19 September 2013
Supreme Court
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M/S. MONNET ISPAT & ENERGY LTD. Vs JAN CHETNA .

Bench: G.S. SINGHVI,V. GOPALA GOWDA
Case number: C.A. No.-008288-008288 / 2013
Diary number: 26019 / 2012
Advocates: E. C. AGRAWALA Vs ANITHA SHENOY


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NON-REPORTABLE

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA

CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION

CIVIL APPEAL No. 8288 OF 2013 (Arising out of SLP (C) No. 27387 of 2012)

  

M/s. Monnet Ispat and Energy Limited         ....Appellant

versus

Jan Chetna and others         ....Respondents  

 

O R D E R

G.S. SINGHVI, J.

1. Whether the Division Bench of the Delhi High Court could have entertained  

and allowed the petition filed by respondent No.1 as Public Interest Litigation for  

setting aside order dated 31.12.2008 passed by National Environment Appellate  

Authority (for short,  ‘NEAA’) and remanded the case  to  the competent  quasi  

judicial forum for being decided on merits.

2. The appellant is a company incorporated under the Companies Act, 1956.  

Its  registered  office  is  at  Raipur  (Chhattisgarh).  On  27.6.2007,  the  appellant  

submitted an application to Chhattisgarh Environment and Conservation Board  

(respondent No.3) for sanctioning the proposed expansion of its existing plant at  

Naharpali, Kharsia, Raigarh. Respondent No.3 issued notice dated 4.8.2007 under  

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the Environment Protection Act, 1986 and the Rules framed thereunder for holding  

public  hearing.   As  many as  700  persons  participated  in  the  public  hearing.  

Thereafter,  respondent  No.3  sent  report  dated  4.10.2007  to  the  Ministry  of  

Environment  and  Forests  (respondent  No.2),  which  granted  environmental  

clearance for the project of the appellant.  

3. Two days before the date fixed for public hearing, Shri Ramesh Agrawal  

and two others, namely, Ms. Ranjana Rajput and Mr. Vinod  Chhaparlya filed  

Civil Suit No.30-A/ 2007 in the Court of District Judge, Raigarh (for short, ‘the  

trial Court’) impleading the appellant as a defendant and prayed for grant of a  

declaration that the appellant had illegally set up industry at Villages Naharpali,  

Bhupdevpur,  Salihabhata  and  Singhanpur.   They  further  prayed  for  ordering  

closure of the industry and for issue of a permanent injunction against the holding  

of public hearing for expansion of the existing industry and / or establishment of  

any new industry by the appellant.

4. Along with the suit, the plaintiffs filed an application under Order 39 Rules  

1 and 2 CPC for stay of the public hearing. By  order  dated  4.8.2007,  the  trial  

Court dismissed the application for temporary injunction.  After six days,  Shri  

Ramesh Agrawal and two others filed another application for injunction but no  

order appears to have been passed on that application.

5. After 2 months and 20 days of rejection of the injunction application filed  

by Shri Ramesh Agrawal and two others,  Shri Ram Kumar Agarwal and Shri  

Ramesh Sharma filed Writ Petition No.5534/2007 before the Chhattisgarh High  

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Court under the name and style of “Ekta Parishad” and prayed that the State  

Government  may be  directed  to  conduct  an  inquiry into  the  correctness  and  

genuineness  of  the  Environment  Impact  Assessment  Report  prepared  by  

respondent No.3.  Later on, the writ petitioners withdrew their cause.

6. The environment clearance granted by respondent No.2 was challenged by  

respondent No.1 by filing an appeal under the National Environment Appellate  

Authority Act, 1997 (for short, ‘the 1997 Act’).  On notice, respondent No.3 filed  

reply and pleaded that  environment clearance  was  granted to  the appellant in  

accordance with law.  NEAA dismissed the appeal of respondent No.1 vide order  

dated 31.12.2008 by recording the following observations:

"10. The Counsel for Appellant submitted the proceedings of the  draft  constitution  of  Jan  Chetna  on  24.11.2008  without  supporting affidavit which was  required to be filed under the  NEAA Rules, 1997 for taking responsibility of the authenticity  of  the  facts  stated  in  the  document.  The  Counsel  for  the  Appellant mentioned that the affidavit is required to be filed only  while filing the Memorandum of Appeal under the NEAA Rules  and not with the subsequent document. The Authority perused  the  draft  proceedings  of  the  meeting  dated  15.2.2005  and  observed that only 10 persons have formed the association called  "Jan Chetna". Out of 10 members only two members complete  address  are  given in the proceedings.  From the addresses  so  given,  it  may be  inferred  that  none of  the  members  of  "Jan  Chetna" belong to Naharpali, Kharsia, Raigarh, the project area.  Further the minutes of the meeting dated 15.2.2008 shows that  Shri Rajesh Tripathi was given responsibility of preparation of  authorization letter in favour of Ramesh Aggarwal and issue the  same  to  oppose  the  Environmental  Clearance  granted  to  the  Respondent No.3. As per serial number 12 of the proceedings  dated  10.5.2005,  Shri  Rajesh  Tripathi's  address  for  communication etc.,  would  be  No.159,  Kelo  Vihar,  Raigarh.  But,  it  is  found  that  the  Authorisation  letter  issued  by  Shri  Rajesh Tripathi bearing the address of Satyam Kunj, Naya Gunj,  Raigarh, which was the address of Shri Ramesh Aggarwal and  

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there was no mention of designation of Shri Rajesh Tripathi in  this letter. This action of the Appellant creates doubt about the  authenticity of the authorization letter so issued. From the above  it is clear that neither of the members of the "Association" - Jan  Chetna as aggrieved persons as claimed in para 4(iv) above nor  it has been authorized by the primary aggrieved persons.   The  Appellant has not disclosed all material facts for the purpose of  adjudication of  the  Appeal.  While considering the legality of  secondary  public  injury  complaints  by  the  Hon'ble  Supreme  Court  in  S.P.  Gupta  Vs.  UOI  (1981),  See  SCC  87  held  as  follow:  

"..........  in  such  cases  a  member  of  the  public  having  sufficient  interest  can  certainly  maintain  an  action  challenging the legality of such acts or omissions but if the  person  or  specific  class  or  group  of  persons  who  are  primarily injured by such acts or omissions, do not wish to  claim any relief and accept such act or omission willingly  and without protest, the member of public who complaints  of a secondary public injury cannot maintain the action."

The Appellant has failed to prove that its association is acting on  behalf and in the interest of people who are or may be affected  by the grant of Environmental Clearance by Respondent No.1.

Having perused all the submissions and the documents filed by  the Appellant and the Respondents, the Authority conclude that  the Appellant organization - Jan Chetna is not an association of  persons likely to be affected by the order of the Environmental  Clearance  granted  to  Respondent  No.3  by Respondent  No.1.  Therefore,  the  Appellant  organization  -  Jan  Chetna  is  not  qualified to file an Appeal before this Authority under Section  11(2)(c) of the NEAA Act, 1997.   Accordingly, the Appeal filed  by the Appellant is not maintainable.”

7. Respondent No.1 challenged the aforesaid order in Writ Petition (C) No.  

8399 of 2009, which was described as a Public Interest Litigation and prayed that  

order dated 31.12.2008 passed by NEAA may be set  aside and a direction be  

issued to NEAA to decide the appeal on merits.   Respondent No.1 claimed that it  

was  a  representative  body  of  those  affected  by  the  environmental  clearance  

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granted in favour of the appellant and, therefore, it had the locus to challenge the  

decision taken by respondent No.2.

8. In the counter affidavit filed by the appellant, several objections were taken  

to the maintainability of the petition.  It was pleaded that in the garb of filing a  

Public Interest Litigation, respondent No.1 was seeking annulment of the order  

passed by NEAA and such relief could be claimed only by filing a regular petition  

under Article 226 of the Constitution, which is required to be heard and decided  

by a Single Judge.  The appellant also referred to the pendency of Writ Petition(C)  

No.5534/2007  before  the  Chhattisgarh  High Court  and  pleaded  that  the  writ  

petition filed before the Delhi High Court was an abuse of the process  of the  

Court.   Another plea taken by the appellant was that the entire cause of action for  

filing the petition had accrued in Chhattisgarh and the Delhi High Court did not  

have the jurisdiction to entertain the petition filed by respondent No.1.   

9. The Division Bench of the High Court did take cognizance of the objections  

taken by the appellant but did not deal with the same except the one relating to  

territorial jurisdiction of the Delhi High Court and overruled the same. On merits,  

the Division Bench relied upon judgment dated 14.9.2009 passed by a coordinate  

Bench  in LPA No.277/2009  Vedanta  Alumina Ltd.  v.  Prafulla  Samantra  and  

others wherein it was held that an organisation, which is working in the area and is  

closely following the issue of setting up of industries and impact thereof on the  

environment falls  in the  category of  a  ‘person aggrieved’  and concluded that  

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NEAA committed serious error by dismissing the appeal of respondent No.1 on  

the ground of lack of locus.  

10. We have heard Dr. A.M. Singhvi, learned senior counsel for the appellant  

and Shri Sanjay Parikh,  learned counsel for respondent No.1  and perused the  

record.

