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REPORTABLE

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA

CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION

CRIMINAL APPEAL No. 2099 OF 2011

M.V. JAYARAJAN                            .….. APPELLANT

Vs.

HIGH COURT OF KERALA & ANR.                          .…..RESPONDENTS

J U D G M E N T

VIKRAMAJIT SEN, J.   

1  This Appeal lays siege to the decision of the Division Bench of the  

High Court of Kerala at Ernakulam, which found the Petitioner guilty of  

having committed  criminal  contempt  punishable  under  Section  12 of  the  

Contempt of Courts Act, 1971, and sentenced him to simple imprisonment  

for six months and to pay a fine of Rs.2000/-.

2 The facts leading to these events is that another Division Bench of the  

High Court of Kerala had, by Orders dated 23.6.2010, banned the holding of  

meetings on public roads and road margins in the State with the object of

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ensuring  accident-free  and  uninterrupted  traffic  along  such  public  roads.  

Although not relevant for the present purposes, these Orders were confirmed  

subsequently;  a  Review  Petition  was  dismissed  and  the  Special  Leave  

Petition  was  also  rejected  by  this  Court.   Meanwhile,  on  26.6.2010,  the  

Appellant delivered a speech in a public meeting at Kannur, Kerala allegedly  

convened in connection with a hartal organised to protest against the hike in  

petroleum prices, which was widely reported by the media.  A translation of  

the speech as appearing in local City News reads as follows:-   

“When the Court verdicts go against the country and the  

people, those verdicts have only the value of grass.   From now  

on, what worth do the judges who pronounced the verdict have?  

Today disregarding the verdict of those Judges and flouting their  

judgments, people throughout the length and breadth of Kerala  

are organizing public meetings and rallies.   Why should those  

Judges sit in glass houses and pass verdicts any more?  If they  

have any self respect they should resign and step down from their  

office.   The judiciary can attain greatness only when judgments  

acceptable to the country and obeyed by the people are passed.  

Today even the judiciary is ashamed.   If the Executive exceeds  

its limits the judiciary is there to save.   Judges are to interpret the  

laws  and  interpret  the  intention  of  the  Legislature  which  had  

made the laws and pass orders accordingly.   Unfortunately, what  

some idiots (fools) occupying our seat of justice say is nothing  

else.   Actually  speaking they themselves  make  laws  and they  

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themselves issue orders.   This is not conducive to a democratic  

country.   This is what they should correct.   Today is the day on  

which the verdict of two senior Judges of Kerala High Court has  

been given only the value of grass.”

AsiaNet news reported the speech as follows:-  

“Today  disregarding  the  verdict  of  those  Judges  and  

flouting  their  judgments,  people  throughout  the  length  and  

breadth  of  Kerala  are  organizing  public  meetings  and  rallies.  

Why should those Judges sit in glass houses and pass verdicts  

any more?  If they have any self respect they should resign and  

step down from their office.  The judiciary can attain greatness  

only when judgments acceptable to the country and obeyed by  

the people are passed.    Today judiciary is the refuge.   If  the  

Legislature exceeds its limits there is the judiciary which comes  

to the rescue.   But if the judiciary exceeds its limits who will  

tether the judiciary.   In a democracy people are the supreme.  

Judges are to interpret the laws and interpret the intention of the  

Legislature  which  had  made  the  laws  and  pass  orders  

accordingly.   Unfortunately, what some idiots (fools) occupying  

our seat of justice say is nothing else.”

IndiaVision News also carried this speech, which translated reads thus:-  

“When the Court verdicts go against the country and the people,  

those verdicts have only the value of grass.  Now on, what worth  

do  the  judges  who  pronounced  the  verdict  have?   Today  

disregarding  the  verdict  of  those  Judges  and  flouting  their  

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judgments, people throughout the length and breadth of Kerala  

are organizing public meetings and rallies.   Why should those  

Judges sit in glass houses and pass verdicts any more?  If they  

have any self respect they should resign and step down from their  

office.   Unfortunately, what some idiots (fools) occupying our  

seat  of  justice  say  is  nothing  else.    Actually  speaking  they  

themselves make laws and they themselves issue orders.   This is  

not conducive to a democratic country.   This is what they should  

correct”.

