appeal within one month, from  

the period fixed hereunder, but it even clothes the Court with  

power  to  take  on  record  the  cross-objections  even  after  the  

expiry of the said period.  Thus, right of the cross-objector is  

not taken away in absolute terms in case of such default.  The  

Courts exercise this power vested in them by virtue of specific  

language of Rule 22 itself and thus, its provisions must receive  

a liberal construction.   

24. Maxwell on The Interpretation of Statutes, (12th Edn., by P.  

St. J. Langan), states as follows:-

“A reference to the power of a court being  exercisable  “at  any  time  thereafter”  will  receive  a  literal  construction  {L.   v.  L.  [1962] P.101}.  But where something is to  be  done  “forthwith”  by  some  person  or  body,  a  court  will  not  require  instantaneous  compliance  with  the  statutory  requirement  [Sameen  v.  Abeyewickrema   (1963)  A.C.  597]  “ ‘Forthwith,’ ” Harman L.J. has said, “is  not a precise time and, provided that no  harm  is  done,  ‘forthwith’  means  any  

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reasonable time thereafter,”  and so may,  according  to  the  circumstances,  involve  action  within  days  or  years  [Hillingdon  London Borough Council v. Cutler (1968) 1  Q.B. 124]”

25. Such  provisions  should  be  construed  on  their  plain  

meaning and it may not be necessary for the Court to bring  

into  service  other  principles  of  statutory  interpretation.  

However,  the maxim  De minimis  non curat  lex  shall  apply to  

such statutory provisions.

26.  Bennion  on  Statutory  Interpretation (5th Edn.,  2008,  at  

page 55) states that  

“Where discretion exists The Court will be  more  willing  to  hold  that  a  statutory  requirement  is  merely  directory  if  any  breach of  the  requirement  is  necessarily  followed  by  an  opportunity  to  exercise  some judicial or official discretion in a way  which can adequately compensate for that  breach.”

27. In the case of  Kailash  v.  Nanhku & others  ,    [(2005) 4  

SCC  480],  a  Bench  of  three  Judges  of  this  Court  while  

interpreting the provisions of Order VIII  Rule 1 of the Code,  

which  has  more  stringent  language  and  provides  no  such  

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discretion to extend the limitation as provided to the Courts in  

Order XLI Rule 22, had observed that despite the use of such  

language in the provisions of Order VIII Rule 1 of the Code, the  

judicial  discretion to  extend the limitation  contained therein  

has been a matter of legal scrutiny for quite some time but now  

the law is well settled that in special circumstances, the Court  

can  even  extend  the  time  beyond  the  90  days  as  specified  

therein and held as under:  

“The object is to expedite the hearing and  not to scuttle the same.  The process of  justice  may  be  speeded  up  and  hurried  but the fairness which is a basic element  of  justice  cannot  be  permitted  to  be  buried…    In an adversarial system, no  party  should  ordinarily  be  denied  the  opportunity of participating in the process  of justice dispensation.  Unless compelled  by  express  and  specific  language  of  the  statute, the provisions of CPC or any other  procedural  enactment  ought  not  to  be  construed in a manner which would leave  the  court  helpless  to  meet  extraordinary  situations in the ends of justice.”

28. Thus,  it  is  an  undisputed  principle  of  law  that  the  

procedural laws are primarily intended to achieve the ends of  

justice and, normally, not to shut the doors of justice for the  

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parties at the very threshold.   We have already noticed that  

there is no indefeasible divestment of right of the cross-objector  

in case of  a delay and his  rights to file  cross-objections are  

protected even at a belated stage by the discretion vested in the  

Courts.  But at the same time, the Court cannot lose sight of  

the fact that meaning of ‘ends of justice’ essentially refers to  

justice for all the parties involved in the litigation.  It will be  

unfair to give an interpretation to a provision to vest a party  

with  a  right  at  the  cost  of  the  other,  particularly,  when  

statutory  provisions  do  not  so  specifically  or  even  impliedly  

provide for the same.  The provisions of Order XLI Rule 22 of  

the Code are akin to the provisions of the Limitation Act, 1963,  

i.e. when such provisions bar a remedy, by efflux of time, to  

one party, it gives consequential benefit to the opposite party.  

