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ITEM NO.105                 COURT NO.12               SECTION XIV                S U P R E M E  C O U R T  O F  I N D I A                        RECORD OF PROCEEDINGS Civil Appeal No(s).  1431/2008 M/S. MEENA DEVI JINDAL MED.INS.&RSH&ORS.           Appellant(s)                                 VERSUS LT.GOVERNOR, DELHI & ORS.                          Respondent(s) (with appln. (s) for impleadment and substitution and c/delay in  filing reply affidavit)

Date : 29/03/2017 This appeal was called on for hearing today. CORAM :           HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE ARUN MISHRA          HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE S. ABDUL NAZEER For Appellant(s)  Mr. Parag P. Tripathi, Sr. Adv.

Mr. Ramesh Singh, Adv.  Mr. A.T. Patra, Adv.

                    Ms. Bina Gupta,Adv.                       For Respondent(s)    Ms. Rachana Srivastava,Adv.

Mr. Nitya Madhusoodhnan, Adv.  Mr. Vishnu B. Saharya, Adv.  Mr. Viresh B. Saharya, Adv.

                    M/s Saharya & Co.,Adv.                      Mr. Mukesh Kumar Sharma,Adv.                       

         UPON hearing the counsel the Court made the following                              O R D E R

 The appeal is dismissed in terms of the signed

order.

  (NEELAM GULATI)        COURT MASTER

       (TAPAN KR. CHAKRABORTY)              COURT MASTER

(Signed Reportable order is placed on the file)

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REPORTABLE

 IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA    CIVIL APPELLATE  JURISDICTION   CIVIL   APPEAL No(s). 1431 OF 2008

M/S. MEENA DEVI JINDAL MEDICAL INSTITUTE          & RESEARCH CENTRE Appellant(s)

                         VERSUS

LT.GOVERNOR, DELHI & ORS.             Respondent(s)

O R D E R  

The  appeal  has  been  preferred  by  the  M/s. Meena  Devi  Jindal  Medical  Institute  and  Research Centre questioning the judgment and order passed by the High Court of Delhi at New Delhi on March 03, 2005 in W.P. (C) No. 1479 of 1982 repelling the challenge to the land acquisition proceedings initiated under Section 4 of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894 (in short 'the  Act')  as  per  the  Notification  issued  on 19.3.1981. Enquiry under Section 5A of the Act was held. The objections preferred by the appellant were

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duly considered and rejected.  Thereafter declaration under  Section  6  of  the  Act  was  issued  on  21st

September,  1981.    Appellant/Petitioner  filed  writ petition before the High Court of Delhi questioning the land acquisition proceedings in the year 1982.  

The  facts  unfold  that  one  Smt.  Kanso  Devi (since deceased) was owner of the property.  She had entered into an agreement dated 21.04.1979 with Rank Television Pvt. Ltd. for construction of group housing society.   Appellant  No.1  herein  claims  to  be registered  society  under  the  Societies  Registration Act,  1860  and  it  was  formed  with  the  object  to establish  and  maintain  hospitals  for  philanthropic purpose and it entered into a lease agreement with owner Kanso Devi on 3.1.1981.  The lease agreement has been  concurred by  Rank  Television  Pvt.  Ltd.,  as confirming party. It was tri-partite agreement. Later on 17.2.1981 the appellant No.1 herein entered into an agreement to sell with respect to said property with Kanso Devi.  It was confirmed by M/s Rank Television Pvt. Ltd. Power of Attorney has been obtained by the appellant No.1 from Kanso Devi and the appellant had

