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        REPORTABLE

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA

CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION

CIVIL APPEAL No.  5335  OF 2017 (ARISING OUT OF SLP (C) No.11472/2013)

M/s Unichem Laboratories Ltd.       ….Appellant(s)

VERSUS

Rani Devi & Anr.        …Respondent(s)

WITH

CIVIL APPEAL No.  5336  OF 2017 (ARISING OUT OF SLP (C) No.13070/2013)

M/s Unichem Laboratories Ltd.       ….Appellant(s)

VERSUS

Amar Kaur & Anr.        …Respondent(s)

AND

CIVIL APPEAL No.  5337 OF 2017 (ARISING OUT OF SLP (C) No.27328/2014)

M/s Unichem Laboratories Ltd.       ….Appellant(s)

VERSUS

Rajesh Mohan Kapil        …Respondent(s)

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J U D G M E N T

Abhay Manohar Sapre, J.

S.L.P.(c) No. 11472 of 2013

1) Leave granted.

2) This appeal is filed against the final judgment

and  order  dated  15.10.2012  passed  by  the  High

Court of Judicature at Allahabad in Civil  Revision

No. 441 of 2012 whereby the High Court allowed the

revision and set  aside the  judgment/decree dated

30.07.2012 passed  by  the  Additional  District  and

Sessions  Judge,  Small  Causes  Court,  Ghaziabad,

U.P. in SCC No. 39 of 2001.

3) The  appellant  is  the  plaintiff  whereas  the

respondents are the defendants in the civil suit out

of which this appeal arises.

4) The  appellant  is  a  Public  Limited  Company

registered under the Companies Act. Its registered

office  is  at  Mumbai.  The  appellant  has  one

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industrial  unit at Industrial  Area, Meerut Road in

Ghaziabad (UP).

5) The  State  of  U.P.  has  enacted an Act  called

"The Uttar  Pradesh Industrial  Housing  Act,  1955"

(hereinafter referred to as "the Act”). The object of

this Act is to provide housing to industrial workers

by  the  State  or  local  authorities  working  in  the

industries in the State of UP.

6) Some Sections of the Act, which are relevant

for this case, need mention. Section 3 provides that

the  Act  shall  apply  to  those  houses  which  are

constructed by the State or the authorities specified

in the Section for the occupation of the Industrial

workers  under  the  Industrial  Housing  Scheme

subsidized  by  the  Central  Government  or  any

Scheme notified  in  the  Official  Gazette.  Section 4

empowers the State Government to appoint Labour

Commissioner to exercise the powers under the Act

in relation to the houses and other matters specified

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therein. Section 7 specifies the duties of the Labour

Commissioner.  Sections  10  and  11  deal  with

allotment of houses and the manner in which the

allotment  is  to  be  made.  Section  12 specifies  the

conditions  of  occupation  of  the  houses  by  the

allottees.  Section  13  deals  with  the  bar  of

jurisdiction of the Court and provides that no order

made by the State or Labour Commissioner under

the Act would be called in question in any Court

and no injunction shall be granted by any Court or

any  authority  in  respect  of  any  action  taken  in

pursuance of any power conferred by or under the

Act.  Sections  15  and  16  empower  the  Labour

Commissioner  to  fix  the  rates  of  rent  and  the

manner  of  its  payment.  Section 18 empowers  the

Labour Commissioner to enter into any house for

the  purpose  of  administering  or  carrying  out  the

provisions  of  the  Act.  Section  20  enables  the

employer of the allottee to enter into an agreement

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with the Labour Commissioner for recovery of rent

every  month  from  the  salary  of  their

employee(allottee).  Section 21 so long as it  was a

part  of  the  Act  (since  deleted  w.e.f  28.4.72)  had

empowered the Labour Commissioner to evict any

allottee  from  the  allotted  house  on  the  grounds

specified  therein.  Section  22  provides  a  right  of

appeal  to  the  State  against  the  order  of  Labour

Commissioner.  Section  28  provides  rule-making

power to carry out the provisions of the Act. This, in

substance, is the Scheme of the Act.     