Before such vested benefit can be taken away, the Court has to  

strike a balance between respective rights of the parties on the  

plain reading of  the statutory provision to meet the  ends of  

justice.  If a cross-objector fails to file cross-objections within  

the stipulated  time,  then his  right  to  file  cross-objections  is  

taken away only in a limited sense.  To that extent a benefit is  

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granted to the other party, i.e.  the appellant,  of having their  

appeal heard without such cross-objections.  Still, however, if  

the Court is of the opinion that it is just and proper to permit  

the  filing  of  cross-objection  even  after  the  expiry  of  the  

statutory limitation of  one month, it  is  certainly vested with  

power to grant the same, but of course, only after hearing the  

other party.   That is how the rights of the parties are to be  

balanced in consonance with the scheme of Order XLI Rule 22  

of the Code.

29. In  Justice  G.P.  Singh’s Principles  of  Statutory  

Interpretation  (11th Edn.,  2008),  the  learned  author  while  

referring to judgments of different Courts states (at page 134)  

that procedural laws regulating proceedings in court are to be  

construed  as  to  render  justice  wherever  reasonably  possible  

and to  avoid  injustice  from a mistake  of  court.   He  further  

states (at pages 135 and 136) that: “Consideration of hardship,  

injustice or absurdity as avoiding a particular construction is a  

rule which must be applied with great care.  “The argument ab  

inconvenienti”, said LORD MOULTON, “is one which requires to  

be used with great caution”.”

19

30. The learned author  while  referring to  the  judgments  of  

this  Court  in  the  case  of  Sangram  Singh v.  Election  

Tribunal, Kotah [(1955) 2 SCR 1] recorded (at page 384) that  

“while  considering  the  non-compliance  with  a  procedural  

requirement, it has to be kept in view that such a requirement  

is  designed  to  facilitate  justice  and  further  its  ends  and  

therefore,  if  the  consequence  of  non-compliance  is  not  

provided, the requirement may be held to be directory…”

31. This Court in the case of  Byram Pestonji  Gariwala v.  

Union Bank of India & others [(1992) 1 SCC 31] referred to  

Crawford's  Statutory  Construction (para  254)  to  say  that:  

“Statutes relating to remedies and procedure must receive a  

liberal construction 'especially so as to secure a more effective,  

a speedier, a simpler, and a less expensive administration of  

law'.”  

32. The  consistent  view  taken  by  this  Court  is  that  the  

provisions of a statute are normally construed to achieve the  

ends  of  justice,  advance  the  interest  of  public  and to  avoid  

multiplicity of litigation.  In the case of Dondapati Narayana  

Reddy v.  Duggireddy  Venkatanarayana Reddy  & others  

20

[2001  (8)  SCC  115],  this  Court  expressed  similar  view  in  

relation to amendment of pleadings.  The principles stated in  

this judgment may aptly be applied generally in relation to the  

interpretation of provisions of the Code.   Strict construction of  

a  procedural  law  is  called  for  where  there  is  complete  

extinguishment  of  rights,  as  opposed  to  the  cases  where  

discretion  is  vested  in  the  courts  to  balance  the  equities  

between the parties to meet the ends of justice which would  

invite liberal construction.  For example, under Order XLI Rule  

22 of the Code, cross objections can be filed at any subsequent  

time, even after expiry of statutory period of one month, as may  

be allowed by the Court.  Thus, it is evidently clear that there is  

no complete or indefeasible extinguishment of right to file cross  

objections  after  the  expiry  of  statutory  period  of  limitation  

provided under the said provision.  Cross-objections within the  

scheme of Order XLI Rule 22 of the Code are to be treated as  

separate appeal and must be disposed of on same principles in  

accordance with the provisions of Order XLI of the Code.   

33. This Court in the case of  Sangram Singh (supra)  while  

dealing with the principles of interpretation of provisions of the  

21

Code, laid down three principles which have to be kept in mind  

while interpreting any portion of the Code and held as under:

“31. In our opinion, Wallace, J., and the  other judges who adopt the same line of  thought,  are  right.  As  we  have  already  observed, our laws of procedure are based  on the principle that, as far as possible,  no proceeding in a Court of law should be  conducted to the detriment of a person in  his  absence.  There  are  of  course  exceptions, and this is one of them. When  the  defendant  has  been  served  and  has  been  afforded  an  opportunity  of  appearing, then, if he does not appear, the  Court may proceed in his absence. But, be  it noted, the Court is not directed to make  an ex parte order. Of course the fact that  it is proceedings ex parte will be recorded  in the minutes of its proceedings but that  is  merely a statement of  the fact  and is  not an order made against the defendant  in the sense of an ex parte decree or other  ex  parte  order  which  the  Court  is  authorised to make. All  that Rule 6(1)(a)  does is to remove a bar and no more. It  merely  authorises  the  Court  to  do  that  which it could not have done without this  authority,  namely  to  proceed  in  the  absence of one of the parties. The contrast  in  language  between  rules  7  and  13  emphasises this.  

