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      REPORTABLE

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA       CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION CIVIL APPEAL No.2555 OF 2017

(Arising out of SLP(C)No.25760 of 2015)

M/S. PUROHIT AND COMPANY        ........APPELLANT

VERSUS

KHATOONBEE AND ANR.                .......RESPONDENTS                                                    

J U D G M E N T Jagdish Singh Khehar, CJI

1. Heard learned counsel for the rival parties. 2. The daughter of the respondents died in a motor accident on 02.02.1977.  A claim petition was filed, under Section 166 of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1988 (hereinafter referred to as `the 1988 Act'),  seeking  compensation  on  account  of  the  motor  accident, wherein the respondents' daughter had died, on 23.02.2005 i.e., after a period of more than 28 years.  The Motor Accident Claims Tribunal (hereinafter referred to as `the Tribunal') entertained the above claim. A prayer made to reject the claim petition, for the reason, that the said claim had been raised 28 years after the accident in question, was rejected.  It is in these circumstances, that M/s Purohit and Company (the petitioner herein) approached the

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High  Court,  wherein,  the  matter  was  re-adjudicated.   Again,  a prayer was made at the hands of the petitioner, that the claim had been made belatedly, and was not a surviving claim.  The High Court,  upheld  the  justiciability  of  the  claim  petition,  on  the short ground, that no period of limitation had been provided for raising a claim for compensation, under the Motor Vehicles Act, 1988.  The judgment rendered by the High Court on 07.07.2015, has been assailed by M/s Purohit & Company through the instant petition for special leave to appeal. 3. Leave granted. 4. While raising a challenge to the impugned judgment, in the  first  instance,  a  reference  was  made  to  Section  110- A of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1939 (hereinafter referred to as `the 1939 Act'), in order to demonstrate, that a period of limitation, at the time, was provided for, referable to the date when the accident  had  taken  place.  Section  110A  aforementioned  is  being extracted hereunder:

“110-A.  Application  for  compensation.-  (1)  An application  for  compensation  arising  out  of  an accident of the nature specified in sub-section (1) of Section 110 may be made-

(a) by the person who has sustained the  injury; or

(aa) by the owner of the property; or (b)  where death has resulted from the  

accident, by all or any of the legal  representatives of the deceased; or

(c) by any agent duly authorised by the person injured  or  all  or  any of the legal  representatives of the deceased, as the  case may be:

Provided  that  where  all  the  legal representatives of the deceased have not joined in any  such  application  for  compensation,  the application shall be made on behalf of or for the

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benefit  of  all  the  legal  representatives  of  the deceased and the legal representatives who have not so joined, shall be impleaded as respondents to the application. (2) Every application under sub-section (1) shall be made to the Claims Tribunal having jurisdiction over the area in which the accident occurred, and shall  be  in  such  form  and  shall  contain  such particulars as may be prescribed.

Provided that where any claim for compensation under Section 92-A is made in such application, the application  shall  contain  a  separate  statement  to that effect immediately before the signature of the applicant; (3) No application for such compensation shall be entertained unless it is made within six months of the occurrence of the accident :

Provided  that  the  Claims  Tribunal  may entertain the application after the expiry of the said period of six months if it is satisfied that the applicant  was  prevented  by  sufficient  cause  from making the application in time.”

      (emphasis is ours) A  perusal  of  the  provision  of  Section  110A  of  the  1939  Act, extracted  above,  reveals,  that  a  period  of  limitation  of  six months (from the date of occurrence of the accident) was provided for, to raise a claim for compensation.  5. In the successor legislation, namely, the Motor Vehicles Act, 1988, Section 166(3), as originally enacted, also provided for limitation of a period of six months for filing a claim petition. Section 166 aforementioned is extracted hereunder:

“166.Application for compensation.— (1) An application for compensation arising out of an accident of the nature specified in sub-section (1) of section 165 may be made— (a) by the person who has sustained the injury; or (b) by the owner of the property; or (c) where death has resulted from the accident, by all or any of the legal representatives of the

