M/S SCG CONTRACTS INDIA PVT. LTD. Vs KS CHAMANKAR INFRASTRUCTURE PVT. LTD.
Bench: HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE ROHINTON FALI NARIMAN, HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE VINEET SARAN
Judgment by: HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE ROHINTON FALI NARIMAN
Case number: C.A. No.-001638-001638 / 2019
Diary number: 8868 / 2018
Advocates: ACE LEGAL Vs
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REPORTABLE
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA
CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION
CIVIL APPEAL NO. 1638 OF 2019 (Arising out of Special Leave Petition (C) No. 103/2019)
M/S SCG CONTRACTS INDIA PVT. LTD. Appellant(s)
VERSUS
K.S. CHAMANKAR INFRASTRUCTURE PVT. LTD. & ORS. Respondent(s)
J U D G M E N T
R.F. Nariman, J.
1) Leave granted.
2) In the present case, a Suit was filed on 10.03.2017
claiming a sum of Rs. 6,94,63,114/-. The Defendant No.1 was
served with the summons in the Suit on 14.07.2017. 120 days
from this date takes us to 11.11.2017, by which date no
written statement had been filed. Meanwhile, however, an
Order VII Rule 11 application was filed. This application was
taken up and rejected by the first impugned order dated
05.12.2017. After rejecting the Order VII Rule 11
application, the learned Single Judge recorded that none
appeared for the plaintiff inspite of advance copy stated to
have been given. He also records that the counsel for the
defendant No.1 now states that seven days time be granted to
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file a written statement. Para 14 of the aforesaid order then
reads as follows:
“14. Subject to the defendant No.1 paying costs of
Rs.25,000/- to the counsel for the plaintiff on or
before 15th December, 2017, the time for filing
the written statement is extended till 15th
December, 2017. If either of the conditions is
not complied with, the right of the defendant No.1
to file written statement shall stand closed
without any further order.”
3) In obedience to this order, a written statement was filed
on 15.12.2017 by the defendant No.1. By a belated application
dated 06.08.2018, it was averred that the recent changes that
have been made in the Code of Civil Procedure were not adhered
to as a result of which the written statement which had yet to
be taken on record could not so to be taken on record in view
of the fact that 120 days had elapsed from the date of service
of summons of this Suit.
4) On 24.09.2018, another learned Single Judge took up this
application and held that the 05.12.2017 order being final,
even though the provisions of law may provide otherwise, the
defendant No.1’s written statement which was filed on
15.12.2017 should be taken on record. The petitioner has
filed a Special Leave Petition against the aforesaid two
orders.
5) Learned counsel appearing on behalf of the petitioner has
taken us through the recent amendments made in the Code of
Civil Procedure and argued, laying great emphasis on State of
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Bihar and Others vs. Bihar Rajya Bhumi Vikas Bank Samiti,
(2018) 9 SCC 472 as well as Canara Bank vs. N.G. Subbaraya
Setty and Anr. AIR 2018 SC 3395 for the proposition that the
amendments so made now provide for the consequence of non-
filing of written statement, and as this is so, the provisions
of Order VIII Rules 1 and 10 can no longer be said to be
directory but can only be said to be mandatory. In this view
of the matter, since a statutory prohibition now exists, the
doctrine of res judicata cannot be availed.
6) As against this, learned counsel appearing on behalf of
the respondents has argued, basing himself on the decisions in
Bhanu Kumar Jain vs. Archana Kumar and Another, (2005) 1 SCC
787 and Shaikh Salim Haji Abdul Khayumsab vs. Kumar and
Others, (2006) 1 SCC 46 that the vital difference between res
judicata in a subsequent suit and res judicata in two
different stages of the same proceeding must be kept in view.
He stated that as the 05.12.2017 order had attained finality
and could only now be challenged after the decree in the Suit
is passed, clearly, the order of 24.09.2018 is correct. He
also stated that by now the order dated 05.12.2017 had been
acted upon and a wrongful act of the Court therefore, cannot
prejudice him. He also argued citing the judgment of R.K.
Roja vs. U.S. Rayudu and Another, (2016) 14 SCC 275 that as an
Order VII Rule 11 application had been filed and that had to
be answered before trial of the Suit could commence, it was
clear that a written statement could not be filed. He then
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relied upon Section 151 of the Code of Civil Procedure which
preserves the inherent power of the court, more particularly,
that of a Court of record - the High Court, and can be invoked
in cases like the present where grossly unjust consequences
would otherwise ensue.
7) Having heard learned counsel for both parties, it is
important to first set out the statutory provisions.
