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REPORTABLE

        IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA          CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION            CIVIL APPEAL No.8829 OF 2016

      (ARISING OUT OF SLP (C) No. 24443/2007)

M/s Harish Chandra & Company …….Appellant(s)

VERSUS

State of U.P. Thr. Superintending Engineer ……Respondent(s)

WITH

SPECIAL LEAVE PETITION (C) No. 23950 of 2007

M/s Harish Chandra & Company …….Petitioner (s)

VERSUS

State of U.P. Thr. Superintending Engineer ……Respondent(s)

          J U D G M E N T

Abhay Manohar Sapre, J.    

In Special Leave Petition (c) No. 24443 of 2007

1) Leave granted.

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2) This appeal is filed against the final judgment

and order  dated 17.08.2007 of  the  High Court  of

Uttarakhand at Nainital in O.A. No. 1097 of 2001

whereby the High Court allowed the appeal filed by

the respondent herein and set aside the judgment

and  order  dated  30.05.1996  passed  by  the  Civil

Judge, Dehradun and, in consequence, allowed the

objections of  the State of  U.P. filed under Section

30/33  of  the  Arbitration  Act,  1940  (hereinafter

referred to as “the Act  1940”)   against  the award

dated 27.11.1995 which, in turn, also resulted in its

setting aside.   

3) Facts of the case need mention, in brief, infra

to appreciate the controversy involved in the appeal.

4) The  appellant  herein  is  a  civil  contractor

whereas  the  respondent  is  the  State  of  U.P.

represented  through  Superintending  Engineer

Irrigation  Construction  Circle,  Yamuna  Colony,

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Dehradun.  

5) In the year 1979, the respondent (State) invited

tender   being  Number  6/1979-80  for  doing

"Earthwork in power channels on different routes of

various distances and also construction of drainage

crossing  in  Chhoti  Lui  falling  in  6  stretches  and

divided in two sections called  "serial 4” and “serial

6" in a scheme called -  KHARA HYDEL SCHEME".

6) The appellant submitted their tender for serial

4  and  serial  6.  The  respondent  accepted  the

appellant's  tender.  Accordingly,  two  agreements

bearing  nos.  5/SE/79-80  and  6/SE/79-80  were

executed between the appellant and the respondent

for execution of the work in question on 30.10.1979.

7) So  far  as  agreement  No.  5/SE/79-80  is

concerned,  it  was  in  relation  to  work  of  section

bearing serial 4 whereas agreement No. 6/SE/79-80

was in relation to work of section bearing serial 6.

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The  work,  pursuant  to  these  agreements,  was  to

start from 01.12.1979 and had to be completed on

or before 31.05.1982.

8) Disputes of various nature arose between the

parties in execution of  both the agreements.   The

disputes were related  to the completion of works,

its nature, manner of its completion, non-payment

and withholding of  appellant's  bills,   deduction of

amount from the bills etc..  Since the disputes could

not  be  settled  amicably,  the  parties  invoked  the

arbitration  clause  (1.47)  contained  in  the

agreements  and  approached  the  Civil  Court  for

appointment of arbitrator and for making references

to him for adjudication of the disputes which had

arisen between them in relation  to  2  agreements.

The request was acceded to and accordingly some

disputes were referred to the sole arbitrator.  

9) So far as this appeal is concerned, it arises out

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of  disputes,  which  relates  to  agreement  No.

6/SE/79-80,  i.e.,  (serial  6).  So  far  as  disputes

relating to agreement No. 5/SE/79-80 i.e.(serial 4)

and  some  disputes  relating  to  agreement  No.

6/SE/79-80 are concerned, they were also referred

to  the  arbitrator  for  his  decision.  One  reference,

however, attained finality by the orders of this Court

in State of U.P. vs. Harish Chandra & Co., (1999)

1 SCC 63,   whereas another reference is pending in

this Court.  