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been placed in possession of the property. Kanso Devi purportedly executed a will in favour

of the appellant No.1 on 4.4.1982.  She ultimately died on 27.11.1989 during the pendency of the writ petition.   It  is  submitted  that  property  had  been mutated in the name of the appellant No.1- charitable institution .  The acquisition had been questioned in the High Court on the ground that in the Notification issued under Section 4 of the Act, purpose was shown to be planned development of Delhi.  Only 10,000 Sq. Yard land comprised in Khasra No. 394 (plot no.20), Alipur Road, Delhi was proposed to be acquired.  It was  not  specified  in  the  Notification  for  what specific  purpose  of  planned  development  of  Delhi, Notification  had  been  issued.   Thus  the  objection raised by the Appellant No.1 herein, in the course of enquiry, held under Section 5A of the Act, had been illegally rejected.  The acquisition for the purpose of School was not mentioned in the Notification issued under Section 4 of the Act as such the Notification was vague and no useful purpose would  be served by acquisition of a small plot of land.

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It was not disputed that in the zonal plan prepared  for  development  of  Delhi,  the  area  in question  had  been  shown  as  reserved  for  the institutional purposes.

The writ application was resisted on behalf of the respondents on the ground that acquisition had been  made  in  accordance  with  law  for  the  planned development  of  Delhi.   Ultimately  it  was  for  the purpose of the school the acquisition had been made and it would be open after acquisition to change the purpose  related to the planned development of Delhi as such there was no illegality in the acquisition of the land and no malafide has been attributed.   

The  High  Court  by  the  impugned  order  has dismissed  the  writ  application  on  various  grounds; firstly that acquisition is permissible for planned development of the city.  Apart from that, it has been found that in that zonal development plan of Delhi the area in question had been shown for the institutional purposes thus, it was open to acquire the area in accordance  therewith  for  the  purpose  of  planned development of Delhi.  The petitioner No.1, at the

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relevant point of time, was having only agreement to sell in its favour.  The enquiry was properly held under Section 5A of the Act.  Thus the writ petition has been ultimately dismissed holding that running of educational  institution  by  the  Government  for  the benefit of public at large can hardly be equated to running of the charitable hospital.  Thus acquisition cannot be said to be suffering with any illegality. Thus the same has been upheld.  Aggrieved thereby the appeal has been preferred.  

It  was  submitted  by  the  learned  senior counsel  appearing  on  behalf  of  the  appellants  that there was no public  purpose behind the acquisition. The mention that it was for planned development of Delhi was absolutely vague, mention of public purpose, if any. The enquiry under Section 5A of the Act was not properly conducted.  The objection raised by the appellant had been illegally rejected.  Reliance has been  placed  on  the  decisions  with  respect  to  the vagueness on  Munshi Singh & Ors. vs. Union of India [(1973)2 SCC 337] and with respect to the entitlement of tenants to question the acquisition, reliance has

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been placed on the decision of this court in Union of India & Ors. vs.  Krishan Lal Arneja & Ors. [(2004)8 SCC  453]  in  which  reliance  was  placed  upon  the decision in  Municipal Corporation of Greater Bombay vs.  Industrial Development Investment Co. (P.) Ltd. [(1996) 11 SCC 501] in which it has been held that it cannot be said that in no case of the land acquisition under  the  provisions  of  the  Act  tenant  cannot challenge the  proceedings.

On the other hand learned counsel on behalf of the respondents has submitted that land as has been acquired in accordance with zonal plan for “planned development of Delhi” for institutional purposes land could  be  acquired  by  specifying  that  it  is  being acquired for planned development of Delhi. Learned counsel  has  relied  upon  the  decision  of  the Constitution Bench of this Court in  Aflatoon & Ors. vs. Lt. Governor of Delhi & Ors. [(1975) 4 SCC 285]. She has also referred to the decision of this Court in Bhagat Singh vs. State of U.P. & Ors. [(1999) (2) SCC 384] to submit that once the land has been acquired for planned development its purpose can be changed at

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any  point  of  time  for  appropriately  for  planned development of the city.

