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REPORTABLE

 IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA

CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION

CIVIL APPEAL NOS.   10866   ­10867 OF 2010

M. SIDDIQ (D) THR. LRS.                   … APPELLANT(S)

VERSUS

MAHANT SURESH DAS AND OTHERS ETC.        … RESPONDENT(S)

WITH

C.A. No. 4768­4771/2011, C.A. No. 2636/2011, C.A. No. 821/2011, C.A. No. 4739/2011, C.A. No. 4905­ 4908/2011,  C.A. No. 2215/2011, C.A. No. 4740/2011, C.A. No. 2894/2011, C.A. No. 6965/2011, C.A. No. 4192/2011, C.A. No. 5498/2011, C.A. No. 7226/2011, C.A. No. 8096/2011,   C.A.No. ________ of 2018 (@ Diary No. 22744/2017).

J U D G M E N T

ASHOK BHUSHAN, J.(For Self & Dipak Misra, CJI.)

These appeals were fixed for commencement of final

arguments on 05.12.2017, when Dr. Rajeev Dhavan, learned

senior counsel appearing for the appellants (C.A. No.

10866­10867 of 2010 and C.A. No. 2215 of 2011) submitted

that the Constitution Bench Judgment of this Court in

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Dr. M. Ismail Faruqui and Ors. Vs. Union of India and

Ors., (1994) 6 SCC 360  (hereinafter referred to as

“Ismail Faruqui’s  case”) needs reconsideration, hence

the reference be made to a larger Bench.   The above

submission of Dr. Dhavan was opposed by learned counsel

appearing for the respondents.  After completion of the

pleadings, when matter was again taken on 14.03.2018, we

thought it appropriate that we should hear Dr. Dhavan as

to whether the judgment in  Ismail Faruqui’s  case

requires reconsideration.   

2. We have heard Dr. Rajeev Dhavan, learned senior

counsel for the appellants, Shri K. Parasaran and Shri

C.S. Vaidyanathan, learned senior counsel for the

respondents in Civil Appeal Nos. 4768­4771 of 2011, Shri

Tushar Mehta, learned Additional Solicitor General has

appeared for the State of U.P.  We have also heard Shri

P.N. Mishra, Shri S.K. Jain and several other learned

counsels.   Shri Raju Ramachandran, learned senior

counsel has also addressed submissions supporting the

reference to larger Bench.   Learned counsel for the

parties have given their notes of submissions.  

3. Before we notice the respective submissions of

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learned counsel for the parties, we need to notice few

facts, leading to the   Constitution Bench decision in

Ismail  Faruqui’s  case.  The  sequence  of  events  which

lead filing of these appeals be also noticed.   The

Constitution Bench in  Ismail Faruqui’s  case has

extracted few facts from White Paper, which was

published by Central Government.  In Para 5 and 6 of the

judgment, the Constitution Bench noticed:­

“5. The ‘Overview’ at the commencement of the White Paper in Chapter I states thus:

“1.1 Ayodhya situated in the north of India is a township in District Faizabad of Uttar Pradesh. It has long been a place of holy pilgrimage because of its mention in the epic Ramayana  as  the place of  birth  of Sri Ram. The structure commonly known as Ram Janma Bhoomi­Babri Masjid  was erected  as  a mosque  by one Mir Baqi in Ayodhya in 1528 AD. It is claimed by some sections that it was built at the site believed to be the birthspot of Sri Ram where a temple had stood earlier. This resulted in a long­standing dispute.

1.2 The controversy entered a new phase with the placing of idols in the disputed structure in December 1949. The premises were attached under Section 145 of the Code of Criminal Procedure. Civil suits were filed shortly thereafter. Interim orders in these civil suits

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restrained the parties from removing the idols or interfering with their worship. In effect, therefore, from December 1949 till 6­12­1992 the structure had not been used as a mosque.”

6. The movement to construct a Ram Temple at the site of the disputed structure gathered momentum in recent years which became a matter of great controversy and a source of tension. This led to several parleys the details of which are not very material for the present purpose. These parleys involving the Vishwa Hindu Parishad (VHP) and the All India Babri Masjid Action Committee (AIBMAC), however, failed to resolve the dispute. A new dimension was added to the campaign for construction of the temple with the formation of the Government in Uttar Pradesh in June 1991 by the Bhartiya Janata Party (BJP) which declared its commitment to the construction of the temple and took certain steps like the acquisition of land adjoining the disputed structure while leaving out the disputed structure itself from the acquisition. The focus of the temple construction movement from October 1991 was to start construction of the temple by way of kar sewa on the land acquired by the Government of Uttar Pradesh while leaving the disputed structure intact. This attempt did not succeed and there was litigation in the Allahabad High Court as well as in this Court. There was a call for resumption of kar sewa from 6­12­1992 and the announcement made by the organisers was for a symbolic  kar sewa  without violation of the court orders including those made in the proceedings pending in this Court. In spite of initial reports from Ayodhya on 6­12­1992 indicating an air of normalcy, around midday a crowd addressed by leaders of BJP, VHP, etc., climbed the Ram Janma Bhumi­Babri Masjid (RJM­BM) structure and started

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damaging the domes. Within a short time, the entire structure was demolished and razed to the ground. Indeed, it was an act of “national shame”. What was demolished was not merely an ancient structure; but the faith of the minorities in the sense of justice and fairplay of majority. It shook their faith in the rule of law and constitutional processes. A five­hundred­year­old structure which was defenceless and whose safety was a sacred trust in the hands of the State Government was demolished.”

4. The Constitution Bench has noticed details of suits,

which were filed in the year 1950 and thereafter, which

suits were ultimately transferred to the Allahabad High

Court to be heard together in the year 1989.  In Para 9

of the judgment, following has been noticed:­

“9.  A brief reference to certain suits in this connection may now be made. In 1950, two suits were filed by some Hindus; in one of these suits in January 1950, the trial court passed interim orders whereby the idols remained at the place where they were installed in December 1949 and their puja by the Hindus continued. The interim order was confirmed by the High Court in April 1955. On 1­2­1986, the District Judge ordered the opening of the lock placed on a grill leading to the sanctum sanctorum of the shrine in the disputed structure and permitted puja by the Hindu devotees. In 1959, a suit was filed by the Nirmohi Akhara claiming title to the disputed structure. In 1981, another suit was filed claiming title to the disputed structure by the Sunni Central Wakf Board. In 1989, Deoki Nandan Agarwal, as the next friend  of  the Deity filed a title suit in respect of the disputed structure. In 1989,

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the aforementioned suits were transferred to the Allahabad High Court and were ordered to be heard together. On 14­8­1989, the High Court ordered the maintenance of status quo in respect of the disputed structure (Appendix­I to the White Paper). As earlier mentioned, it is stated in para 1.2 of the White Paper that:

“…  interim orders in these civil suits restrained the parties from removing the idols or interfering with their worship. In effect, therefore, from December 1949 till 6­12­1992 the structure had not been used as a mosque.”

5. As a result of the happenings at Ayodhya on

06.12.1992, the President of India issued a proclamation

under Article 356 of the Constitution of India assuming

to himself all the functions of the Government of Uttar

Pradesh, dissolving the U.P. Vidhan Sabha.   As a

consequence of the events at Ayodhya on 06.12.1992, the

Central Government decided to acquire all areas in

dispute in the suits pending in the Allahabad High

Court. It was also decided to acquire suitable adjacent

area, which would be made available to two Trusts for

construction of a Ram Temple and a Mosque respectively.

The Government of India has also decided to request the

President to seek the opinion of the Supreme Court on

the question whether there was a Hindu temple existing

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on the site where the disputed structure stood.   An

ordinance was issued on 07.01.1993 namely “Acquisition

of Certain Area at Ayodhya Ordinance” for acquisition of

67.703 acres of land in the Ram Janam Bhumi­Babri Masjid

complex.  A reference to the Supreme Court under Article

143 of the Constitution was also made on the same day,

i.e. 07.01.1993.  The Ordinance No. 8 of 1993 had been

replaced by the Acquisition of Certain Area at Ayodhya

Act, 1993 (No. 33 of 1993) (hereinafter referred to as

“Act, 1993”).   A Writ Petition Under Article 32 was

filed in this Court challenging the validity of the Act

No. 33 of 1993.   Several writ petitions at Allahabad

High Court were also filed challenging various aspects

of the Act, 1993. This Court exercising its jurisdiction

under Article 139A had transferred the writ petitions,

which were pending in the High Court.   The Writ

Petitions under Article 32, transferred cases from High

Court of Allahabad as well as Reference No.1 of 1993

made by President under Article 143 were all heard

together and decided by common judgment dated

24.10.1994, where the Constitution Bench had upheld the

validity of the Act except that of Section 4(3) of the

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Act, 1993 which was struck down.   

6. After the judgment of this Court in the above

Constitution Bench, all the suits, which had been

transferred by the High Court to be heard by a Full

Bench of the High Court stood revived.  One Mohd. Aslam,

who was also one of the petitioners in Constitution

Bench  Judgment  in  Ismail  Faruqui’s  case  filed  a  writ

petition seeking certain reliefs with regard to 67.703

acres of land acquired under the Act, 1993.  This Court

on 13.03.2002 passed an interim order.  Paras 4 and 5 of

the interim order are as follows:­

“4.  In the meantime, we direct that on 67.703 acres of acquired land located in various plots detailed in the Schedule to the Acquisition of Certain Area at Ayodhya Act, 1993, which is vested in the Central Government, no religious activity of any kind by anyone either symbolic or actual including bhumi puja or shila puja, shall be permitted or allowed to take place.

5.  Furthermore, no part of the aforesaid land shall be handed over by the Government to anyone and the same shall be retained by the Government till the disposal of this writ petition nor shall any part of this land be permitted to be occupied or used for any religious purpose or in connection therewith.”

7. The above writ petition was ultimately decided on

31.03.2003 by a Constitution Bench, which judgment is

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reported in (2003) 4 SCC 1, Mohd. Aslam alias Bhure Vs.

Union of India and Others.  Before the Constitution

Bench, both the parties had placed reliance on  Ismail

Faruqui’s case. This Court disposed of the writ petition

directing that order of this Court dated 13.03.2002 as

modified on 14.03.2002 should be operative until

disposal of the suits in the High Court of Allahabad.

The Allahabad High Court after hearing all the suits on

merits  decided  all the  suits  vide  its  judgment  dated

30.08.2010.  The parties aggrieved ­ both plaintiffs and

defendants in the original suits have filed these

appeals in this Court.   

8. Dr. Rajeev Dhavan submits that judgment in  Ismail

Faruqui’s  case had made observations that a mosque is

not an essential part of the practice of the religion of

Islam and namaz (prayer) by Muslims can be offered

anywhere, even in open.   The observations made by the

Constitution Bench has influenced the decisions under

the appeal, the law laid down in  Ismail Faruqui  in

relation to praying in a mosque not being an essential

practice is contrary to both, i.e. the law relating to

essential practice and the process by which essential

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practice is to be considered. Whether essential practice

can be decided on a mere  ipse dixit  of the Court or

whether the Court is obliged to examine belief, tenets

and practices, is a pure question of law.   The  Ismail

Faruqui’s judgment being devoid  of any examination on

the above issues,   the matter need to go to a larger

Bench.  

9. Dr. Dhavan specifically referred to paras 78 and 82

of the judgment in  Ismail Faruqui’s  case.   He

specifically attacked following observations in

Paragraph 78 :­

“78. While offer of prayer or worship is a religious practice, its offering at every location where such prayers can be offered would not be an essential or integral part of such religious practice unless the place has a particular significance for that religion so as to form an essential or integral part thereof. Places of worship of any religion having particular significance for that religion, to make it an essential or integral part of the religion, stand on a different footing and have to be treated differently and more reverentially.”

10. In Para 82, following observation is specifically

attacked:­

“A mosque  is  not an  essential  part of  the practice of the religion of Islam and namaz(prayer) by Muslims can be offered

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anywhere, even in open.”

11. He  submits  that essential practice  of  a religion

requires  a  detailed  examination.   He  has  referred  to

various judgments of this Court to support his

submission that wherever this Court had to determine the

essential practice of a religion, detailed examination

was undertaken.   He submits that  Ismail Faruqui’s case

does not refer to any material nor enters into any

detailed examination before making the observations in

Paragraphs 78 and 82 as noticed above.   Dr. Dhavan

further  submits  that  a  broad  test  of  essentiality  as

laid  down  by  Seven  Judges  Bench  in  The  Commissioner,

Hindu Religious Endowments, Madras Vs. Sri Lakshmindra

Thirtha Swamiar of Sri Shirur Mutt, 1954 SCR 1005 cannot

be cut down by a later judgment of lesser strength,

which judgments have introduced the test of integrality.

He submits that the test of integrality is

interchangable with essentiality test.   Dr. Dhavan,

during his submissions, has taken us to submissions made

by various parties before the High Court, where reliance

was placed on  Ismail Faruqui’s case.   He has also

referred to various grounds taken in these appeals,

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which grounds rely on the judgment of  Ismail Faruqui’s

case.  He submits that the above furnishes ample grounds

for appellants to pray for reconsideration of  Ismail

Faruqui’s case.  Dr. Dhavan in his notes 'For reference

to a larger Bench' has clarified that questionable

aspects as noted above are not the ratio of  Ismail

Faruqui’s case.  Dr. Dhavan submits that ratio in Ismail

Faruqui’s case can be summed up to the following

effect:­

(i) The suits revive in their entirety.

(ii) The acquisition was legally competent,

traceable to List III and Entry 42 of the

Seventh Schedule of the Constitution.

(iii) The word ‘vest’ has multiple meanings and

implied that the status of the Central

Government was that of a statutory receiver

which would dispense with the land (including

the  other  areas  acquired)  in  accordance  with

the judgment in the suits rather than the

Reference which was declined.  

(iv) Status quo as in Section 7(2) of the Act would

be maintained, justified on the basis of

comparative user since 1949.

(v) Secularism is a facet of equality and

represents equal treatment of all religions in

their own terms and with equal respect and

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concern for all.

12. Shri K. Parasaran, learned senior counsel refuting

the submissions of Dr. Dhavan submitted that the prayer

for reconsideration of the judgment in Ismail Faruqui’s

case is not maintainable at the instance of the

appellants.   He submitted that those who were eo nomine

parties to the proceedings in the case in  Ismail

Faruqui,  litigated bona fide in respect of a public

right viz. the right of the Muslim public, all persons

interested in such right shall, for the purposes of

Section 11 Civil Procedure Code, be deemed to claim

under the persons so litigating and are barred by Res

Judicata in view of Explanation VI to Section 11 C.P.C.

He submits that the interests of Muslim community were

adequately represented before this Court in  Ismail

Faruqui’s case.   He further submits that the judgment

in Ismail Faruqui’s case is binding on those who are eo­

nomine parties thereto.  Even apart from the question of

res judicata, the doctrine of representation binds those

whose interests are the same in the subject matter of

Ram Janam Bhumi­Babri Masjid as those of eo­nomine

parties.   He submitted that the appellants are not

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entitled to request for reconsideration of the said

judgment on the principle of doctrine of representation.

Mr. Parasaran submitted that to reconsider the judgment

in Ismail Faruqui’s case will be an exercise in futility

as the judgment therein is binding on the present

appellants. Assuming without admitting that by a further

reference  to  a  larger  bench  Ismail  Faruqui’s  case  is

overruled, nevertheless, in so far as “Ayodhya

Janmasthan Babri Masjid” is concerned, the judgment in

Ismail Faruqui’s case will still be binding on the

appellants  on  the  principle  of  finality.   He  submits

that in the present case, the submissions made were a

reargument of the submissions made in  Ismail Faruqui’s

case as if it were an appeal against the said judgment

by canvassing the correctness of the said judgment.   He

further submits that in addition to being binding on the

parties, the judgment operates as a declaration of law

under Article 141 of the Constitution.      

13. Shri Parasaran further submits that observations in

Ismail Faruqui’s case that a mosque is not an essential

part of the practice of Islam have to be read in the

context of validity of the acquisition of the

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suit property under the Act, 1993.   He submits that

this Court has not ruled that offering namaz by Muslims

is not an essential religious practice. It only ruled

that the right to offer namaz  at every mosque that

exists  is  not  essential  religious  practice.  But  if  a

place of worship of any religion has a particular

significance  for that religion,  enough to  make  it  an

essential or integral part of the religion, then it

would stand on a different footing and would have to be

treated differently and more reverentially.

Mr.Parasaran respectfully submitted that the thrust of

the reasoning of this Court has to be understood as to

the freedom of religion under Articles 25 and 26 of the

Constitution in the context of the inherent sovereign

power of the State to compulsorily acquire property in

the exercise of its jurisdiction of eminent domain in a

secular democracy.    

14. Shri Parasaran further submits that the fundamental

right of the Muslim community under Article 25, to offer

namaz, is not affected because the Babri Masjid was not

a mosque with particular significance for that religion.

The faith/practice to offer namaz is an essential part

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of Muslim religion and, therefore, it may be performed

in any mosque at Ayodhya.   Ayodhya is of particular

significance to the Hindus as a place of pilgrimage

because of the ancient belief that Lord Ram was born

there.   He further submits that the impact of

acquisition is equally on the right and interest of both

the communities. Shri Parasaran, during his submissions,

has also tried to  distinguish  the cases relied by the

appellants to support their submissions in favour of

reference.   

15. Shri C.S. Vaidyanathan has submitted that present is

not a case where judgment of Ismail Faruqui’s case need

any reference to a larger Bench. He has adopted the

submissions made by Shri Parasaran.

16. Shri Tushar Mehta, learned Additional Solicitor

General, submits that Constitution Bench judgment of

this Court in  Ismail Faruqui’s case is a correct law,

which does not deserves to be disturbed by referring it

to a larger Bench.  Shri Mehta further submits that the

prayer made by the appellants for referring to larger

Bench deserves to be rejected on the ground of

inordinate delay. He submits that judgment was rendered

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in 1994.   The judgment came for consideration in Mohd.

Aslam’s case, (2003) 4 SCC 1 where both the parties have

relied on the judgments.   Had there been any genuine

grounds, request for reference ought to have been made

at that time.  He further submits that a request is not

a bona fide request and has been made with the intent to

delay the proceedings.   Shri Tushar Mehta, learned

Additional Solicitor General has reiterated his

submissions that State of U.P. is neutral in so far as

merits of the case of either of the parties is

concerned.   

17. Shri Parmeshwar Nath Mishra, learned counsel

appearing for one of the respondents submits that all

Mosques of the World are not essential for practice of

Islam.   During the submissions, he referred to various

texts, sculptures of the religion of Islam.  He further

submits that the Al­Masjid, Al­Haram i.e. Ka‘ba in Mecca

is a mosque of particular significance for the reasons

that there is Quranic command to offer prayers facing

towards Ka‘ba and to perform Haj as well as Umra in

Ka‘ba without which right to practise the religion of

Islam is not conceivable.  Two other Mosques namely, Al­

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Masjid Al­Aqsa i.e. Baitul Muqaddas in Jerusalem and Al­

Masjid of Nabi at Madina also have particular

significances for the reason that besides Ka‘ba,

pilgrimage to these two mosques have also been commanded

by the sacred Hadiths.   Shri Mishra in his submission

has referred to and relied on various texts and

sculptures.  He has referred to verses of Holy Quran and

Hadiths, which are principal source of religion of

Islam, its beliefs, doctrine, tenets and practices.   

18. Shri S.K. Jain, learned senior counsel appearing for

Nirmohi Akhada has also refuted the submission of Dr.

Dhavan that  Ismail Faruqui’s case needs to be referred

to a larger Bench.

19. Dr. Rajeev Dhavan in his submissions in rejoinder

refutes the submission of Shri Parasaran that principle

of res judicata is attracted in the present case.   He

submits that Ismail Faruqui’s case was about a challenge

to the Act, 1993 and the Presidential Reference and the

question as to whether in the light of the Act, 1993 the

suits abated due to Section 4(3) of the Act, 1993.  The

cases under these appeals are from suits, where the

issues were entirely different. He submits that for

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constituting a matter res judicata the following

conditions must be satisfied, namely:­

1. The matter directly and substantially in issue

in the  subsequent  suit or issue must  be the

same matter which was directly and

substantially in issue in the former suit;

2. The former suit must have been a suit between

the same parties or between parties under whom

they or any of them claim;

3. The parties must have litigated under the same

title in the former suit;

4. The court which decided the former suit must be

a court competent to try the subsequent suit or

the suit in which such issue is subsequently

raised; and

5. The matter directly and substantially in issue

in the subsequent suit must have been heard and

finally decided by the Court in the first suit.

Further Explanation I shows that it is not the

date on which the suit is filed that matters

but the date on which the suit is decided, so

that even if a suit was filed later, it will be

a former suit if it has been decided earlier.

In order therefore that the decision in the

earlier two appeals dismissed by the High Court

operates  as res judicata  it will  have  to  be

seen whether all the five conditions mentioned

above have been satisfied.         

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20. He submits that matter, which was directly and

substantially in issue in the suits is entirely

different from the issues, which came for consideration

in the case of  Ismail Faruqui.  His submission is that

Ismail Faruqui’s case was concerned with the Act, 1993

and the Presidential Reference.  He further submits that

issue of essentiality of a Mosque generally was not

before the Court and emerged only in the judgment.  He

further submits that pure questions of law are not res

judicata.   The ipse dixit of the Court that something

is, or not the essential practice is contrary to law.