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entertaining a claim petition, arising out of a motor accident after twelve months (from the date of occurrence of the accident). Obviously, the period of limitation provided for through Section 166(3) of the 1988 Act, could be relaxed upto twelve months, by demonstrating that there was sufficient cause for such delay. 6. It  would  however,  be  pertinent  to  mention,  that  the period of limitation provided under Section 166(3) aforementioned was  completely  done  away  with,  with  effect  from  14.11.1994,  as Section 166(3) came to be deleted, from the Motor Vehicles Act, 1988.  The question which has arisen for consideration, in the instant appeal, is the consequence of the omission of sub-Section (3) of Section 166 of the 1988 Act.  Does the above omission have the effect of allowing a claimant, to file a claim application, at any time, and whenever he chooses? Even after a decade!  7. The contention of the respondents-claimants to overcome the period of limitation was based on two judgments. Firstly, it is based on the judgment in Dhannalal vs. D.P.Vijayvargiya, (1996) 4 SCC 652, wherein, this Court had held as under:

“7.In this background, now  it has  to be  examined as to what is the effect of omission of sub-section (3) of Section 166 of the  Act.  From  the Amending Act  it does not appear that   the   said sub-section  (3) has    been    deleted retrospectively. But  at the  sametime, there is nothing in the Amending  Act to  show that benefit of  deletion of sub-section (3)  of Section 166 is not to be extended to pending claim petitions where a plea of limitation has been raised. The effect of deletion of sub-section (3) from Section 166 of the Act can be tested  by an  illustration. Suppose  an accident had  taken place  two years before 14.11.1994 when sub-section (3) was omitted from Section 166. For one reason or the other no claim petition had been filed by the victim or the heirs of  the victim  till 14.11.1994. Can a  claim

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petition be  not filed after  14.11.1994  in respect  of  such  accident?  Whether   a  claim petition filed  after 14.11.1994 can be rejected by the Tribunal on the ground of limitation saying that  the period of twelve  months  which  had been prescribed when sub-section (3) of Section 166 was in force having expired the  right   to prefer  the claim petition had been extinguished and  shall  not  be  revived  after  deletion  of sub-section (3) of  Section  166  w.e.f. 14.11.1994? According to us, the answer  should be in negative. When sub-section (3) of      Section  166 has  been  omitted,  then  the  Tribunal  has  to entertain  a claim  petition without       taking note of the date on   which  such   accident  had   taken place.  The  claim petitions cannot be thrown out on the ground that such claim petitions were barred by  time  when         sub-section (3) of Section 166 was  in  force. It need not  be impressed that Parliament  from  time  to   time  has   introduced amendments in the old  Act as  well as  in the new Act in order to protect the interests of the victims of the accidents and their heirs if the victims die. One such amendment has been introduced in the Act by the  aforesaid   Amendment  Act 54  of   1994  by  substituting  sub-section  (6)  of Section 158 which provides:

"158. (6)As  soon as  any information      regarding   any  accident  involving      death  or   bodily  injury  to   any      person is  recorded or report  under      this  section  is completed  by  a      police    officer,  the   officer in  

charge  of  the  police station      shall forward  a copy  of the  same      within thirty days from the date of      recording of information or, as the      case may  be, on completion of such      report  to the  Claims  Tribunal      having  jurisdiction  and a copy      thereof to the  concerned   insurer      and where a  copy is made available      to the  owner, he shall also within      thirty  days  of  receipt  of  such      report, forward  the same to  such      Claims Tribunal and Insurer." In view  of sub-section (6) of  Section 158  of the Act the officer in-charge  of  the  police station  is enjoined   to  forward  a   copy  of information/report  regarding the  accident to  the Tribunal having jurisdiction. A copy thereof has

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also to be  forwarded to the insurer concerned. it also  requires  that  where   a  copy   is  made available to  the owner of the vehicle, he shall within thirty days of receipt of such copy forward the same to the Claims Tribunal and insurer. In this background, the deletion of sub-section (3) from Section 166 should be  given full  effect so that the object of deletion of the said section by Parliament is not defeated. If a victim of  the accident      or  heirs  of  the  deceased  victim  can prefer claim  for compensation       although  not being preferred earlier because       of the       expiry of  the period of limitation prescribed, how  the victim  or the  heirs of  the  deceased shall be in a worse position if the question of condonation of delay  in filing  the claim       petition  is pending  either  before  the   Tribunal,  the  High Court or  the Supreme Court. The present appeal is one  such  case.   The  appellant  has  been pursuing  from   the  Tribunal   to   this  Court. His   right   to get compensation in connection with the accident in question is being resisted by the respondents on the ground of delay in filling the same.  If he  had not  filed any petition for claim till  14.11.1994  in respect of  the accident which  took  place  on   4.12.1990,   view  of   the Amending Act he became entitled  to  file  such claim  petition,  the  period  of limitation having been deleted, the claim petition which has been filed   and  is   being  pursued   upto  this  Court cannot be thrown out on the ground of limitation.”