7) The  State  Government  constructed  several

houses in accordance with the provisions of the Act

and  allotted,  quarter  Nos.  5,6,7,8,11  and  12  in

Block  No.  59  at  Industrial  Labour  Colony,

Ghaziabad  to  the  appellant  vide  order  dated

29.04.1971 so as  to  enable  the  appellant  to  allot

these houses/quarters to the workers for their use

and occupation while they were in the appellant's

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employment.  The  allotment  order  issued  by  the

State,  inter alia, provided that,  (1) monthly rent of

each quarter would be Rs.  23/-;  (2)  The quarters

would  be  used  only  for  residence  by  the  eligible

worker; (3) The allottee of the quarter shall deposit

security money of Rs. 46/- per quarter and will also

execute agreement as prescribed before occupying

the quarter; and (4) In the event, it is found that the

allotment is made to ineligible worker, his tenancy

shall  cease  attracting  penal  action  as  provided

under the Act/Rules etc.

8) Respondent  No.1's  husband-Dharam  Dev

Yadav was in the employment of  the appellant as

industrial worker. He was working in the appellant's

industrial  unit.  On 11.05.1971,  he applied  to  the

appellant  for  allotment of  one quarter  for  his use

and  occupation.  The  appellant,  vide  order  dated

12.05.71, allotted quarter No.5 in Block No. 59 in

the industrial colony at Ghaziabad to Dharam Dev

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Yadav. On allotment, Dharam Dev Yadav executed a

declaration as required under the Act/Rule.   

9) Dharam Dev Yadav retired from the appellant's

service on 12.01.1992. He, however, made request

to  the  appellant  vide  his  letter  dated 11.01.92 to

allow him to remain in occupation of the quarter for

a period of six months. The appellant acceded to his

request and accordingly granted him time to vacate

the  quarter  on  or  before  30.06.1992  on

humanitarian ground. Dharam Dev Yadav did not

vacate the quarter  after  expiry of  six  months and

continued  to  remain  in  its  occupation.  In  the

meantime,  he  died  leaving  behind  his  wife

(respondent  No.  1  herein)  who  also  continued  to

remain in the occupation of the quarter along with

her family members.  

10) The appellant, therefore, filed a civil suit in the

year  2001  being  S.C.C.  No  39/2001  before  the

Additional  District  &  Sessions  Judge,  Ghaziabad

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against  the  respondents.  The  suit  was  for

respondent's eviction from the quarter in question

and  also  for  claiming  damages  for  its  use  and

occupation payable from 30.06.1992. It was alleged

that the allotment period having come to an end on

the  date  of  retirement  of  Dharam  Dev  Yadav  on

12.01.1992 and the same having been extended for

six months till  30.06.1992, he was under legal as

well as contractual obligation to vacate the quarter

on  and  after  30.06.1992.  It  was  alleged  that  the

respondents, who claim through Dharam Dev Yadav

had no independent right to remain in occupation of

the  quarter  because  they  were  neither  in  the

appellant's employment and nor any allotment order

had been issued by the appellant or/and the State

in their favour in relation to quarter No. 5. It was

alleged that the respondents are, therefore, in illegal

occupation of the quarter in question as trespasser

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and hence were liable to be evicted from the said

quarter.  

11) The respondents filed their written statement

and denied the claim made by the appellant. It was

alleged that the appellant being a Company had no

right to file a suit unless resolution had been passed

authorizing  the  plaintiff-Company  to  file  the  suit

against  the  respondents.  It  was  alleged  that  the

appellant  not  being  the  owner  of  the  quarter  in

question  had  no  right  to  file  a  civil  suit  seeking

respondent's  eviction  from  the  quarter.  The

respondents  then  alleged  that  they  were  in

occupation  of  the  suit  house  as  tenant.  The

respondents also alleged that the suit was barred by

virtue of Section 13 of the Act read with Section 23

of  the  Small  Cause  Courts  Act  and hence  it  was

liable to be dismissed as being barred.

12) The  Trial  Court  framed  9  issues.  Parties

adduced  evidence.  The  Trial  Court,  vide

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judgment/decree  dated  30.07.2012  decreed  the

appellant’s suit and passed eviction decree against

the  respondents.  It  was  held  that,  (i)  the  suit  is

maintainable;  (ii)  there  existed  a  relationship  of

landlord  and  tenant  between  the  plaintiff  and

Dharam Dev  Yadav;  (iii)  the  monthly  rent  of  suit

house  is  Rs  34/-;  (iv)  the  suit  is  not  barred  by

Section 13 of the Act read with Section 23 of the

Provincial Small Cause Courts Act;  (v) the District

Judge  has  jurisdiction  to  try  the  suit;  (vi)  the

plaintiff  is authorized and hence competent to file

the  civil  suit;  (vii)  Dharam Dev  Yadav  was  under

contractual  and legal obligation to vacate the suit

house no sooner he retired from service;  (viii) the

tenancy in respect of  the quarter came to end on

termination of the employment of Dharam Dev;  (ix)

defendant No. 1 being  wife of the original allottee

had  no  right  to  occupy  the  quarter  in  question

because she was neither  a workman and nor  the

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allottee;  and (x)  the plaintiff  was entitled to claim

Rs.  1000/-  per  month  from  the  defendants  from

25.9.1998  till  the  date  of  filing  the  suit  and  Rs.