34. This Court has reiterated the above dictum with approval  

in the case of Kailash (supra). The  above-stated  principles  

22

require the Court to give precedence to the right of a party to  

put forward its case. In other words unnecessary and avoidable  

technical impediments should not be introduced by virtue of  

interpretative process. At the same time any irreparable loss  

should not be caused to a party on whom the right might have  

vested as a result of default of other party.  Furthermore, the  

courts  have  to  keep  in  mind  the  realities  of  explosion  of  

litigation because of which the Court normally takes time to  

dispose of  appeals.  It  would be a travesty of  justice,  if  after  

passage of substantial time when the appeal is taken up for  

final hearing a cross-objector who was heard and participated  

in the hearing at the admission stage itself,  claims that the  

limitation  period  for  him  to  file  his  cross-objection  will  

commence only from the date of service of a fresh notice on  

him or his pleader, in terms of Order XLI Rule 22 of the Code.  

Such an interpretation would jeopardize the very purpose and  

object of the statute and prejudicially affect the administration  

of justice as the appeal which has come up for final hearing  

and  disposal  would  again  be  lost  in  the  bundle  of  pending  

cases on this pretext.  It is trite that justice must not only be  

23

done but must also appear to have been done to all the parties  

to a lis before the Court.

35. Procedural  laws,  like  the  Code,  are  intended to  control  

and regulate the procedure of judicial proceedings to achieve  

the objects of justice and expeditious disposal of cases.  The  

provisions of  procedural  law which do not  provide  for  penal  

consequences in default of their  compliance should normally  

be construed as directory in nature and should receive liberal  

construction. The  Court  should  always  keep  in  mind  the  

object of the statute and adopt an interpretation which would  

further such cause in light of attendant circumstances.

36. To  put  it  simply,  the  procedural  law  must  act  as  a  

linchpin  to  keep  the  wheel  of  expeditious  and  effective  

determination of dispute moving in its place.  The procedural  

checks must achieve its end object of just, fair and expeditious  

justice to parties without seriously prejudicing the rights of any  

of them.  

37. Now, we would proceed to examine the language of Order  

XLI Rule 22 of the Code.  The stipulated period of one month is  

to commence from the date of service, on the concerned party  

24

or his pleader, of notice of the day fixed for hearing the appeal.  

A cross-objection may also be filed within such further time as  

the Appellate Court may see fit to allow.

Date of hearing

38. First  and foremost,  we  must  explain what  is  meant  by  

‘hearing the appeal’.  Hearing of the appeal can be classified in  

two different stages; one at the admission stage and the other  

at the final stage.  Date of hearing has normally been defined  

as the date on which the court applies its mind to the merits of  

the case.  If the appeal is heard  ex-parte for admission under  

Order XLI Rule 11 of the Code, the Court could dismiss it at  

that very stage or admit the same for regular hearing.  Such  

appeal could be heard in the presence of the other party at the  

admission stage itself, particularly, in cases where a caveat is  

lodged by the respondent to the appeal.

39. The  concept  of  ‘hearing  by  the  Court’,  in  fact,  has  

common  application  both  under  Civil  and  Criminal  

jurisprudence.  Even in a criminal matter the hearing of the  

case is said to be commenced by the Court only when it applies  

25

its mind to frame a charge etc.  Similarly, under civil law also it  

is only when the Court actually applies its mind to averments  

made by party/parties, it can be considered as hearing of the  

case.  This Court in the case of Siraj Ahmad Siddiqui v. Prem  

Nath  Kapoor [1993  (4)  SCC  406]  while  dealing  with  the  

provisions of the U.P. Urban Buildings (Regulation of Letting,  

Rent  & Eviction)  Act,  1972,  referring  to  the  concept  of  first  

hearing, held as under:

“13.  The  date  of  first  hearing  of  a  suit  under  the  Code is  ordinarily  understood  to  be  the  date  on  which  the  court  proposes  to  apply  its  mind  to  the  contentions in the pleadings of the parties  to the suit and in the documents filed by  them for the purpose of framing the issues  to be decided in the suit. …………………… ……………………………We are of the view,  therefore, that the date of first hearing as  defined  in  the  said  Act  is  the  date  on  which  the  court  proposes  to  apply  its  mind  to  determine  the  points  in  controversy between the parties to the suit  and to frame issues, if necessary.”