He further submits that in the Constitution Bench, the

suits were not transferred rather it was the writ

petitions, which were filed in the High Court

challenging the Act, 1993, were transferred.   No

transfer of the suit having been made in the Supreme

Court to be heard alongwith  Ismail Faruqui’s case, the

judgment in Ismail Faruqui’s case cannot be said to be

judgment  in the  suits.  What  constitute  an  essential

practice and how it is to be established is a pure

question of law and not amenable to res judicata.  It is

open to this court to examine the law relating to

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determination and application of the essential practices

test.  The observations on prayer in a Mosque not being

essential or concept of particular significance and

comparative significance are without foundation.

Replying  to the  submission  of Shri  Tushar  Mehta,  Dr.

Dhavan submits that State has not taken a non­neutral

stance in the present proceedings.   He submits that

there is no delay on the part of the appellants in

praying for reconsideration of  Ismail Faruqui’s

judgment.  He submits that impugned judgment of the High

Court is affected by the observations made in the Ismail

Faruqui’s case.   He submits that submission of Shri

Tushar Mehta that prayer is not bonafide and has been

made  only  to  delay  the proceedings  are incorrect  and

deserves to be rejected.   Dr. Dhavan has also referred

to various observations made by judgment in High Court

to support its submissions that judgment of  Ismail

Faruqui’s  case has influenced the judgment of the High

Court.    He has further referred to various submissions

made by the learned counsel for the parties relying on

judgment of Ismail Faruqui’s case before the High Court.

He further submits that in these appeals also, several

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grounds have been taken by the different learned counsel

relying on Ismail Faruqui’s case.   

21. Learned counsel for the parties have referred to and

relied on various judgments of this Court, which shall

be referred to while considering the submissions in

detail.  

22. Before  we  enter into  the submissions  advanced by

the learned counsel for the parties it is relevant to

notice certain established principle on reading of a

judgment of the Court. The focal point in the present

case being Constitution Bench judgment in Dr. M. Ismail

Faruqui & Ors. vs. Union of India & Ors. reported   in

(1994) 6 SCC 360.  We have to find out the context of

observations made in the judgment which according to the

appellant are questionable and to decide whether the

said observations furnish any ground for reconsideration

of the Constitution Bench judgment. The most celebrated

principle on reading of a judgment of a Court of law

which has been approved time and again by this Court is

the statement by LORD HALSBURY in Quinn v. Leathem, 1901

AC 495, where following was laid down:

“Before discussing the case of Allen v. Flood (1898) AC 1 and what was decided

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therein, there are two observations of a general character which I wish to make, and one is to repeat what I have very often said before, that every judgment must be read as applicable to the particular facts proved, or assumed to be proved, since the generality of the expressions which may be found there are not intended to be expositions of the whole law, but are governed and qualified by the particular facts of the case in which such expressions are to be found. The other is that a case is only an authority for what it actually decides. I entirely deny that it can be quoted for a proposition that may seem to follow logically from it. Such a mode of reasoning assumes that the law is necessarily a logical code, whereas every lawyer must acknowledge that the law is not always logical at all. ”

23. The following words of LORD DENNING in the matter of

applying precedents have become locus classicus:

“Each case depends on its own facts and a close similarity between one case and another is not enough because even a single significant detail may alter the entire aspect, in deciding such cases, one should avoid the temptation to decide cases (as said by Cardozo, J. ) by matching the colour of one case against the colour of another. To decide therefore, on which side of the line a case falls, the broad resemblance to another case is not at all decisive.  

* * *

Precedent should be followed only so far as it marks the path of justice, but you must cut the dead wood and trim off the side branches else you will find yourself lost in thickets and branches. My plea is to keep the

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path of justice clear of obstructions which could impede it.”

The above passage has been quoted with approval by

this Court in Sarva Shramik Sanghatana (KV), Mumbai vs.

State of Maharashtra and others, (2008) 1 SCC 494.

24. In the Constitution Bench judgment in  Islamic

Academy of Education and another v. State of Karnataka

and others, (2003) 6 SCC 697,  Chief Justice  V.N. Khare

speaking for majority held:

“The ratio decidendi of a Judgment has to be found out only on reading the entire Judgment. In fact the ratio of the judgment is what is set out in the judgment itself. The answer to the question would necessarily have to be read in the context of what is set out in the judgment and not in isolation. In case of any doubt as regards any observations, reasons and principles, the other part of the judgment has to be looked into. By reading a line here and there from, the judgment, one cannot find out the entire ratio decidendi of the judgment. We, therefore, while giving our clarifications, are deposed to look into other parts of the Judgment other than those portions which may be relied upon.”  

25. Justice S.B. Sinha, J. in his concurring opinion has

reiterated the principles of interpretation of a

judgment in paragraphs 139 to 146. Following has been

25

held in paragraphs 139­146:

“INTERPRETATION OF A JUDGMENT 139. A judgment, it is trite, is not to

be read as a statute. The ratio decidendi of a judgment is its reasoning which can be deciphered only upon reading the same in its entirety. The ratio decidendi of a case or the principles and reasons on which it is based is distinct from the relief finally granted or the manner adopted for its disposal. [See  Executive Engineer, Dhenkanal Minor Irrigation Division v. N.C. Budharaj [2001]2 SCC 721].

140.  In  Padma  Sundara  Rao  v. State  of T.N.,(2002) 3 SCC 533, it is stated: (SCC p. 540 paragraph 9)

"There is always peril in treating the words of a speech or judgment as though they are words in a legislative enactment, and it is to be remembered that judicial utterances are made in the setting of the facts of a particular case, said Lord Morris in Herrington v. British Railways Board (1972) 2 WLR 537 [Sub nom British Railways Board v. Herrington, (1972) 1 All ER 749. Circumstantial flexibility, one additional or different fact may make a world of difference between conclusions in two cases." [See also  Haryana Financial Corporation v. Jagadamba Oil Mills (2002 3 SCC 496]

141. In General Electric Co. v. Renusagar Power Co.,  (1987) 4 SCC 137, it  was held: (SCC p.157, paragraph 20)

"As often enough pointed out by us, words and expressions used in a judgment are not to be construed in the same manner as statutes or as words and expressions defined in

26

statutes. We do not have any doubt that when the words "adjudication of the merits of the controversy in the suit" were used by this Court in State of U.P. v. Janki Saran Kailash Chandra  [1974]1SCR31 , the words were not used to take in every adjudication which brought to an end the proceeding before the court in whatever manner but were meant to cover only such adjudication as touched upon the real dispute between the parties which gave rise to the action. Objections to adjudication of the disputes between the parties, on whatever ground are in truth not aids to the progress of the suit but hurdles to such progress. Adjudication of such objections cannot be termed as adjudication of the merits of the controversy in the suit. As we said earlier, a broad view has to be taken of the principles involved and narrow and technical interpretation which tends to defeat the object of the legislation must be avoided."  

142. In Rajeshwar Prasad Mishra v. The State of  West, Bengal,  AIR 1965 SC  1887, it  was held:  

"Article 141 empowers the Supreme Court to declare the law and enact it. Hence the observation of the Supreme Court should not be read as statutory enactments. It is also well known that ratio of a decision is the reasons assigned therein." (See also  Amar Nath Om Prakash and Ors. v. State of Punjab[1985] 1 SCC 345 and  Hameed Joharan v. Abdul Salam, 2001 (7) SCC 573).

143. It will not, therefore, be correct to contend, as has been contended by Mr. Nariman, that answers to the questions would be the ratio to a judgment. The answers to the questions are merely conclusions. They have to be interpreted, in a case of doubt or dispute with the reasons assigned in support

27

thereof in the body of the judgment, where for, it would be essential to read the other paragraphs of the judgment also. It is also permissible for this purpose (albeit only in certain cases and if there exist strong and cogent reasons) to look to the pleadings of the parties.

144. In Keshav Chandra Joshi  v. Union of India, 1992 Supp (1) SCC 272, this Court when faced with difficulties where specific guidelines had been laid down for determination of seniority in Direct Recruits Class II Engineering Officers' Association v. State of Maharashtra, (1990) 2 SCC 715, held that the conclusions have to be read along with the discussions and the reasons given in the body of the judgment.

145. It is further trite that a decision is an authority for what it decides and not what can be logically deduced therefrom. [See Union of India v. Chajju Ram, (2003) 5 SCC 568.

146. The judgment of this Court in T.M.A. Pai Foundations, (2002) 8 SCC 481,  will, therefore, have to be construed or to be interpreted on the aforementioned principles, The Court cannot read some sentences from here  and there to  find  out the intent and purport of the decision by not only considering what has been said therein but the text and context in which it was said. For the said purpose the Court may also consider the constitutional or relevant, statutory provisions vis­a­vis its earlier decisions on which reliance has been placed.”

26. Justice Arijit Pasayat, J. speaking for the Court in

Commissioner of Central Excise, Delhi vs. Allied Air­

conditioning Corporation (Regd.), (2006) 7 SCC 735, held

28

that the judgment should be understood in the light of

facts of the case and no more should be read into it

than what it actually says. In paragraph 8 following has

been laid down:

“8.....A judgment should be understood in the light of facts of the case and no more should be read into it than what it actually says. It is neither desirable nor permissible to pick out a word or a sentence from the judgment divorced from the context of the question under consideration and treat it to be complete law decided by this Court. The judgment must be read as a whole and the observations from the judgment have to be considered in the light of the questions which were before this Court. (See  Mehboob Dawood Shaikh v. State of Maharashtra , (2004) 2 SCC 362.....”

27. In the light of the above principles, we now revert

back to the Constitution Bench judgment in  Ismail

Faruqui. We need to notice the issues which had come up

for consideration before the Constitution Bench, the

ratio of the judgment and the context of observations.

We  have noticed  above  that  the  Constitution  Bench  in

Ismail Faruqui case decided five transferred cases, two

writ petitions filed under Article 32 and Special

Reference No.1 of 1993. The Special Reference No.1 of

1993 made by the President of India under Article 143

29

was respectfully declined to be answered by the

Constitution Bench. The challenge in the writ petitions

under Article 32 and transferred cases was to the Act,

1993. The Act, 1993 was enacted to provide for the

acquisition of certain area at Ayodhya and for matters

connected therewith or incidental thereto. Section 2(a)

defines the area as:

“2(a) “area” means the area (including all the buildings, structures or other properties comprised therein) specified in the Schedule;

28. The Schedule of the Act contained the description of

the area acquired. Apart from the other plots Revenue

Plot Nos.159 and 160  situated in village Kot Ramchandra

wherein structure commonly known as Ram Janam Bhumi­

Babri Masjid was situated was also included. Several

other plots including all the building structure on

other properties comprised therein were acquired.  

29. The validity of Act, 1993 was challenged on several

grounds. The ground for challenge has been noticed in

paragraph 17 of the judgment which is to the following

effect:

“17. Broadly stated, the focus of challenge to the statute as a whole is on the

30

grounds of secularism, right to equality and right to freedom of religion. Challenge to the acquisition of the area in excess of the disputed area is in addition on the ground that the acquisition was unnecessary being unrelated to the dispute pertaining to the small disputed area within it. A larger argument advanced on behalf of some of the parties who have assailed the Act with considerable vehemence is that a mosque being a place of religious worship by the Muslims, independently of whether the acquisition did affect the right to practice religion, is wholly immune from the State's power of acquisition and the statute is, therefore, unconstitutional as violative of Articles 25 and 26 of the Constitution of India for this reason alone. The others, however, limited this argument of immunity from acquisition only to places of special significance, forming an essential and integral part of the right to practice the religion, the acquisition of which would result in the extinction of the right to freedom of religion itself. It was also contended that the purpose of acquisition in the present case does not bring the statute within the ambit of Entry 42, List III but is referable to Entry 1, List II and, therefore, the Parliament did not have the competence to enact the same. It was then urged by learned Counsel canvassing the Muslim interest that the legislation is tilted heavily in favour of the Hindu interests and, therefore, suffers from the vice of non­secularism, and discrimination in addition to violation of the right to freedom of religion of the Muslim community.....”

30. The challenge to the acquisition of the area in

excess of area which is disputed area was on the ground

31

that same was unnecessary, hence, ought to be declared

invalid. The challenge to excess area was laid by

members of the Hindu community to whom the said plots

belonged. One of the grounds of attack was based on

secularism. It was contended that Act read as a whole is

anti­secular and against the Muslim community. A mosque

has immunity from State's power of acquisition. It was

contended  on  behalf  of  the Muslim  community  that  the

defences  open  to  the minority  community  in  the  suits

filed by other side including that of adverse possession

for over 400 years since 1528 AD when the Mosque was

constructed have been extinguished by the acquisition.

The suits have been abated without the substitution of

an alternate dispute resolution mechanism to which they

are entitled in the Constitutional scheme.  

31. The Constitution Bench held that acquisition of the

properties under the Act affects the rights of both the

communities and not merely those of the Muslim

community. In paragraph 49 following has been noticed:

“49. The narration of facts indicates that the acquisition of properties under the Act affects the rights of both the communities and not merely those of the Muslim community. The interest claimed by the Muslims is only over the disputed site where

32

the mosque stood before its demolition. The objection of the Hindus to this claim has to be adjudicated. The remaining entire property acquired under the Act is such over which no title is claimed by the Muslims. A large part thereof comprises of properties of Hindus of which the title is not even in dispute.... ”

32. This Court also noticed that Ayodhya is said to be

of particular significance to the Hindus as a place of

pilgrimage because of the ancient belief that Lord Rama

was born there. The Court also noticed that equally

mosque was of significance for the Muslim community as

an ancient mosque built by Mir Baqi in 1528 AD. In

paragraph 51 of the judgment following has been noticed:

“51. It may also be mentioned that even as Ayodhya is said to be of particular significance to the Hindus as a place of pilgrimage because of the ancient belief that Lord Rama was born there, the mosque was of significance for the Muslim community as an ancient mosque built by Mir Baqi in 1528 A.D. As a mosque, it was a religious place of worship by the Muslims. This indicates the comparative significance of the disputed site to the two communities and also that the impact of acquisition is equally on the right and interest of the Hindu community. Mention of this aspect is made only in the context of the argument that the statute as a whole, not merely Section 7 thereof, is anti­secular being slanted in favour of the Hindus and against the Muslims.”  

33. As noted above, one of the principal submission

33

which was raised by the petitioners before the

Constitution Bench was that mosque cannot be acquired

because of a special status in the Mohammedan Law.  The

Constitution Bench in Ismail Faruqui case by a separate

heading “MOSQUE – IMMUNITY FROM ACQUISITION” from

paragraphs 65 to 82 considered the above ground.  

34. The discussion from paragraphs 65 to 82 as per above

heading indicates that the discussion and all

observations were in the context of immunity from

acquisition of a mosque. In paragraph 65 of the judgment

a larger question was raised at the hearing that there

is no power in the State to acquire any mosque,

irrespective of its significance to practice of the

religion of Islam. The Court after noticing the above

observation has observed that the proposition advanced

does appear to be too broad for acceptance. We re­

produce paragraph 65 which is to the following effect:

“65. A larger question raised at the hearing was that  there  is  no  power in the State to acquire any mosque, irrespective of its significance to practice of the religion of Islam. The argument is that a mosque, even if it is of no particular significance to the practice of religion of Islam, cannot be acquired because of the special status of a mosque in Mahomedan Law. This argument was not confined to a mosque of particular

34

significance without which right to practice the religion is not conceivable because it may form an essential and integral part of the practice of Islam. In the view that we have taken of limited vesting in the Central Government as a statutory receiver of the disputed area in which the mosque stood, for the purpose of handing it over to the party found entitled to it, and requiring it to maintain status quo therein till then, this question may not be of any practical significance since there is no absolute divesting of the true owner of that property. We may observe that the proposition advanced does appear to us to be too broad for acceptance inasmuch as it would restrict the sovereign power of acquisition even where such acquisition is essential for an undoubted national purpose, if the mosque happens to be located in the property acquired as an ordinary place of worship without any particular significance attached to it for the practice of Islam as a religion. It would also lead to the strange result that in secular India there would be discrimination against the religions, other than Islam. In view of the vehemence with which this argument was advanced by Dr. Rajeev Dhavan and Shri Abdul Mannan to contend that the acquisition is invalid for this reason alone, it is necessary for us to decide this question. ”

35. Although in paragraph 65 the Court observed that the

proposition is too broad for acceptance but in view of

the vehemence with which argument of the learned counsel

appearing for the petitioners was put the Court

proceeded to decide the issue.

35

36. The contention   before the Constitution Bench was

also  that  acquisition  of  a  mosque  violates  the  right

given under Articles 25 and 26 of the Constitution of

India. After noticing the law in the British India,

prior to 1950, and the law after enforcement of the

Constitution, the Constitution Bench came to the

conclusion that places of religious worship like

mosques, churches, temples etc. can be acquired under

the State's sovereign power of acquisition. Such

acquisition per se does not violates either Article 25

or Article 26 of the Constitution. After noticing the

various decisions following was laid down in paragraph

74:

“74.It appears from various decisions rendered by this Court, referred later, that subject to the protection under Articles 25 and 26 of the Constitution, places of religious worship like mosques, churches, temples etc. can be acquired under the State's sovereign power of acquisition. Such acquisition per se does not violate either Article 25 or Article 26 of the Constitution. The decisions relating to taking over of the management have no bearing on the sovereign power of the State to acquire property. ”

37. The Constitution Bench further held that the right

to practice, profess and propagate religion guaranteed

36

under Article 25 of the Constitution does not

necessarily include the right to acquire or own or

possess property. Similarly, this right does not extend

to the right of worship at any and every place of

worship. Further, it was held that protection under

Articles 25 and 26 of the Constitution is to religious

practice which forms an essential and integral part of

the religion. In paragraphs 77 and 78 following has been

held:

“77. It may be noticed that Article 25 does not contain any reference to property unlike Article 26 of the Constitution. The right to practice, profess and propagate religion guaranteed under Article 25 of the Constitution does not necessarily include the right to acquire or own or possess property. Similarly this right does not extend to the right of worship at any and every place of worship so that any hindrance to worship at a particular place per se may infringe the religious freedom guaranteed under Articles 25 and 26 of the Constitution. The protection under Articles 25 and 26 of the Constitution is to religious practice which forms an essential and integral part of the religion. A practice may be a religious practice but not an essential and integral part of practice of that religion.  

78. While offer of prayer or worship is a religious practice, its offering at every location where such prayers can be offered would not be an essential or integral part of such religious practice unless the place has a particular significance for that religion

37

so as to form an essential or integral part thereof. Places of worship of any religion having particular significance for that religion, to make it an essential or integral part of the religion, stand on a different footing and have to be treated differently and more reverentially. ”

38. With the above observation the Constitution Bench

held that offer of prayer or worship is a religious

practice, its offering at every location would not be an

essential or integral part of such religious practice

unless the place has a particular significance for that

religion so as to form an essential or integral part

thereof. Places of worship of any religion having

particular significance for that religion, to make it an

essential or integral part of the religion, stand on a

different footing and have to be treated differently and

more reverentially.  

39. From what we have noticed above following are

deducible:

(i) Places of religious worship like mosques,

churches, temples, etc. can be acquired under

the State's sovereign power of acquisition,

which does not violate Articles 25 or 26 of the

Constitution.

38

(ii) The  right  to  practice,  profess  and  propagate

religion guaranteed under Article 25 does not

extend to the right of worship at any and every

place of worship so that any hindrance to

worship at a particular place per se may

infringe the religious freedom guaranteed under

Articles 25 and 26 of the Constitution.

(iii)The protection under Articles 25 and 26 of the

Constitution is to religious practice which

forms an essential or integral part of the

religion.

(iv) A practice may be a religious practice but not

an essential and integral part of practice of

that religion.

(v) While offer of prayer or worship is a religious

practice, its offering at every location where

such prayers can be offered would not be an

essential  or  integral  part  of such  religious

practice unless the place has a particular

significance for that religion so as to form an

essential or integral part thereof.

The Court itself has drawn a distinction with regard

39

to the place of a particular significance for that

religion where offer of prayer or worship may be an

essential or integral part of the religion.

40. The Court held that the mosques were subject to the

provisions of statute of limitation thereby

extinguishing the right of Muslims to offer prayers in a

particular mosque. In paragraph 80 following was held:

“80. It has been contended that a mosque enjoys a particular position in Muslim Law and once a mosque is established and prayers are offered in such a mosque, the same remains for all time to come a property of Allah and the same never reverts back to the donor or founder of the mosque and any person professing Islamic faith can offer prayer in such a mosque and even if the structure is demolished, the place remains the same where the Namaz can be offered. As indicated hereinbefore, in British India, no such protection was given to a mosque and the mosque was subjected to the provisions of statute of limitation there by extinguishing the right of Muslims to offer prayers in a particular mosque lost by adverse possession over that property.”

41. The Constitution Bench unequivocally laid down that

every immovable property be a temple, church or mosque

etc. is liable to be acquired and a mosque does not

enjoy any additional protection which is not available

to religious places of worship of other religions.

40

42. Now, we come to paragraph 82 of the judgment which

is the sheet anchor of the submission raised by Dr.

Rajiv Dhavan. Serious objections have been raised by Dr.

Rajiv Dhavan to some observations made in paragraph 82.