3 In  his  reply  affidavit  filed  in  the  High  Court  in  the  Contempt  

proceedings the Appellant has asseverated, inter alia, as follows:-    

“4. It  is  true  that  I  have  made  a  speech  referring  to  

Annexure  V  judgment  passed  by  this  Honourable  Court,  

prohibiting  holding  of  meetings  on  public  roads  and  road  

margins.   It  was  not  a  prepared  speech,  but  one  delivered  

extempore.   The allegations that  by making the said speech,  I  

have committed contempt of  this  Honourable Court,  by using,  

during the course of the speech, certain words for which distorted  

meanings have been given in the petition, is absolutely incorrect  

and without any basis.  In this connection I may submit that I am  

a person who believes in the Rule of Law and the supremacy of  

the Constitution.  I have firm faith and unquestionable loyalty to  

the Constitution and the institutions created under it.  I have great  

respect  and  adoration  for  the  judiciary  and  the  Honourable  

Judges.  I have always obeyed the verdicts of Courts and have  

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never once defied its authority, or will ever I do it.  The media  

has reported distorted versions of the speech I made referring to  

Annexure V judgment and give wide publicity to it taking certain  

words used by me in the speech out of context  and providing  

their  own  interpretation  and  meaning  to  those  with  ulterior  

motives  and  designs.  I  have  criticized  the  judgment  as  to  its  

impracticability  and difficulty  of  implementation.   It  was  in  a  

Public Interest Litigation filed by a Transport Operator, seeking  

to prevent conduct of public meetings in the PWD road in front  

of  Alwaye  Railway  Station  that  this  Honourable  court  has  

rendered  the  judgment  prohibiting  the  holding  of  meeting  on  

public roads and road margins throughout the State.  As a Social  

and Political  Worker,  I  felt  that  the above judgment  has  been  

passed  without  considering  the  vital  factual  and  legal  aspects  

involved and that it may adversely affect the legal rights of the  

Public including their Fundamental Right of freedom of speech  

and expression and to assemble peacefully, guaranteed to them  

under Article 19 of the Constitution.  In my speech I have used  

the words commonly used by the villagers of North Malabar to  

convey  my  message  to  the  audience  and  they  have  also  

understood the same in the sense those words usually carry with  

them.   There  is  no  meaning  to  those  words  as  given  and  

interpreted  by  the  persons  who  have  preferred  the  contempt  

petitions before this Honourable court seeking to initiate action  

against this deponent under the Contempt of Courts Act.

5. Annexure V judgment of this Honourable Court was  

rendered  without  considering  the  Public  Interest  or  the  

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contentions  of  the  parties,  affected  thereby,  including  the  

Government.   The Court  has gone beyond the issues before it  

which  it  was  called  upon  to  decide.   The  general  declaration  

issued, prohibiting the conduct of meetings on the road margins  

was far exceeding the relief sought for in the writ petition.  It has  

been the practice followed in this country and in this State even  

from the pre-independence period to hold meetings on the road  

margins.  If the conduct of such meetings is likely to create any  

law and order situation, or hindrance to the traffic, the police and  

other statutory authorities are clothed with power to control such  

meetings by resorting to the provisions under the Police Act and  

other  similar  laws.   The  Executive  Magistrate  has  power  to  

control,  restrict  and prohibit  the  conduct  of  such meetings  by  

invoking the provisions of Sec. 144 of the Criminal Procedure  

Code.   Thus,  under  law  without  infringing  the  freedom  of  

movement of the public at large, meetings could be convened on  

the road margins.