40. The  date  of  hearing  must  not  be  confused  with  the  

expression ‘step in the proceedings’.   These are two different  

concepts of procedural law and have different connotation and  

26

application.   What  may  be  a  ‘step  in  the  proceeding’,  

essentially, may not mean a ‘hearing’ by the Court.  Necessary  

ingredients  of  ‘hearing’  thus  are  application  of  mind  by  the  

court and address by the party to the suits.   

41. Now we would proceed to discuss the purpose of giving  

one month’s time and notice to the respondent to file cross-

objection.  The primary intention is, obviously, to give him a  

reasonable  opportunity  to  file  cross-objections  in  the  appeal  

filed by the other party.  It may be noticed that filing of cross-

objections is not an exclusive but, an alternate remedy which a  

party can avail as alternative of filing a separate appeal in its  

own right.

42. The language of Order XLI Rule 22 of the Code fixes the  

period of limitation to be computed from the date of service of  

notice  of  hearing  of  the  appeal  upon  the  respondent/cross-

objector and within one month of such date he has to file cross  

objections. Thus, the crucial point of time is the date on which  

the notice of hearing of the appeal is served.  This could be a  

notice for actual date of hearing or otherwise.

27

43. There appears to be a dual purpose emerging from the  

language of Order XLI Rule 22 of the Code.  Firstly, to grant  

time of one month or even such further time as the Appellate  

Court may see fit to allow; and secondly, to put the party or his  

pleader  at  notice  that  the  appeal  has  been admitted  and is  

fixed for hearing and the Court is going to pronounce upon the  

rights and contention of the parties on the merits of the appeal.  

Once  such  notice  is  served,  the  period  of  limitation  under  

Order XLI Rule 22 of the Code will obviously start running from  

that date. If both these purposes are achieved any time prior to  

the service of a fresh notice then it  would be an exercise in  

futility to issue a separate notice which is bound to result in  

inordinate delay in disposal of appeals which, in turn, would be  

prejudicial to the appellants. A law of procedure should always  

be construed to eliminate both these possibilities.

44. A  Bench  of  three  Judges  of  this  Court  in  the  case  of  

Salem Advocate Bar Association, Tamil Nadu v.  Union of  

India [(2003)  1  SCC 49]  while  examining  the  constitutional  

validity of various amended provisions of the Code, (amended  

or introduced by Amendment Act 46 of 1999 and Amendment  

28

Act 22 of 2002) discussed requirements of Section 27 of the  

Code which relates to issuance of summons to the defendants  

to appear and answer the claim.  Such summons are required  

to be issued within one month from the date of institution of  

the  suit.   The  Court  held  that  once steps in  furtherance  to  

issuance  of  summons  within  one  month  are  taken  by  the  

plaintiff, then even if the summons are not served within that  

period,  it  will  be substantial  compliance of  the provisions of  

Section 27 of the Code.  Following dictum of the court can be  

usefully noticed at this stage.

“7. It was submitted by Mr. Vaidyanathan  that the words “on such day not beyond  thirty days from the date of the institution  of  the  suit”  seem  to  indicate  that  the  summons  must  be  served  within  thirty  days of the date of the institution of the  suit.  In our opinion, the said provisions  read as a whole will not be susceptible to  that  meaning.   The  words  added  by  amendment,  it  appears,  fix  outer  time  frame,  by  providing  that  steps  must  be  taken within thirty days from the date of  the  institution  of  the  suit,  to  issue  summons.  In other words, if the suit is  instituted,  for  example,  on  1st January,  2002,  then  the  correct  addresses  of  the  defendants and the process fee must  be  filed  in  the  Court  within  thirty  days  so  that summons be issued by the Court not  beyond thirty  days  from the  date  of  the  

29

institution  of  the  suit.   The  object  is  to  avoid long delay in issue of summons for  want of steps by the plaintiff.  It is quite  evident  that  if  all  that  is  required to  be  done  by  a  party,  has  been  performed  within the period of thirty days, then no  fault can be attributed to the party.  If for  any reason, the court is not in a position  or is unable to or does not issue summons  within  thirty  days,  there  will,  in  our  opinion,  be  compliance  with  the  provisions of Section 27 once within thirty  days  of  the  issue  of  the  summons  the  party concerned has taken steps to file the  process  fee  along  with  completing  the  other  formalities  which  are  required  to  enable the court to issue the summons.”  