Entire paragraph 82 is quoted below:

“82. The correct position may be summarised thus. Under the Mahomedan Law applicable in India, title to a mosque can be lost by adverse possession (See Mulla's Principles of Mahomedan Law, 19th Edn. by M. Hidaytullah ­ Section 217; and AIR 1940 PC 116). If that is the position in law, there can be no reason to hold that a mosque has a unique or special status, higher than that of the places of worship of other religions in secular India to make it immune from acquisition by exercise of the sovereign or prerogative power of the State. A mosque is not an essential part of the practice of the religion of Islam and Namaz (prayer) by Muslims can be offered anywhere, even in open. Accordingly, its acquisition is not prohibited by the provisions in the Constitution of India. Irrespective of the status of a mosque in an Islamic country for the purpose of immunity from acquisition by the State in exercise of the sovereign power, its status and immunity from acquisition in the secular ethos of India under the Constitution is the same and equal to that of the places of worship of the other religions, namely, church, temple etc. It is neither more nor less than that of the places of worship of the other religions. Obviously, the acquisition of any religious place is to be made only in unusual and extraordinary situations for a larger national purpose keeping in view that such acquisition should not result in extinction of the right to

41

practice the religion, if the significance of that place be such. Subject to this condition, the power of acquisition is available for a mosque like any other place of worship of any religion. The right to worship is  not at  any and every place, so long as it can be practised effectively, unless the right to worship at a particular place is itself an integral part of that right. ”

“A mosque is not an essential part of the practice of the religion of Islam and namaz(prayer) by Muslims can be offered anywhere, even in open.”

43. Dr. Dhavan submits that above observation in Para 82

of the Constitution Bench judgment in  Ismail Faruqui’s

case is the reason for reconsideration of the judgment.

He submits that the above statements in paragraph 82 are

wrong because it is wrong to say that  

(vi) A mosque is not essential to Islam.

(vii) The essential practices doctrine does not

protect places of worship other than those

having particular significance.    

44. Elaborating his submission, Dr. Dhavan relies on

several judgments of this Court where what are the

essential practice of a religion had been elaborated and

how the Court should determine the essential practice of

a religion has been noticed.   The submission is that

42

above observations were made by the Constitution Bench

on its ipse dixit without consideration of any material

due to which reason the statement is unsustainable.  

45. Before we proceed to examine the nature and content

of above statement, it is relevant to have an overview

of the law laid down by this Court with regard to

essential practices of a religion.  The locus classicus

of the subject is Constitution Bench judgment of this

Court in  Commissioner, Hindu Religious Endowments,

Madras Vs. Sri Lakshmindra Thirtha Swamiar of Sri Shirur

Mutt, AIR 1954 SC 282.   The Mathadipati of Shirur Mutt

filed a writ petition in Madras High Court challenging

various provisions of Madras Hindu Religious and

Charitable Endowments Act, 1951.   Challenge to the Act

was on various grounds including the ground that

provisions of the Act violate the fundamental right

guaranteed under Articles 25 and 26 of the Constitution

of India.   The High Court had struck down various

provisions of the Act against which appeal was filed by

the Commissioner, Hindu Religious Endowments, Madras.

Justice B.K. Mukherjea speaking for the Constitution

Bench held that it would not be correct to say that a

43

religion is nothing but a doctrine or belief.   It was

held that a religion may also lay down a code of ethical

rules for its followers and it might prescribe rituals

and observances, ceremonies and modes of worship which

are regarded as integral parts of religion.  In Para 17,

following was held:­

“17.....Religion is certainly a matter of faith with individuals or communities and it is not necessarily theistic. There are well known religions in India like Buddhism and Jainism which do not believe in God or in any Intelligent First Cause. A religion undoubtedly has its basis in a system of beliefs or doctrines which are regarded by those who profess that religion as conducive to their spiritual well being, but it would not be correct to say that religion is nothing else but a doctrine or belief. A religion may not only lay down a code of ethical rules for its followers to accept, it might prescribe rituals and observances, ceremonies and modes of worship which are regarded as integral parts of religion, and these forms and observances might extend even to matters of food and dress.”

46. Further, in Para 18, following was laid down:­

18.  The guarantee under our Constitution not only protects the freedom of religious opinion but it protects also acts done in pursuance of a religion and this is made clear by the use of the expression “practice of religion” in Article 25......”

47. The Court further held; what constitutes the

44

essential part of a religion is primarily to be

ascertained with reference to the doctrines of that

religion itself.   In Para 19, following has been laid

down:­

“19.  The contention formulated in such broad terms cannot, we think, be supported. In the first place, what constitutes the essential part of a religion is primarily to be ascertained with reference to the doctrines of that religion itself. If the tenets of any religious sect of the Hindus prescribe that offerings of food should be given to the idol at particular hours of the day, that periodical ceremonies should be performed in a certain way at certain periods of the year or that there should be daily recital of sacred texts or oblations to the sacred fire, all these would be regarded as parts of religion and the mere fact that they involve expenditure of money or employment of priests and servants or the use of marketable commodities would not make them secular activities partaking of a commercial or economic character; all of them are religious practices and should be regarded as matters of religion within the meaning of Article 26(b).  

What Article 25(2)(a) contemplates is not regulation by the State of religious practices as such, the freedom of which is guaranteed by the Constitution except when they run counter to public order, health and morality but regulation of activities which are economic, commercial or political in their character though they are associated with religious practices......”  

48. Two other judgments were delivered in the same year,

45

which had relied and referred to Madras judgment.   In

Ratilal Panachand Gandhi and Others Vs. State of Bombay

and Others, AIR 1954 SC 388, in paragraph Nos. 10 and 13

following was held:­

“10.  Article 25 of the Constitution guarantees to every person and not merely to the citizens of India, the freedom of conscience and the right freely to profess, practise and propagate religion. This is subject, in every case, to public order, health and morality. Further exceptions are engrafted upon this right by clause (2) of the article. Sub­clause (a) of clause (2) saves the power of  the State to  make  laws regulating or restricting any economic, financial, political or other secular activity which may be associated with religious practice; and sub­clause (b) reserves the State’s power to make laws providing for social reform and social welfare even though they might interfere with religious practices.  

Thus, subject to the restrictions which this article imposes, every person has a fundamental right under our Constitution not merely to entertain such religious belief as may be approved of by his judgment or conscience but to exhibit his belief and ideas in such overt acts as are enjoined or sanctioned by his religion and further to propagate his religious views for the edification of others.....

13.  Religious practices or performances of acts in pursuance of religious belief are as much a part of religion as faith or belief in particular doctrines. Thus if the tenets of the Jain or the Parsi religion lay down that

46

certain rites and ceremonies are to be performed at certain times and in a particular manner, it cannot be said that these are secular activities partaking of commercial or economic character simply because they involve expenditure of money or employment of priests or the use of marketable commodities. No outside authority has any right to say that these are not essential parts of religion and it is not open to the secular authority of the State to restrict or prohibit them in any manner they like under the guise of administering the trust estate.....”  

49. Another judgment, which followed the  Shirur Mutt

case was Sri Jagannath Ramanuj Das and Another Vs. State

of Orissa and Another, AIR 1954 SC 400. The Constitution

Bench in  Sri Venkataramana Devaru and Others Vs. State

of Mysore and Others, AIR 1958 SC 255  had occasion to

consider Articles 25 and 26 of the Constitution of India

in context of Madras Temple Entry Authorisation Act,

1947 as amended in 1949.  Referring to Shirur Mutt case,

following was stated in para 16(3):­

“16(3)....Now, the precise connotation of the expression "matters of religion" came up for consideration by this Court in The Commissioner, Hindu Religious Endowments, Madras v. Sri Lakshmindra Thirtha Swamiar of Sri Shirur Mutt (AIR 1954 SC 282), and it was held therein that it embraced not merely matters of doctrine and belief pertaining to the religion but also the practice of it, or to  put it  in  terms of  Hindu theology, not

47

merely its Gnana but also its Bakti and Karma Kandas....”   

50. Another judgment, which needs to be noticed is Mohd.

Hanif Quareshi and Others Vs. State of Bihar, AIR 1958

SC 731.   A writ petition under Article 32 was filed

questioning the validity of three legislative enactments

banning the slaughter of certain animals passed by the

States of Bihar, Uttar Pradesh and Madhya Pradesh

respectively. One of the submissions raised by the

petitioner was that banning of slaughter of cows

infringes fundamental right of petitioner to sacrifice

the cow on Bakra­Id.  The Court proceeded to dwell with

essential  practice  of the  religion  of  Islam  in  above

context.  The Court examined the material placed before

it for determining the essential practice of the

religion and made following observations in paragraph

13:­

“What then, we inquire, are the materials placed before us to substantiate the claim that the sacrifice of a cow is enjoined or sanctioned by Islam? The materials before us are extremely meagre and it is surprising that on a matter of this description the allegations in the petition should be so vague. In the Bihar Petition No. 58 of 1956 are set out the following bald allegations:

Xxxxxxxxxxxxxxx

48

We have, however, no material on the record before us which will enable us to say, in the face of the foregoing facts, that the sacrifice of a cow on that day is an obligatory overt act for a Mussalman to exhibit his religious belief and idea. In the premises, it is not possible for us to uphold this claim of the petitioners.”

51. Next case to be considered is  Sardar Syedna Taher

Saifuddin Saheb Vs. State of Bombay, AIR 1962 SC 853.

The issue raised before this Court in the above case was

regarding validity of law interfering with right of

religious denomination to excommunicate its members.

Articles 25 and 26  came to be considered in the above

context.  In paragraph 34 of the judgment, referring to

earlier decisions of this Court, main principles

underlying have been noticed, which is to the following

effect:­   

“34. The content of Articles 25 and 26 of the Constitution came up for consideration before this Court in 1954 SCR 1005 : (AIR 1954 S.C. 282); Ramanuj Das v. State of Orissa, 1954 SCR 1046 : (AIR 1954 SC 400); 1958 SCR 895 : (AIR 1958 S.C. 255); (Civil Appeal No. 272 of 1969 D/­17­3­1961 : (AIR 1961 S.C. 1402) and several other cases and the main principles underlying these provisions have by these decisions been placed beyond controversy. The first is that the protection of these articles is not limited to matters of

49

doctrine or belief, they extend also to acts done in pursuance of religion and therefore contain a guarantee for rituals and observances, ceremonies and modes of worship which are integral parts of religion. The second is that what constitutes an essential part of a religion or religious practice has to be decided by the courts with reference to the doctrine of a particular religion and include practices which are regarded by the community as a part of its religion.”

52. Next judgment to be noticed is Constitution Bench

judgment of  Tikayat Shri Govindlalji Maharaj etc. Vs.

State of Rajasthan and Others, AIR 1963 SC 1638.    The

validity of Nathdwara Temple Act, 1959 was challenged in

the Rajasthan High Court.  It was contended by Tilkayat

that the idol of Shri Shrinathji in the Nathdwara Temple

and all the properties pertaining to it were his private

properties and hence, the State Legislature was not

competent to pass the Act. It was also contended that if

the temple was held to be a public temple, then the Act

would be invalid because it contravened the fundamental

rights guaranteed to the denomination under Articles 25

and 26 of the Constitution.  Gajendragadkar, J. speaking

for the Court in Paragraphs 58 and 59 laid down

following:­

50

“58. In deciding the question as to whether a given religious practice is an integral part of the religion or not, the test always would be whether it is regarded as such by the community following the religion or not. This formula may in some cases present difficulties in its operation. Take the case of a practice in relation to food or dress. If in a given proceeding, one section of the community claims that while performing certain rites white dress is an integral part of the religion itself, whereas another section contends that yellow dress and not the white dress is the essential part of the religion, how is the Court going to decide the question? Similar disputes may arise in regard to food. In cases where conflicting evidence is produced in respect of rival contentions as to competing religious practices the Court may not be able to resolve the dispute by a blind application of the formula that the community decides which practice in an intergral part of its religion, because the community may speak with more than one voice and the formula would, therefore, break down. This question will always have to be decided by the Court and in doing so, the Court may have to enquire whether the practice in question is religious in character and if it is, whether it can be regarded as an integral or essential part of the religion, and the finding of the Court on such an issue will always depend upon the evidence adduced before it as to the conscience of the community and the tenets of its religion. It is in the light of this possible complication which may arise in some cases that this Court struck a note of caution in the case of Dungah Committee Ajmer v. Syed Hussain Ali & Ors.18 and observed that in order that the practices in question should be treated as a part of religion they must be regarded by the said religion as its essential and integral

51

part; otherwise even purely secular practices which are not an essential or an integral part of religion are apt to be clothed with a religious form and may make a claim for being treated as religious practices within the meaning of Article 26.

59. In this connection, it cannot be ignored that what is protected under Articles 25(1) and 26(b) respectively are the religious practices and the right to manage affairs in matters of religion. If the practice in question is purely secular or the affair which is controlled by the statute is essentially and absolutely secular in character, it cannot be urged that Article 25(1) or Article 26(b) has been contravened. The protection is given to the practice of religion and to the denomination’s right to manage its own affairs in matters of religion. Therefore, whenever a claim is made on behalf of an individual citizen that the impugned statute contravenes his fundamental right to practise religion or a claim is made on behalf of the denomination that the fundamental right guaranteed to it to manage its own affairs in matters of religion is contravened, it is necessary to consider whether the practice in question is religious or the affairs in respect of which the right of management is alleged to have been contravened are affairs in matters of religion. If the practice is a religious practice or the affairs are the affairs in matter of religion, then, of course, the right guaranteed by Article 25(1) and Article 26 (b) cannot be contravened.”

53. The above decisions of this Court clearly lay down

that the question as to whether particular religious

52

practice is essential or integral part of the religion

is a question, which has to be considered by considering

the doctrine, tenets and beliefs of the religion.  What

Dr. Dhavan contends is that Constitution Bench in Ismail

Faruqui’s case without there being any consideration of

essentiality of a religion have made the questionable

observations in paragraph 82 as noticed above.   

54. We have to examine the observations made in

paragraph 82 of the Constitution Bench judgment in the

light of the above submission, law and the precedents as

noticed above.  The statement “a mosque is not essential

part of the practice of religion…..” is a statement

which has been made by the Constitution Bench in

specific context and reference.  The context for making

the above observation was claim of immunity of a mosque

from acquisition.  Whether every mosque is the essential

part of the practice of religion of Islam, acquisition

of which  ipso facto  may violate the rights under

Articles 25 and 26, was the question which had cropped

up for consideration before the Constitution Bench.

Thus, the statement that a mosque is not an essential

part of the practice of religion of Islam is in context

53

of issue as to whether the mosque, which was acquired by

Act, 1993 had immunity from acquisition.     

55. The above observation by the Constitution Bench has

been made to emphasise that there is no immunity of the

mosque from the acquisition. We have noticed that

Constitution Bench had held that while offer of prayer

or worship is a religious practice, its offering at

every location where such prayers can be offered would

not be an essential or integral part of such religious

practice unless the place has a particular significance

for that religion so as to form an essential or integral

part thereof. The above observation made in paragraph 78

has to be read along with observation made in paragraph

82. What Court meant was that unless the place of

offering of prayer has a particular significance so that

any hindrance to worship   may violate right under

Articles 25 and 26, any hindrance to offering of prayer

at any place shall not affect right under Articles 25

and 26. The observation as made in paragraph 82 as

quoted above has to be understood with the further

observation made in the same paragraph where this Court

held:

54

“82....Obviously, the acquisition of any religious place is to be made only in unusual and extraordinary situations for a larger national purpose keeping in view that such acquisition should not result in extinction of the right to practice the religion, if the significance of that place be such. Subject to this condition, the power of acquisition is available for a mosque like any other place of worship of any religion. The right to worship is not at any and every place, so long as it can be practised effectively, unless the right to worship at a particular place is itself an integral part of that right. ”

56. The Court held that if the place where offering of

namaz is a place of particular significance, acquisition

of which may lead to the extinction of the right to

practice  of the  religion,  only in  that condition  the

acquisition is not permissible and subject to this

condition, the power of acquisition is available for a

mosque like any other place of worship of any religion.

Thus, observation made in paragraph 82 that mosque is

not an essential part of the practice of the religion of

Islam and namaz even in open can be made was made in

reference to the argument of the petitioners regarding

immunity of mosque from acquisition.

57. The submission which was pressed before the

Constitution Bench was that there is no power in the

55

State to acquire any mosque, irrespective of its

significance to practice of the religion of Islam. The

said contention has been noticed in paragraph 65 of the

judgment as extracted above.   

58. The sentence “A mosque is not essential part of the

practice of the religion of Islam and namaz(prayer) by

Muslims can be offered anywhere, even in open” is

followed immediately by the next sentence that is

“Accordingly, its acquisition is not prohibited by the

provisions in the Constitution of India” which makes it

amply clear that the above sentence was confined to the

question of immunity from acquisition of a mosque which

was canvassed before the Court. First sentence cannot be

read divorced from the second sentence which immediately

followed the first sentence.  

59. No arguments having been raised before the

Constitution Bench that Ram Janam Bhumi­Babri Masjid is

a mosque of a particular significance, acquisition of

which shall extinct the right of practice of the

religion, the Court had come to the conclusion that by

acquisition of mosque rights under Articles 25 and 26

are  not  infringed.   We  conclude  that  observations  as

56

made by the Constitution Bench in paragraphs 78 and 82

which have been questioned by the petitioners were

observations made in reference to acquisition of place

of worship and has to confine to the issue of

acquisition of place of worship only. The observation

need not be read broadly to hold that a mosque can never

be an essential part of the practice of the religion of

Islam.

"Comparative significance” & “Particular significance”.

60. Dr. Rajiv Dhavan submits that the Constitution Bench

has entered into the comparative significance of both

the places that is birth place of Ram for Hindus and Ram

Janam Bhumi­Babri Masjid for Muslims. He submits that

India is a secular country and all religions have to be

treated equal and the Court by entering into comparative

significance concept has lost sight of the secular

principles which are embedded in the Constitution of

India. It is true that the Constitution Bench has used

phrase “comparative significance” but comparative

significance of both the communities were noticed only

to highlight the significance of place which is claimed

by both the parties and to emphasise that the impact of

57

acquisition is equally on the  right and interest of the

Hindu community as well as Muslim community. In

paragraph 51 of the judgment following has been noticed:

“51. It may also be mentioned that even as Ayodhya is said to be of particular significance to the Hindus as a place of pilgrimage because of the ancient belief that Lord Rama was born there, the mosque was of significance for the Muslim community as an ancient mosque built by Mir Baqi in 1528 A.D. As a mosque, it was a religious place of worship by the Muslims. This indicates the comparative significance of the disputed site to the two communities and also that the impact of acquisition is equally on the right and interest of the Hindu community. Mention of this aspect is made only in the context of the argument that the statute as a whole, not merely Section 7 thereof, is anti­secular being slanted in favour of the Hindus and against the Muslims. ”

61. Dr. Dhavan has also taken exception to the phrase

'particular significance' as is occurring in the

Constitution Bench judgment. He submits that all

religions are equal and have to be equally respected by

all including the State. All mosques, all churches and

all temples are equally significant for the communities

practicing and professing such religions. The concept

that some places are of particular significance is

itself faulty. We have bestowed our consideration to the

58

above aspect of the matter. We have already noticed that

the Constitution Bench held that acquisition is a

sovereign or prerogative power of the State to acquire

property and all religious places, namely, church,

mosque, temple etc. are liable to be acquired in

exercise of right of eminent domain of the State. The

Constitution Bench also observed that acquisition of

place of religious worship like church, mosque etc. per

se does not violate rights under Articles 25 and 26. The

Court, however, has noticed one fetter on such

acquisition. The Constitution Bench held that if a

particular place is of such significance for that

religion that worship at such place is an essential

religious practice and the extinction of such place may

breach  their right of  Article  25,  the  acquisition  of

such  place  is  not  permissible. A  place of  particular

significance has been noticed by the Constitution Bench

in  the  above  context.  When  acquisition  of such  place

results in extinction of the right to practice the

religion, there is violation of Article 25, which was an

exception laid by the Constitution Bench while laying

down general proposition that acquisition of all places

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of  worship  is  permissible.  Thus,  no exception  can  be

taken to the Constitution Bench having used expression

'place of particular significance' for carving out an

exception  to  the  general  power of  acquisition  of  the

State of religious places like church, mosque and temple

or gurudwara. The above exception carved out by the

Constitution Bench is to protect the constitutional

right guaranteed under Article 25.

'Particular significance' of place of birth of Lord Rama

62. Dr. Dhavan  has taken  exception  to  observation  of

Constitution Bench, where, place of birth of Lord Rama,

has been held to be of particular significance.   He

submits that the above observation was uncalled for

since there cannot be any comparison between two

religions. We have observed above that phrase

“particular significance” was used by the Constitution

Bench only in context of immunity from acquisition. What

the Court held was that if a religious place has a

particular significance, the acquisition of it  ipso

facto  violates the right of religion under Articles 25

and 26, hence the said place of worship has immunity

from acquisition.   It is another matter that the place

60

of birth of Lord Rama is referred as sacred place for

Hindu community, which has been pleaded throughout. In

any view of the matter acquisition under Act, 1993

having been upheld, the use of expression “particular

significance” has lost all its significance for decision

of the suits and the appeals.

RES­JUDICATA

63. Shri Parasaran submits that appellants are precluded

from questioning the  Ismail Faruqui’s  judgment. The

petitioner in  Ismail Faruqui’s case  represented the

right of the Muslim public, hence, all persons

interested in such rights for the purposes of Section 11

be deemed to claim under the persons so litigating and

are barred by res­judicata in view of Explanation VI to

Section  11,  CPC.  He further  submits  that  judgment  in

Ismail Faruqui’s case  is part of the judgment in the

suit itself, in view of the fact that IA in suits were

transferred and decided alongwith petitions under

Article 32. The appellants are thus clearly bound by the

judgment in Ismail Faruqui’s case.  

