1

REPORTABLE

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA

CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION

    Civil Appeal No(s). 4483 OF 2019 (Arising out of SLP(C) No. 20017  of 2017)

Snowtex Investment Limited Appellant(s)

                               Versus

Principal Commissioner of Income Tax,  Central-2, Kolkata Respondent(s)

J U D G M E N T

Dr Dhananjaya Y Chandrachud, J

1 Leave granted.

2 This appeal arises from a judgment of a Division Bench of the High Court

of  Calcutta dated 22 November 2016 in an appeal under Section 260A of the

Income Tax Act, 1961.  

3 The appellant was registered as a non-banking financial company under

the Reserve Bank of India Act, 1934. The appellant filed its return of income on 27

September 2008.   The return was processed under Section 143(1) on 8 October

2009. On the case being selected for scrutiny, a notice was issued under Section

143(2). By an order dated 14 December 2010 the assessing officer  recorded that

the principal business activity of the assessee is trading in shares and securities.

The loss from share trading was held to be a speculation loss. The assessing

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officer held that in view of the provisions of Section 43(5)(d), activities pertaining

to futures and options could not be treated as speculative transactions.The loss

from speculation was held not to be capable of being set off against the profits

from business.

4 Against the order of the assessing officer for assessment year 2008-2009,

an appeal was filed before the CIT(A). The CIT(A) held that the assessee derived

income from trading in derivatives and share business along with dividend and

interest  and was an NBFC.   The CIT(A)  inter  alia  held that  the provisions of

Section  43(5)  came  into  existence  with  effect  from  1  April  2006  and  hence,

transactions in futures and options must be treated as business income as distinct

from trading in shares.  Consequently, the CIT(A) rejected the contention of the

assessee that the assessing officer had erred in not allowing the speculation loss

to be set off against profits of trading in futures and options.  

5 The Revenue appealed against the decision of the CIT(A). The Income Tax

Appellate Tribunal1 by its decision dated 6 November 2015 held that the claim of

the assessee for setting off the loss from share trading should be allowed against

the profits  from transactions in futures and options,  since the character  of  the

activities was similar.  The ITAT held that the assessee which was in the business

of share trading had treated the entire activity of the purchase and sale of shares

which comprised both of delivery based and non-delivery based trading, as one

composite business.

6 The Revenue appealed before the High Court which by its judgment dated

22 November 2016 accepted its submission. The High Court held that the profits

1 “ITAT”

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which  had  arisen  from trading  in  futures  and  options  were  not  profits  from a

speculative business. Hence the loss on trading in shares could not be set off

against the profits arising from the business of futures and options.

7 The dispute in the present case pertains to assessment year 2008-2009.    

8 Mr.  R.V.  Easwar,  learned  senior  counsel  appearing  on  behalf  of  the

appellant has urged two submissions in order to assail the decision of the High

Court.   First, it has been submitted that the Explanation to Section 73 as it stood

prior to its amendment with effect from 1 April 2015 by Finance (No. 2) Act, 2014

contemplated that where any part of the business of a company,  other than a

company,  the  principal  business  of  which  is  the  granting  of  loans  and

advances, consists in the purchase of shares of other companies, the company

shall, for the purposes of this section, be deemed to be carrying on a speculation

business.  In other words, the explanation as it then stood  clarified that where the

principal business of the company consists of the grant of loans and advances,

the deeming fiction  provided in  the explanation would  not  be attracted.  In  the

present  case,  it  was urged that  the principal  business of  the assessee for  AY

2008-2009 was of granting loans and advances.   This submission was sought to

be buttressed on the basis of the figures drawn from the balance sheet  of the

appellant as extracted in the order of assessment.   Those figures, it has been

submitted, indicate that for the financial year ending 31 March 2008, the following

position emerges:

(i)  The total funds available – Rs 13.48 crores;

(ii)  Funds deployed for loans and advances  - Rs 11.32 crores

(iii) Percentage – 84%

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(iv) Deployed for share business – Rs 1.28 crores

(v) Percentage – 9.5%

(vi)  Unsecured loans – Rs 5.92 crores

Consequently, the submission which has been urged under the first head is that

the  assessee  having  deployed  a  substantial  part  of  its  funds  during  the

assessment year for loans and advances, the High Court erred in accepting the

view of the assessing officer.  It was urged that the assessee has a certificate as

an NBFC under the provisions of the Reserve Bank of India Act 1934.   