1000/- per month during the pendency of suit till

possession  is  taken  of  the  suit  house  from  the

defendants.  

13) Felt  aggrieved,  the  defendants  filed  revision

before the High Court under Section 25 of the Small

Cause  Courts  Act.  By  impugned  order,  the  High

Court  allowed  the  revision,  set  aside  the

judgment/decree of the Trial  Court and dismissed

the appellant's suit. The High Court held that, (i) the

civil suit at the instance of the plaintiff (appellant) is

not maintainable for want of plaintiff's (appellant’s)

locus; (ii) the suit, however, is not barred by Section

13 of the Act;  (iii) such suit, however, could be filed

by  the  State  Government  or/and  Labour

Commissioner; and (iv) there was no relationship of

landlord and tenant between the appellant and the

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original allottee. The High Court then proceeded to

give directions to the Principal Secretary, Labour to

take action against the erring officials who failed to

take any action to obtain possession of the quarters

from illegal occupants.

14) Felt aggrieved, the plaintiff filed present appeal

by way of special leave before this Court.      

15) Heard  Mr.  Sudhir  Chandra,  learned  senior

counsel for the appellant and Mr. Jay Savla, learned

counsel for respondent No.2.

16) Having heard  learned counsel for the parties

and on perusal  of  the  record of  the  case,  we are

inclined to allow the appeal and while setting aside

the  impugned  order  and  restore  the

judgment/decree  of  the  Trial  Court,  which rightly

decreed appellant’s suit against the respondents.

17) In  our  considered  opinion,  both  the  Courts

rightly held that the Civil Suit is not barred under

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Section 13 of  the Act.  The reasons are not  far  to

seek.  

18) As would be clear from the provisions of  the

Act,  the power to decide the eviction cases under

the  Act  was  earlier  vested  with  the  Labour

Commissioner  under  Section  21  of  the  Act.

However, by U.P. Act No. 22/1972, Section 21 was

deleted  with  effect  from  28.04.1972.  This

necessarily resulted in restoring the power to try the

eviction suit by the Civil Court under general law in

terms of  Section 9 of  the Code of  Civil  Procedure

1908 (hereinafter referred to as “the Code”).

19) Section 9 of the Code provides that the Courts

shall  have  jurisdiction  to  try  all  suits  of  a  "civil

nature" excepting suits of which their cognizance is

either expressly or impliedly barred. A suit filed to

claim eviction from any accommodation is a suit of

"civil  nature"  and,  therefore,  the  Civil  Court  is

competent to take cognizance of such suit unless its

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jurisdiction  is  expressly  or  impliedly  barred  by

virtue of any special Enactment.  It is not so here.  

20) As  mentioned  above,  the  jurisdiction  of  the

Civil  Court to try the eviction cases arising under

the  Act  was  barred  by  virtue  of  Section  21  till

28.04.1972  because  the  power  to  try  such  cases

was  vested  in  Labour  Commissioner.  It  was

permissible for the Legislature to do so.  However,

on and after 28.04.1972, Labour Commissioner was

divested with the power to try the eviction cases by

reason of deletion of Section 21 from the Act. The

jurisdiction to try the suits arising under the Act,

therefore,  stood restored to the Civil Court by virtue

of  Section  9  of  the  Code  because  the  Legislature

then did not confer such powers to try the matters

arising under the Act on other specified authority on

and after 28.04.1972. It is for these reasons, we are

of the considered opinion that the Civil Court was

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justified in trying and deciding the suit out of which

this appeal arises.     

21) So  far  as  rigour  of  Section  13  of  the  Act  is

concerned, in our opinion, it does not put any fetter

on the powers of the Civil Court to try and decide

the eviction cases filed by the State or any authority

or  allotee  of  the  houses  against  the  person  in

possession of the quarter on and after 28.04.1972.   