64. Dr. Dhavan replying the submissions of Shri

Parasaran submits that Ismail Faruqui’s case was about a

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challenge to the Act,1993, the Presidential reference

and further as to whether in the light of Act, 1993 the

suits abated due to Section 4(3) of the Act. The cases

under appeal are from suits where the issues are

entirely different. The suits having never been

transferred to be decided with  Ismail Faruqui’s case,

the decision rendered in Ismail Faruqui’s case cannot be

said to be part of the judgment in suits. He submits

that the issues which were raised in  Ismail  Faruqui’s

case  were not the issues which are directly and

substantially in issue in the suits. He further submits

that  res judicata  is not attracted in the present

proceedings.

65. The principle of  res judicata  as contained in

Section 11 of Civil Procedure Code as well as the

general principles are well settled by several judgments

of this Court. For applicability of the principle of res

judicata  there are several essential conditions which

need to be fulfilled. Shri Parasaran, in support of his

submission, states that the parties in Ismail Faruqui’s

case  represented the interest of Muslim community and

those petitioners bonafidely litigated in respect of

62

public rights, hence, all persons interested in such

rights be deemed to claim under the person so

lititgating attracting the applicability of Explanation

VI of Section 11, CPC. He placed reliance on judgment of

this Court in  Ahmed Adam Sait & others versus

Inayathullah Mekhri & others, 1964 (2) SCR 647.  In the

above case, in suit under Section 92, CPC, a scheme had

already been framed by Court of Competent Jurisdiction.

Another suit was instituted under Section 92 of CPC

praying for settling a scheme for proper administration

of the Jumma Masjid. The plea of res judicata was urged.

Upholding the plea of  res judicata, following was laid

down:­

“... In assessing the validity of this argument, it is necessary to consider the basis of the decisions that a decree passed in a suit under s.92 binds all parties. The basis of this view is that a suit under s.92 is a representative suit and is brought with the necessary sanction required by it on behalf of all the beneficiaries interested in the Trust. The said section authorises two or more persons having an interest in the Trust to file a suit for claiming one or more of the reliefs specified in clauses (a) to (h) of sub­section (1) after consent in writing there prescribed has been obtained. Thus, when a suit is brought under s.92, it is brought by two or more persons interested in the Trust who have taken upon themselves the

63

responsibility of representing all the beneficiaries of the Trust. In such a suit, though all the beneficiaries may not be expressly impleaded, the action is instituted on their behalf and relief is claimed in a representative character. This position immediately attracts the provisions of explanation VI to s.11 of the Code. Explanation VI provides that where persons litigate bona fide in respect of a public right or of a private right claimed in common for themselves and others, all persons interested in such right shall, for the purposes of this section, be deemed to claim under the persons so litigating. It is clear that s.11 read with its explanation VI leads to the result that a decree passed in a suit instituted by persons to which explanation VI applies will  bar further  claims by persons interested in the same right in respect of which the prior suit had been instituted. Explanation VI thus illustrates one aspect of constructive res judicata. Where a representative suit is brought under s.92 and a decree is passed in such a suit, law assumes that all persons who have the same interest as the plaintiffs in the representative suit were represented by the said plaintiffs and, therefore, are constructively barred by res judicata from reagitating the matters directly and substantially in  issue in the said earlier suit.”

66. Learned Counsel for both the parties have referred

to  and  relied  on  Constitution  Bench  Judgment  of this

Court in  Gulabchand Chhotalal Parikh versus State of

Gujarat, AIR 1965 SC 1153. Whether a decision of High

64

Court on merits on certain matters after contest in a

writ petition under Article 226 of the Constitution

operates as res judicata in regular suit with respect to

the same matter between the same party was the issue

considered by this court. This Court after referring to

almost all relevant judgments on the subjects laid down

following in paragraphs 60 and 61:­

”60. As a result of the above discussion, we are of opinion that the provisions of S.11, C.P.C., are not exhaustive with respect to an earlier decision operating as res judicata between the same parties on the same matter in controversy in a subsequent regular suit and that on the general principle of res judicata, any previous decision on a matter in controversy, decided after full contest or after affording fair opportunity to the parties to prove their case by a Court competent to decide it, will operate as res judicata in a subsequent regular suit. It is not necessary that the Court deciding the matter formerly be competent  to  decide the subsequent suit or that the former proceeding and the subsequent suit have the same subject­matter. The nature of the former proceeding is immaterial.

61. We do not see any good reason to preclude such decisions on matters in controversy in writ proceedings under Arts. 226 and 32 of the Constitution from operating as res judicata in subsequent regular suits on the same matters in controversy between the same parties and thus to give limited effect to the principle of  the finality of  decisions after full contest. We therefore, hold that, on the general principle of res judicata, the

65

decision of the High Court on a writ petition under Art.226 on the merits on a matter after contest will operate as res judicata in a subsequent regular suit between the same parties with respect to the same matter.”

67. In Daryao and others versus State of U.P. & others,

AIR 1961 SC 1457,  this Court held that on general

consideration of public policy there seems to be no

reason by which the rule of  res judicata  should be

treated as not admissible or irrelevant in deciding writ

petition filed under Article 32.  

68. A Constitution Bench of this Court in Sheodan Singh

versus Daryao Kunwar, AIR 1966 SC 1332,  after

elaborately considering the principles underlined under

Section 11 of the CPC, held that there are five

essential conditions which must be satisfied before plea

of  res judicata  can be pressed. In paragraph 9 of the

judgment, the conditions have been enumerated which are

to the following effect:­  

”9. A plain reading  of S.11  shows  that to constitute a matter res judicata, the following conditions must be satisfied, namely ­(I) The matter directly and substantially in issue in the subsequent suit or issue must be the same matter which was directly  and substantially in issue in the

66

formar suit; (II) The former suit must have been a suit between the same parties or between parties under whom they or any of them claim; (III) The parties must have litigated under the same title in the former suit; (IV) The court which decided the former suit must be a Court competent to try the subsequent suit or the suit in which such issue is subsequently raised; and (V) The matter directly and substantially in issue in the subsequent suit must have been heard and finally decided by the Court in the first suit. Further Explanation I shows that it is not the date on which the suit is decided, so that even if a suit was filed later, it will be a former suit if it has been decided earlier. In order therefore that the decision in the earlier two appeals dismissed by the High Court operates as res judicata it will have to be seen whether all the five conditions mentioned above have been satisfied.”

69. One of the submissions put on forefront by Dr.

Dhavan is that issues which were involved in  Ismail

Faruqui’s  case  are not  issues  which  are  directly and

substantially involved in the suits giving rise to these

appeals, hence, the plea of res judicata should fail on

this ground alone. One of the conditions as enumerated

by  this Court  in  Sheodan  Singh’s  case(supra)  is that

“the matter directly and substantially in issue, in

subsequent suit must have been heard and finally decided

by the Court in the first suit.” Dr. Dhavan elaborating

67

the principle of directly and substatially in issue has

relied on judgment of this court in Sajjadanashin Sayed

vs. Musa Dadabhai Ummer, (2000) 3 SCC 350. This Court

while considering the condition of “directly and

substantially in issue” in reference to Section 11 laid

down following principles in paragraph 12, 13 & 14:­  

”12. It will be noticed that the words used in Section 11 CPC are “directly and substantially in issue”. If the matter was in issue directly and substantially in a prior litigation and decided against a party then the decision would be res judicata in a subsequent proceeding. Judicial decisions have however held that if a matter was only “collaterally or incidentally” in issue and decided in an earlier proceeding, the finding therein would not ordinarily be res judicata in a latter proceeding where the matter is directly and substantially in issue.  

13. As pointed out in Halsbury’s Law of England(Vol.16, para 1538, 4th  edition), the fundamental rule is that a judgment is not conclusive if any matter came collaterally in question[R.v.knaptoft Inhabitants; Heptulla Bros. v. Thakore WLR at p.297(PC)]; or if any matter was incidentally cognizable [Sanders(otherwise Saunders)v. Sanders (otherwise Saunders) All ER at p.771].

14. A collateral or incidental issue is one that is ancillary to a direct and substantive issue; the former is an auxillary issue and the latter the principal issue. The expression “collaterally or incidentally” in issue implies that there  is  another matter which is “directly and substantially” in issue(Mulla’s Civil Procedure Code, 15th

68

edn.,p.104).

Difficulty in distinguishing whether a matter was directly in issue or collaterally or incidentally in issue and tests laid down in various courts.  

70. In  Mahila Bajrangi(dead) through Lrs. versus

Badribai w/o Jagannath and another, (2003) 2 SCC 464,

above principle was reiterated in following words in

paragraph 6 which is to the following effect:­

”6.....That apart, it is always the decision on an issue that has been directly and substantially in issue in the former suit between the same parties which has been heard and finally decided that is considered to operate as res judicata and not merely any finding on every incident or collateral question to arrive at such a decision that would constitute res judicata.”

71. The impugned judgment has also categorically held

that issues, which have been raised in the suits are not

the issues, which can be said to have been noticed and

adjudicated by this court in Ismail Faruqui’s case. The

High Court has clearly held that the authority of the

Superior Court laying down a law is binding on the

courts below provided a matter has been decided by the

court.  In Para 4054, following has been held:­

69

“4054.   The mere fact that some facts have been noticed by the Government of India in White Paper and those facts have simply been noticed by the Apex Court while referring to the facts mentioned in the White Paper, it cannot be said that those facts can be construed as if they have been accepted by the Apex Court to be correct and stand adjudicated. The law of precedent is well known. The authority of the superior Court laying down a law is binding on the Courts below provided a matter has been decided by the Court. An issue can be considered to be decided by a superior Court when it was raised, argued and decided and only then it is a binding precedent for the other courts.”

72. We have noticed above that the issues which were

involved in Ismail Faruqui’s case were validity of Act,

1993. One of the issues which was taken up by  Ismail

Faruqui’s case was as to whether by virtue of Section 4

sub­section (3) of Act, 1993 suits pending in Allahabad

High Court stands abated. The Presidential Reference

No.1 of 1993 was also heard along with the writ

petitions and transferred cases. The issues which have

been framed in the suits giving rise to these appeals

are different issues which cannot be said to be directly

and substantially in issue in  Ismail Faruqui’s case.

Non­fulfilment of this condition itself is sufficient to

reject the plea of  res judicata  as raised by Shri

70

Parasaran.  

73. We may further notice submissions of Shri Parasaran

that IA which was filed in the suit was also taken up

along with the  Ismail Faruqui’s case,  hence, the

judgment rendered in  Ismail Faruqui’s case  shall be

treated to be the part of judgment in the suits which

preclude the appellant to reagitate the same issue. For

appreciating the above submissions we need to look into

as to what matters were before this Court in  Ismail

Faruqui’s case.

74. The Act, 1993 was preceded by an ordinance which was

issued on 07.01.1993. Section 4(3) of the Ordinance

contemplated that suit, appeal or other proceeding in

respect of right, title or interest having to any

property vested in Central Government under Section 3

shall abate. After the ordinance plaintiff had applied

for amendment of plaints challenging the legality and

validity of the Ordinance. High Court in the suits

framed the issue namely “whether the suits have abated

or survive”. Many writ petitions were also filed in the

High Court challenging the Ordinance.  Writ Petition

No.208 of 1993, Mohd. Aslam versus Union of India & Ors.

71

was also filed under Article 32 in this Court. The Union

of India had filed transfer petitions under Article 139A

for transferring of writ petitions filed in Allahabad

High Court. By an Order dated 24.09.1993 passed in Union

of India & Others versus Dr. M.Ismail Faruqui and

others, (1994) 1 SCC 265,  this Court allowed the

transfer application transferring five writ petitions to

be heard alongwith the Presidential Reference and writ

petitions filed under Article 32. The preliminary issue

which was framed by the High Court in both the suits was

stayed. It is useful to extract paragraph 4 and 7 of the

order:­  

“4.  After the issuance of the Ordinance it appears that in the pending suits renumbered O.O.S. Nos. 3 and 4 of 1989 the plaintiffs applied for amendment of the plaints challenging the legality and validity of the Ordinance by which the suits abated. The Full Bench of the High Court heard the said applications and passed an order on March 15, 1993. By the said order the High Court framed the question ‘whether the suit has abated or survives’ and since the said issue necessarily touched upon the validity of the Ordinance, the Court  ordered  notice to the Attorney General and listed the case for hearing of the issue on April 26, 1993. Although this order was passed in Suit O.O.S. No. 4 of 1989, it was also to govern the amendment application in Suit O.O.S. No. 3 of 1989. It also appears that in the meantime as

72

many as five Writ Petition Nos. 552, 925, 1351, 1532 and 1809 of 1993 came to be filed in the High Court challenging the validity of the Ordinance, now the Act. Besides these proceedings in the High Court a Writ Petition No. 208 of 1993 also came to be filed in this Court under Article 32 of the Constitution challenging the legality and validity of the very same law.

7.  In the result, we allow this application by ordering the withdrawal of the five Writ Petition Nos. 552, 925, 1351, 1532 and 1809 of 1993 to this Court to be heard along with the Presidential reference and Writ Petition No. 208 of 1993 pending in this Court. The hearing of the preliminary issue  framed by the High Court ‘whether the suit has abated or survives’ in both the suits will stand stayed till further orders. In order to expedite the hearing we direct as under:”

75. From the above, it is clear that suits which were

pending in the High Court were never transferred to be

heard alongwith Presidential Reference and writ petition

filed under Article 32. This Court had only stayed the

hearing of preliminary issue framed by the High Court as

to whether the suits have abated or survive. It is also

relevant to notice that in Special Reference No. 1 of

1993, individual notices were issued to the parties to

the proceeding which stood abated by virtue of Section

4(3) of the Ordinance but mere issuance of notice when

the suits were not transferred by this Court to be heard

73

alongwith Presidential Reference is not sufficient to

conclude that the judgment of  Ismail Faruqui  should be

treated as part of judgment in suits. We, thus, also do

not accept the submissions of Shri Parasaran that

judgment of Ismail Faruqui  is part of the judgment in

the suit itself. We, thus, do not find any substance in

the above submissions raised by Shri Parasaran.

Reliance on the judgment of Ismail Faruqui

76. Dr. Dhavan submits that  Ismail Faruqui’s  judgment

goes to the core of the issues in these appeals and it

permeates throughout the impugned judgment in the suits.

He submits that observations concerning comparative

significance of the disputed site and the observation

that a mosque is not an essential part of the practice

of the religion of Islam, have permeated the impugned

judgment as the Hindu parties have successfully claimed

that the disputed site, which is allegedly the

birthplace of Lord Ram is protected by Articles 25 and

26.  Dr. Dhavan has referred to various observations of

the HIGH Court in the impugned judgment to support his

submission.  He  has  also  referred  to  various  grounds

74

taken in the appeals filed against the judgment of the

High Court.

77. Shri Parasaran and Shri Tushar Mehta refuting the

above submission contend that even if the judgment of

Ismail Faruqui has been referred to in the submission of

the counsel for the parties before the High Court and

has been noticed in the impugned judgment, the impugned

judgment in no way is affected by the observations made

in Ismail Faruqui’s case.   

78. It is relevant to notice some of the observations

made by the High Court in the impugned judgment and

certain grounds taken in some of the appeals, which are

before us. Justice S.U.Khan referring to  Ismail

Faruqui’s  case in his judgment made following

observations:­

“A mosque even if its construction remains as a mosque cannot be treated to be mosque if no prayers are offered in it and it is in the possession, occupation and use of non­Muslims as held by the Privy Council in Mosque known as Masjid Shahid Ganj Vs. S.G.P.C. Amritsar, AIR 1940 P.C. 116 approved in Dr. M. Ismail Farooqi Vs. Union of India, 1994 (6) S.C.C. 360. Accordingly, unless it is proved that prayers were being offered in the premises in dispute, or the Hindus had not exclusively possessed the constructed portion and inner court yard it cannot be held to be a mosque

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or a continuing mosque uptil 22nd/ 23rd December, 1949. The case set up and the argument of some of the Hindu parties that till 1855 no prayers (Namaz) were offered in the mosque  is not at  all acceptable.  If  a mosque is referred to as mosque in several gazetteers, books etc. and nothing else is said then it means that it is a mosque in use as such. A defunct mosque where prayers are not at all offered, whenever mentioned as mosque, is bound to be further qualified as defunct and not in use. If construction of mosque could not be obstructed, how offering of prayer in it could be obstructed. Moreover, there was absolutely no sense in dividing the premises in dispute by railing in 1856 or 1857 if Muslims were not offering Namaz in the constructed portion till then. In the riot of 1855 seventy Muslims were killed while taking shelter in the premises in dispute. After such a huge defeat Namaz could not be for the first time started thereat.”  

79. Justice Sudhir Agarwal in his judgment has also

noticed  Ismail Faruqui’s  case.   Dr. Dhavan referred to

the submissions made by Shri Ravi Shankar Prasad in

Paras 3501 and 3502 of the impugned judgment:­

“3501.  Sri Prasad argued that belief of Hindus that Lord Ram as incarnation of Vishnu having born at Ayodhya forms an integral part of Hindu religion which cannot be denied to be practised, observed and performed by them and refers to Commissioner of Police and others v. Acharya Jagadishwarananda Avadhuta and another, (2004) 12 SCC 770 (para 9) and Sri Adi Visheshwara of Kashi Vishwanath Temple, Varanasi (supra). In order to show

76

what constitutes public order under Article 25 of the Constitution, he also placed reliance on Dalbir Singh and others v. State of Punjab, AIR 1962 SC 1106 (para 8).

3502.  Next he submits that applying the doctrine of Eminent Domain, the place in dispute, having special significance for Hindus, cannot be touched at all either by any particular person or even by State and the provisions of even acquisition would not apply to it though with respect to the alleged mosque, it has been already held and observed by the Apex Court that the disputed building could not be shown to be of any special significance to Muslims. He refers to Dr. M. Ismail Faruqui and others v. Union of India and others, (1994) 6 SCC 360 (para 65, 72, 75 and 96); Acharya Maharajshri Narendra Prasadji Anandprasadji Maharaj and others v. State of Gujarat and others, (1975) 1 SCC 11. The relief sought by the plaintiff (Suit­4) is barred by Section 34 Specific Reliefs Act, 1963 and reliance is placed on Executive Committee of Vaish Degree College, Shamli and others v. Lakshmi Narain and others, (1976) 2 SCC 58 (para 20 and 27); American Express Bank Ltd. v. Calcutta Steel Co. and others, (1993) 2 SCC 199 (pare 22).”

80. Justice Sudhir Agarwal has noticed Ismail Faruqui’s

case in Para 2723 in following manner:­

“2723. In Ismail Farooqui (supra), Supreme Court has considered the plea of validity of acquisition of land under Land Acquisition Act that once a waqf of mosque is created, the property vests in almighty and it always remain a waqf hence such a property cannot be acquired. While negativing this plea, the Apex Court said that a plea in regard to general religious purposes cannot

77

be said to be an integral part of religion which will deprive the worshippers of the right of worship at any other place and therefore, such a property can be acquired by the State. However, the position would be otherwise if the religious property would have been of special significance and cannot be one of several such kind of properties. It will be useful to reproduce the relevant observation in this regard:

“78. lt appears from various decisions rendered by this Court, referred later, that subject to the protection under Articles 25 and 26 of the Constitution, places of religious worship like mosques, churches, temples etc. can be acquired under the State’s sovereign power of acquisition. Such acquisition per se does not violate either Article 25 or Article 26 of the Constitution. The decisions relating to taking over of the management have no bearing on the sovereign power of the State to acquire property.”

“82. While offer of prayer or worship is a religious practice, its offering at every location where such prayers can be offered would not be an essential or integral part of such religious practice unless the place has a particular significance for that religion so as to form an essential or integral part thereof. Places of worship of any religion having particular significance for that religion, to make it an essential or integral part of the religion, stand on a different footing and have to be treated differently and more reverentially.”

81. There are references of judgments of  Ismail

Faruqui’s  case in various other places in the judgment

of Justice Sudhir Agarwal like Para 5 in the judgment

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where it has been observed that area of the land in

dispute, which is to be adjudicated by this Court (High

Court) is now restricted to what has been referred to in

Ismail Faruqui’s  case.   Para 5 of the judgment is as

follows:­

“5.   In view of the decision of the Apex Court in Dr. M. Ismail Faruqui etc. v. Union of India and others, (1994) 6 SCC  360 : AIR 1995 SC 605, the area of land in dispute which is to be adjudicated by this Court is now restricted to what has been referred to in para 4 above, i.e. main roofed structure, the inner Courtyard and the outer Courtyard. In fact, the area under the roofed structure and Sahan, for the purpose of convenience shall be referred hereinafter as “inner Courtyard” and rest as the “outer Courtyard”. Broadly, the measurement of the disputed area is about 130X80 sq. feet.”

82. Dr. Dhavan, in his written submissions, has

mentioned details of several other places, where Justice

Sudhir Agarwal has referred to Ismail Faruqui’s case in

the impugned judgment.   