9 The second limb of the submissions, which is in the alternative, is that the

provisions of the Explanation to Section 73 were amended so as to bring trading

in shares within its purview by Finance (No. 2) Act 2014.  It was urged that this

amendment  should  be  construed  to  be  retrospective,  though  Parliament  has

brought it into force with effect from 1 April 2015. In this regard, it was submitted

that insofar as trading in derivatives is concerned, the provisions of Section 43(5)

were amended by Finance Act,  2005 to provide that  an eligible transaction in

respect of trading in derivatives of securities carried out on a recognised stock

exchange shall not be deemed as a speculative transaction.  It was urged that

there  was  a  clear  anomaly  in  the  provisions  of  law.   The  anomaly,  it  was

submitted, consisted in the fact that delivery based trading in shares was treated

as a speculative business until the amendment to the Explanation to Section 73

was brought into force on 1 April 2015. On the other hand, what was essentially

speculative and non-delivery based, namely, trading in derivatives on recognised

stock exchanges was removed from the purview of the business of speculation

with effect from 2006-2007.   Reliance has been placed on the Circular of the

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CBDT dated 27 February 2006 explaining the provisions of the Finance Act, 2005

and on the Circular dated 21 January 2015 explaining the provisions of Finance

(No. 2) Act, 2015. Hence, it  is urged that even though Parliament brought into

force the amendment to the Explanation to Section 73 with effect  from 1 April

2015, this would not affect the judicial authority of this Court to indicate that the

amendment must, by its very nature, be regarded as retrospective having regard

to  the  intent  and  purpose  of  the  amendment.  Reliance  was  placed  on  the

decisions of this Court in  Allied Motors (P) Ltd. v.  Commissioner of Income

Tax, Delhi  2 and in Commissioner of Income Tax  v.  Alom Extrusions Ltd.  3.

10 On the other hand, it has been urged on behalf of the Revenue by Mr Arijit

Prasad that in evaluating what constitutes the principal business of the assessee

within the meaning of the Explanation to Section 73, the High Court has relied on

two significant  circumstances.   The  first  circumstance  is  the admission of  the

assessee before the assessing officer to the effect that share trading was the sole

business of the assessee during the assessment year in question.    The second

circumstance is  that  while  the assessee had received interest  on loans of  Rs

2,21,917, it had paid out interest of Rs 62,84,111.60.  The Revenue has urged

that the figures from the balance sheet of the assessee would indicate that while

the assessee had borrowed unsecured loans to the tune of Rs 5.92 crores and

had given loans and advances of  Rs 11.32 crores,  this  included interest  free

lending  of  Rs.  9.58  crores.   In  this  background,  the  High  Court  came to  the

conclusion  that  the  principal  business  for  the  assessment  year  was  not  the

granting of loans and advances.   This finding was supported on the above two

2 (1997) 3 SCC 472 3 (2010) 1 SCC 489

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grounds.    

11 On  the  second  issue  of  the  claim  of  retrospectivity,  it  was  urged  that

though the Court has the power in an appropriate case, based on the intent of the

legislature to hold that an amendment is retrospective, the position in this case is

quite distinct.   In the present case, it was submitted that when the provisions of

Section 43(5) were amended with effect from 2006 by the Finance Act 2005, the

legislature took note of the provisions of Section 73.   Yet it did not consider it

appropriate to make a corresponding amendment in the Explanation to Section 73

and it is only nine years thereafter that an amendment to the latter provision was

introduced.  Hence, it was urged that the intent of the legislature was not to make

the amendment to the Explanation to Section 73 retrospective.

12 Reliance has been placed on the decisions of this Court in Commissioner

of Income Tax (Central)-I, New Delhi v. Vatika Township Private Ltd.  4   and on

the  judgment  of  a  three  judge  Bench  of  this  Court  in  Vijay  Industries v

Commissioner of Income Tax  5.

13 These submissions now fall for consideration.

14 The provisions of Section 43(5) were amended by the Finance Act, 2005.

Prior to the amendment, Section 43(5) defined a ‘speculative transaction’ to mean

a transaction in which a contract for the purchase or the sale of any commodity

including stocks and shares is settled otherwise than by the actual delivery or

transfer  of  the  commodity  or scrips.   The  impact  of  the  amendment  by  the

Finance  Act,  2005  was  that  an  eligible  transaction  on  a  recognised  stock

4 (2015) 1 SCC 1 5 (2019) 4 SCC 184

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exchange in respect of trading in derivatives was deemed not to be a speculative

transaction.     With  effect  from 1  April  2006,  trading  in  derivatives  was  by  a

deeming fiction not regarded as a speculative transaction when it was carried out

on a recognized stock exchange.