8) The Commercial Courts, Commercial Division and Commercial
Appellate Division of High Courts Act, 2015 came into force on
23.10.2015 bringing in their wake certain amendments to the
Code of Civil Procedure. In Order V, Rule 1, sub-rule (1),
for the second proviso, the following proviso was substituted:
“Provided further that where the defendant fails
to file the written statement within the said
period of thirty days, he shall be allowed to file
the written statement on such other days, as may
be specified by the Court, for reasons to be
recorded in writing and on payment of such costs
as the court deems fit, but which shall not be
later than one hundred twenty days from the date
of service of summons and on expiry of one hundred
and twenty days from the date of service of
summons, the defendant shall forfeit the right to
file the written statement and the court shall not
allow the written statement to be taken on
record.”
Equally, in Order VIII Rule 1, a new proviso was substituted
as follows:
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“Provided that where the defendant fails to file
the written statement within the said period of
thirty days, he shall be allowed to file the
written statement on such other day, as may be
specified by the court, for reasons to be recorded
in writing and on payment of such costs as the
Court deems fit, but which shall not be later than
one hundred and twenty days from the date of
service of summons and on expiry of one hundred
and twenty days from the date of service of
summons, the defendant shall forfeit the right to
file the written statement and the court shall not
allow the written statement to be taken on
record.”
This was re-emphasized by re-inserting yet another proviso in
Order VIII Rule 10 CPC, which reads as under:-
“Procedure when party fails to present written
statement called for by Court.- Where any party
from whom a written statement is required under
Rule 1 or Rule 9 fails to present the same within
the time permitted or fixed by the Court, as the
case may be, the Court shall pronounce judgment
against him, or make such order in relation to
the suit as it thinks fit and on pronouncement of
such judgment a decree shall be drawn up.
Provided further that no Court shall make an
order to extend the time provided under Rule 1 of
this Order for filing of the written statement.”
A perusal of these provisions would show that ordinarily a
written statement is to be filed within a period of 30 days.
However, grace period of a further 90 days is granted which
the Court may employ for reasons to be recorded in writing and
payment of such costs as it deems fit to allow such written
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statement to come on record. What is of great importance is
the fact that beyond 120 days from the date of service of
summons, the defendant shall forfeit the right to file the
written statement and the Court shall not allow the written
statement to be taken on record. This is further buttressed by
the proviso in Order VIII Rule 10 also adding that the Court
has no further power to extend the time beyond this period of
120 days.
9) In Bihar Rajya Bhumi Vikas Bank Samiti (supra), a
question was raised as to whether Section 34(5) of the
Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996, inserted by Amending
Act 3 of 2016 is mandatory or directory. In para 11 of the
said judgment, this Court referred to Kailash vs. Nanhku,
(2005) 4 SCC 480 referring to the text of Order 8 Rule 1 as it
stood pre the amendment made by the Commercial Courts Act. It
also referred to the Salem Advocate Bar Association vs. Union
of India, (2005) 6 SCC 344, which, like the Kailash judgment,
held that the mere expression “shall” in Order 8 Rule 1 would
not make the provision mandatory. This Court then went on to
discuss in para 17 State vs. N.S. Gnaneswaran, (2013) 3 SCC
594 in which Section 154(2) of the Code of Criminal Procedure
was held to be directory inasmuch as no consequence was
provided if the Section was breached. In para 22 by way of
contrast to Section 34, Section 29-A of the Arbitration Act
was set out. This Court then noted in para 23 as under:
“23. It will be seen from this provision that,
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unlike Sections 34(5) and (6), if an award is made
beyond the stipulated or extended period contained
in the section, the consequence of the mandate of
the arbitrator being terminated is expressly
provided. This provision is in stark contrast to
Sections 34(5) and (6) where, as has been stated
hereinabove, if the period for deciding the
application under Section 34 has elapsed, no
consequence is provided. This is one more
indicator that the same Amendment Act, when it
provided time periods in different situations, did
so intending different consequences.”
10) Several High Court judgments on the amended Order VIII
Rule 1 have now held that given the consequence of non-filing
of written statement, the amended provisions of the CPC will
have to be held to be mandatory. [See Oku Tech Private
Limited vs. Sangeet Agarwal & Ors. by a learned Single Judge
of the Delhi High Court dated 11.08.2016 in CS (OS) No.
3390/2015 as followed by several other judgments including a
judgment of the Delhi High Court in Maja Cosmetics vs. Oasis
Commercial Pvt. Ltd. 2018 SCC Online Del 6698.
11) We are of the view that the view taken by the Delhi High
Court in these judgments is correct in view of the fact that
the consequence of forfeiting a right to file the written
statement; non-extension of any further time; and the fact
that the Court shall not allow the written statement to be
taken on record all points to the fact that the earlier law on
Order VIII Rule 1 on the filing of written statement under
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Order VIII Rule 1 has now been set at naught.