45. The learned counsel for the appellant also relied upon the  

judgment  of  this  court  in  the  case  of  Sushil  Kumar  

Sabharwal v.  Gurpreet Singh & others [2002 (5) SCC 377]  

to  contend   that  knowledge  of  appeal  cannot  be  equated to  

notice of date of hearing.  There is no doubt that this Court in  

para  11  of  that  judgment  made  a  distinction  between  the  

knowledge  of  the  date  of  hearing  and  the  knowledge  of  

pendency of suit.  Referring to the evidence in that case, this  

Court held that the version of the defendant should have been  

believed  by  the  courts  concerned  because  he  was  denied  a  

reasonable opportunity to present his case before the Court.  In  

30

the present case this distinction is hardly of any help to the  

counsel for the appellant inasmuch as they have appeared and  

argued  at  the  admission  stage  of  the  appeal  which  was  

admitted in their presence and an order was also passed for  

final hearing.

46. Adverting  to  the  facts  of  the  present  case,  as  already  

noticed, the appellants had also filed caveat in the appeal.  In  

law, the rights of a caveator are different from that of cross-

objectors  per  se.  In  terms  of  Section  148A  of  the  Code,  a  

caveator has a right to be heard mandatorily for the purposes  

of passing of an interlocutory order.  The law contemplates that  

a caveator is to be heard by the court before any interim order  

can be passed against him.  But in the present case when the  

appeal was listed for hearing at the admission stage itself, the  

appellants  had appeared and argued the matter  not  only  in  

relation to grant of an interim order but also on the merits of  

the appeal.  The High Court, on 12th of September, 2001, after  

applying its  mind to  the  merits  of  the  case had passed the  

following order:

“Admit.

31

Heard the counsel  for  the appellant  and  respondent.

Interim  stay  as  prayed,  in  I.A.  II/01  subject to the appellant depositing 50% of  amount  awarded  with  all  statutory  benefits  etc.,  before  the  reference  court,  within eight weeks.

Respondents  permitted to withdraw 25%  of the amount.   Remaining 25% amount  shall be kept in fixed deposit for the term  of six months.

Call for records.

List  for  hearing  immediately  after  the  records  are  received  with  connected  cases.”

47. As  is  evident  from  the  above  order,  the  records  were  

required to be called from the lower courts and thereafter, the  

appeal  was  to  be  heard  finally.   Though the  court  had not  

actually fixed any particular date, it had directed the appeal to  

be listed for  hearing.   Then again,  vide  its  order  dated 25th  

January, 2002, the High Court had directed the appellant(s) to  

move an application for early hearing of  the appeal.   On all  

these occasions, the appellant(s), or his pleader, was present  

and participated in the proceedings before the Court.  Thus,  

the appellant(s) not only had the knowledge of pendency of the  

32

appeal but also had notice of fixing of hearing of the appeal.  

Even on 18th September, 2003, the High Court took notice of  

the  cross-objection  and  counsel  for  the  appellant(s)/cross  

objector was directed to furnish copies of the cross-objection  

within three weeks to the Additional Advocate General.  After  

the records from lower courts were received, the matter was  

heard  and  judgment  impugned  in  the  present  appeal  was  

pronounced by the High Court on 22nd October, 2003.

48. In these circumstances, it is difficult for this Court to hold  

that the period of 30 days, as contemplated under Order XLI  

Rule 22 of the Code, never commenced even till final disposal  

of the appeal.  Such an interpretation will frustrate the very  

purpose of the Code and would be contrary to the legislative  

intent.  We may also notice that the appeal was finally heard  

without  fixing  any  particular  date  and  in  presence  of  the  

appellant(s).   Under  such circumstances,  the  requirement of  

fixing a final date separately must be deemed to be waived by  

the parties.