  (emphasis is ours) The second judgment on which reliance was placed, was The New India Assurance Co.Ltd. vs. C.Padma, (2003) 7 SCC 713, wherein also, the matter was adjudicated on the same lines by observing as under:

“10. The  ratio  laid  down  in  Dhannalal's   case (supra) applies with full force to the facts of the present case.   When the claim petition was filed sub-section  (3)  of  Section  166  had  been  omitted. Thus, the Tribunal was bound to entertain the claim petition without taking note of the date on which the accident took place.  Faced with this situation, Mr. Kapoor submitted that Dhannalal's case does not consider Section 6-A of the General Clauses Act and therefore, needs to be reconsidered.  We are unable to accept the submission. Section 6-A of the General Clauses Act, undoubtedly, provides that the repeal of a provision will not affect the continuance of

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the enactment so repealed and in operation at the time of repeal.  However, this is subject to "unless a different intention appears".  In Dhannalal's case the reason for the deletion of sub-section (3) of Section 166 has been set out.  It is noted that Parliament realized the grave injustice and injury caused  to  heirs  and  legal  representatives  of  the victims  of  accidents  if  the  claim  petition  was rejected only on the ground of limitation.  Thus "the  different  intention"  clearly  appears  and Section  6A  of  the  General  Clauses  Act  would  not apply.   11. Mr. Kapoor, learned counsel for the appellant, has placed reliance on the decision rendered by this Court in Vinod Gurudas Raikar vs. National Insurance Co. Ltd., AIR 1991 SC 2156.  The facts of that case were that the appellant was injured in an accident, which took place on 22.1.1989.  The claim petition of  the  appellant  was  filed  on  15.3.1990  with  a prayer for condonation of delay. The Tribunal held that in view of sub-section (3) of Section 166 of the new Motor Vehicles Act, which came into force on 1.7.1989, the delay of more than six months could not be condoned. In the facts and circumstances of that  case  this  Court  held  that  the  case  of  the appellant was covered by the new Act and the delay for a longer period than six months could not be condoned.  In our view, the facts of the case in Vinod Gurudas (supra) are different from the facts of the present case, as noticed above.   12.  The learned counsel for the appellant, next contended  that  since  no  period  of  limitation  has been prescribed by the legislature, Article 137 of the  Limitation  Act  may  be  invoked,  otherwise, according to him, stale claims would be encouraged leading  to  multiplicity  of  litigation  for non-prescribing  the  period  of  limitation.  We  are unable  to  countenance  the  contention  of  the appellant for more than one reason.  Firstly, such an Act like the Motor Vehicles Act is a beneficial legislation aimed at providing relief to the victims or their families, if otherwise the claim is found genuine.  Secondly, it is a self contained Act which prescribes  the  mode  of  filing  the  application, procedure to be followed and award to be made.  The Parliament,  in  its  wisdom,  realised  the  grave injustice and injury being caused to the heirs and legal  representatives  of  the  victims  who  suffer bodily injuries/die in accidents, by rejecting their claim petitions at the threshold on the ground of limitation, and purposely deleted sub-section (3) of

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Section 166, which provided the period of limitation for filing the claim petitions and this being the intendment  of  the  legislature  to  give  effective relief to the victims and the families of the motor accidents untrammeled by the technicalities of the limitation,  invoking  of  Article  137  of  the Limitation Act would defeat the intendment of the Legislature.”

   (emphasis is ours) Based on the aforesaid determination rendered by this Court, the High Court, by its impugned order dated 07.07.2015, arrived at the conclusion,  that  there  being  no  period  of  limitation  at  the juncture, when the claim petition was filed on 23.02.2005, the same could not have been rejected, merely for reason of delay. 8. Dissatisfied with the impugned order passed by the High Court on 07.07.2015, M/s Purohit and Company has approached this Court, by filing the instant appeal. 9. The  solitary  contention  advanced  at  the  hands  of  the learned counsel for the appellant was, that even though there may no longer be a defined period of limitation, for approaching the Motor Accident Claims Tribunal, to raise a claim for compensation (under  the  provisions  of  the  Motor  Vehicles  Act,  1988),  yet  a claimant must approach a Court, for raising such a claim within a reasonable time. It was submitted, that after a period of time, the claim would be stale and will have to be treated as a dead claim. Such a claim, it was submitted, could not be treated as a surviving claim. To demonstrate situations when an accident's claim would no longer be considered to be a surviving claim, illustratively it was submitted, that in a given case when the evidence to establish the rival claims, would not be available, for the mere reason of lapse