22) Section 13 only provides that if  any order is

passed  by  the  State  Government  or  Labour

Commissioner under the Act,  it shall not be called

in question in any Court and no Court shall grant

any injunction in respect of any action taken or to

be taken under the Act.   

23) This,  in  our  opinion,  only  means  that  no

industrial  worker or any person alike him, if  feels

aggrieved of any order passed under the Act by the

specified authority, will have a right to file any case

in the Civil  Court  to challenge the legality  of  any

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such order or/and action taken under the Act. In

other  words,  it  only  restricts  the  rights  of  the

worker/person  in  approaching  the  Courts  to

question the legality of the action taken under the

Act.  This  Section  unlike  Section  21  cannot  be

construed  as  ousting  the  jurisdiction  of  the  Civil

Court to try the eviction suit filed by the employer

under the Act.

24) It is a settled principle of law that exclusion of

jurisdiction of  the Civil  Court  is  not  to be readily

inferred and such exclusion is either be “explicitly

expressed or clearly implied”.  It is a principle by no

means to be whittled down and has been referred to

as a “fundamental rule”.  As a necessary corollary of

this  rule,  provisions excluding jurisdiction of  Civil

Courts  are  required  to  be  construed  strictly.   In

other  words,  it  is  trite  rule  of  interpretation  that

existence  of  jurisdiction  in  Civil  Courts  to  decide

questions of civil nature is a general rule whereas

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the  exclusion  is  an  exception.   The  burden  is,

therefore, on the party who raises such a contention

to  prove  such  exclusion.   (See  Interpretation  of

Statutes  by  G.P.  Singh,  12th Edition,  pages

747-748).  It is not so in this case.

25) It is for these reasons, we are of the view that

both the Courts below were right in holding that the

suit is not hit by rigors of Section 13 of the Act.

26) This  takes us to  examine the next  question,

namely,  whether  the  High  Court  was  justified  in

holding that the appellant (company) had no right to

file  the  suit  for  want  of  any  locus  qua the

defendants  in  relation  to  the  quarter  or  in  other

words,  whether  the  High  Court  was  justified  in

holding that there was no privity of contract of any

nature  between  the  appellant  and  Dharam  Das

Yadav in relation to the quarter and, therefore, they

were not competent to file a suit under the Act to

seek  respondents  eviction  from  the  quarter  and

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such suit could be filed either by the State or/and

Labour Commissioner? Yet another question as to

whether the High Court was justified in holding that

there  did  not  exist  any  tenancy  between  the

appellant and the worker in respect of the quarter?

We do not agree with the view taken by the High

Court as, in our view, the questions posed deserve

to be answered in appellant’s favour and against the

respondents for the reasons mentioned infra.

27) It is not in dispute that the State had allotted

the  quarters  to  the  appellant  under  the  Act  by

issuing an allotment order.  It is also not in dispute

that  the  allotment  of  quarters  was  made  by  the

appellant  to  their  workers  for  their  use  and

occupation,  who  were  in  their  employment.  That

apart and as would be clear,  the Act enabled the

appellant to deduct the rent every month from the

monthly  salary of  the workers under  the Act  and

lastly, there existed a relationship of the employer

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and  the  employee  between  the  appellant  and  the

allottee-worker due to which only, the workers were

eligible to secure the quarter under the Act as a part

of their service conditions.

28) In  our  considered  opinion,  the  aforesaid

undisputed  facts  were  sufficient  to  hold  that

contractual relationship between the appellant and

the  allottee-worker  in  relation  to  the  quarter  for

deciding  their  inter  se rights  had  come  into

existence.   It  could  be,  therefore,  construed  as

tenancy  agreement  between  the  parties.   The

appellant was, therefore, competent  to file the civil

suit  against  the  worker  for  his  eviction  from the

quarter  allotted  to  him  on  the  strength  of  such

agreement by taking recourse to the provisions of

the  Act.   The  breaches  alleged  by  the  appellant

against  the  respondents  in  the  suit  rendered  the

worker and all those claiming through him liable to

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suffer  the  eviction  order  because  such  breaches

were rightly held proved by the Trial Court.