49. It  may  be  noticed  that  somewhat  divergent  views  have  

been  taken  by  different  High  Courts  while  interpreting  the  

33

provisions of Order XLI Rule 22 of the Code.  The High Court of  

Rajasthan in the case of  The East India Hotels Limited v.  

Smt. Mahendra Kumari [AIR 2008 Raj.  131]  took the view  

that respondent cross-objector had put in appearance through  

his counsel as a caveator and the appeal was admitted on 28th  

March, 2006 in his presence and participation.  As the appeal  

was  admitted  in  their  presence,  the  Rajasthan  High  Court  

opined that no notice thereafter was required to be served on  

the caveator for the purposes of Order XLI Rule 22 and period  

of limitation of one month would start from 28th March, 2006  

(i.e.  the date of  admission)  for  filing of cross-objection.   The  

filing of the cross objection in that case was delayed by 507  

days.  On the issue of condonation the High Court felt that the  

delay could not be condoned in the facts and circumstances of  

the case and thus dismissed the cross-objections as barred by  

time.  It  also needs to be noticed that the judgments of the  

Delhi  High Court  in  the  case  of  Jhutter  Singh (supra)  and  

Rashida Begum (supra) were also examined by the Rajasthan  

High Court and are distinguished on facts as in those cases at  

no point of time the objector or respondent had participated.

34

50. The Rajasthan High Court also relied upon the judgment  

of the High Court of Andhra Pradesh in the case of  Mutyam  

Agaiah v. Special Deputy Collector, (NTPC) L.A. Unit. [2002  

(2)  ALT  715]  wherein  that  High  Court  while  accepting  the  

submissions of the respondent had held that:  

“…We  have  to  understand  the  issue  of  notices  in  the  proper  perspective.   The  notices are meant for giving knowledge to  the  other  side  regarding  the  judicial  proceedings filed by the appellant.   It  is  not every time necessary that the notices  should  be  in  writing  in  the  prescribed  form.  If  the  knowledge  of  filing  of  the  appeals can be proved, then it is sufficient  notice  in  law.   The  respondent-cross  objector  engaged  an  Advocate,  who  filed  vakalatnama and he defended the cause  of the claimant in the Original Petition.  It  means  that  the  cross-objector  had  sufficient  knowledge  regarding  the  appeals.   Nothing  prevented  for  the  respondent-cross-objector  for  filing  the  objections…….”

51. In  the  case of  Rashida Begum (supra)  the  Delhi  High  

Court had noticed that limitation for filing the cross objection  

would start from the date of service of notice of hearing of the  

appeal.  A notice containing only the date of hearing of the stay  

35

application  but  not  the  appeal  would  not  be  ‘notice’  as  

contemplated under Order XLI Rule 22 of the Code.

52. The view taken by the Delhi High Court is more in line  

with the intent of the provisions of Order XLI Rule 22 while the  

decision of the Rajasthan High Court was on its own facts and  

cannot  be  treated  to  be  stating  a  preposition  of  law.   The  

application  of  law would always depend upon the facts  and  

circumstances of a given case and what is the true and correct  

construction of Order XLI Rule 22 we shall shortly proceed to  

state.

53. In  the  case  of  Pralhad  &  others v.  State  of  

Maharashtra and another [2010 (10) SCC 458], a Bench of  

this Court to which one of us was a member was dealing with  

the object and scope of the powers vested in the Court in terms  

of Order XLI Rule 33 of the Code.  This Court observed that  

Rule 33 empowers the Appellate Court to pass any decree or  

make any order which ought to have been passed or made and  

also to pass or make such further decree or order as the case  

may  require.   The  Appellate  Court  can  exercise  this  power  

notwithstanding that appeal is only with respect to a part of  

36

decree. This power may be exercised in favour of any of the  

respondents or the parties although such respondent or party  

may not have filed any appeal or objections.  In other words,  

the Court has been vested with the power to pass such orders  

which ought to have been passed in the facts of a given case.  