10) Consequent  upon  the  reference  made  to  the

arbitrator  insofar  as  the  present  appeal  is

concerned,  the  appellant  (claimant)  filed  6  claims

(claim Nos. 12 to 17) before the sole arbitrator (Mr.

Harish  Chandra  -  retired  Chief  Engineer).  The

details  of  the  6  claims  made  by  the  appellant

against the respondent (State) are as under: -  

Claim No. Claim Amount 12. Claim  due  on Rs. 1,05,00,000.00

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account  of breaking  of  large pieces  of  hard rock in the filling done from 9.00 to 9.80 KM.

along with interest @ 24% per annum from  31.5.86  to the  date  the amount is actually paid.  

13. Claims  due  as payment   on account  of non-payment after 30.9.85.

Rs.  11,62,650.00 along with interest at 24% per annum from 1.6.86 to the date the amount is actually paid.  

14. Payment  due  as claim on account of  wrongful deduction  of Security.  

Rs.  1,04,426.00 along with interest at 24% per annum from 1.5.85 to the date the amount is actually paid.  

15. Payment  due  as claim on account of  extra excavation.  

Rs.  5,51,250.00 along with interest @ 24% per annum from 1.6.86 to the date  the  amount actually paid.  

16. Payment  due  as claim on account of  dressing  done on slopes of filled earth  in embankments from Km. 9.00 to KM. 9.80

Rs.  4,59,200.00 along with interest @ 24% per annum from 1.6.86 to the date  of  amount actually paid.  

17. Stopping  the respondents  from deducting  any quantity  of excavation  done by  petitioner because of sitting in  the  monsoon year  1986  and onwards, if any.  

Order  respondents to  accept  our measurement  for excavation  on 31.5.86.  

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11) The  respondent  (State)  contested  the

aforementioned  claims  by  filing  their  reply.   The

State   also  filed  their  counter  claims  against  the

appellant  claiming  damages.  The  appellant

contested the  counter  claims by filing  their  reply.

The parties adduced evidence and examined several

witnesses in support of their respective claims.  

12) On  27.11.1995,  the  arbitrator  passed  a

reasoned  award.  Out  of  6  claims,  the  arbitrator

allowed appellant's 3 claims, i.e., claim Nos. 12, 13

and 17 and rejected the claims Nos. 14, 15 and 16.

The arbitrator also rejected the counter claims of the

respondent (State) in toto. The details of the claims

awarded and rejected are as under:  

Claim No.

Amount demanded Rs. Amount Awarded Rs.  

12. Rs.  1,05,00,000.00 24%  interest  from 31.5.86

Rs. 44,98,995.00

13. Rs.  11,62,650  with 24%  interest  upto

Rs.  10,61,450/-  with interest  18%  from

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31.5.86 1.6.86 to 27.11.95 14. Rs.  1,04,426  with

interest from 1.5.85 Rejected

15. Rs.  5,51,250/-  with interest  @  24%  from 1.6.86

Rejected

16. Rs.  4,59,200/-  with interest  @  24%  from 1.6.86

Rejected

17. Order  respondent  to accept  measurement for  excavation  on 31.5.86

No  deduction  in quantity  already  paid vide 27th Running bill are justified  

13) The respondent, felt aggrieved, filed objections

under Section 30 of the Act 1940  before the Civil

Judge(S.D.),  Dehradun  against  the  award.  The

appellant  contested  the  objections  and  prayed  for

passing  a  decree  in  term of  the  award.  By  order

dated  30.05.1996,  the  civil  Judge  rejected  the

objections and passed a decree in term of the award

along with simple interest payable at the rate of 18%

p.a. on the awarded sum of Rs.55,60,445/-  from

the date of decree till payment of amount.  

14) The  respondent,  felt  aggrieved,  filed  appeal

being O.A. No. 1097 of 2001 before the High Court.

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By impugned judgment dated 17.08.2007, the High

Court allowed the appeal, set aside the order of the

Trial Court and while allowing the objections filed by

the State set aside the award.  The High Court held

that the arbitrator misconducted himself in passing

the  award  inasmuch  as  he  travelled  beyond  the

terms of the agreement.  