83. Justice Dharam Veer Sharma, while giving a

dissenting judgment has referred to submission of

parties in Ismail Faruqui’s case at Paras 3038 and 3039

of Volume III, following observations have been made

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while considering the Issue No.19(d):­

“On behalf of defendants it is contended that the building in question was not a mosque under the Islamic Law.   It is not disputed that the structure has already been demolished on 6.12.1992.  According to Dr. M. Ismail Faruqui and others v. Union of India and others, (1994) 6 SCC 360, the Hon’ble Apex Court held at para 70 that the sacred character of the mosque can also be lost. According to the tenets of Islam, minarets are required to give Azan.  There cannot be a public place of worship in mosque in which Provision of Azan is not available, hence the disputed structure cannot be deemed to be a mosque.”

84. Further, Justice Dharam Veer Sharma while noticing

submission of Shri H.S. Jain has observed as follows:­

“Shri H.S. Jain, advocate relied upon para 78 of Ismail Faruqui’s judgment to argue that since birth place of Lord Ram was considered as a place of worship which was integral part of religious practice of Hindu from times immemorial.   The deity stood on a different footing and had to be treated reverentially.”

85. Justice Sharma has observed that, in para 78 of the

Ismail Faruqui’s judgment, the Apex Court held that the

place of birth has a particular significance for Hindus

and should be treated on a different footing. At page

3455, following observations have been made by Justice

Sharma while referring to Ismail Faruqui’s case:­

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“Hon'ble Apex Court upheld the validity of provisions of Acquisition of Certain Area at Ayodhya, 1993 in Dr. Ismail Faruqui case (supra) and held that the Central Government can acquire any place of worship. At para­78 Apex Court held that the place of birth has a particular significance for Hindus and it should be treated on different footing, which reads as under:  

“78. While offer of prayer or worship is a religious practice, its offering at every location where such prayers can be offered would not be an essential or integral part of such religious practice unless the place has a particular significance for that religion so as to form an essential or integral part thereof. Places of worship of any religion having particular significance for that religion, to make it an essential or integral part of the religion, stand on a different footing and have to be treated differently and more reverentially.”

On behalf of Hindus it is urged that the plaintiffs are not entitled for the relief claimed and as such the relief is barred by the provisions of Section 42 of the Specific Relief Act, 1877 which is at par with Section 34 of the Specific Relief Act,1963 on the ground that they have superior fundamental rights. Contentions of Hindus are as under:

The Hindus have superior fundamental right than the Muslims under articles 25 & 26 of the Constitution of India for the reasons that performing customary rituals and offering services worship to the lord of universe to acquire merit and to get salvation as such it is integral part of Hindu Dharma & religion in view whereof it is humbly submitted that the instant suit is liable to be dismissed with exemplary cost:”

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86. Dr. Dhavan further submits that Justice Sharma has

relied on submissions advanced by Shri P.N. Mishra, who

had relied on paragraphs 77, 78, 80 and 82 of  Ismail

Faruqui’s  case. Dr. Dhavan has also referred to

submission of Shri Ravi Shankar Prasad, which was

noticed by Justice Sharma that the right of Hindus to

worship at the Rama Janam Bhumi, continuing since times

immemorial was an integral part of their religious right

and faith and was also  sanctified by  judicial orders

since 1949.   This right has concretised and has to be

protected.  

87. Although Dr. Dhavan has referred to various passages

from impugned judgment, where reference has been made of

Ismail Faruqui’s case but main paragraphs where findings

have been returned in reference to Ismail Faruqui’s case

are Paragraphs 4049 to 4054 (Vol. II) of judgment of

Justice Sudhir Agarwal, as has been pointed out by Shri

Tushar Mehta, learned Additional Solicitor General.

88. Paragraphs 4049 and 4050 are to the following

effect:­

“4049.  Some of the learned counsel for the

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parties sought to rely on the Constitution Bench decision in Dr. M. Ismail Faruqui (supra) by reading certain passages in a manner as if the Apex Court has expressed its opinion on certain aspects which are contentious issues before this Court in the suits pending before us and said that the said observations are binding on this Court and, therefore, those aspects cannot be looked into.

4050.  Sri Iyer, Senior Advocate sought to read the aforesaid judgement where the contents of the White Paper issued by the Central Government quoted to suggest that these are the findings of the Government of India having taken note by the Apex Court and, therefore, should be treated to be concluded. It is suggested that the issues, if any, in those matters should be deemed to be concluded by the judgement of the Apex Court.”

89. The above submission was noted and expressly

rejected by the High Court in Paragraph 4051, which is

to the following effect:­

“4051.  We, however, find no force in the submission. The Constitution Bench considered the validity of Ayodhya Act, 1993 whereby certain land at Ayodhya including the land which was subject matter in these suits sought to be acquired by the Government of India. Further, the Apex Court was considering the special reference made by the President of India on 7th January, 1993 under Article 143 of the Constitution seeking opinion of the Apex Court on the following question: "Whether a Hindu temple or any Hindu religious structure existing prior to the construction of Ram Janma Bhumi­Babari

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Masjid (including the premises of the inner and outer courtyard of said structure) in the area on which the structure stood."

90. The High Court has clearly held that mentioning of

certain facts in  Ismail  Faruqui’s  case does not mean

that those facts stood adjudicated by this Court for the

reason that those facts were neither in issue before the

Supreme Court nor had been adjudicated.   The relevant

discussion in the above context is contained in

Paragraph 4053, which is to the following effect:­

“4053.   It is in this context that certain facts place on record are mentioned therein but it cannot be said that those facts stood adjudicated by the Apex Court for the reason that those facts neither were in issue before the Court nor actually have been adjudicated. The only one question which has specifically been considered and decided that was necessary in the light of challenge thrown to the power of acquisition of land over which a mosque existing. It appears that pro­mosque parties raised a contention that a mosque cannot be acquired because of special status in Mohammedan Law irrespective of its significance to practice of the religion of Islam. This argument in the context of acquisition of land was considered from para 68 (AIR) and onwards in the judgement. The Court has held that the right to worship of Muslims in a mosque and Hindus in a temple was recognised only as a civil right in British India. Relying on the Full Bench decision of Lahore High Court in Mosque Known as Masjid Shahid Ganj Vs. Shiromani Gurdwara Prabandhak Committee, Amritsar, AIR 1938

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Lahore 369 where it was held that a mosque if adversely possessed by non muslims it will loose its sacred character as mosque, the Apex Court held that, "the view that once a consecrated mosque, it remains always a place of worship as a mosque was not the Mahomedan Law of India as approved by Indian Courts." The Lahore High Court also held that, "a mosque in India was an immovable property and the right of worship at a particular place is lost when the right to property on which it stands is lost by adverse possession." Both these views were approved by the Privy Council and the Apex Court followed the said view.   Besides, independently also the Court took the view that the sovereign power of the State empowers it to acquire property. It is a right inherent in every sovereign to take an appropriate private property belonging to individual citizens for public use.   This right is described as eminent domain in American Law and is like the power of taxation of offering of political necessity and is supposed to be based upon an implied reservation by the Government that private property acquired by its citizens under its protection  may be  taken or  its use can be controlled for public benefit irrespective of the wishes of the owner. The Court also considered the right of worship whether a fundamental right enshrined under Article 25 or 26 of the Constitution and observed, "while offer of prayer or worship is a religious practice, its offering at every location where such prayers can be offered would not be an essential or integral part of such religious practice unless the place has a particular significance for that religion so as to form an essential or integral part thereof. Places of worship of any religion having particular significance for that religion, to make it an essential or integral part of the religion, stand on a different footing and have to be treated differently

85

and more reverentially".   Ultimately the law has been laid down by the Constitution Bench by majority that under the Mohammedan Law applicable in India title to a mosque can be lost by adverse possession. If that is the position in law, there can be no reason to hold  that a mosque  as  a unique  or  special status, higher than that of the places of worship of other religions in secular India to make it immune from acquisition by exercise of the sovereign or prerogative power of the State. A mosque is not an essential part of the practice of religion of Islam and namaz (prayer) by Muslims can be offered anywhere even in open. The Court also held that unless the right to worship at a particular place is itself an integral part of that right, i.e., the place is of a particular significance, its alienability cannot be doubted. The Apex Court having answered the various questions on the validity of the Act 1993 decline to answer the reference and returned the same as such as it is. The suits having been revived due to striking down of Section 4(3) of the Act, this Court trying the original suits has to decide the entire matter on merits unless it can be shown that a particular issue which is engaging attention of this Court in trial of the original  suit has already been raised, argued and decided by the Apex Court. The learned counsels for the parties have not been able to show any such finding in respect to the matters which are involved in various issues before this Court and, therefore, we are not in agreement with the counsels for the parties as argued otherwise.”

(underlined by us)

91. The High Court has clearly held that an issue can be

considered to be decided by a superior Court only when

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it was raised, argued and decided.   Following was held

in Paragraph 4054:­

“4054.   The mere fact that some facts have been noticed by the Government of India in White Paper and those facts have simply been noticed by the Apex Court while referring to the facts mentioned in the White Paper, it cannot be said that those facts can be construed as if they have been accepted by the Apex Court to be correct and stand adjudicated. The law of precedence is well known. The authority of the superior Court laying down a law is binding on the Courts below provided a matter has been decided by the Court. An issue can be considered to be decided by a superior Court when it was raised, argued and decided and only then it is a binding precedent for the other courts.”

92. The above view  expressed  by majority  judgment in

appeal, thus, makes it clear that the High Court has

held  that judgment  of  Ismail Faruqui's  case  does not

decide any of the issues which are subject matter of the

suit. Whatever observations have been made in the

judgment of  Ismail Faruqui  are  not to govern the

decision in suits and the suits were to be decided on

the basis of the evidence on record.   The questionable

observations made in  Ismail Faruqui's case  have to be

treated as only observations and not for the purpose of

deciding suits and these appeals, they are not to be

87

treated as governing factor or relevant.   The said

observations are to be understood solely as observation

made in context of land acquisition and nothing more.    

93. It is due to above finding of the High Court that in

several appeals filed against impugned judgment by the

plaintiff of Suit Nos.1 and 5 grounds have been taken

which grounds have been referred to and  relied by Dr.

Rajiv Dhavan in his submission as noted above. The

grounds taken in the appeal, to which exception is being

taken by Dr. Dhavan are:

(i) Partition of the site would effectively

extinguish the right of Hindus to worship at

the site protected by Article 25 being a site

which is integral and essential part of Hindu

religion;

(ii) The purported Muslim structure on the area was

never pleaded to be an essential or integral

part of the Islamic religion.

94. The  above  grounds  are  yet  to  be looked  into and

considered by this Court in these appeals.

95. We have already dealt with and noticed the extent

and nature of the observations made by this Court in

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Paragraphs 78 and 82 of  Ismail Faruqui’s  case. The

expression “particular significance” and “comparative

significance” as occurring in the judgment in  Ismail

Faruqui’s  case has also been noted and explained by us

in foregoing paragraphs.  The observations of this Court

in Ismail Faruqui’s case has to be understood as above.

The question  as  to  whether  in  the impugned  judgment,

reliance on  Ismail Faruqui’s  case affects the ultimate

decision of the High Court and needs any clarification

or correction is a task, which we have to undertake with

the assistance of learned counsel for the parties in the

present appeals.   We, thus, conclude that reliance on

the judgment of Ismail Faruqui by the High Court in the

impugned judgment and reliance by learned counsel for

the appellants and taking grounds in these appeals on

the strength of judgment of  Ismail Faruqui’s  case are

all questions, on the merits of the appeals, which need

to be addressed in these appeals.   Thus, the above

submission does not help the appellant in contending

that judgment of  Ismail Faruqui’s  case needs

reconsideration.

Additional grounds for reference to larger Bench

89

96. Shri Raju Ramachandran, learned senior counsel

appearing for some of the parties has pressed for the

reference to larger Bench for reconsideration of Ismail

Faruqui’s case on some additional grounds in addition to

what has been canvassed by Dr. Rajeev Dhavan. Shri Raju

Ramachandran submits that looking to the importance of

the case the matter should be referred to the

Constitution Bench for reconsideration of  Ismail

Faruqui’s  judgment.   He submits that there are various

instances, where this court had made reference to larger

Bench looking to the importance of the matter. He

submits that High Court vide its order dated 10.07.1989

had withdrawn the suits to be tried by the High Court by

Full Bench looking to the importance of the case.  The

case being very important and appeals having been filed

by all the sides, the case is of such magnitude that it

is appropriate that matter may be referred to a Bench of

a larger strength to consider the case.   Shri

Ramachandran has referred to and relied on several

judgments of this Court, which shall be noted by us

hereinafter.   

97.  The submission of Shri Raju Ramachandran has been

90

refuted by Shri K. Parasaran, learned senior counsel and

Shri C.S. Vaidyanathan.   They submit that if there are

constitutional principles involved, the matter can be

referred to a larger bench, but present is not a case

where any principle of constitutional interpretation is

involved, hence reference of the case to a larger bench

needs to be refused.   Shri Parasaran submits that

present appeals arise out of a suit where for deciding

the issues in a suit, the evidence is to be appreciated,

which need not be done by five judges. He submits that

five judges are to appreciate the evidence only in case

of Presidential Election.

98. Before we enter into submission of learned counsel

for the parties, the constitutional provision regarding

reference of a case for hearing by the Constitution

Bench consisting of five judges need to be looked into.

Article 145(3) of the Constitution provides that minimum

number of judges, who are to sit for purpose of deciding

any case involving a substantial question of law as to

the interpretation of the Constitution or for the

purpose of hearing any reference under article 143 shall

be five.  The proviso to Article 145(3) provides:­

91

“Provided that, where the Court hearing an appeal under any of the provisions of this Chapter other than Article 132 consists of less than five Judges and in the course of the hearing of the appeal the Court is satisfied that the appeal involves a substantial question of law as to the interpretation of this Constitution the determination of which is necessary for the disposal of the appeal, such Court shall refer the question for opinion to a Court constituted as required by this clause for the purpose of deciding any case involving such a question and shall on receipt of the opinion dispose of the appeal in conformity with such opinion”

99. As per proviso, the reference to a bench of five

judges can be made by judges sitting in lesser strength

than five judges while hearing an appeal, on fulfilment

of following two conditions:­

(i) The Court is satisfied that the appeal

involves a substantial question of law as to

the interpretation of this Constitution;

(ii) The determination of which is necessary for

the disposal of the appeal.           

100. The proviso to Article 145(3) as noted above, thus,

clearly indicate that on fulfilment of both the

conditions as noticed above, a bench of smaller strength

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than five judges can make a reference of a case to be

heard by a Bench strength of five judges.  This Court in

Abdul Rahim Ismail C. Rahimtoola Vs. State of Bombay,

AIR 1959 SC 1315  had occasion to consider Article

145(3).   In the above case, question pertaining to

Article 19(1)(d), (e) and sub­section (5) of Article 19

came for consideration.   A five Judge Bench in  Ebrahim

Vazir Mavat Vs. State of Bombay and others, AIR 1954 SC

229  had already  held that  requirement  that an Indian

citizen to produce a passport before entering into India

is a proper restriction upon entering India.  Before two

judge bench in Abdul Rahim Ismail (supra), challenge was

made to Rule 3 of Passport Rules, 1950, which provided

that no person, proceeding from any place outside India,

shall enter, or attempt to enter, India by water, land

or air unless he is in possession of a valid passport.

Contention raised was that Section 3 of the Act and Rule

3 of the Rules in so far as it purported to relate to an

Indian citizen is ultra vires the Constitution, as they

offended against the provisions of Articles 19(1)(d) and

(e).  This Court had held that issue having already been

decided by a five judges Bench no substantial question

93

of law as to the interpretation of the Constitution

arises.  In Para 6, following was held:­

“6....It was, however, urged that as a constitutional question has been raised this matter cannot be decided by Judges less than five in number. Therefore, the case should be referred to what is described as the Constitution Bench. Article 145(3) of the Constitution states that the minimum number of Judges who are to sit for the purpose of deciding any case involving a substantial question of law as to the interpretation of the Constitution or for the purpose of hearing any reference under Article 143 shall be five. It is clear that no substantial question of law as to the interpretation of the Constitution arises in the present case as the very question raised has been decided by a Bench of this Court consisting of five Judges. As the question raised before us has been already decided by this Court it cannot be said that any substantial question of law arises regarding the interpretation of the Constitution.”

101. In  Bhagwan Swarup Lal Bishan Lal Vs. State of

Maharashtra, AIR 1965 SC 682, this Court held that a

substantial question of interpretation of a provision of

the Constitution cannot arise when the law on the

subject has been finally and effectively decided by this

Court.  In Para 11, following has been laid down:­

“11. ....Learned counsel suggests that the question raised involves the interpretation of a provision of the Constitution and

94

therefore the appeal of this accused will have to be referred to a Bench consisting of not less than 5 Judges. Under Article 145(3) of the Constitution only a case involving a substantial question of law as to the interpretation of the Constitution shall be heard by a bench comprising not less than 5 Judges. This Court held in State of Jammu and Kashmir v. Thakur Ganga Singh, AIR 1960 SC 356   that a substantial question of interpretation of a provision of the Constitution cannot arise when the law on the subject has been finally and effectively decided by this Court…………………

XXXXXXXXXXXXXXXX

As the question raised has already been decided by this Court, what remains is only the application of the principle laid down to the facts of the present case. We cannot, therefore, hold that the question raised involves a substantial question of law as to the interpretation of the Constitution within the meaning Article 145(3) of the Constitution.”

102. A three Judge Bench in  People’s Union for Civil

Liberties (PUCL) and Another Vs. Union of India and

Another, (2003) 4 SCC 399 had also occasion to consider

Article 145(3).  Submission was made that a substantial

question of law as to the interpretation of the

Constitution has arisen, hence, the matter may be

referred to a Bench consisting of Five Judges.   Three

Judge Bench notices that question raised having already

95

been decided in  Union of India Vs. Association for

Democratic Reforms and Another, (2002) 5 SCC 294 – (A

Three Judge Bench Judgment),  no other substantial

question of law regarding interpretation of Constitution

survives, following was laid in Paragraph Nos. 28, 32

and 78:­

“28.  Mr Arun Jaitley, learned Senior Counsel and Mr Kirit N. Raval, learned Solicitor­ General submitted that the question involved in these petitions is a substantial question of law as to the interpretation of the Constitution and, therefore, the matter may be referred to a Bench consisting of five Judges.

32. From the judgment rendered by this Court in  Assn. for Democratic Reforms1  it is apparent that no such contention was raised by the learned Solicitor­General, who appeared in appeal filed on behalf of the Union of India that question involved in that matter was required to be decided by a five­ Judge Bench, as provided under Article 145(3) of the Constitution. The question raised before us has been finally decided and no other substantial question of law regarding the interpretation of the Constitution survives. Hence, the matter is not required to be referred to a five­Judge Bench.

78.   What emerges from the above discussion can be summarised thus:­

Xxxxxxxxxxxxxxx

(C) The judgment rendered by this

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Court in  Assn. for Democratic Reforms has attained finality, therefore, there  is  no question  of interpreting constitutional provision which calls for reference under Article 145(3).”

103.   On question of reference to a larger bench, one

more Constitution Bench judgment of this Court needs to

be noticed, i.e.  Central Board of Dawoodi Bohra

Community and Another Vs. State of Maharashtra and

Another, (2005) 2 SCC 673.   Constitution Bench of this

Court while noticing provisions of Supreme Court Rules,

1966 and Articles 141 and 145(2) noticed in Paragraph 12

of the judgment that the law laid down by this Court in

a decision delivered by a Bench of larger strength is

binding on any subsequent Bench of lesser or coequal

strength. A bench of lesser quorum cannot disagree or

dissent from the view of the law laid down by a Bench of

larger quorum.   In case of doubt, the Bench of lesser

quorum can do is to invite the attention of the Chief

Justice and request for the matter being placed for

hearing before a Bench of larger quorum than the Bench

whose decision has come for consideration.   Two

exceptions were also noticed to the above noted

principles in Para 12(3), which is to the following

97

effect:­

“(3) The above rules are subject to two exceptions: (i) The abovesaid rules do not bind the discretion of the Chief Justice in whom vests the power of framing the roster and who can direct any particular matter to be placed for hearing before any particular Bench of any strength; and (ii) in spite of the rules laid down hereinabove, if the matter has already come up for hearing before a Bench of larger quorum and that Bench itself feels that the view of the law taken by a Bench of lesser quorum, which view is in doubt, needs correction or reconsideration then by way of exception (and not as a rule) and for reasons given by it, it may proceed to hear the case and examine the correctness of the previous decision in question dispensing with the need of a specific reference or the order of Chief Justice constituting the Bench and such listing. Such was the situation in Raghubir Singh and Ors. and Hansoli Devi and Ors. (supra). ”

104.  In the present case, since the submission of Shri

Raju Ramachandran and Dr. Dhavan is for a reference to a

Constitution Bench to reconsider Ismail Faruqui’s  case,

the question needs to be considered in view of the law

laid down by this Court in reference to Article 145(3)

as noticed above. Both Shri Raju Ramachandran and

Dr. Dhavan have placed heavy reliance on order passed by

this Court on 26.03.2018 in W.P. (C) No. 222 of 2018 –

Sameena Begum Vs. Union of India & Ors.  Learned counsel

98

submit that reference to the Constitution Bench has been

made by a three Judge Bench of this Court looking to the

importance of the issue.  A perusal of the order dated

26.03.2018 indicates that challenge in those writ

petitions pertains to the prevalent practice of polygamy

including Nikah Halala; Nikah Mutah; and Nikah Misyar on

the ground that they are unconstitutional.  Referring to

a five Judges Constitution Bench judgment of this Court

in the case of  Shayara Bano etc. Vs. Union of India &

Ors. etc., (2017) 9 SCC 1, where this Court declared

that practice of talaq­e­biddat or triple talaq is not

protected by Article 25 and it is not an essential

religious practice, it was contended that the five

Judges Bench judgment in  Shayara Bano (supra)  has not

dealt with the aspect of Nikah Halala; Nikah Mutah; and

Nikah Misyar.  Thus, the question as to those religious

practices are protected by Article 25 was very much

involved in the Writ Petition before three Judge Bench.