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of  time.  Either,  the  witnesses  would  not  be  available,  or accessible, on account of lapse of time, resulting in lapse of memory and a situation in which truthful evidence can no longer be recorded.  The  contention  was,  that  in  such  background,  it  was imperative for the concerned Court, to determine whether, in the facts and circumstances of a particular case, the claim could be considered  as  a  surviving  claim,  on  the  date  when  the  claim petition was filed before the Motor Accident Claims Tribunal. 10. In support of the contention advanced at the hands of the learned  counsel  for  the  appellant,  as  has  been  noticed  in  the foregoing  paragraph,  learned  counsel  invited  our  attention  to Corporation Bank vs. Navin J.Shah, (2000) 2 SCC 628, wherein a claim  for  compensation  had  been  raised  under  the  Consumer Protection  Act,  1986,  wherein  also,  there  was  no  period  of limitation prescribed (at the time, when the claim was raised). Dealing with the question in hand, this Court had recorded the following observations:

“12. We   may   further  notice  that  there  is another  strong reason as to why the claim made by the respondent should not have  been granted.  The transactions in question took place in the years 1979  and 1981.  The  difficulties  in  realisation of  the amounts due from the consignee also became clear  at the  time when the claim was made before the Corporation and the  claim  had been made as early as on 19-12-1982. The  petition  before the Commission was filed on  25-9-1992  that is clearly a decade after a claim  had been made  before  the Corporation. A claim could not have  been  filed  by the respondent at this distance of time. Indeed at the   relevant   time  there  was  no  period  of limitation under the  Consumer  Protection Act to prefer  a   claim  before    the   Commission   but   that does not mean that the claim could  be made even  after  an  unreasonably  long  delay. The Commission has rejected  this contention  by  a

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wholly wrong approach  in taking  into consideration  that the foreign  exchange payable to Reserve Bank   of   India  was  still  due  and, therefore,  the claim  is  alive.  The claim of the respondent is  from  the Bank. At  any rate, as stated earlier, when the claim  was  made  for indemnifying  the losses suffered  from  the Corporation,  it was clear to the parties about the futility  of   awaiting  any  longer  for  collecting such amounts from the foreign  bank. In  those circumstances,  the  claim,  if  at  all  was   to  be made, ought to have been  made  within a reasonable time  thereafter.  What is reasonable time to lay a  claim depends upon the facts of each case.  In the legislative wisdom, three  years'  period has been prescribed as  the  reasonable time  under the Limitation  Act  to  lay  a  claim  for  money.   We think,that  period  should  be  the  appropriate standard adopted         for computing reasonable time to raise a claim in a matter      of  this nature.  For this reason also we  find   that the claim  made by the respondent ought to have been rejected by the Commission.”

  (emphasis is ours) It would be pertinent to mention, that the claim raised under the Consumer Protection Act, in the above judgment, was delayed by a period of 10 years, and even though, no period of limitation was prescribed, this Court held, that the same was not maintainable. 11. Reliance  was  also  placed  on  Haryana  State  Coop.  Land Development Bank Vs. Neelam (2005) 5 SCC 91, wherein, this Court held as under:

“17. In  Nedungadi  Bank  Ltd.(2001)  6  SCC  222,  a Bench of this Court,  where S.Saghir Ahmad was a member [His Lordship was also a member in Ajaib Singh (supra), opined : (SCC pp.459-60, para 6)

"6.  Law  does  not  prescribe  any time-limit  for  the  appropriate Government  to  exercise  its  powers under Section 10 of the Act. It is not that  this  power  can  be  exercised  at any  point  of  time  and  to  revive matters which had since been settled. Power  is  to  be  exercised  reasonably and  in  a  rational  manner.  There

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appears to us to be no rational basis on  which  the  Central  Government  has exercised powers in this case after a lapse  of  about  seven  years  of  the order  dismissing  the respondent from service.  At  the  time  reference  was made no industrial dispute existed or could  be  even  said  to   have  been apprehended. A dispute which is stale could  not  be  the  subject-matter  of reference under Section 10 of the Act. As to when a dispute can be said to be stale  would  depend  on  the  facts  and circumstances of each case. When the matter has become final, it appears to us to be rather incongruous that the reference be made under Section 10 of the Act in the circumstances like the  present one. In fact it could be said that there was no dispute pending at the  time  when  the  reference  in question was made."