15) Felt  aggrieved,  the  appellant

(contractor/claimant) has filed this appeal by way of

special  leave  against  the  judgment  of  the  High

Court.     

16) Heard  Mr.  Vijay  Hansaria,  learned  senior

counsel  for  the  appellant  and  Mr.  S.R.  Singh,

learned senior counsel for the respondent.

17) Mr.  Vijay  Hansaria,   learned  senior  counsel

appearing  for  the  appellant  (claimant/contractor)

while  assailing  the  legality  and correctness of  the

impugned order contended that the High Court was

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clearly in error in allowing the appeal of the State

(respondent)  which  resulted  in  allowing  the

objections filed by the State before the Civil  judge

which, in turn, resulted in setting aside of the said

award which was rightly upheld by the Civil Judge.

18) Learned counsel urged that there was no case

made  out  by  the  State  in  their  objections  of  any

legal  misconduct  committed by the arbitrator  and

nor there was any factual or/and legal foundation

laid  so  as  to  constitute  a  case  of  any  legal

misconduct within the meaning of Section 30 of the

Act 1940 for setting aside the award.

19) Learned counsel pointed out that even cursory

reading  of  the  order  of  the  High  Court  would

indicate that the apparent legal error was committed

by the High Court while allowing the appeal. It was

his submission that the High Court virtually acted

as a first appellate Court as if the appeal before the

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High  Court   arose  directly  against  the  award.

Learned counsel pointed out that the  High Court

then  proceeded  to  examine  the  legality  and

correctness of  all  factual findings of  the arbitrator

by appreciating the evidence and then finding fault

in  the  approach  of  the  arbitrator  so  also  finding

error in the findings set aside the award as being

bad in law.  

20) Learned counsel urged that such approach of

the  High  Court  was  wholly  without  jurisdiction

being against  the  law laid  down by  this  Court  in

series of decisions wherein this Court has, inter alia,

ruled that  the  Court  while  hearing  the  objections

under Section 30 of the Act 1940 against the award,

cannot sit as an appellate Court over the decision of

the arbitrator.

21) Learned  counsel  then  contended  that  even

otherwise  on  the  merits,  the  award  and  the

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judgment of the Trial Court do not suffer from any

illegality  and nor  any case of  legal  misconduct  is

made out against the arbitrator so as to empower

the Court to set  aside the award under Section 30

of  the  Act  1940.  It  was  his  submission  that  the

arbitrator did not travel beyond the agreement and

on the other hand discussed each and every issue

by  appreciating  the  evidence  on  record  with

reference to each claim and then recorded a finding

in favour of the appellant in relation to three claims

and rejected the remaining claims of the appellant.

22) Learned  counsel  lastly  contended  that  this

Court  should,  therefore,   restore  the  order  of  the

Trial Court and, in consequence, uphold the award,

which is partly in favour of the appellant and partly

against  them,  as  being  just  and  legal  by  setting

aside of the impugned order of the High Court.

23) In reply,  Mr. S.R. Singh, learned counsel for

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the respondent supported the impugned order and

contended that it does not call for any interference.

It  was his submission that the reasoning and the

conclusion arrived at by the High Court for setting

aside  the  award is  legal  and proper  and hence  it

deserves to be upheld calling no interference.  

24) Having  heard  the  learned  counsel  for  the

parties and on perusal of the record of the case, we

are  inclined  to  accept  the  submissions  of  the

learned counsel for the appellant as, in our opinion,

it has substance.  

25) The question which arises for consideration in

this appeal is whether the High Court was justified

in  allowing  the  objections  filed  by  the  respondent

(State) under Section 30 of the Act 1940 and thereby

was justified in setting aside of the award passed by

the  sole  arbitrator  on  the  ground  of   "legal

misconduct"?  In  other  words,  the  question  that

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arises for consideration in this appeal is whether on

facts any case of legal misconduct on the part of the

arbitrator is made out by the State under Section 30

of the Act 1940 for setting aside of the award dated

27.11.1995?