The three Judge Bench also came to the conclusion that

the above noted concepts have not been decided by the

Constitution Bench, hence the reference was made to the

Constitution Bench, looking to the importance of the

99

issue. The reference made by order dated 26.03.2018 was

in the facts as noted above and does not support the

submissions made by Shri Raju Ramachandran in the

present case.    

105. Now, we come to those cases, which have been relied

by Shri Raju Ramachandran in support of his submission.

106. The Judgment of this Court in  Hyderabad Industries

Ltd. And Another Vs. Union of India And Others, (1995) 5

SCC 338 was a case where a three Judge Bench had doubted

the correctness of an earlier judgment, i.e., Khandelwal

Metal and Engineering Works and Another Vs. Union of

India and Others, (1985) 3 SCC 620.   Similarly,  S.S.

Rathore Vs. State of M.P., 1988 (Supp.) SCC 522 was also

a case where correctness of a five Judges decision in

Sita Ram Goel Vs. Municipal Board, Kanpur and Others,

AIR 1958 SC 1036  was doubted.   Further, judgments of

this Court due to difference of opinion in two judgments

or conflict of opinion in judgments insisted reference,

which are cases of this court in  Ashwani Kumar and

Others Vs. State of Bihar and Others, (1996) 7 SCC 577

and  Balasaria Construction (P) Ltd. Vs. Hanuman Seva

Trust and Others, (2006) 5 SCC 662, hence these cases

100

also does not support the submission.   The judgment of

this Court in  Acchan Rizvi (I) Vs. State of U.P. and

Others, (1994) 6 SCC 751 and Acchan Rizvi (II) Vs. State

of U.P. and Others, (1994) 6 SCC 752 are the cases where

interlocutory applications in contempt petitions were

filed and decided.  No principle regarding reference was

noticed, the said judgments have no relevance with

regard to issue of reference of larger Bench.

Similarly, judgment of this Court in  Mohd. Aslam alias

Bhure Vs. Union of India and Others, (2003) 2 SCC  576

was a case where an interim order was passed by this

Court with regard to acquisition of 67.703 acres of land

as was noticed in Ismail Faruqui’s case.  This judgment

has no relevance with regard to reference to larger

Bench.   Judgment of this Court in  Mohd. Aslam alias

Bhure Vs. Union of India and Others, (2003) 4 SCC 1, has

been relied, which was a case decided by a five Judges

Bench. A public interest writ petition under Article 32

was filed with regard to manner in which the adjacent

land, i.e., adjacent land to the disputed structure

should be preserved till the final decision in the suit

pending in the High Court, which was revived consequent

101

to judgment in  Ismail Faruqui’s  case.   The five Judges

Bench noticed various observations and directions passed

in  Ismail Faruqui’s  case and ultimately had directed

that interim order passed by this Court on 13.03.2002 as

modified on 14.03.2002 should be operative until

disposal of the suits in the High Court of Allahabad not

only  to  maintain  communal harmony but also  to  fulfil

other objectives of the Act. The Writ Petition was

disposed of accordingly. No principle regarding

reference to larger Bench was laid down in the said

case, which may support the submission of learned

counsel.   

107. A two Judge Bench judgment in Vinod Kumar Shantilal

Gosalia Vs. Gangadhar and Others, 1980 (Supp.) SCC 340

has also been relied, in which following order was

passed:­

“After having heard counsel for the parties we reserved judgment. On going through the judgment of the Judicial Commissioner and the documents and after a careful consideration of the arguments of the parties, we find that these appeals involve a substantial question of law of great importance which is likely to govern a number of cases arising out of mining leases in the present territory of Goa, Daman & Diu. We, therefore, direct that this case be placed before a larger Bench. Let these appeals be placed before the

102

Hon’ble the Chief Justice for orders.”

108. The  above  order  was passed  by  two Judge Bench,

which had directed the appeal to be placed before Chief

Justice for hearing the matter by a larger Bench due to

the fact that appeal involves a substantial question of

law of great importance.  The said matter cannot be read

as an order directing the matter to be placed before a

Constitution Bench nor any proposition regarding

reference to Constitution Bench is decipherable from the

above order, which may help the learned counsel.

Another judgment, which was relied by Shri Ramachandran

is an order passed by Justice E.S. Venkatramiah –

Vacation  Judge in  Ram Jethmalani  Vs. Union  of  India,

(1984) 3 SCC 696.  The above order was passed in a Writ

Petition (Criminal). Issue in the above case involves

release of Sikh leaders detained after Punjab action.

One of the issues noticed in the order was that it

relates to personal liberty of a sizeable section of the

community.  Court was of the view that question involved

are too large and complex for the shoulders of a Single

Judge.  The Court opined that these and other cases of

103

like nature should be heard by a seven Judges Bench of

this Court.  The above order was passed in the peculiar

circumstances as noticed in the judgment and no

principle of law has been laid down in context of

reference of a case to a Constitution Bench.  The above

order was, thus, in peculiar facts of the case.   

109. In  Krishan Kumar Vs. Union of India and Others,

(1989) 2 SCC 504, the Court noticed that on the issue,

there are no decided cases of this Court, hence the

Court observed that in the above view, the matter should

be referred to a larger Bench.   That again was a

judgment of two Judge Bench and there was no direction

that reference should be made to a larger Bench

contemplated in the order, which might have been a Bench

of three Hon’ble Judges deciding the issue. In Union of

India Vs. M. Gopalakrishnaiah, 1995 Supp. (4) SCC 81, an

earlier Constitution Bench judgment in  Delhi Transport

Corporation Vs. D.T.C. Mazdoor Congress and Others, 1991

Supp  (1)  SCC  600  was  noticed  and  the  question  as  to

whether the reasoning of the decision in the  Delhi

Transport Corporation (supra)  and  Central Inland Water

Transport Corporation Limited and Another Vs. Brojo Nath

104

Ganguly and Another, (1986) 3 SCC 156, which applied to

permanent employees can be extended to the Director on

their fixed tenure in the Scheme should be considered.

Thus, whether the Constitution Bench Judgment applied in

aforesaid case was the question referred, which is again

an order passed in the peculiar facts of the case and

does not contain any ratio pertaining to reference to

larger Bench.   

110.  Similarly, in Syndicate Bank Vs. Prabha D. Naik and

Another, (2002) 10 SCC 686, a two Judge Bench made a

reference to larger Bench to consider the interpretation

of Article 535 of the Portuguese Civil Code and

applicability of the Limitation Act.  The reference was

not to a Constitution Bench and was only to a larger

Bench, which might be to a three Judge Bench. Similarly,

in  Charanjeet Singh Vs. Raveendra Kaur, (2008) 17 SCC

650  looking to the importance of the question, a two

Judge Bench had made reference to a larger Bench.  Two

Judge Bench reference was not to a Constitution Bench,

hence, does not support the submission.  To the similar

effect is the judgment of this Court in  Telecom

Regulatory Authority of India Vs. Bharat Sanchar Nigam

105

Limited (2014) 3 SCC 304, where two Judge Bench has made

a reference to a larger Bench.   In  Securities and

Exchange  Board of  India Vs. Sahara  India  Real Estate

Corporation Limited and Others, (2014) 8  SCC 751, an

earlier order passed by three Judge Bench was sought to

be enforced, hence reference was made to a Three Judge

Bench, which again was not a case for reference to a

Constitution  Bench  of  five  Judges.  Judgment  of  this

Court in  Rajeev  Dhavan Vs. Gulshan Kumar Mahajan and

Others, (2014) 12 SCC 618  was a case pertaining to a

contempt petition, which is not relevant for the present

controversy.  Last judgment relied by Shri Ramachandran

is Vivek Narayan Sharma Vs. Union of India, (2017) 1 SCC

388.  The three Judge Bench was considering the issue of

notification dated 08.11.2016 demonetizing currency

notes of Rs. 500/­ and Rs. 1000/­.  Various aspects of

demonetization came for consideration in the writ

petition filed under Article 32 and the transfer

petitions, where this Court noticed following in

Paragraph 3:­

"3. Keeping in view the general public importance and the far­reaching implications which the answers to the questions may have, we consider it proper to direct that the

106

matters be placed before the larger Bench of five Judges for an authoritative pronouncement. The Registry shall accordingly place the papers before the Hon'ble the Chief Justice for constituting an appropriate Bench.”

111.  In the above background, the three Judge Bench has

directed the matter to be placed before larger bench of

five judges.   

112. Present is a case where appeals have been filed

against judgment dated 30.09.2010 of Allahabad High

Court by which Four Original Suits, which were

transferred by the High Court to itself have been

decided.  Four Civil Suits were filed claiming title to

the disputed structure. Parties lead elaborate evidences

running in several thousands pages.   The Court, after

marshalling the evidences before it has decided the

Civil Suits giving rise to these appeals.   The issues,

which have arisen in these appeals are no doubt

important issues, which have to be heard and decided in

these appeals. Normally appeals arising out of suits are

placed before a Bench of Two Judges but looking to the

importance of the matter, the present appeals have

already been placed before three Judge Bench.   For the

107

aforesaid reasons, we do not agree with the submission

of Shri Raju Ramachandran that these appeals be referred

to Constitution Bench of Five Judges to reconsider the

Constitution Bench judgment in Ismail Faruqui’s case.

113. Before we close we remind us as well as members of

both the major communities of this country, Hindus and

Muslims, the thoughtful message given by Justice S.U.

Khan   in his judgment as well as the words of Justice

J.S. Verma, speaking for majority in   Ismail Faruqui’s

case. Justice S.U. Khan made following appeal:

'Muslims must also ponder that at present the entire   world wants to know the exact teaching of Islam in respect of relationship of Muslims with others. Hostility­peace­ friendship­tolerance­opportunity to impress others with the Message­opportunity to strike wherever and whenever possible­or what? In this regard Muslims in India enjoy a unique position. They have been rulers here, they have been ruled and now they are sharers in power (of course junior partners). They are not in majority but they are also not negligible minority (Maximum member of Muslims are in huge majority which makes them indifferent to the problem in question or in negligible minority which makes them redundant. Indian Muslims have also inherited huge legacy of religious learning and knowledge. They are therefore in the best position to tell the world the correct position. Let them start with their role in the resolution of the conflict at hand.”

108

114. Justice J.S. Verma in paragraph 156 of the judgment

expressed great hope into Hinduism which is a tolerant

faith. In paragraph 156 it was observed:

"156.Before we pass final orders, some observations of a general nature appear to be in order. Hinduism is a tolerant faith. It is that tolerance that has enabled Islam, Christianity, Zoroastrianism, Judaism, Buddhism, Jainism and Sikhism to find shelter and support upon this land. We have no doubt that the moderate Hindu has little taste for the tearing down of the place of worship of another to replace it with a temple. It is our fervent hope that that moderate opinion shall find general expression and that communal brotherhood shall bring to the dispute at Ayodhya an amicable solution long before the courts resolve it.”

115.  We are also reminded of rich culture and heritage

of this ancient country which has always been a matter

of great learning and inspiration for the whole world.  

116.  The great King Asoka in 245 B.C. (Before Christ),

had given several messages to the world which are

engraved in rock edicts which   shows reverence towards

faith of others. The   Twelfth Rock Edict of the great

King Asoka stated:

"'The King, beloved of the Gods, honours every form of religious faith, but considers no gift or honour so much as the increase of the substance of religion; whereof this is

109

the root, to reverence one's own faith and never to revile that of others. Whoever acts differently injures his own religion while he wrong's another's.' 'The texts of all forms of religion shall be followed under my protection.'”

117. Dr. S. Radhakrishnan, most Learned and respected

former President of India, in his celebrated book  “The

Hindu View of Life”  while dealing with the subject of

“conflict of religion” has expressed great hope with

Hindu view of life. Dr. Radhakrishnan in prophetic words

states:

“That the Hindu solution of the problem of the conflict of religions is likely to be accepted in the future seems to me to be fairly certain. The spirit of democracy with its immense faith in the freedom to choose one's ends and direct one's course in the effort to realize them makes for it. Nothing is good which is not self­chosen; no determination is valuable which is not self­ determination. The different religions are slowly learning to hold out hands of friendship to each other in every part of the world. The parliaments of religions and conferences and congresses of liberal thinkers of all creeds promote mutual understanding and harmony. The study of comparative religion is developing a fairer attitude to other religions. It is impressing onus the fundamental unity of all religions by  and the need  of  the hour determine the emphasis in each religion. We are learning to think clearly about the inter­relations of religions. We tend to look upon different religions not as incompatibles but as

110

complementaries, and so indispensable to each other for the realization of the common end. Closer contact with other religions has dispelled the belief that only this or that religion has produced men of courage and patience, self­denying love and creative energy. Every great religion has cured its followers of the swell of passion, the thrust of desire and the blindness of temper. The crudest religion seems to have its place in the cosmic scheme, for gorgeous flowers justify the muddy roots from which they spring.”

118.  We are confident that observations made by Justice

S.U. Khan of Allahabad High Court as quoted above as

well as observations of Justice J.S. Verma made in

paragraph 156 of the judgment are observations which

shall guide both the communities in their thought, deed

and action.

119.  To conclude, we again make it clear that

questionable observations made in Ismail Faruqui's case

as noted above were made in context of land acquisition.

Those observations were neither relevant for deciding

the suits nor relevant for deciding these appeals.

120. In view of our foregoing discussions, we are of the

considered opinion that no case has been made out to

refer the Constitution Bench judgment of this Court in

111

Ismail Faruqui case (supra) for reconsideration.  

121. We record our appreciation to the valuable

assistance rendered by the learned counsel for both the

parties, especially Shri Ejaz Maqbool and P.V.

Yogeswaran who have rendered great assistance to the

Court in compiling various volumes in orderly manner

which had been of great help to the Court, both, in

hearing and deciding the issue.  

122. The appeals which are awaiting consideration by

this Court for quite a long period, be now listed in

week commencing 29th October, 2018 for hearing.

..........................CJI.  ( DIPAK MISRA )

...........................J.       ( ASHOK BHUSHAN )

NEW DELHI,   SEPTEMBER 27, 2018.

1    

REPORTABLE  

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA  

CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION  

CIVIL APPEAL NOS. 10866-10867 OF 2010      M. SIDDIQ (D) THR. LRS.    … APPELLANT(S)     

VERSUS    MAHANT SURESH DAS AND ORS. ETC.         … RESPONDENT(S)  

 WITH  

 CIVIL APPEAL NOS. 4768-4771 OF 2011  CIVIL APPEAL NO. 2636 OF 2011  CIVIL APPEAL NO. 821 OF 2011  CIVIL APPEAL NO. 4739 OF 2011  CIVIL APPEAL NOS. 4905-4908 of 2011  CIVIL APPEAL NO. 2215 of 2011  CIVIL APPEAL NO. 4740 of 2011  CIVIL APPEAL NO. 2894 of 2011  CIVIL APPEAL NO. 6965 of 2011  CIVIL APPEAL NO. 4192 of 2011  CIVIL APPEAL NO. 5498 of 2011  CIVIL APPEAL NO. 7226 of 2011  CIVIL APPEAL NO. 8096 of 2011  DIARY NO. 22744 OF 2017  

J U D G M E N T    

S.ABDUL NAZEER, J.    

1. I have had the privilege of reading the erudite Judgment of my  

learned Brother Justice Ashok Bhushan.  My learned Brother has

2    

held that the questionable observations made in paragraph 82 of  

the judgment in Dr. M. Ismail Faruqui and Ors. v. Union of India  

and Ors. (1994) 6 SCC 360 (for short 'Ismail Faruqui') are not  

relevant for deciding these appeals.  Therefore, His Lordship has  

concluded that no case has been made out seeking reference of  

these appeals to a Constitution Bench of this Court.  I am unable to  

accept this view expressed by my learned Brother.  However, I am in  

respectful agreement with his opinion on the question of res  

judicata contained in paragraphs 63 to 75 of the Judgment and  

have restricted this judgment to the other issues.    

2. Since the facts of the case and the rival contentions of the  

parties have been set out by my learned Brother in detail, it is not  

necessary to reiterate them. Therefore, I have stated only certain  

relevant facts.  

3. In Ismail Faruqui, the Court started by elucidating the  

background of the case leading to the Acquisition of Certain Area at  

Ayodhya Act, 1993 (No. 33 of 1993) (for short '1993 Act') and the  

reasons for making Special Reference to this Court by the President  

of India in exercise of his power in clause (1) of Article 143 of the

3    

Constitution of India.  Herein the Special Reference mentioned, had  

the following question for consideration and opinion:  

"Whether a Hindu temple or any Hindu  religious structure existed prior to the  construction of the Ram Janma Bhumi-Babri  Masjid (including the premises of the inner  and outer courtyards of such structure) in the  area on which the structure stood?"    

4.  After narrating the facts, the Court went on to examine the  

constitutional validity of the 1993 Act. On this issue, the Court  

concluded that the Parliament has the legislative competence to  

enact the said legislation and except for Section 4(3), the entire  

1993 Act is constitutionally valid. While deciding so, the Court in  

paragraph 51 went on to discuss the "comparative significance" of  

the disputed site to the two communities. The following is  

reproduced as under:     

"51.  It may also be mentioned that even as  Ayodhya is said to be of particular significance  to the Hindus as a place of pilgrimage because  of the ancient belief that Lord Rama was born  there, the mosque was of significance for the  Muslim community as an ancient mosque built  by Mir Baqi in 1528 AD.  As a mosque, it was a  religious place of worship by the Muslims.   This indicates the comparative significance of  the disputed site to the two communities and  also that the impact of acquisition is equally  on the right and interest of the Hindu

4    

community.  Mention of this aspect is made  only in the context of the argument that the  statute as a whole, not merely Section 7  thereof, is anti-secular being slanted in favour  of the Hindus and against the Muslims."  

5. After the aforementioned conclusion, in paragraphs 65 to 82  

the Court examined the question as to whether a mosque is  

immune from acquisition. Among these paragraphs, the  

observations in paragraphs 77, 78 and 80 are important for the  

matter in hand and are reproduced as under:-  

"77.  It may be noticed that Article 25 does not  contain any reference to property unlike Article  26 of the Constitution. The right to practise,  profess and propagate religion guaranteed  under Article 25 of the Constitution does not  necessarily include the right to acquire or own  or possess property. Similarly this right does  not extend to the right of worship at any and  every place of worship so that any hindrance  to worship at a particular place per se may  infringe the religious freedom guaranteed  under Articles 25 and 26 of the Constitution.  The protection under Articles 25 and 26 of the  Constitution is to religious practice which  forms an essential and integral part of the  religion. A practice may be a religious practice  but not an essential and integral part of  

practice of that religion.  

78. While offer of prayer or worship is a  religious practice, its offering at every  location where such prayers can be offered  would not be an essential or integral part of

5    

such religious practice unless the place has  a particular significance for that religion so  as to form an essential or integral part  thereof. Places of worship of any religion  having particular significance for that  religion, to make it an essential or integral  part of the religion, stand on a different  footing and have to be treated differently  

and more reverentially.  

80. It has been contended that a mosque  enjoys a particular position in Muslim Law and  once a mosque is established and prayers are  offered in such a mosque, the same remains  for all time to come a property of Allah and the  same never reverts back to the donor or  founder of the mosque and any person  professing Islamic faith can offer prayer in  such a mosque and even if the structure is  demolished, the place remains the same where  the namaz can be offered. As indicated  hereinbefore, in British India, no such  protection was given to a mosque and the  mosque was subjected to the provisions of  statute of limitation thereby extinguishing the  right of Muslims to offer prayers in a particular  mosque lost by adverse possession over that  

property."  

    (Emphasis supplied)  

6. In paragraph 82 this Court summarised the position as under:  

"82. The correct position may be summarised  thus. Under the Mahomedan Law applicable in  India, title to a mosque can be lost by adverse  

possession (See Mulla's Principles of  Mahomedan Law, 19th Edn., by M.

6    

Hidayatullah - Section 217; and Shahid  Ganj v. Shiromani Gurdwara [AIR 1940 PC  116, 121]. If that is the position in law, there  can be no reason to hold that a mosque has a  unique or special status, higher than that of  the places of worship of other religions in  secular India to make it immune from  acquisition by exercise of the sovereign or  prerogative power of the State. A mosque is  not an essential part of the practice of the  religion of Islam and namaz (prayer) by  

Muslims can be offered anywhere, even in  open. Accordingly, its acquisition is not  prohibited by the provisions in the  Constitution of India. Irrespective of the status  of a mosque in an Islamic country for the  purpose of immunity from acquisition by the  State in exercise of the sovereign power, its  status and immunity from acquisition in the  secular ethos of India under the Constitution  is the same and equal to that of the places of  worship of the other religions, namely, church,  temple etc. It is neither more nor less than  that of the places of worship of the other  religions. Obviously, the acquisition of any  religious place is to be made only in unusual  and extraordinary situations for a larger  national purpose keeping in view that such  acquisition should not result in extinction of  the right to practise the religion, if the  significance of that place be such. Subject to  this condition, the power of acquisition is  available for a mosque like any other place of  worship of any religion. The right to worship is  not at any and every place, so long as it can be  practised effectively, unless the right to  worship at a particular place is itself an  integral part of that right."     