While dealing with this issue, this Court held as under:

“18. The provision of  Order XLI Rule 33  CPC  is  clearly  an  enabling  provision,  whereby the appellate court is empowered  to  pass  any  decree  or  make  any  order  which ought to have been passed or made,  and to pass or make such further or other  decree or order as the case may require.  Therefore, the power is very wide and in  this enabling provision, the crucial words  are that the appellate court is empowered  to  pass  any  order  which  ought to  have  been made as the  case may require. The  expression  “order  ought  to  have  been  made”  would  obviously  mean  an  order  which  justice  of  the  case  requires  to  be  made.  This  is  made  clear  from  the  expression used in the said rule by saying  “the court may pass such further or other  order  as  the  case may  require”.  This  expression “case” would mean the justice  of the case. Of course, this power cannot  be exercised ignoring a legal interdict or a  prohibition clamped by law.”

54. The Court clearly held that the expression “order ought to  

have  been  made”  obviously  means  an  order  which  justice  

demands in facts of the case.  The dictum of law stated by this  

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Court clearly demonstrates that justice between the parties to  

a case is the essence of procedural law and unless the statute  

expressly  prohibits  or  put  an  embargo,  the  Courts  would  

interpret  the  procedural  law  so  as  to  achieve  the  ends  of  

justice.

55. If we examine the provisions of Order XLI Rule 22 of the  

Code in its correct perspective and in light of the above stated  

principles  then the  period of  limitation  of  one  month stated  

therein would commence from the service of notice of the day of  

hearing of  appeal  on the respondent  in  that  appeal.     The  

hearing  contemplated under  Order  XLI  Rule  22 of  the  Code  

normally is the final hearing of the appeal but this rule is not  

without any exception.  The exception could be where a party  

respondent appears at the time of admission of the appeal, as a  

caveator or otherwise and argues the appeal on merits as well  

as while passing of interim orders and the Court has admitted  

the appeal in the presence of that party and directs the appeal  

to be heard finally on a future date actual or otherwise, then it  

has to be taken as complete compliance of the provisions of  

Order XLI Rule 22 of the Code and thereafter,  the appellant  

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who has appeared himself or through his pleader cannot claim  

that  period mentioned under  the  said provision of  the Code  

would commence only when the respondent is served with a  

fresh notice of hearing of the appeal in the required format.  If  

this  argument  is  accepted  it  would  amount  to  travesty  of  

justice  and  inevitably  result  in  delay  while  causing  serious  

prejudice to the interest of the parties and administration of  

justice.  Such interpretation would run contra to the legislative  

intent behind the provisions of Order XLI Rule 11 of the Code  

which  explicitly  contemplate  that  an  appeal  shall  be  heard  

expeditiously and disposed of as far as possible within 60 days  

at the admission stage.  All the provisions of Order XLI of the  

Code have to be read conjunctively to give Order XLI Rule 22  

its true and purposive meaning.  Having analytically examined  

the provisions  of  Order XLI  Rule  22,  we may now state  the  

principles for its applications as follow:

(a) Respondent in an appeal is entitled to receive a notice of  

hearing  of  the  appeal  as  contemplated  under  Order  XLI  

Rule 22 of the Code;

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(b) The limitation of one month for filing the cross-objection as  

provided  under  Order  XLI  Rule  22  of  the  Code  shall  

commence from the date of service of notice on him or his  

pleader of the day fixed for hearing the appeal.

(c)  Where a respondent in the appeal is a caveator or otherwise  

puts in appearance himself and argues the appeal on merits  

including for the purposes of interim order and the appeal is  

ordered to be heard finally on a date fixed subsequently or  

otherwise,  in presence of  the  said respondent/caveator,  it  

shall be deemed to be service of notice within the meaning of  

Order  XLI  Rule  22.   In other  words  the limitation  of  one  

month shall start from that date.

56. Needless to notice that the cross-objections are required  

to be filed within the period of  one month from the  date  of  

service  of  such  notice  or  within  such  further  time  as  the  

Appellate Court may see fit to allow depending upon the facts  

and circumstances of the given case.   

57. Since the provisions of Order XLI  Rule 22 of  the Code  

itself provide for extension of time, the Courts would normally  

be  inclined  to  condone  the  delay  in  the  interest  of  justice  40

unless  and  until  the  cross-objector  is  unable  to  furnish  a  

reasonable  or  sufficient  cause  for  seeking  the  leave  of  the  

Court to file  cross-objections beyond the statutory period of  

one month.   