29) This takes us to examine one more question,

which arises for consideration, namely, status of the

allottee-worker  qua the appellant on his ceasing to

be in the appellant’s employment in relation to the

quarter.  It  is  not  in  dispute  that  the  quarter  in

question  was  allotted  to  Dharam  Dev  Yadav  by

virtue of he being in the appellant's employment. It

is  also  not  in  dispute  that  he  retired  from  the

service  on  12.01.1992.  He  was,  therefore,  under

contractual obligation to vacate the quarter on his

retirement.  He did not do so and instead sought

extension  to  vacate  the  quarter  after  six  months.

The appellant granted it. Despite grant of extension,

he did not vacate after expiry of six months. In the

meantime,  he  died  and  his  family  members

(respondents) continued to remain in its occupation.

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30) The  law  on  this  question  is  well  settled.  A

contract  of  tenancy created between the employer

and  employee  in  relation  to  any  accommodation

terminates on the cessation of the employment of an

employee. In other words, such tenancy is only for

the period of employment and comes to an end on

termination of  the contract  of  employment.   Such

employee then has no right to remain in occupation

of the accommodation once he ceases to be in the

employment  of  his  employer.   He   has  to  then

surrender the accommodation to his employer.

31) In  this  case,  the  possession  of  the  original

allottee Dharam Dev Yadav became illegal  on and

after  12.01.1992  when  he  retired  from  service

because  on  this  date,  tenancy  in  relation  to  suit

quarter  also  came  to  an  end.   In  any  event,  it

became unauthorized on and after 30.06.1992. The

respondents too had no independent right to remain

in  occupation  of  the  quarter  in  question  because

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they  were  neither  in  the  employment  of  the

appellant and nor were the allottees under the Act

so  as  to  entitle  them to  remain in  possession on

their own rights.

32) The  Trial  Court  was,  therefore,  justified  in

recording  the  aforesaid  findings  against  the

respondents  and  was  also  justified  in  passing

decree for eviction and recovery of rent by way of

damages against the respondents. We find no good

ground to interfere in any of  these findings.  They

are accordingly upheld.

33) We may mention here that Section 630 of the

Companies Act also deals with such type of cases

arising between the Company and its employees to

whom  the  Company  has  provided  the

accommodation as part of his service conditions.  

34) The  Section  enables  the  Company  to  file  a

complaint  against  their  employee,  if  he  fails  to

vacate  the  accommodation  allotted  to  him by  the

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Company  by  virtue  of  his  employment  on

termination  of  his  employment.   Such  complaint

can be filed by the Company in the competent Court

wherein  the  Company  can  seek  employee's

prosecution, eviction from the accommodation and

also  for  imposition  of  the  fine  as  specified  in  the

Section.

35) The  appellant-Company,  in  this  case  could,

therefore, also take recourse to invoke the remedy

available  against  the  respondents  under  the

Companies Act.  It was legally permissible for them

to  do  so  because  the  Act  did  not  bar  the

applicability of Companies Act for resorting to such

remedy against the respondents. Be that as it may.

36) Learned  counsel  for  the  respondents  lastly

submitted that the State/Central  Government has

issued some G.Os. which, according to him, enable

the workers occupying the quarters after ceasing to

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be in the employment to purchase the quarters as

per the procedure prescribed in the G.Os.  

37) It is not for this Court to examine this question

in these proceedings for the simple reason that this

appeal is confined only to examine the legality of an

order passed by the High Court in the eviction suit.

We, therefore, express no opinion on this question.

38) In the light of foregoing discussion, we cannot

concur with the reasoning and the conclusion of the

High  Court.  The  appeal  thus  succeeds  and  is

allowed. The impugned order is set aside and that of

the Trial Court is restored.  

39) The respondents are granted 3 months’ time to

vacate  the  suit  quarter  provided  they  deposit  the

entire decreetal amount awarded by the Trial Court

and also deposit the three months’ rent by way of

damages for use and occupation at the same rate

determined by the Trial Court.  

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40) Let  the  decretal  amount  be  deposited  in  the

concerned Trial Court within one month. Failure to

deposit  the  amount  within  one  month  will  entitle

the appellant to execute the decree forthwith.

In S.L.P.(c) Nos. 13070 of 2013 and 27328

of 2014

Leave granted.

In view of the aforesaid judgment passed

in appeal arising out of S.L.P.(c) No. 11472 of 2013,

these appeals are also allowed on the same terms

and conditions.                   

            ………...................................J.

[R.K. AGRAWAL]             

                         …...……..................................J.

        [ABHAY MANOHAR SAPRE] New Delhi; April 18, 2017  

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