6. The criticism made by me against the judgment was  

with  honest  intention  and  bonafide  purpose  and  by  way  of  

expressing of my opinion in respect of the same to the public.  As  

a public worker, I thought it was my bounden duty to make such  

criticism when the judiciary has failed to consider properly the  

issue involved while rendering the above judgment.  In so doing,  

I  have  never  intended  to  demean  any  of  the  Judges  of  this  

Honourable Court or the authority of this Honourable Court.  The  

Fundamental Freedom of speech and expression guarantied (sic)  

by  the  Constitution  is  no  less  important  than  the  freedom  of  

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judgment to move freely throughout the Territory of India. In the  

judgment the Honourable Court has only considered the freedom  

of  persons  to  move  freely,  without  bestowing  such  anxious  

consideration to the freedom of speech and expression as also of  

the  freedom  to  assemble  peacefully  guarantied  (sic)  to  the  

citizens by the Constitution with equal force.  For that reason,  

according to me, the Judgment was not in consonance with the  

constitutional scheme.  I thought, I should bring this infirmity to  

the  notice  of  the  General  Public.   My  speech  was  only  to  

highlight the above.   

7. The words in  question used by me in the speech,  

specifically referred to in the Contempt Petition  drawing it out of  

contest, are those prevalent in the area and characteristic of the  

assemblage  to  which  I  spoke.   The  speech  was  one  made  in  

protest against the hiking of prices of Essential Commodities and  

the audience was largely constituted of the poor sections of the  

society,  the common man of the area.  The words particularly  

referred to in the contempt petition have no specific or definite  

meaning  and  the  sense  it  carries  is  according  to  its  ordinary  

usage.  That being so, those words taken out of context and given  

a  meaning  that  suits  the  intention  of  the  petitioner  in  the  

contempt  of  court  petition,  may  not  be  made  the  basis  for  

initiating  contempt  proceedings  against  me.   Since  the  above  

judgment  was  practically  impossible  of  implementation,  there  

were public meetings held on the road side on the day subsequent  

to the judgment also in several places in the State and that was  

the reason for me to say that the above judgment was rejected by  

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the public.  In doing so, I have never challenged the authority of  

this  Honourable  court  or  made  any  disparaging  remarks  

demeaning  any  of  the  Honourable  Judges  of  this  Honourable  

Court.  Therefore, considering that the speech made by me was in  

a particular context and the language used was one apposite to  

the issue and the nature of the audience, there is no justification  

in picking up one or two words used in the speech out of context  

and raising the allegation of contempt of court against me based  

on the incorrect and fanciful meanings attributed to those words,  

without considering the entire speech as a whole and the context  

in  which  such  a  speech  was  made.   In  this  connection  it  is  

pertinent to note that the petitioner has not produced the entire  

text of the speech made by me along with the Contempt Petition  

and it is a well established principle of law that in order to decide  

whether there is contempt or not reading of the speech as a whole  

is necessary.   Since words torn out of context from it  may be  

liable to be misunderstood.

……..

13 Sumbhan  is  a  word  used  in  Malayalam  without  any  

specific or definite meaning.  As distinct from a “word” with a  

definite  meaning  in  a  language,  there  are  “usuages”  in  every  

language which have different shades of meaning with varying  

connotations depending on the occasions in which it is used as  

also the regions, sections of people, circumstances, etc in relation  

to which it  is  used.   The word “Sumbhan”, is  such a usuages  

which  is  understood  in  different  senses  and  connotations  in  

different parts of the State and depending on the class of people  

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who  uses  the  same.    Even  inspite  of  such  variations,  it  is  

submitted that the word “Sumbhan” can never be understood as  

having  the  meaning  attributed  to  it  in  the  contempt  petition  

namely “idiot” or “fool”.