15 The  circular  of  the  CBDT dated  27  February  2006  indicated  that  this

amendment was occasioned by the changes which were introduced by SEBI both

at  the legal  and technological  level  for  bringing in  greater  transparency in  the

market for derivatives.   Explaining the reason for the amendment, the Circular

states:

“3.10  Excluding  ‘trading  in  derivatives’ on  recognised  stock exchanges from the ambit of ‘speculative transactions’

Existing provisions of clause (5) of section 43 define ‘speculative transaction’ to  mean  a  transaction  in  which  a  contract  for  the purchase or sale of any commodity including stocks and shares is settled  otherwise  than  by  the  actual  delivery  or  transfer  of  the commodity or scrips. The proviso to section 43(5) lists out certain transactions which are not deemed to be speculative transactions.

Systemic  and  technological  changes  introduced  by  SEBI  have resulted in sufficient transparency in the stock markets and have to a  large  extent  curbed  the  scope  for  generating  fictitious  losses through artificial transactions or shifting of incidence of loss from one  person  to  another.  The  screen  based  computerized  trading provides  for  audit  trail.  In  the  wake  of  these  developments,  the present  distinction  between  speculative  and  non-speculative transactions,  in  respect  of  trading  in  derivatives  of  securities  is losing relevance.

The Finance Act, 2005 has, accordingly, amended section 43(5) to provide  that  an  eligible  transaction  in  respect  of  trading  in derivatives of securities carried out on a recognised stock exchange shall  not  be  deemed  as  speculative  transaction.  The  notification prescribing the rules and the conditions to be fulfilled by a stock exchange  to  be  recognized  by  the  Central  Government  for  the purposes  of  section  43(5)  [i.e.,  Rules  6DDA and  6DDB  of  the Income-tax Rules, 1962] has been published in the Official Gazette on 1st July, 2005 vide S. O. No. 932(E).

Applicability: From A.Y. 2006-07 onwards.”

16 Section  73  deals  with  losses  from speculation  business.    Under  sub-

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Section (1) of  Section 73, a loss computed in relation to speculation business

carried on by an assessee can only be set off against the profits and gains of

another speculation business.   The Explanation to Section 73 contains a deeming

fiction where certain businesses shall, for the purposes of the section, be deemed

to be speculation businesses.   The Explanation also carves out an exception in

respect  of  certain  specified  businesses  which  shall  lie  outside  the  fold  of  the

deeming fiction.  Prior to the amendment of the Explanation by the Finance (No.

2) Act 2014 with effect from 1 April 2015, the business of trading in shares carried

on  by  a  company  was  not  excluded  from  its  purview.   However,  by  the

amendment which was brought into force from 1 April 2015, the explanation to

Section 73 reads as follows:

“Explanation -  Where any part of the business of a company (other  than a  company whose gross  total  income consists mainly  of  income  which  is  chargeable  under  the  heads “Interest  on  securities”,  “Income  from  house  property”, “Capital  gains”  and  “Income  from  other  sources”,  or  a company the principal business of which is the business of trading  in  shares  or  banking  or  the  granting  of  loans  and advances)  consists  in  the  purchase  and sale  of  shares  of other  companies,  such company shall,  for  the purposes of this  section,  be  deemed  to  be  carrying  on  a  speculation business to the extent to which the business consists of the purchase and sale of such shares.”

17 While on the one hand, Parliament  amended Section 43(5) with effect

from 1 April 2006 as a result of which trading in derivatives on recognised stock

exchanges  fell  outside  the  purview  of  the  business  of  speculation,  a

corresponding amendment to the Explanation to Section 73 in respect of trading

in shares was brought in only with effect from 1 April 2015.      

18 The submission which has been urged on behalf of the appellant is that

there was no logical reason to exclude from the purview of speculation business,

trading in shares, whereas trading in derivatives was excluded, as we have seen,

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from the ambit of Section 43(5) after 1 April 2006. We  will  consider  this  aspect

of the alternative submission subsequently.     