                  (Emphasis supplied)

7    

7.  Dr. Rajeev Dhavan, learned senior counsel, submits that the  

observations made in the above mentioned paragraph, reading "A  

mosque is not an essential part of the practice of the religion of  

Islam and namaz (prayer) by Muslims can be offered anywhere,  

even in open." is contrary to law and the Court was obliged to  

examine the faith to make this statement.  He further contends that  

the observations on the concepts of particular significance and  

comparative significance are without foundation.  Moreover, he  

contends that what constitutes the essential part of a religion is  

primarily to be ascertained with reference to the doctrine of that  

religion itself as has been done by the Seven-Judge Constitution  

Bench of this Court in, the Commissioner, Hindu Religious  

Endowments, Madras v. Sri Lakshmindra Thirtha Swamiar of Sri  

Shirur Mutt 1954 SCR 1005 (for short 'Shirur Mutt'). It has also  

been submitted that the broad test of "essentiality" in Shirur Mutt  

cannot be cut down by later Five and Two Judges' decisions.   

"Integral" is interchangeable with "essential".  The latter cannot be  

short circuited by the use of the former.  This may lie at the root of  

many mal-understandings and needs to be clarified. Further, it is  

precisely this error of integrality that Ismail Faruqui uses when it

8    

speaks of "particular significance". He also submits that the test  

used in paragraph 78 of Ismail Faruqui was essential and integral  

even though the word "or" was used. The Court has failed to  

examine the tenets of faith and proceeded in its own intuitive  

understanding to make ipse dixit observations. Learned senior  

counsel has also relied on certain decisions of this Court in support  

of his contentions.  Ismail Faruqui being devoid of any examination  

on this issue, the matter needs to go to a larger Bench. Dr. Dhavan  

further submits that the impugned judgment was affected by the  

questionable observations in Ismail Faruqui. He has taken us  

through various paragraphs in the impugned judgment in this  

regard.  Dr. Dhavan has also referred to various observations made  

in the impugned judgment to support his submission that Ismail  

Faruqui has influenced the said judgment.  

8. On the other hand, Shri Parasaran, learned senior counsel  

submits that the questionable observations in Ismail Faruqui that  

a mosque not being an essential part of the practice of Islam have  

to be read in the context of the validity of the acquisition of the suit  

property under the 1993 Act.   He submits that this Court has not  

ruled that offering Namaz by Muslims is not an essential religious

9    

practice.  It only ruled that right to offer Namaz at every mosque  

that exists is not essential religious practice. But if a place of  

worship of any religion has a particular significance for that  

religion, enough to make an essential or integral part of the religion,  

then it would stand on a different footing and would have to be  

treated differently and more reverentially.  It is argued that the  

fundamental right of Muslim community under Article 25, to offer  

namaz is not affected in the present case as the Babri Masjid was  

not a mosque with particular significance for that religion.    

9. We have also heard S/Shri C.S. Vaidyanathan, Raju  

Ramachandran, S.K. Jain, learned senior counsel and Shri Tushar  

Mehta, learned Additional Solicitor General and Shri P.N. Mishra,  

learned advocate.     

10. Learned counsel for the parties have also produced Islamic  

religious texts on mosque, relevant excerpts of the holy Quran and  

illuminating discourses on the holy Quran in support of their  

respective contentions on whether a mosque is an essential part of  

the practice of the religion of Islam.   

11. It is evident from Ismail Faruqui that the principal  

submission of the petitioners was that mosque cannot be acquired

10    

because of a special status in Mahomedan Law.  The Constitution  

Bench has discussed this aspect under a separate heading "Mosque  

– Immunity from Acquisition" from paragraph 65 of the judgment.  

Specifically in paragraph 74, the Court observed that subject to  

protection under Articles 25 and 26 of the Constitution, places of  

religious worship, like mosques, churches, temples, etc. can be  

acquired under the State's sovereign power of acquisition.   Such  

acquisition per se does not violate either Article 25 or Article 26 of  

the Constitution.  Further, the Court in paragraph 77 noted that  

Article 25 does not contain any reference to property unlike Article  

26 of the Constitution.  The right to practice, profess and propagate  

religion guaranteed under Article 25 of the Constitution does not  

necessarily include right to acquire or own or possess property.   

Similarly, this right does not extend to the right of worship at any  

and every place of worship so that any hindrance to worship at a  

place per se may infringe the religious freedom guaranteed under  

Articles 25 and 26 of the Constitution. Additionally, in paragraph  

78, it noted that places of worship of any religion having particular  

significance for that religion, to make it an essential or integral part  

of the religion, stand on a different footing and have to be treated

11    

differently and more reverentially. While summarizing the position,  

in paragraph 82, the Court has observed that a mosque is not an  

essential part of practice of religion of Islam and namaz by Muslims  

can be offered anywhere even in open.  

12. What constitutes the essential part of a religion is primarily to  

be ascertained with reference to the doctrine, tenets and beliefs of  

that religion itself.  This has been laid down at page 1025 in Shirur  

Mutt :   

"……..The learned Attorney-General lays stress  

upon clause (2)(a) of the article and his  contention is that all secular activities, which  may be associated with religion but do not  really constitute an essential part of it, are  amenable to State regulation.   

 The contention formulated in such broad  

terms cannot, we think, be supported. In the  first place, what constitutes the essential  part of a religion is primarily to be  ascertained with reference to the doctrines  of that religion itself. If the tenets of any  religious sect of the Hindus prescribe that  offerings of food should be given to the idol  at particular hours of the day, that  periodical ceremonies should be performed  in a certain way at certain periods of the  year or that there should be daily recital of  sacred texts or oblations to the sacred fire,  all these would be regarded as parts of  religion and the mere fact that they involve  expenditure of money or employment of

12    

priests and servants or the use of  marketable commodities would not make  them secular activities partaking of a  commercial or economic character; all of  them are religious practices and should be  regarded as matters of religion within the  meaning of Article 26(b). What Article  25(2)(a) contemplates is not regulation by  

the State of religious practices as such, the  freedom of which is guaranteed by the  Constitution except when they run counter  to public order, health and morality, but  regulation of activities which are economic,  commercial or political in their character  though they are associated with religious  practices."  

   (Emphasis supplied)   

13. Further, at pages 1028-1029 it is stated that,  

"Under Article 26(b), therefore, a religious  

denomination or organization enjoys  complete autonomy in the matter of  deciding as to what rites and ceremonies  are essential according to the tenets of the  religion they hold and no outside authority  has any jurisdiction to interfere with their  decision in such matters. Of course, the  scale of expenses to be incurred in connection  with these religious observances would be a  matter of administration of property belonging  to the religious denomination and can be  controlled by secular authorities in accordance  with any law laid down by a competent  legislature; for it could not be the injunction of  any religion to destroy the institution and its  endowments by incurring wasteful expenditure  on rites and ceremonies."  

(Emphasis supplied)   

13    

14. In Ratilal Panachand Gandhi v. The State of Bombay and  

Ors. 1954 SCR 1055, a Constitution Bench of this Court has held  

thus:  

"It may be noted that 'religion' is not  necessarily theistic and in fact there are well  known religions in India like Buddhism and  Jainism which do not believe in the existence  of God or of any Intelligent First Cause. A  religion undoubtedly has its basis in a  system of beliefs and doctrines which are  regarded by those who profess that religion  to be conducive to their spiritual well being,  but it would not be correct to say, as seems  to have been suggested by one of the  learned Judges of the Bombay High Court,  that matters of religion are nothing but  matters of religious faith and religious  belief.    

xxx   xxx    xxx    ….. No outside authority has any right to  say that these are not essential parts of  religion and it is not open to the secular  authority of the State to restrict or prohibit  them in any manner they like under the  guise of administering the trust estate."  

   (Emphasis supplied)     

15. In Sri Venkataramana Devaru and Ors. v. The State of  

Mysore and Ors. 1958 SCR 895, a Constitution Bench of this

14    

Court had the opportunity to consider Articles 25 and 26 of the  

Constitution of India in the context of Madras Temple Entry  

Authorisation Act, 1947 as amended in 1949.  After referring to  

Shirur Mutt, this Court has held as under:  

 "16(3)…. Now, the precise connotation of the  expression “matters of religion” came up for  

consideration by this Court in The  Commissioner, Hindu Religious Endowments,  Madras v. Sri Lakshmindra Thirtha Swamiar of  Sri Shirur Mutt [(1954) SCR 1005] and it was  held therein that it embraced not merely  matters of doctrine and belief pertaining to the  religion but also the practice of it, or to put it  in terms of Hindu theology, not merely  

its Gnana but also its Bhakti and Karma  Kandas. …."  

16. In The Durgah Committee, Ajmer and Anr. v. Syed Hussain  

Ali and Ors. (1962) 1 SCR 383, a Constitution Bench of this Court,  

after considering the historical background of the dispute, has held  

thus:-   

"Having thus reviewed broadly the genesis  of the shrine, its growth and the story of its  endowments and their management, it may  now be relevant to enquire what is the  nature of the tenets and beliefs to which  Soofism subscribes.  Such an enquiry would  serve to assist us in determining whether the  Chishtia sect can be regarded as a religious

15    

denomination or a section thereof within  Art 26."    

   (Emphasis supplied)     

17. In Sardar Syedna Taher Saifuddin Saheb v. The State of  

Bombay 1962 Supp (2) SCR 496, this Court was considering the  

validity of the law interfering with the right of religious  

denominations to ex-communicate its members.  In this context  

Articles 25 and 26 came to be considered.  After referring to the  

various decisions a Constitution Bench of this Court has held as  

under:-     

 "The content of Arts. 25 and 26 of the  Constitution came up for consideration before  

this Court in the Commissioner, Hindu  Religious Endowments Madras v. Sri  Lakshmindra Thirtha Swamiar of Sri Shirur  Matt; Mahant Jagannath Ramanuj Das v. The  State of Orissa; Sri Venkatamana Devaru v. The  State of Mysore; Durgah Committee; Ajmer v.  Syed Hussain Ali  and several other cases and  the main principles underlying these  provisions have by these decisions been placed  beyond controversy.  The first is that the  protection of these articles is not limited to  matters of doctrine or belief they extend also to  acts done in pursuance of religion and  therefore contain a guarantee for rituals and  observances, ceremonies and modes of  worship which are integral parts of religion.  

16    

The second is that what constitutes an  essential part of a religious or religious  practice has to be decided by the courts  with reference to the doctrine of a  particular religion and include practices  which are regarded by the community as a  part of its religion."    

          (Emphasis supplied)      

18. In Tilkayat Shri Govindlalji Maharaj v. State of Rajasthan  

and Ors. (1964) 1 SCR 561, a Constitution Bench of this Court was   

considering the validity of Nathdwara Temple Act, 1959 (No. XIII of  

1959). The same was challenged on behalf of the denomination of  

followers of Vallabha. The case originally involved challenge to the  

Nathdwara Ordinance, 1959 (No. II of 1959) which was issued on  

February 6, 1959.  Subsequently, this Ordinance was repealed by  

the Act and the petitioner was allowed to amend his petition. It was  

contended that if the temple was held to be a public temple then the  

Act is to be invalid because it contravenes the fundamental rights  

guaranteed to the denomination under Articles 25 and 26 of the  

Constitution.  After considering the rival contentions, the Court has  

held as under:   

17    

"In deciding the question as to whether a given  religious practice is an integral part of the  religion or not, the test always would be  whether it is regarded as such by the  community following the religion or not. This  formula may in some cases present difficulties  in its operation. Take the case of a practice in  relation to food or dress. If in a given  proceeding, one section of the community  claims that while performing certain rites  white dress is an integral part of the religion  itself, whereas another section contends that  yellow dress and not the white dress is the  essential part of the religion, how is the Court  going to decide the question? Similar disputes  may arise in regard to food. In cases where  conflicting evidence is produced in respect of  rival contentions as to competing religious  practices the Court may not be able to resolve  the dispute by a blind application of the  formula that the community decides which  practice in an integral part of its religion,  because the community may speak with more  than one voice and the formula would,  therefore, break down. This question will  always have to be decided by the Court and  in doing so, the Court may have to enquire  whether the practice in question is religious  in character and if it is, whether it can be  regarded as an integral or essential part of  the religion, and the finding of the Court on  such an issue will always depend upon the  evidence adduced before it as to the  conscience of the community and the  tenets of its religion. It is in the light of this  possible complication which may arise in some  cases that this Court struck a note of caution  

in the case of Durgah Committee Ajmer v. Syed  Hussain Ali [(1962) 1 SCR 383 at p. 411] and

18    

observed that in order that the practices in  question should be treated as a part of religion  they must be regarded by the said religion as  its essential and integral part; otherwise even  purely secular practices which are not an  essential or an integral part of religion are apt  to be clothed with a religious form and may  make a claim for being treated as religious  practices within the meaning of Article 25(1)."    

        (Emphasis supplied)     

19. It is clear from the aforesaid decisions that the question as to  

whether a particular religious practice is an essential or integral  

part of the religion is a question which is to be considered by  

considering the doctrine, tenets and beliefs of the religion.  It is also  

clear that the examination of what constitutes an essential practice  

requires detailed examination as reflected in the aforesaid  

judgments.   

20. At this juncture, it is also pertinent to note the observations in  

Sri Adi Visheshwara of Kashi Vishwanath Temple, Varanasi and  

Ors. v. State of U.P. and Ors. (1997) 4 SCC 606, at paragraph 28,  

where it is stated:  

"….The concept of essentiality is not itself a  determinative factor. It is one of the  circumstances to be considered in  adjudging whether the particular matters of  religion or religious practices or belief are

19    

an integral part of the religion.  It must be  decided whether the practices or matters are  considered integral by the community itself.   Though not conclusive, this is also one of the  facets to be noticed. The practice in question is  religious in character and whether it could be  regarded as an integral and essential part of  the religion and if the court finds upon  evidence adduced before it that it is an integral  or essential part of the religion, Article 25  accords protection to it…."    

               (Emphasis supplied)  

 21. As mentioned above, parties have produced various texts in  

Islam in support of their respective contentions.  For the present,  

we are concerned with the approach of the Court in concluding  

questionable observations without examining the doctrine, tenets  

and beliefs of the religion. The conclusion in paragraph 82 of Ismail  

Faruqui that "A mosque is not an essential part of the practice of  

the religion of Islam and namaz (prayer) by Muslims can be offered  

anywhere, even in open" has been arrived at without undertaking  

comprehensive examination.  

22. Now, the question is whether the impugned judgment has  

been affected by the questionable observations in Ismail Faruqui.   

A perusal of the impugned judgment shows that learned advocates

20    

appearing for the parties have repeatedly quoted various  

paragraphs of Ismail Faruqui while arguing the case and have also  

placed strong reliance on the questionable observations made in  

Ismail Faruqui.    

23. A few paragraphs mentioned at page Nos. 3038-3039, 3061,  

3392, 3429 and 3439 of the impugned judgment delivered by  

Justice D.V Sharma wherein Ismail Faruqui is quoted have been  

reproduced as under:  

"ISSUE NO. 19 (d): Whether the building in  

question could not be a mosque under the  Islamic Law in view of the admitted position  

that it did not have minarets?   

FINDINGS:   

On behalf of defendants it is contended  that the building in question was not a  mosque under the Islamic Law. It is not  disputed that the structure has already been  

demolished on 6.12.1992. According to Dr. M.  Ismail Faruqui and others v. Union of India and  others, case, 1994 (6) SCC 360, the Hon'ble  Apex Court held at para 70 that the sacred  character of the mosque can also be lost.  According to the tenets of Islam, minarets are  required to give Azan. There cannot be a public  place of worship in mosque in which Provision  of Azan is not available, hence the disputed  

structure cannot be deemed to be a mosque.   

According to Islamic tenets, there cannot  be a mosque without place of Wazoo and

21    

surrounded by a graveyard on three sides.   Thus, in view of the above discussions, there is  a strong circumstance that without any  minaret there cannot be any mosque.  Issue  No. 19(d) is decided accordingly, against the  

plaintiffs and in favour of the defendants."  

[Printed volume of the judgment at  

page Nos. 3038-3039]  

"Defendants further claim that the  property in suit was not in exclusive  possession of Muslims right from 1858. It is  further submitted that in view of the  possession of Hindus from 1858 and onwards  which is evident from Ext. 15, 16, 18, 19, 20,  27 and 31, the outer Courtyard was  exclusively in possession of Hindus and the  inner Courtyard was not exclusively in  possession of Muslims but also in joint  possession of Hindus and Muslims till 1934.  Muslims were dispossessed from the inner  Courtyard also in 1934 and plaintiffs admit  that Muslims were dispossessed on  22/23December 1949 from the inner  Courtyard. Thus, on the basis of Islamic tenets  the Muslims claim that the property shall be  construed as a Mosque. In this reference the  controversy has already been set at rest by the  Privy Council in the decision of Masjid Shahid  Ganj v. Shiromani Gurudwara Prabandhak  Committee, Amritsar, AIR 1940 PC 116. The  aforesaid view has been approved in Dr. M.  Ismail Faruqui v. Union Of India, 1994 (6) SCC  360, Para 70 of the ruling is relevant which  

reads as under……"  

[Printed volume of the judgment at  

page Nos. 3061]

22    

"Sri Jain has relied upon para 78 of Dr. M.  Ismail Faruqui and others v. Union of India and  others 1994(6) SCC 360, which is reproduced  as under :   

“While offer of prayer or worship is are  religious practice, its offering at every  location where such prayers can be  offered would not be an essential or  integral part of such religious practice  unless the place has a particular  significance for that religion so as to  form an essential or integral part  thereof. Places of worship of any  religion having particular significance  for that religion, to make it an  essential or integral part of the  religion, stand on a different footing  and have to be treated differently and  

move reverentially."   

Sri H.S. Jain, Advocate has further argued  that since birth place of Lord Ram was  considered as a place of worship which was  integral part of religious practice of Hindu from  times immemorial. It is deity and it stands on  a different footing and have to be treated  reverentially. Sri Jain has further urged that in  view of the constitutional mandate as provided  under Article 25 of the Constitution this place  which was all the time being worshipped has  be treated by this Court as a place of worship  because of the belief of the Hindu based on  religious book and religious practice to be birth  place of Lord Ram as the temple was  constructed in the 12th century. It is expedient  to say that prior to 12th century there is  evidence that earlier temples were also  constructed at the site. Thus, according to Sri  H.S. Jain, Advocate there is overwhelming

23    

evidence to establish the site of Ram  Janambhumi and the Court has to recognize  the same. Thus, the suit of the plaintiffs which  causes hindrance for worship of Hindu is liable  to be dismissed on this count as no relief can  be granted under Section 42 of the Specific  Relief Act, 1877, now Section 34 of the Specific  

Relief Act, 1963."  

[Printed volume of the judgment at  

page Nos. 3392]  

"LORD RAM AS THE AVATAR OF VISHNU  HAVING BEEN BORN AT AYODHYA AT THE  JANMASTHAN IS ADMITTEDLY THE CORE  PART OF HINDU BELIEF AND FAITH WHICH  IS IN EXISTENCE AND PRACTICED FOR THE  LAST THOUSANDS OF YEARS.  THE HINDU  SCRIPTURES ALSOS SANCTIFY IT.  ARTICLE  25 OF THE CONSTITUTION BEING A  FUNDAMENTAL RIGHT ENSUES ITS  PRESERVATION AND NO RELIEF CAN BE  TAKEN BY THE COURT WHICH SEEKS TO  RESTRICT OR ALTOGETHER EXTINGUISH  THIS RIGHT.  

The fact that Ram Janambhumi is an  integral part of Hindu Religion and the right to  worship there is a fundamental right of the  Hindu religion and can be enforced through a  suit can be clearly made out through a  number of decisions of the Hon'ble Supreme  Court."  

 [Printed volume of the judgment at  

page Nos. 3429]  

"THE RELIGIOUS RIGHT OF HINDUS TO  WORSHIP RAM LALA AT THE JANMASTHAN  BECAME CONCRETISED BEFORE THE

24    

CONSTITUTION CAME INTO BEING AND THE  SAME REQUIRES TO BE PROTECTED.    It is well-known that the Constitution of India  was enacted, i.e. given to ourselves, w.e.f. 26th  January, 1950.  Before it, the right of Hindus  to worship was duly sanctified and recognized  by judicial orders.  In fact, the Supreme Court records in the  Ismail Faruqui case above the contention in  paragraph 1.2 of the White Paper of the  Government of India as recorded in Paragraph  9, Page 380, of the said judgment.  It reads as  follows: "Interim orders in these civil suits  restrained the parties from removing the idols  or interfering with their worship.  In effect,  therefore, from December 1949 till 6.12.1992   the structure had not been used as a mosque."    It is further very significant to note that the  Muslims for the first time, after 1949, assert  their right howsoever unsustainable, only in  18th December, 1961.    Therefore, the right of the Hindus to worship  at the Rama Janma Bhumi, continuing since  times immemorial as an integral part of their  religious right and faith was also sanctified by  judicial orders from 1949 continuously.  This  right has concretised and remains an integral  part of Hindu religion and has to be protected."  