14 I hail from Cannanore District, in the Northern part of the  

Kerala State.  The impugned speech I was making to a village  

population  at  Kannur,  a  considerable  section  of  which  cannot  

claim even to be moderately educated.   “Sumbhan”, is a word  

widely used by the people in the area to refer to a person who had  

said  or  expressed  something  or  acted  in  any  particular  way  

without  properly  considering  the  various  aspects  of  a  matter  

intensively,  in  all  its  aspects,  or  evaluating  or  taking  into  

consideration, the likely consequences that may ensure thereby,  

in  a  hasty  and  casual  manner,  even  if  he  be  a  person  highly  

reputed and accepted by all as an intelligent and knowledgeable  

person.  In such a situation by referring to the Honourable Judges  

who have issued the judgments in question, to the people who  

were  at  a  loss  to  understand  the  logic  and  reason  of  the  

disapproval of a right which for them was an integral part of their  

legal right which they have been enjoying all through the past,  

and as old as  the memory of  the existing generations goes as  

“Sumbhan”, I was only conveying to them and carrying home to  

them the idea that those Judges, while passing the judgment have  

not properly considered the issue involved in all its aspects nor  

have  they  comprehended  the  attendant  circumstances  or  the  

resultant consequences thereof.

………

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21 Having regard to the above, it is humbly submitted that,  

this  Honourable Court  may be pleased to see that  the charges  

levelled against me in the above Contempt of Courts Case are not  

sustainable in law and accordingly it is prayed that accepting this  

reply  affidavit,  the  Contempt  of  court  proceedings  initiated  

against me may kindly be dropped.”

The Appellant has also relied on Article 19(1) (b), 19(1) (a) and 19(1)(d) and  

19(3) of the Constitution.  He has deposed that he considered his duty “to  

speak to the people evaluating the same and expressing my views regarding  

the impact  and the adverse consequences  it  will  make on the social  and  

political life of this country and its people, as also the interference and the  

intrusions  it  will  make  on  the  rights,  including  the  fundamental  rights  

guaranteed to  the  citizens  of  this  country  by the  Constitution  …. I  may  

submit  in  my  speech  I  have  not  made  consciously  or  otherwise  any  

disparaging  or  disrespectful  statements  or  remarks  against  any  of  the  

Hon’ble Judges of this Court.”   As regards the use of the word ‘sumbhan’ or  

‘sumbhanmar’, the Appellant has taken the stand that the word implied that  

“those Judges, while passing the judgment have not properly considered the  

issues involved in all its aspects nor have they comprehended the attendant  

circumstances or the resultant consequences thereof.”

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4 In the said affidavit, the Appellant has quoted decisions of this Court  

in P.N. Duda v. P.Shiv Shanker 1988 (3) SCC 167; Re- S Mulgaokar 1978  

(3)  SCC  339  and  R  v.  Metropolitan  Police  Commissioner,  Ex-parte  

Blackburn 1968 (2) All ER 319(CA).   We are in respectful agreement with  

all the observations made in these judgments.

5 On 15.11.2011, the Appeal was taken on Board and admitted.    A  

direction was passed that the Appellant be released on bail but that the fine  

should be deposited within one week.   By that time, as per the submissions  

made by the learned senior counsel appearing for the Appellant had suffered  

incarceration for one week.

6 Learned Senior Counsel for the Appellant has drawn our attention to  

certain  expressions  used  in  the  impugned  Judgment,  which  we  

unhesitatingly and unequivocally find to be inappropriate when used by the  

Judge in an Order or judgment.   Since we have expressed our opinion we  

shall adjure from even mentioning the explanation offered on behalf of the  

Bench as elucidation in the backdrop of the syntax.  The sentence passed  

comprehensively does all the speaking.  The endeavour of the learned Senior  

Counsel is to persuade us that these words had been employed by the Judges  

because they were prejudiced against the Appellant, and that prejudice has  

resulted  in  imposing  the  impugned  sentence  in  its  total  and  complete  

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severity.  The  said  observations  do  not  impact  upon  the  character  of  the  

words used by the Appellant in his public speech, since they occur after the  

event.