19 At  this  stage,  we  will  deal  with  the  first  submission  which  is  that  the

Explanation to Section 73, as it stood prior to the amendment, excluded from the

deeming  definition  of  a  speculation  business,  a  situation  where  the  principal

business of a company was granting of loans and advances.

20 In the present case, there is no dispute about the fact that the assessee

was registered as an NBFC under the provisions of the Reserve Bank of India Act,

1934.   Section 73(1) does not define specifically, the circumstances in which the

principal business of a company would be regarded as a business of the specified

description.  In  the present  case,  the principal  business was  urged to be the

granting of loans and advances. We cannot accept this submission and are of the

view that the High Court was justified in rejecting it. The circumstance, which in

our view is of crucial significance, is how the assessee construed its own line of

business.   The High Court has extracted what the assessee stated before the

assessing officer namely:

“………… in our case the share trading is our sole business during the assessment year under concern”.

From the above statement of the assessee, it is evident that the assessee

itself stated that share trading was its sole business during the assessment year

in question i.e.  A.Y. 2008-2009.

21 Mr. R.V. Easwar, learned senior counsel submits that while the assessee

did make this statement before the assessing officer, it should not be regarded as

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conclusive.   It was urged that the submission of the assessee was also rejected

on the basis that while it had received interest on loans of Rs 2.21 lakhs, it had

paid out interest of Rs 62.84 lakhs.   The submission is that, it is not merely the

receipt of interest on  loans and advances, but the deployment of funds which

should have a bearing in determining the principal nature of the business. In this

context,  reliance  was  placed  on  the  view  taken  by  a  Division  Bench  of  the

Calcutta High Court in  Commissioner of Income Tax v.  Savi Commercial P.

Ltd.  6.   The High Court, while dealing with the provisions of the Explanation to

Section 73, observed that income alone cannot be taken into account and where

the activity of granting loans and advances “is on a larger scale than the business

of  buying and selling  shares”  that  would be an important  indicator.    In  other

words, it was held that profit alone cannot be made a distinctive factor.    

22 The correctness of this aspect of the submission which has been urged by

learned senior counsel need not be determined in the facts of the present aspect,

since we are of  the view that the High Court  was justified in relying upon the

specific admission of the assessee that during the assessment year in question,

its  sole business  was  of  dealing  in  shares.    We  must  also  advert  to  the

circumstance  that while the assessee had furnished loans and advances of Rs

11.32 crores during the assessment year, this included interest free lending to the

extent of Rs 9.58 crores.  Having regard to these facts and circumstances, the

specific  admission  of  the  assessee  before  the  assessing  officer  assumes

significance.    The assessee made an admission on a statement of fact which in

our view, must bind it.  In this view of the matter, the principal  business of the

6 (2015) 373 ITR 243

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assessee was not of granting loans and advances during the assessment year. As

a consequence, the deeming fiction under Section 73 would be attracted.   Hence,

the finding of the High Court, on the first aspect, cannot be faulted.

23 That leads the Court to the second submission which has been canvassed

in the course of the hearing of the appeal.   The provisions of Section 43(5) were

amended with effect from 1 April 2006.   The Finance Act, 2005 contained the

following memorandum explaining the amendment:

“The  proposed  amendment,  therefore,  seeks  to  provide  that  an eligible transaction carried out in respect of trading in derivatives in a recognised stock exchange shall not be deemed to be a speculative transaction.  The proposed amendment also seeks to notify relevant rules  etc.  regarding  conditions  to  be  fulfilled  by  recognised exchanges in this regard.   Further it is also proposed to amend sub- section (4) of section 73 so as to reduce the period of carry forward of  speculation  losses  from  eight  assessment  years  to  four assessment years.”

24 While amending the provisions of  Section 43(5),  the Parliament  indeed

was cognizant of the provisions which were contained in Section 73(4).    The

above memorandum indicates that the provisions of Section 73(4) were proposed

to be amended so as to reduce the period of carry forward of speculation losses

from eight  assessment years to  four  assessment  years.  Having introduced an

amendment to Section 73(4), the Parliament would have, if it intended to bring

about  a  parity  with  the  provisions  of  Section  43(5)  introduced  a  specific

amendment.  Parliament, however, did not do so by the Finance Act 2005. It was

only  with  effect  from 1  April  2015  that  an  amendment  was  brought  about  to

exclude trading in shares from the deeming provision contained in the Explanation

to Section 73. Parliament  may have had reasons to allow the situation to

continue until the amendment was brought into force, including its view in regard

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to the stability of the stock market.  Insofar as this Court is concerned, It would be

difficult to hold that the provisions which were contained in the Finance Act (No. 2)

2014 insofar as they amended the Explanation to Section 73 were clarificatory or

that notwithstanding the provision by which the amendment was brought into force

with effect from 1 April 2015, that it should be given retrospective effect. We reject

the second submission.