18. It  is  trite  that  the  courts  and  tribunals having  plenary  jurisdiction  have  discretionary power  to  grant  an  appropriate  relief  to  the parties.  The  aim and object of the Industrial Disputes Act may be to impart social justice to the workman but the same by itself would not mean that irrespective  of  his  conduct  a  workman  would automatically  be  entitled  to  relief.   The procedural  laws  like  estoppel,  waiver  and acquiescence  are  equally  applicable  to  the industrial  proceedings.  A  person  in  certain situation  may  even  be  held  to  be  bound  by  the doctrine of acceptance sub silentio. The respondent herein  did  not  raise  any  industrial  dispute questioning the termination of her services within a reasonable time. She even accepted an alternative employment  and  has  been  continuing  therein  from 10.8.1988. In  her  replication  filed  before  the Presiding  Officer  of  the  Labour  Court  while traversing the plea raised by the appellant herein that she is gainfully employed in HUDA with effect from  10.8.1988  and  her  services  had  been regularized therein, it was averred :

"6.  The  applicant  workman  had  already given  replication  to  the  A.L.C.-cum- Conciliation Officer,  stating   therein that  she  was  engaged  by  HUDA  from 10.8.1988  as  clerk-cum-typist  on  daily wage basis.  The applicant workman has

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the right to come to the service of the  management and she is interested to join them."

19. She, therefore, did not deny or dispute that she had been regularly employed or her services had been regularized.  She merely exercised her right to join the service of the appellant. 20. It is true that the respondent had filed a writ petition within a period of three years but indisputably  the  same  was  filed  only  after  the other workmen obtained the same relief from the Labour Court in a reference made in that behalf by the State.  Evidently in the writ petition she was not in a position to establish her legal right so as to obtain a writ of or in the nature of mandamus directing the appellant herein to reinstate her in service.  She  was  advised  to  withdraw  the  writ petition  presumably  because  she  would  not  have obtained any relief in the said proceeding.  Even the  High  Court  could  have  dismissed  the  writ petition  on  the  ground  of  delay  or  could  have otherwise  refused  to  exercise  its  discretionary jurisdiction.  The conduct of the respondent in approaching the Labour Court after more than seven years  had,  therefore,  been  considered  to  be  a relevant factor by the Labour Court for refusing to grant any relief to her.  Such a consideration on the part of the Labour Court cannot be said to be an  irrelevant  one.   The  Labour  Court  in  the aforementioned  situation  cannot  be  said  to  have exercised  its  discretionary  jurisdiction injudiciously,  arbitrarily  and  capriciously warranting interference at the hands of the High Court in exercise of its discretionary jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution. 21. The matter might have been different had the respondent been appointed by the appellant in a permanent vacancy. 22. Both  HUDA  and  the  appellant  are  statutory organizations.  The service of the respondent with the Appellant was an ad hoc one.  She served the appellant  only  for  a  period  of  one  year  three months; whereas she had been serving HUDA for more than sixteen years.  Even if she is directed to be reinstated in the services of the appellant without back wages as was directed by the High Court, the same would remain an ad hoc one and,  thus, her services can be terminated upon compliance of the provisions of the Industrial Disputes Act. It is

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also relevant to note that there may or may not now be any regular vacancy with the appellant-Bank.  We have noticed hereinbefore that in the year 1996, the vacancies had been filled up and a third party right had been created.  It has not been pointed out  to  us  that  there  exists  a  vacancy.  Having considered the equities between the parties, we are of the opinion that it was not a fit case where the High  Court  should  have  interfered  with  the discretionary jurisdiction exercised by the Labour Court. 23. For the reasons aforementioned, the impugned judgment cannot be sustained which is set aside accordingly.  This appeal is allowed. However, in the  facts  and  circumstances  of  the  case,  there shall be no order as to costs.”