Section  3(f)  of  the  Act  defines  public purpose for which acquisition can be made under the Act.  The definition of public purpose is inclusive of Section  3f(iii)  contains the  provisions  regarding acquisition  for  planned  development  of  land  from public fund in pursuance of any scheme or policy would be for public purpose.  Section 3(f) of the Act is extracted hereunder:

“3(f) The expression “public purpose”  includes - (i)  the  provision  of  village-sites,  or  the extension,  planned  development  or  improvement  of existing village-sites; (ii) the  provision  of  land  for  town  or  rural planning; (iii) the provision of land for planned development of  land  from  public  funds  in  pursuance  of  any scheme  or  policy  of  Government  and  subsequent disposal  thereof  in  whole  or  in  part  by  lease, assignment  or  outright  sale  with  the  object  of securing further development as planned; (iv) the provision of land for a corporation owned or controlled by the State; (v) the provision of land for residential purposes to the poor or landless or to persons residing in areas affected by natural calamities, or to persons displaced  or  affected  by  reason  of  the implementation  of  any  scheme  undertaken  by Government, any local authority or a corporation owned or controlled by the State; (vi) the provision of land for carrying out any educational,  housing,  health  or  slum  clearance scheme sponsored by Government, or by any authority established by Government for carrying out any such scheme,  or,  with  the  prior  approval  of  the

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for  institutional  area,  it  was  not  necessary  to mention particular purpose, once planned development of Delhi has been specified that to be read with the zonal plan  applicable in the area in question.  Thus, it  Could not be said that the Notification suffered with any legal vice.  The constitution Bench of this court in the case of A  flatoon (supra) has considered the question where the Notification was issued under section  4  of  the  act  with  respect  to  planned development  of  Delhi  though  no  doubt  it  was  with respect to larger area,  but area would not make  a difference, ultimately this court has upheld similar Notification  under  Section  4,  while  discussing  the matter, this Court held as under:

“23.The  planned  development  of  Delhi  had  been decided upon by the Government before 1959, viz., even  before  the  Delhi  Development  Act  came  into force. It is true that there could be no planned development of Delhi except in accordance with the provisions of Delhi Development Act after that Act came  into  force  but  there  was  no  inhibition  in acquiring  land  for  planned  development  of  Delhi under the Act before the Master Plan was ready. [see  the  decision  in  Patna  Improvement  Trust  v. Smt. Lakshmi Devi). In other words, the fact that actual development is

permissible in an area other than a development area with the approval or sanction of the local authority did  not  preclude  the  Central  Government  from acquiring the land for planned development under the

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Acts. Section 12 is concerned only with the planned development. It has nothing to do with acquisition of  property;  acquisition  generally  precedes development.  For  planned  development  in  an  area other than a  development area, it is only necessary to  obtain  the  sanction  or  approval  of  the  local authority as provided in section 12(3). The Central Government could acquire any property under the Act and develop it after obtaining the approval of the local authority. We do not think it necessary to go into the question whether the power to acquire the land under Section 15 was delegated by the Central Government to the Chief Commissioner of Delhi. We have  already  held  the  appellants  and  the  writ petitioners  cannot  be  allowed  to  challenge  the validity of the notification under section 4 on the ground of laches and acquiescence. The plea that the Chief  Commissioner  of  Delhi  had  no  authority  to initiate the proceeding for acquisition by issuing the  notification  under  section  4  of  the  Act  as section 15 of the Delhi Development Act gives that power  only  to  the  Central  Government  relates primarily to the validity of the notification. Even assuming that the Chief Commissioner of Delhi was not  authorized by the central Government to issue the  notification  under  Section  4  of  the  land acquisition Act, since the appellants and the writ petitioners  are  precluded  by  their  laches  and acquiescence from questioning the notification, the contention must, in any event, be negatived and we do so.”

The  reliance  has  been  placed  by  learned counsel  appearing  on  behalf  of  the  appellant  on Munshi Singh's case (supra)  which reads as follows:

“8. As already noticed, in the notifications under section 4 all that was  stated  was  that the land was  required  for  "planned development   of  the area". There  was   no  indication whatsoever whether the  development   was  to  be  of  residential  and building  cites  or  of   commercial  and  industrial plots nor was it possible  for any one interested in the land sought to be acquired to find out what kind of planned development was under contemplation i.e.