12) However, learned counsel appearing for the respondents
relied strongly upon the judgment in Bhanu Kumar Jain (supra)
and Shaikh Salim Haji Abdul Khayumsab (supra) and, in
particular, paras 22 and 27 of the first judgment and paras 4
& 19 of the second judgment.
13) We are of the view that since both these judgments dealt
with the pre-amendment position, they would not be of any
direct reliance insofar as the facts of the present case is
concerned.
14) Learned counsel appearing for the respondents also relied
upon R.K. Roja vs. U.S. Rayudu and Another (supra) for the
proposition that the defendant is entitled to file an
application for rejection of plaint under Order VII Rule 11
before filing his written statement. We are of the view that
this judgment cannot be read in the manner sought for by the
learned counsel appearing on behalf of the respondents.
Order VII Rule 11 proceedings are independent of the filing of
a written statement once a suit has been filed. In fact, para
6 of that judgment records “However, we may hasten to add that
the liberty to file an application for rejection under Order 7
Rule 11 CPC cannot be made as a ruse for retrieving the lost
opportunity to file the written statement”.
15) Learned counsel appearing for the respondents then argued
that it cannot be assumed that the learned Single Judge did
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not know about these amendments when he passed the first
impugned order dated 05.12.2017. We do not wish to enter upon
this speculative arena. He then argued that since this
judgment permitted him to file the written statement beyond
120 days, it was an act of the Court which should prejudice no
man. This doctrine cannot be used when the res is not yet
judicata. The 05.12.2017 order is res sub judice inasmuch as
its correctness has been challenged before us.
16) Learned counsel for the respondents then strongly relied
upon the inherent powers of the Court to state that, in any
case, a procedural provision such as contained in the
amendment, which may lead to unjust consequences can always,
in the facts of a given case, be ignored where such unjust
consequences follow, as in the facts of the present case. We
are again of the view that this argument has also no legs to
stand on, given the judgment of this Court in Manohar Lal
Chopra vs. Rai Bahadur Rao Raja Seth Hiralal, [1962] Suppl 1
SCR 450. In this judgment, the Court held:
“The suit at Indore which had been instituted
later, could be stayed in view of s.10 of the
Code. The provisions of that section are
clear, definite and mandatory. A Court in
which a subsequent suit has been filed is
prohibited from proceeding with the trial of
that suit in certain specified circumstances.
When there is a special provision in the Code
of Civil Procedure for dealing with the
contingencies of two such suits being
instituted, recourse to the inherent powers
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under s.151 is not justified...”
(at page 470)
Clearly, the clear, definite and mandatory provisions of Order
V read with Order VIII Rule 1 and 10 cannot be circumvented by
recourse to the inherent power under Section 151 to do the
opposite of what is stated therein.
17) Clearly, therefore, the 05.12.2017 order which applies in
the face of the amendments made to the Civil Procedure Code
cannot be sustained. When we come to the second order dated
24.09.2019, the only reason for this order is that 05.12.2017
has attained finality.
18) Factually speaking, this is not correct as a Special
Leave Petition from the said order has been filed. Even
otherwise, this Court in Canara Bank vs. N.G. Subbaraya Setty
and Anr. (supra) has held (page 3414):
“(ii) An issue of law which arises between the
same parties in a subsequent suit or proceeding
is not res judicata if, by an erroneous decision
given on a statutory prohibition in the former
suit or proceeding, the statutory prohibition is
not given effect to. This is despite the fact
that the matter in issue between the parties may
be the same as that directly and substantially
in issue in the previous suit or proceeding.
This is for the reason that in such cases, the
rights of the parties are not the only matter
for consideration (as is the case of an
erroneous interpretation of a statute inter
parties), as the public policy contained in the
statutory prohibition cannot be set at naught.
This is for the same reason as that contained in
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matters which pertain to issues of law that
raise jurisdictional questions. We have seen
how, in Natraj Studios (AIR 1981 SC 537)
(supra), it is the public policy of the
statutory prohibition contained in Section 28 of
the Bombay Rent Act that has to be given effect
to. Likewise, the public policy contained in
other statutory prohibitions, which need not
necessarily go to jurisdiction of a Court, must
equally be given effect to, as otherwise special
principles of law are fastened upon parties when
special considerations relating to public policy
mandate that this cannot be done.”
The aforesaid para applies on all fours to the facts of the
present case, as even assuming that the 05.12.2017 order is
final, res judicata cannot stand in the way of an erroneous
interpretation of a statutory prohibition. The present is one
such case. Therefore, the second order must also be set
aside.
19) The appeal is allowed, with the consequence that the
written statement of Defendant No.1 must be taken off the
record.
.......................... J. (ROHINTON FALI NARIMAN)
.......................... J. (VINEET SARAN)
New Delhi; February 12, 2019.