25 Even  though an amendment, including one in the context of the Finance

Act is brought into force with effect from a stipulated date, the Court may as an

exercise  of  statutory  interpretation,  determine  whether  the  amendment  is

clarificatory or was intended to operate with retrospective effect. Such an exercise

was  carried  out  by  this  Court  in  its  decision  in  Allied  Motors   (supra).

Interpreting the provisions of Section 43B, this Court held thus:

“10…While interpreting Section 43-B without the first proviso some of the High Courts, in order to prevent undue hardship to the assessee, had taken the view that Section 43-B would not be attracted unless the sum payable  by  the assesee by  way of  tax,  duty,  cess  or  fee  was payable in the same accounting year.   If the tax was payable in the next accounting year, Section 43-B would not be attracted.   This was done in order to prevent any undue hardship to assessees such as the ones  before  us.   The  Memorandum of  Reasons  takes  note  of  the combined effect of Section 43-B and the first proviso inserted by the Finance Act, 1987.   After referring to the fact that the first proviso now removes the hardship caused to such taxpayers it explains the insertion of Explanation 2 as being for the purpose of removing any ambiguity about the term “any sum payable” under clause (a) of Section 43-B. This Explanation is made retrospective.   The Memorandum seems to proceed on the basis that Section 43-B read with the proviso takes care of the hardship situation and hence Explanation 2 can be inserted with retrospective  effect  to  make  clear  the  ambit  of  Section  43-B(a). Therefore,  Section  43-B(a),  the  first  proviso  to  Section  43-B  and Explanation  2 have to  be  read together  as  giving  effect  to  the  true intention  of  Section  43-B.  If  Explanation  2  is  retrospective,  the  first proviso will  have to  be so construed.    Read in  this  light  also,  the proviso has to be read into Section 43-B from its inception along with Explanation 2.”

26 The decision of the Court was intrinsically based on a holistic reading of the

provisions  of  Section  43-B.  The  memorandum  proceeded  on  the  basis  that

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Section  43-B  read  with  the  proviso  was  intended  to  alleviate  a  situation  of

hardship.  Hence, Explanation 2 was enacted  with retrospective effect to clarify

the  ambit  of  Section  43-B(a).    This  Court  held  that  if  Explanation  2  is

retrospective, the first proviso would be similarly so construed.   This position was

re-enforced by a departmental circular. The Court, in other words, interpreted the

intent of Parliament.

27 A similar line of enquiry has been adopted in the subsequent decision of

this  Court  in  Alom Extrusions (supra).    In  that  case,  while  construing  the

provisions of Section 43-B, this Court held:

“25.   Before concluding, we extract hereinbelow the relevant observations of this Court in CIT v. J.H. Gotla (1985)7 which reads as under: (SCC p. 360, para 47)

“47.   … we should find out  the intention from the language used by the legislature and if strict literal construction leads to an absurd result i.e. result not intended to be subserved by the object of the legislation found in the manner indicated before, and if another construction is possible apart from strict  literal  construction then that  construction should be preferred to the strict  literal  construction.  Though equity  and taxation  are  often  strangers, attempts  should  be  made  that  these  do  not  remain  always  so  and  if  a construction results in equity rather than in injustice, then such construction should be preferred to the literal construction.

The test to be applied is essentially one of the intent of the legislature.  