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whether  the  land  would  be  acquired  and  the development made  by the government or whether the owners of  properties would  be  required  to develop  a  particular  area  in  a specified  way. If  the  master  plan which came  to  be sanctioned

on September 4, 1962 had been  available  for inspection  by  the  persons  interested  in  filing objections  or  even   if  the  knowledge  of  its existence on the part  of the appellants had been satisfactorily  proved  the  position  may  have  been different.  In  that  situation  the  appellants  could not claim that they were unable to file objections owing   to  the  lack  of  any  indication  in  the notification under section 4 of  the  nature  of development  for  which  the   area   was   being requisitioned.  On behalf of the state it has been pointed  out   that  the  appellants  had  themselves filed a copy of  the master plan  which  was sanctioned on September 4,  1962  and  that   it was a matter of common knowledge that the  master plan  was  under preparation.  The details relating to the master plan  and  the  plan  itself  had been published  in  the local  newspapers and the appellants could have easily discovered what  the proposed scheme was with  regard  to the development of the area in which they were interested. In view of the peculiar circumstances of these cases we gave an opportunity  to  the  state to apply for amendment  of  its return since  nothing had been said  about  these  matters therein and to produce  additional  evidence  in  support  of  its allegations. Such  a  petition  was filed   and certain documents  were sought to be placed on the record.   after   a  careful  consideration  of  the petition for amendment and  the evidence  sought to be adduced we dismissed the  prayer for amendment as well as for production of additional  evidence as we were not satisfied that the documents sought  to be produced  were  either  relevant  or  were required   to   enable  this  court  to  pronounce judgment.”

It is apparent from the aforesaid discussion made in Munshi Singh's case  (supra)  that there was no master plan/zonal plan in vogue in the area.  Thus when there was no plan for the area, in that context,

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this  court  has  observed  that  mention  in  the Notification issued under Section 4 of the act that it was acquisition for the purpose of planned development of the area was vague as such purpose should have been mentioned. In the Munshi Singh's case   (supra) the facts  were  totally  different  and  the  decision  in Munshi  Singh's  case   (supra) had  been  taken consideration in the latter decision of Constitution Bench  in  Aflatoon's  case (supra)  and  the  similar submission raised with respect to the vagueness of the Notification issued under Section 4 of the Act was not accepted.

This court in  Nand Kishore Gupta & Ors. vs. State of U.P. & Ors. [(2010) 10 SCC 282]  has also considered the concept of public purpose under Section 3(f)  of  the  Act  and  it  has  been  discussed  that  a purpose  complementary  to  public  purpose  is  also  a public purpose.  When the land had been acquired for construction of Yamuna Expressway which itself was of public  importance  the  acquisition  of  the  land  for Yamuna  Expressway  for  development  of  the  same  for commercial, amusement, industrial, institutional and

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residential purposes was held to be complementary to the  creation  of  expressway  hence  amounted  to acquisition  for  public  purpose.   The  planned development of Delhi is by itself a public purpose. The submission raised by the appellant is thus liable to be rejected.

In view of the decision on merits, we need not go into the question as to whether the petition was maintainable at the instance of the petitioners on the strength of the lease deed. The fact remains that owner has not chosen at any point of time to question it.   

The acquisition is for public purpose.  In our  opinion,  there  was  no  vagueness  in  the Notification.  It could not be said that particular property  has  been  plucked  out  as  there  is  no allegation of any malafide attributed in the matter of acquisition.   it  was  as  per  zonal  plan  which  is binding upon all concerned and  could not be departed to  having  been  issued  under  the  provisions  of  the Delhi Development Act, 1957.

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Thus we find no force in the appeal.  The same is liable to be and is hereby dismissed.  No costs.

................J.      (ARUN MISHRA)

...............J.           (S. ABDUL NAZEER)

NEW DELHI; MARCH 29, 2017