11. Shri  Parikh  made  strenuous  efforts  to  convince  the  Court  that  the  

hypertechnical objection raised by the appellant should not be entertained and in  

view of  the  judgment  rendered  by  the  Division Bench of  the  High Court  in  

Vedanta  Alumina Ltd.  v.  Prafulla Samantra  (supra),  the  special  leave petition  

should be dismissed.

12. We have considered the submission of the learned counsel but have not felt  

impressed.  

13. Chapter 3 Part A of the Delhi High Court Rules contains rules relating to  

the practice of the High Court in the hearing of causes and other matters. Part B  

contains rules relating to the jurisdiction of a Single Judge and of Benches of the  

Court. The relevant clauses of Rule 1 of Part B read as under:

“Part B

JURISDICTION OF A SINGLE JUDGE AND OF BENCHES OF THE COURT

1. Cases ordinarily to be heard by a single Judge—Subject to  the provisos hereinafter set forth the following classes of cases  shall  ordinarily be  heard and disposed  of  by a  Judge setting  alone:

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(i) to (xvii) xxx xxx xxx

(xviii)  (a)  Application  or  petition  under  Article  226  of  the  Constitution of India for the issue of any directions, orders or  writs in the nature of Mandamus, prohibition,  quo-warranto or  certiorari for the enforcement of fundamental rights conferred  by Part III of the Constitution of India or for any other purpose,  except:

(i)  Petitions  where  vires of  Acts  or  statutory  rules,  regulations, or bye-laws are challenged.

(ii) Petitions where personal liberty is involved.

(iii)  Petitions  pertaining  to  all  Revenue/tax  matters  including entertainment taxes, except Municipal Tax.

(iv)  Petitions  arising from the  orders  of  the  Board  for  Industrial  and  Financial  Reconstruction/Appellate  Authority for Industrial and Financial Reconstruction or  seeking directions to them; and

(v) Petitions pertaining to Public Interest litigation.

(vi) Petitions pertaining to the award to Tenders.  

(vii) Petitions relating to Co-operative Societies.

(viii) Petitions being service matters of Armed Forces of  the Union.

(ix) Petitions arising out of Land Acquisition.

(x) Petitions concerning orders passed by the High Court  on the administrative side.

Provided that as regards pending cases, the learned single Judge  may hear the part-heard matters.

Explanation: The preliminary hearing for  admission and  final  disposal  of  applications  and  petitions  pertaining  to  matters  mentioned in clause (i) to (x) of sub-rule (xviii)(a) above shall  however be before a Bench of two Judges and before a Single  Bench when there is no sitting of Division Bench.”

Rule 4, which relates to jurisdiction of a Bench of two Judges, also reads as under:

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“4. All cases to be disposed of by a Bench of two Judges save  as provided by law or by these rules—Save as provided by  law or by these rules or by special order of the Chief Justice, all  cases shall be heard and disposed of by a Bench of two Judges.”

14. A bare reading of the above reproduced provisions makes it clear that the  

petition filed by respondent No.1 for quashing order dated 31.12.2008 could be  

heard only by Single Bench of the Delhi High Court.  However, by disguising the  

petition as a Public Interest Litigation, respondent No.1 succeeded in getting the  

same listed  before  the  Division Bench of  the  High Court.  Unfortunately,  the  

Division Bench did not  deal with the objection raised  by the appellant to  the  

maintainability of the petition filed by respondent No.1 and proceeded to decide  

the matter on merits which, in our considered view, was legally impermissible.

15. We are not suggesting that respondent No.1 had indulged in Bench hunting  

but  it  needs  to  be  emphasised  that  every  Bench  of  the  High  Court  should  

scrupulously follow the relevant rules and should not violate statutory provisions  

specifying its jurisdiction, else the sanctity of the rules relating to distribution of  

causes between the Single, the Division Bench and larger Benches will be lost.

16. In the result, the appeal is allowed and the impugned order is set aside. The  

writ petition filed by respondent No.1 shall now be listed before a Single Judge of  

the  High Court,  who  shall  decide  the  same  without  being influenced  by  the  

observations contained in the impugned order or this order.   

17. While disposing of the appeal in the manner indicated above, we consider it  

necessary to make it clear that this Court has not expressed any opinion on the  

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merits of the case and the parties shall be free to advance all legally permissible  

arguments before the learned Single Judge of the High Court.

         …………………………J.  (G.S.SINGHVI)

                                          …………………………J. (V. GOPALA GOWDA)

NEW DELHI; SEPTEMBER  19,  2013.

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