28 In  a  more  recent  decision in  Commissioner  of  Income Tax v.  Vatika

Township Pvt. Ltd.  8, a  Constitution Bench of this Court held thus:

“42.1.  “Notes  on  Clauses”  appended  to  the  Finance  Bill,  2002  while proposing insertion of proviso categorically states that “this amendment will  take effect from 1.6.2002”. These become epigraphic9 words, when seen in contradistinction to other amendments specifically stating those to be  clarificatory  or  retrospectively  depicting  clear  intention  of  the legislature.  It  can  be  seen  from  the  same  notes  that  a  few  other amendments  in  the  Income  Tax  Act  made  by  the  same  Finance  Act specifically making those amendments retrospective. For example, clause 40 seeks to amend S.92-F. Clause (iii-a) of S.92-F is amended “so as to

7 (1985) 4 SCC 343 8  (2015) 1 SCC 1 9 Ed.: As per the Oxford Dictionary, “epigraphic” here means: intending to suggest the

theme or purpose of the amendment

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clarify that the activities mentioned in the said clause include the carrying out of any work in pursuance of a contract.” (emphasis supplied).  This amendment  takes  effect  retrospectively  from  1-4-2002.  Various  other amendments also take place retrospectively. The Notes on Clauses show that the legislature is fully aware of three concepts:

(i) prospective amendment with effect from a fixed date;

(ii) retrospective amendment with effect from a fixed anterior date; and

(iii) clarificatory amendments which are retrospective in nature.”

29 In M/s. Vijay Industries (supra), decided on 1 March 2019, a three judge

Bench  of  this  Court  held  that  the  provisions  of  Section  80AB  which  were

introduced by the Finance (No. 2) Act, 1980 with effect from 1 April 1981 could not

be regarded as clarificatory in nature. The Court held that the provision was made

with prospective effect and the amendment would not apply to assessment years

1979-1980 and 1980-1981 because the amended provision was brought on the

statute book after the assessment years in question.

30 In conclusion, we therefore, hold that the amendment which was brought

by Parliament to the Explanation to Section 73 by the Finance (No 2) Act 2014

was with  effect  from 1  April  2015.    In  its  legislative  wisdom,  the  Parliament

amended  Section 43(5) with effect from 1 April 2006 in relation to the business of

trading  in  derivatives,  Parliament  brought  about  a  specific  amendment  in  the

Explanation to Section 73, insofar as trading in shares is concerned, with effect

from 1 April 2015.   The latter amendment was intended to take effect from the

date stipulated by Parliament and we see no reason to hold either that  it was

clarificatory or that the intent of Parliament was to give it retrospective effect.

31 The consequence is that in A.Y. 2008-2009, the loss which occurred to the

assessee as a result of its activity of trading in shares (a loss arising from the

business of  speculation) was not capable of being set off against the profits which

15

it had earned against the business of futures and options since the latter did not

constitute profits and gains of a speculative business.

32 For the reasons we have indicated, we find no error in the decision of the

High Court. The appeal is, accordingly, dismissed.   There shall be no order as

to costs.

33 Pending application(s), if any, shall stand disposed of.

……….………………................................J.            (Dr Dhananjaya Y Chandrachud)

………………………...............................J.            (Hemant Gupta)

New Delhi  April 30, 2019

16

ITEM NO.15               COURT NO.9               SECTION XVI

              S U P R E M E  C O U R T  O F  I N D I A                        RECORD OF PROCEEDINGS

Petition for Special Leave to Appeal (C) No. 20017/2017

(Against the Final judgment and order dated 22.11.2016 passed by the Hon’ble High Court of Calcutta in ITAT No. 199 of 2016)

M/S SNOWTEX INVESTMENT LIMITED                     Petitioner(s)

                               VERSUS

PRINCIPAL COMMISSIONER OF INCOME TAX, CENTRAL -2, KOLKATA   Respondent(s)      Date : 30-04-2019 This petition was called on for hearing today.

CORAM :           HON'BLE DR. JUSTICE D.Y. CHANDRACHUD          HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE HEMANT GUPTA

For Appellant(s) Mr. R.V. Easwar, Sr. Adv.

                   Mr. Naveen R. Nath, AOR Ms. Lalit Mohini Bhat, Adv. Mr. Rahul Jain, Adv. Ms. Rubal Bansal, Adv.

                   For Respondent(s)

Mr. Arijit Prasad, Sr. Adv. Ms. Rukhmini Bobde, Adv.

                   Mrs. Anil Katiyar, AOR                      

         UPON hearing the counsel the Court made the following                              O R D E R

Leave granted.

The  appeal  is  dismissed  in  terms  of  the  signed  reportable

judgment.

Pending application(s), if any, shall stand disposed of.

(MANISH SETHI)                                  (SAROJ KUMARI GAUR) COURT MASTER (SH)                                  BRANCH OFFICER

(Signed reportable judgment is placed on the file)