[Printed volume of the judgment at  

page Nos. 3439]

25    

24. Similarly, in the judgment rendered by Justice Sudhir  

Agarwal, Ismail Faruqui has been quoted at page No. 2015 in the  

printed volume of the judgment, which is as under:  

"3501. Sri Prasad argued that belief of Hindus  that Lord Ram as incarnation of Vishnu having  born at Ayodhya forms an integral part of  Hindu religion which cannot be denied to be  practised, observed and performed by them  

and refers to Commissioner of Police & others v.  Acharya Jagadishwarananda Avadhuta&  another, (2004) 12 SCC 770 (para 9) and Sri  Adi Visheshwara of Kashi Vishwanath Temple,  Varanasi (supra). In order to show what  constitutes public order under Article 25 of the  

Constitution, he also placed reliance on Dalbir  Singh & others v. State of Punjab, AIR 1962 SC  1106 (para 8).   

3502. Next he submits that applying the  doctrine of Eminent Domain, the place in  dispute, having special significance for Hindus,  cannot be touched at all either by any  particular person or even by State and the  provisions of even acquisition would not apply  to it though with respect to the alleged  mosque, it has been already held and observed  by the Apex Court that the disputed building  could not be shown to be of any special  

significance to Muslims. He refers to Dr. M.  Ismail Faruqui and others v. Union of India &  others, (1994) 6 SCC 360 (para 65, 72, 75 and  96); Acharya Maharajshri Narendra Prasadji  Anand prasadji Maharaj and others v. State of  Gujarat & others, (1975) 1 SCC 11. The relief  sought by the plaintiff (Suit-4) is barred by  Section 34 Specific Reliefs Act, 1963 and

26    

reliance is placed on Executive Committee of  Vaish Degree College, Shamli and others v.  Lakshmi Narain and others, (1976) 2 SCC 58  (para 20 and 27); American Express Bank Ltd.  v. Calcutta Steel Co. and others, (1993) 2 SCC  199(para 22)."  

25. After considering Ismail Faruqui, Justice Sudhir Agarwal in  

paragraphs 2722 to 2725 has opined as under:  

"2722. The Fourth angle: It is a deity which  has filed the present suit for enforcement of its  rights. The religious endowment in the case in  hand so far as Hindus are concerned, as they  have pleaded in general, is a place of a peculiar  and unique significance for them and there  cannot be any other place like this. In case  this place is allowed to extinguish/extinct by  application of a provision of statutes, may be  of limitation or otherwise, the fundamental  right of practicing religion shall stand denied  to the Hindus permanently since the very  endowment or the place of religion will  disappear for all times to come and this kind of  

place cannot be created elsewhere.   

2723. In Ismail Farooqui (supra), Supreme  Court has considered the plea of validity of  acquisition of land under Land Acquisition Act  that once a waqf of mosque is created, the  property vests in almighty and it always  remain a waqf hence such a property cannot  be acquired. While negativing this plea, the  Apex Court said that a plea in regard to  general religious purposes cannot be said to be  an integral part of religion which will deprive  the worshippers of the right of worship at any  other place and therefore, such a property can

27    

be acquired by the State. However, the position  would be otherwise if the religious property  would have been of special significance and  cannot be one of several such kind of  properties. It will be useful to reproduce the  

relevant observation in this regard:  

"78. It appears from various decisions  rendered by this Court, referred later,  that subject to the protection under  Articles 25 and 26 of the Constitution,  places of religious worship like  mosques, churches, temples etc. can  be acquired under the State's  sovereign power of acquisition. Such  acquisition per se does not violate  either Article 25 or Article 26 of the  Constitution. The decisions relating to  taking over of the management have  no bearing on the sovereign power of  

the State to acquire property."   

"82. While offer of prayer or worship is  a religious practice, its offering at every  location where such prayers can be  offered would not be an essential or  integral part of such religious practice  unless the place has a particular  significance for that religion so as to  form an essential or integral part  thereof. Places of worship of any  religion having particular significance  for that religion, to make it an  essential or integral part of the  religion, stand on a different footing  and have to be treated differently and  

more reverentially."   

2724. The above observations show if the  religious endowment is of such nature, which

28    

is of specific significance or peculiar in nature,  could not have been found elsewhere, the  acquisition of such property by the  Government will have the effect of depriving  the worshippers their right of worship under  Article 25 of the Constitution and such an  acquisition even under the statutory provision,  cannot be permitted. We find sufficient  justification to extend this plea to the statute  of limitation also, inasmuch as, if the statute  pertaining to acquisition cannot be extended to  a religious place of special significance which  may have the effect of destroying the right of  worship at a particular place altogether,  otherwise the provision will be ultra vires, the  same would apply to the statute of limitation  also and that be so, it has to be read that the  statute of limitation to this extent may not be  availed where the debutter's property is of  such a nature that it may have the effect of  extinction of the very right of worship on that  place which is of peculiar nature and specific  significance. This will be infringing the  fundamental right under Article 25 of the  

Constitution.   

2725. In fact this reason could have been  available to the plaintiffs (Suit-4) also had it  been shown by them that the mosque in  question for them was a place of special  significance but this has already been  observed by the Apex Court in respect to this  particular mosque that like others it is one of  the several mosques and by acquisition of the  place it will not have the effect of depriving  such fundamental right of Muslims. It is  always open to them to offer prayer at any  other place like they could have done here but  Hindus are not placed on similar footing.

29    

According to Hindus, this is a place of birth of  lord Rama and that be so, there cannot be any  other place for which such belief persists since  time immemorial. Once this land is allowed to  be lost due to the acts of persons other than  Hindus, the very right of this Section of people,  as protected by Article 25, shall stand  destroyed. This is another reason for not  attracting the provisions of limitation in the  present case."  

26. Similarly, Justice D.V. Sharma has stated thus:    

"A SOVEREIGN GOVERNMENT EVEN BY  EXERCISING THE POWER OF EMINENT  DOMAN CANNOT EXERCISE THE POWER OF  ACQUISITION OF LAND OR PROPERTY  WHICH EXTINGUISHES THE CORE OF THE  FAITH OR THE PLACE OR THE INSTITUTION  

WHICH IS HELD TO BE SACRED.   

What clearly follows is that a sovereign  Government cannot extinguish the core of the  Hindu religion which is the Ram Janambhumi,  let alone the same be extinguished through a  suit, by transferring the same to some other  party in this case the plaintiff thereby ensuring  that the said fundamental right to worship at  

the Ram Janambhumi is extinguished forever.  

RELEVANT CASE LAW…  

(b) Dr. M. Ismail Faruqui and Others v. Union of  India & Others, 1994 (6) SCC Para 76, Page  416 – Acharya Maharajshri Narendra Prasadji  Anand Prasadji Maharaj v. State of Gujarat,  (1976) 2 SCR 317 at pages 327-328: (AIR 1974  

SC 2098 at p. 2103), has held :  

30    

"One thing is, however, clear that  Article 26 guarantees inter alia the  right to own and acquire movable and  immovable property for managing  religious affairs. This right, however,  cannot take away the right of the State  to compulsorily acquire property ......If,  on the other hand, acquisition of  property of a religious denomination by  the State can be proved to be such as  to destroy or completely negative its  right to own and acquire movable and  immovable property for even the  survival of a religious institution the  question may have to be examined in a  

different light."              

Para 82 - A mosque is not an essential part of  the practice of religion of Islam and Namaz by  Muslims can be offered anywhere, even in the  open. Accordingly, its acquisition is not  prohibited by the provisions in the  Constitution of India. Obviously, the  acquisition of any religious place is to be made  only in unusual and extraordinary situations  for a larger national purpose. Keeping in view  that such acquisition should not result in  extinction of the right to practice the religion if  

the significance of that place be such.   

Note (i) Ram Janmasthan in Ayodhya where  Ram Lala is Virajman is a place of religious  significance as described in the above  judgment. If the sovereign authority, under the  power of eminent domain, cannot acquire it,  can a plea at the instance of plaintiffs who are  private persons in Suit No. 4 be entertained,  upholding of which would lead to denial of  

such sacred place altogether to the Hindus.

31    

Note (ii) At page 413, Para 65 of Ismail Faruqui  – No argument made about a mosque of  special significance which forms an essential  part of Islam. Hence, no question raised about  Baburi Mosque as integral to Islam and it has  not been raised in the plaint here or evidence  laid or any contention ever made that the said  mosque was of any significance to the practice  

of Islam as a religion……."  

[Printed volume of the judgment at  

page Nos.3438-3439]  

"FINDINGS ….. Hon'ble Apex Court upheld the  validity of provisions of Acquisition of Certain  Area at Ayodhya, 1993 in Dr. Ismail Faruqui  case (supra) and held that the Central  Government can acquire any place of worship.  At para- 78 Apex Court held that the place of  birth has a particular significance for Hindus  and it should be treated on different footing,  

which reads as under:-   

“78. While offer of prayer or worship is  a religious practice, its offering at every  location where such prayers can be  offered would not be an essential or  integral part of such religious practice  unless the place has a particular  significance for that religion so as to  form an essential or integral part  thereof. Places of worship of any  religion having particular significance  for that religion, to make it an  essential or integral part of the  religion, stand on a different footing  and have to be treated differently and  

more reverentially.”  

32    

On behalf of Hindus it is urged that the  plaintiffs are not entitled for the relief claimed  and as such the relief is barred by the  provisions of Section 42 of the Specific Relief  Act, 1877 which is at par with Section 34 of  the Specific Relief Act,1963 on the ground that  they have superior fundamental rights.  

Contentions of Hindus are as under:   

"The Hindus have superior fundamental  right than the Muslims under articles 25 & 26  of the Constitution of India for the reasons  that performing customary rituals and offering  service worship to the lord of universe to  acquire merit and to get salvation as such it is  integral part of Hindu Dharma & religion in  view whereof it is humbly submitted that the  instant suit is liable to be dismissed with  

exemplary cost: …  

2. In M. Ismail Faruqui (Dr.) v. Union of India,  (1994) 6 SCC 360, the Hon’ble Supreme Court  has held that the Right to Practise, Profess and  Propagate Religion guaranteed under Article  25 of the Constitution does not extend to the  Right of Worship at any and every place of  worship so that any hindrance to worship at a  particular place per se may infringe the  religious freedom guaranteed under Articles 25  and 26 of the Constitution of India. The  protection under Articles 25 and 26 is to  religious practice which forms integral part of  practice of that religion. While offer of prayer  or worship is a religious practice, its offering at  every location where such prayers can be  offered would not be an essential or integral  part of such religious practice unless the place  has a particular significance for that religion  so as to form an essential or integral part  thereof. Places of worship of any religion

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having particular significance of that religion  to make it an essential or integral part of the  religion stand on a different footing and have  to be treated differently and more reverentially.  Relying on said judgment it is submitted that  Sri Ramjanamsthan has particular significance  for the Hinduism as visiting and performing  customary rites confer merit and gives  salvation it is firm belief of the Hindus based  on their sacred Divine Holy Scriptures which  belief neither can be scrutinized by any Court  of Law nor can be challenged by the persons  having no faith in Hinduism as this is  conscience of the Hindus having special  protection under Article 25 of the Constitution  of India. Relevant paragraph 77 and 78 of the  

said judgment read as follows:   

77. It may be noticed that Article 25  does not contain any reference to  property unlike Article 26 of the  Constitution. The right to practise,  profess and propagate religion  guaranteed under Article 25 of the  Constitution does not necessarily  include the right to acquire or own or  possess property. Similarly this right  does not extend to the right of worship  at any and every place of worship so  that any hindrance to worship at a  particular place per se may infringe the  religious freedom guaranteed under  Articles 25 and 26 of the Constitution.  The protection under Articles 25 and  26 of the Constitution is to religious  practice which forms an essential and  integral part of the religion. A practice  may be a religious practice but not an

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essential and integral part of practice  

of that religion.   

78. While offer of prayer or worship is  a religious practice, its offering at every  location where such prayers can be  offered would not be an essential or  integral part of such religious practice  unless the place has a particular  significance for that religion so as to  form an essential or integral part  thereof. Places of worship of any  religion having particular significance  for that religion, to make it an  essential or integral part of the  religion, stand on a different footing  and have to be treated differently and  more reverentially.   

3. In M. Ismail Faruqui (Dr.) v. Union of  India (supra) the Hon’ble Supreme Court held  that a mosque is not an essential part of the  practice of the religion of Islam and namaz  (prayer) by Muslims can be offered any where  even in open. The Right to Worship is not at  any and every place so long as it can be  practised effectively, unless the Right to  Worship at a particular place is itself an  integral part of that right. Relying on said ratio  of law it is submitted that without offering  prayer at Sri Ramjanamsthan described as  Babri mosque in the plaint it can be practised  somewhere else but offering prayer instead of  Sri Ramjanamsthan at any other place cannot  be practised because the merit which is  obtained by worshiping at the birth place of Sri  Ram cannot be obtained by doing so at other  places and it will be contrary to the holy Divine  Sacred Scripture of the Hindus and will cause  extinction of a most sacred shrine of the

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Hindus. Relevant paragraph Nos. 80 to 87 of  

the said judgment read as follows:   

80. It has been contended that a  mosque enjoys a particular position in  Muslim Law and once a mosque is  established and prayers are offered in  such a mosque, the same remains for  all time to come a property of Allah  and the same never reverts back to the  donor or founder of the mosque and  any person professing Islamic faith can  offer prayer in such a mosque and  even if the structure is demolished, the  place remains the same where the  namaz can be offered. As indicated  hereinbefore, in British India, no such  protection was given to a mosque and  the mosque was subjected to the  provisions of statute of limitation  thereby extinguishing the right of  Muslims to offer prayers in a particular  mosque lost by adverse possession  

over that property.   

81. Section 3(26) of the General  Clauses Act comprehends the  categories of properties known to  Indian Law. Article 367 of the  Constitution adopts this secular  concept of property for purposes of our  Constitution. A temple, church or  mosque etc. are essentially immovable  properties and subject to protection  under Articles 25 and 26. Every  immovable property is liable to be  acquired. Viewed in the proper  perspective, a mosque does not enjoy  any additional protection which is not

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available to religious places of worship  

of other religions.   

82. The correct position may be  summarised thus. Under the  Mahomedan Law applicable in India,  title to a mosque can be lost by  adverse possession (See Mulla’s  Principles of Mahomedan Law, 19th  Edn., by M. Hidayatullah — Section  217; and Shahid Ganj v. Shiromani  Gurdwara. If that is the position in  law, there can be no reason to hold  that a mosque has a unique or special  status, higher than that of the places  of worship of other religions in secular  India to make it immune from  acquisition by exercise of the sovereign  or prerogative power of the State. A  mosque is not an essential part of the  practice of the religion of Islam and  namaz (prayer) by Muslims can be  offered anywhere, even in open.  Accordingly, its acquisition is not  prohibited by the provisions in the  Constitution of India. Irrespective of  the status of a mosque in an Islamic  country for the purpose of immunity  from acquisition by the State in  exercise of the sovereign power, its  status and immunity from acquisition  in the secular ethos of India under the  Constitution is the same and equal to  that of the places of worship of the  other religions, namely, church, temple  etc. It is neither more nor less than  that of the places of worship of the  other religions. Obviously, the  acquisition of any religious place is to

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be made only in unusual and  extraordinary situations for a larger  national purpose keeping in view that  such acquisition should not result in  extinction of the right to practise the  religion, if the significance of that place  be such. Subject to this condition, the  power of acquisition is available for a  mosque like any other place of worship  of any religion. The right to worship is  not at any and every place, so long as  it can be practised effectively, unless  the right to worship at a particular  place is itself an integral part of that  

right…..”  

[Printed volume of the judgment at  

page Nos.3454-3458]  

27. Hence, it is clear that the questionable observations in Ismail  

Faruqui have certainly permeated the impugned judgment. Thus,  

the impugned judgment can be claimed to be both expressly and  

inherently affected by the questionable observations made in Ismail  

Faruqui. Further, Ismail Faruqui prima facie leads a different  

approach regarding the application of essential and/or integral test  

which also needs to be resolved as a matter of constitutional  

significance. In my view, Ismail Faruqui needs to be brought in line  

with the authoritative pronouncements in Shirur Mutt and other

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decisions referred to in paragraphs 14 to 18 and 20 of this  

judgment.  

28. The importance and seriousness of the matter can be better  

understood by the observations made by Justice S.U. Khan in the  

impugned judgment itself, in the following words:-  

"Here is a small piece of land (1500 square  yards) where angels fear to tread.  It is full of  innumerable land mines.  We are required to  clear it.  Some very sane elements advised us  not to attempt that.  We do not propose to  rush in like fools lest we are blown.  However,  we have to take risk.  It is said that the  greatest risk in life is not daring to take risk  when occasion for the same arises.  Once angels were made to bow before Man.   Sometimes he has to justify the said honour.   This is one of those occasions.  We have  succeeded or failed?  No one can be a judge in  his own cause.  Accordingly, herein follows the judgment for  which the entire country is waiting with bated  breath."  

29. It is relevant here to state that by an order dated 26.3.2018 a  

three-Judge Bench of this Court in Sameena Begum v. Union of  

India & Ors. [Writ Petition (Civil) No. 222 of 2018] has referred the  

matter relating to polygamy including Nikah Halala; Nikha Mutah;  

and Nikah Misya to a Constitution Bench.  The order of reference in  

the said case reads as under:

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"It is submitted by learned counsel for the  petitioners that the challenge in these writ  petitions pertains to the prevalent practice of  polygamy including Nikah Halala; Nikah  Mutah; and Nikah Misyar as they are  unconstitutional.  Various grounds have been  urged in support of the stand as to how these  practices, which come within the domain of  personal law, are not immune from judicial  review under the Constitution.  It is urged by  them that the majority opinion of the  

Constitution Bench in the case of Shayara  Bano etc. v. Union of India & Ors. etc. (2017) 9  SCC 1 has not dealt with these aspects.  They  have drawn our attention to various  paragraphs of the judgment to buttress the  point that the said issues have not been really  addressed as there has been no delineation on  these aspects.  

On a perusal of the judgment, we find the  submission of the learned counsel for the  parties/petitioners is correct that these  concepts have not been decided by the  Constitution Bench.   

 xxx   xxx   xxx    xxx   xxx   xxx    At this juncture, a submission has  

been advanced at the Bar that keeping in  view the importance of the issue, the  matter should be placed before the  Constitution Bench.  Accepting the said  submission, it is directed that the matter  be placed before Hon'ble the Chief Justice  of India for constitution of appropriate  Constitution Bench for dwelling upon the

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issues which may arise for consideration  from the writ petitions."  

     (Emphasis supplied)  

30. Moreover, a two-Judge Bench of this Court on 6.7.2018 in  

Jyoti Jagran Mandal v. NDMC & Anr. [Civil Appeal No. 5820 of  

2018] has referred the matter in relation to the policy decision  

permitting Ram Leela and Puja once in a year in public parks to a  

Constitution Bench holding as under:  

"Application seeking exemption from filing  certified copy of the impugned order is allowed.    

Appeal admitted.     The order of the National Green Tribunal,  

Principal Bench, New Delhi has rejected an  application made by the appellant to have  what is known as “Mata-ki-Chowki” in a public  park. The appellant has expressly relied upon  earlier orders, including a policy decision,  which permits Ram Leela and Puja to be  allowed once in a year in such public parks.   

 The appeal raises a question of great  

constitutional importance as to whether  such activities can be allowed in state  owned premises in view of our Constitution  being secular in nature. The Hon’ble Chief  Justice is, therefore, requested to  constitute an appropriate Bench to hear the  aforesaid matter."  

     (Emphasis supplied)

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31. In Sunita Tiwari v. Union of India & Ors. {Writ Petition (Civil)  

No. 286 of 2017} a Three-Judge Bench of this Court was  

considering the question relating to banning the practice of Female  

Genital Mutilation (FGM) or Khatna or Female Circumcision (FC) or  

Khafd.  It was submitted by the senior counsel appearing for the  

contesting respondent that the matter should be referred to a larger  

Bench for an authoritative pronouncement because the practice is  

an essential and integral practice of the religious sect.  Learned  

Attorney General for India also submitted that it deserves to be  

referred to a larger Bench.  By Order dated 24.09.2018, the matter  

was referred to a larger Bench, the relevant portion of which is as  

under:  

"Regard being had to the nature of the case,  the impact on the religious sect and many  other concomitant factors, we think it  apposite not to frame questions which shall  be addressed to by the larger Bench. We  also think it appropriate that the larger  Bench may consider the issue in its  entirety from all perspectives.   In view of the aforesaid, we are of the view that  the matter should be placed before a larger  Bench. The Registry is directed to place the  papers of the instant matter before the Hon’ble  Chief Justice of India for obtaining appropriate  directions in this regard."  

(Emphasis supplied)

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32. Considering the Constitutional importance and significance of  

the issues involved, the following need to be referred to a larger  

Bench:  

(a) Whether in the light of Shirur Mutt and other  

aforementioned cases, an essential practice can be  

decided without a detailed examination of the beliefs,  

tenets and practice of the faith in question?  

(b) Whether the test for determining the essential practice is  

both essentiality and integrality?       

(c) Does Article 25, only protect belief and practices of  

particular significance of a faith or all practices regarded  

by the faith as essential?  

(d) Do Articles 15, 25 and 26 (read with Article 14) allow the  

comparative significance of faiths to be undertaken?   

  33. The Registry is directed to place this matter before the Hon'ble  

Chief Justice of India for appropriate orders.    

…….……………………………J.            (S. ABDUL NAZEER)  New Delhi;  September 27, 2018.