58. Examining the case in hand within the legal framework  

afore-stated,  it  has  to  be  held  that  the  case  falls  squarely  

within the principles formulated in clause (c).  The appellant(s)  

herein  were  caveators  before  the  High  Court  and they  were  

heard not only while passing of interim orders but the appeal  

itself  was  admitted  in  their  presence.   Further,  the  Court  

directed that the records from lower court be called and after  

receipt of such record the appeal was directed to be listed for  

final  disposal.   Thus,  the  cross-objector  not  merely had the  

knowledge of  pendency of  the  appeal  and order  of  the  High  

Court for its final disposal but he actually participated at all  

the stages of the proceedings before that Court, i.e. at the stage  

of admission of appeal, passing of interim orders and variation  

thereof and at the stage of consideration of application of the  

cross-objector, moved for early hearing of the appeal and, in  

fact,  the appeal had been directed to be heard finally in his  

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presence.   Thus,  in  these  circumstances,  one  month  of  

prescribed period in terms of Order XLI Rule 22 of the Code  

shall  commence from 12th September, 2001, i.e.  the date on  

which the High Court ordered that the appeal may be listed for  

hearing.

59. As  the  period  for  filing  the  cross  objection  had  long  

expired, the application for condonation of delay was filed.  It is  

interesting to note that the appellants in this Court themselves  

admitted  that  they  had  received  the  notice  of  the  appeal  

through their counsel and the period of one month came to an  

end on 12th October, 2001. This submission has been made in  

paragraph 3 of the affidavit annexed to the application filed by  

the cross-objector before the High Court under Section 5 of the  

Limitation Act, 1963, along with the cross-objections, praying  

for condonation of delay and leave of that Court to file their  

cross-objections beyond the statutory period of one month as  

provided in Order XLI Rule 22 of the Code.  

60. Delay was sought to be condoned on the ground that the  

appellants have appeared before the Court and despite receipt  

of the notice of final hearing they could not file cross-objections  

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within  the  prescribed  time  as  they  were  out  of  their  native  

place and have gone to Karwar to earn their livelihood and they  

could not therefore receive the letter and that too within one  

month.  Later, the appellant fell down and his leg was twisted  

and because of swelling and pain he was not able to drive and  

consult his counsel in Bangalore.  It is only after he got well, he  

met  his  counsel  and  filed  the  cross-objections  on  19th  

November, 2002, i.e. after a delay of 404 days.  The High Court  

did not find any merit in the reasons shown for condonation of  

delay  and dismissed the  said  application.   We  have  already  

noticed that Order XLI Rule 22 of the Code itself  provides a  

discretion to the Appellate Court to grant further time to the  

cross-objector  for  the  purposes  of  filing  cross-objections  

provided  the  cross-objector  shows  sufficient  or  reasonable  

cause for  his  inability  to file  the  cross-objections within  the  

stipulated period of one month from the date of receipt of the  

notice  of  hearing  of  appeal.   No  specific  reasons have  been  

recorded by the High Court in the impugned judgment as to  

why  the  said  averments  did  not  find  favour  and  was  

disbelieved.   There  is  nothing  on  record  to  rebut  these  

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averments made by the cross-objector.   

61. In the peculiar facts and circumstances of this case, to do  

complete justice between the parties, we allow the landowner’s  

appeal by setting aside the order of the High Court, limited to  

the extent that the appellants herein have been able to show  

sufficient/reasonable cause for grant of further time to file the  

cross objections beyond the period of one month in terms of  

Order XLI Rule 22 of the Code.  This approach could even be  

adopted  without  the  aid  of  Section  5  of  the  Limitation  Act,  

1963,  which  provisions  may  also  find  application  to  such  

matters.  Be that as it may, we do not consider it necessary to  

delve on this issue in any further detail. Suffice it to say that  

the appellants were entitled to file cross-objections by grant of  

further time before the High Court. Delay in filing the cross-

objections is thus condoned.

62. The High Court has therefore to hear afresh the appeal of the  

State as also the cross objections of the landowners. In that view of  

the  matter,  there  is  no need of  passing a separate  order  on the  

appeal filed by the State before this Court and the same is thus  

disposed of.  44

63. Since  considerable  time  has  elapsed,  we  request  the  High  

Court to dispose of the appeal  and the  cross objections as  early  

as possible, preferably within a period of three months from the  

date of production of this order before the High Court.

64. Parties to bear their own costs.

…………..........................J. (ASOK KUMAR GANGULY)

………….......................J. (SWATANTER KUMAR)

New Delhi May 10, 2011

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