7 Learned Senior Counsel  has not addressed any arguments or  given  

any extenuating explanation with regard to his utterance that if the Judges  

have any self respect they should step down from their office.  We are also  

unable to accept the meaning sought to be given to the word ‘sumbhan’/  

‘sumbhanmar’ since our inquiries reveal that they are pejorative or insulting  

epithets/abuses  akin to  calling a  person a  fool  or  idiot.    The  Appellant  

indubitably has exercised his freedom of speech insofar as he has dissected  

the Judgment  and argued that  it  was contrary to law.    He may also be  

excused in saying that Judges live in glass houses, and that the judgment’s  

worth is less than grass, since this is his perception.   But it is not open to the  

Appellant or any person to employ abusive and pejorative language to the  

authors of a judgment and call upon them to resign and step down from their  

office if they have any self respect.   The Appellant should have kept in  

mind the words of Lord Denning, in the Judgment upon which he has relied,  

that those that criticise a judgment must remember that from the nature of  

the Judge’s office, he cannot reply to their criticism.   In the case in hand, the  

Appellant had his remedy in the form of a Special Leave Petition to this  

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Court, which he has exercised albeit without success.   The speech was made  

within  a  couple  of  days  of  the  passing  of  the  ad  interim injunction;  no  

empirical  evidence  was  referred  to  by  the  Appellant,  nor  has  any  been  

presented thereafter, to support his utterance that the Judgment/Order was  

being opposed by the public at large.  Hence we see these parts of the speech  

as intending to scandalize and lower the dignity of  the Court,  and as an  

intentional and calculated obstruction in the administration of justice.  This  

requires to be roundly repulsed and combated.   

8 Learned Senior Counsel appearing for the Respondent State has in his  

brief  submission  highlighted  the  fact  that  at  no  stage  has  the  Appellant  

tendered  an  apology.   We  have  given  an  opportunity  to  learned  Senior  

Counsel for the Appellant to elucidate this position but he has categorically  

stated that he has instructions that the Appellant does not intend to apologise  

for any of his statements.

9 The  Appellant  is  an  advocate  and  also  an  ex-member  of  the  

Legislative Assembly.   He is fully aware that our Constitution is premised  

on the separation of powers which enjoin the Executive, the Legislature and  

the Judiciary to perform their duties within the Constitutional framework.  

He  is  fully  aware  that  while  he  has  the  right  of  freedom  of  speech  of  

expression,  this  postulates  a  temperate  and  reasoned  criticism and  not  a  

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vitriolic, slanderous or abusive one; this right of free speech certainly does  

not  extend to  inciting the public directly or  insidiously  to disobey Court  

Orders.   The remedy is provided by way of an appeal to the Division Bench,  

which was taken recourse to.   Having perused the translations of his speech,  

we are left in no manner of doubt that he intended to lower the dignity of  

Court, to obstruct and impede its functioning and not merely to criticise its  

pronouncement  which  was  not  to  his  liking.  His  conduct  leaves  him  

unquestionably guilty of the offence of Contempt of Courts, calling for him  

to be punished for his illegal act.   He has shown no remorse or contrition for  

his  conduct.   Instead,  he  has  vainly  etymologised  the  Sanskrit  origin  of  

‘sumbhan’, fully aware of the fact that in its slang, especially to the rural and  

rustic persons he was addressing, it conveyed a strong abuse.  Judges expect,  

nay invite, an informed and genuine discussion or criticism of judgments,  

but to incite a relatively illiterate audience against the Judiciary, is not to be  

ignored.  It was, not the Petitioner’s province, as exercising his freedom of  

speech,  to advise that “if those judges have any self respect,  they should  

resign and quit their offices”.   

10 The impugned Judgment has correctly and condignly committed the  

Appellant for committing contempt of Court and ordered his incarceration.  

Nevertheless,  while  affirming  the  impugned  Judgment,  we  reduce  the  

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sentence of six months imprisonment to that of simple imprisonment for a  

period of four weeks.

11 The  Appeal  is  disposed  of  in  the  above  terms.   We  desist  from  

imposing costs.

                       ............................................J.              [VIKRAMAJIT SEN]  

                         ............................................J.

            [ C. NAGAPPAN] New Delhi; January 30, 2015.   

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