  (emphasis is ours) It  would  be  relevant  to  mention,  that  the  above  judgment  was rendered in a matter, where the challenge was raised under the provisions of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947, wherein also no period  of  limitation  is  prescribed  to  approach  the  Industrial Tribunal.  Despite the above, this Court arrived at the conclusion, that a claim raised after a period of 7 years, was not a surviving claim.  And  therefore,  the  claim  petition  was  held  to  be  not maintainable.  12. Drawing an analogy to the judgments rendered under the Consumer  Protection  Act,  1986,  as  also,  under  the  Industrial Disputes Act, 1947, it was the submission of the learned counsel for the appellant, that even though no period of limitation remains prescribed,  after  the  amendment  of  Section  166  of  the  Motor Vehicles Act, 1988, whereby sub-Section (3) of Section 166 came to be  deleted  (with  effect  from  14.11.1994),  yet  it  would  be imperative to determine, whether at the juncture when the claimant approached the Motor Accident Claims Tribunal, the claim was a live

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and surviving claim.   13. We are satisfied, that the submission advanced at the hands of the learned counsel for the appellant merits acceptance. The judgments on which the High Court had relied, and on which the respondents have emphasised, in our considered view, are not an impediment, to the acceptance of the submission canvassed on behalf of the appellant.  We say so, because in Dhannalal's case (supra) the question of inordinate delay in approaching the Motor Accident Claims  Tribunal,  was  not  considered.  In  the  second  judgment  in C.Padma's case (supra), it was considered.  And in the C.Padma's case,  the  first  conclusion  drawn  in  paragraph  12  was  “...  if otherwise the claim is found genuine...”. We are of the considered view,  that  a  claim  raised  before  the  Motor  Accident  Claims Tribunal, can be considered to be genuine, so long as it is a live and surviving claim.  We are satisfied in accepting the declared position of law, expressed in the judgments relied upon by the learned counsel for the appellant. It is not as if, it can be open to all and sundry, to approach a Motor Accident Claims Tribunal, to raise a claim for compensation, at any juncture, after the accident had  taken  place.  The  individual  concerned,  must  approach  the Tribunal within a reasonable time. 14. The question of reasonability would naturally depend on the  facts  and  circumstances  of  each  case.  We  are  however, satisfied, that a delay of 28 years, even without reference to any other  fact,  cannot  be  considered  as  a  prima  facie reasonable period, for approaching the Motor Accident Claims Tribunal. The only  justification  indicated  by  the  respondents,  for  initiating

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proceedings after a lapse of 28 years, emerges from paragraph 4, contained in the application for condonation of delay, filed by the claimants,  before  the  Tribunal.   Paragraph  4  aforementioned  is extracted hereunder:

“4. That  the  Petitioners  are  poor  person  and they have no knowledge about the Law.  Also the Respondent has not pay the single pie towards any compensation.”

15. Having  given  our  thoughtful  consideration  to  the justification  expressed  at  the  behest  of  the  respondents,  for approaching the Tribunal, after a period of 28 years, we are of the view,  that  the  explanation  tendered,  cannot  be  accepted. Undoubtedly,  the  claim  (pertaining  to  an  accident  which  had occurred  on  02.02.1977),  in  the  facts  and  circumstances  of  the instant case, was stale, and ought to have been treated as a dead claim, at the point of time, when the respondents approached the Tribunal by filing a claim petition, on 23.02.2005.   16. In view of the reasons recorded hereinabove, we hereby set  aside  the  impugned  order  dated  07.07.2015,  and  allow  the instant  appeal,  by  holding,  that  the  claim  raised  by  the respondents before the Motor Accident Claims Tribunal, was not a surviving claim, when the respondents approached the said Tribunal. 17. Before concluding this order, it is relevant to notice, that by a motion bench order dated 14.09.2015, the appellant herein was directed to deposit a sum of Rs.25,000/- towards litigation expenses, payable to the respondents.  The aforesaid deposit was actually made (as has been noticed, in the motion bench order,

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dated 12.07.2016). Since the deposit was made, and was payable to the respondents, we consider it just and appropriate, in the facts and circumstances of this case, to direct the Registry of this Court,  to  transmit  the  aforesaid  amount  of  Rs.25,000/-  to  the respondents, by way of a cheque, drawn in the name of respondent No.1.

                      .........................CJI.

        (JAGDISH SINGH KHEHAR)

.........................J.                              (N.V.RAMANA)                 

                        ..........................J.

         (Dr.D.Y.CHANDRACHUD) NEW DELHI; FEBRUARY 9, 2017.