26) This question, in our opinion, is required to be

decided  in  the  context  of  Section  30  of  Act  1940

since repealed.

27) What  is  the  jurisdiction  of  the  Court  under

Section  30  when  it  examines  the  question  as  to

whether any case of legal misconduct on the part of

an arbitrator in passing an award is made out or not

has been the subject matter of several decisions of

this Court and remains no more res integra?

28) A three-Judge Bench of this Court in State of

U.P. vs.  Allied Constructions,  (2003) 7 SCC 396

while  examining  the  scope  of  Section  30  held  as

under:  

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“The award is a speaking one.  The arbitrator has assigned sufficient and cogent reasons in support thereof.  Interpretation of a contract, it  is  trite,  is  a matter for the arbitrator  to determine.

Sudarshan Trading Co.  vs.  Govt.  of  Kerala (1989) 2 SCC 38: REFERRED TO:

Section  30  of  the  Arbitration  Act,  1940 providing  for  setting  aside  an  award  is restrictive in its operation.  Unless one or the other  condition  contained  in  Section  30  is satisfied, an award cannot be set aside.  The arbitrator  is  a  Judge chosen by the parties and  his  decision  is  final.   The  court  is precluded  from  reappraising  the  evidence. Even  in  a  case  where  the  award  contains reasons, the interference herewith would still be not available within the jurisdiction of the court  unless,  of  course,  the  reasons  are totally perverse or the judgment is based on a wrong proposition of law.  An error apparent on the fact of  the records would not imply closer  scrutiny  of  the  merits  of  documents and materials  on  record.   Once  it  is  found that the view of the arbitrator is a plausible one,  the  court  will  refrain  itself  from interfering.”

29) Justice S. Mukharji, as His Lordship then was,

speaking for the Bench in  M/s Sudarsan Trading

Co. vs.  Government of Kerala,  (1989) 2 SCC 38

while  examining  the  jurisdiction  of  Court  under

Section 30 held as under:

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“However,  there  is  a  distinction  between disputes  as  to  the  jurisdiction  of  the arbitrator and the disputes as to in what way that jurisdiction should be exercised.  There may  be  a  conflict  as  to  the  power  of  the arbitrator to grant a particular remedy.  One has to determine the distinction between an error within the jurisdiction and an error in excess  of  the  jurisdiction.   Court  cannot substitute  its  own  evaluation  of  the conclusion  of  law  or  fact  to  come  to  the conclusion  that  the  arbitrator  had  acted contrary to the bargain between the parties. Whether a particular amount was liable to be paid or damages liable to be sustained, was a decision  within  the  competency  of  the arbitrator in this.  By purporting to construe the contract the court could not take upon itself  the  burden  of  saying  that  this  was contrary to the contract and, as such, beyond jurisdiction.  If on a view taken of a contract, the  decision  of  the  arbitrator  on  certain amounts awarded, is a possible view through perhaps not the only correct view, the award cannot be examined by the court.”

30) The aforesaid view was consistently followed in

later decisions by this Court in  State of Andhra

Pradesh & Ors. Vs. R.V. Rayanim & Ors., (1990) 1

SCC 433 and  Ravindra Kumar Gupta & Co.  vs.

Union of India  (2010) 1 SCC 409.

31) One  cannot,  therefore,  dispute  the  legal

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proposition,  which is now fairly settled keeping in

view the aforementioned law laid down by this Court

that an award can be set aside only on the grounds

specified in sub-clause (a) (b) and (c) of Section 30 of

1940 Act and on no other grounds. Indeed this is

clear  from the  opening  words  of  Section  30  itself

which starts with the words "An award shall not be

set aside except on one or more of the following

grounds." A fortiori, a reasoned award cannot be set

aside unless it falls in any of the three sub-clauses

(a) (b) and (c) of Section 30 of the Act 1940.  

32) The grounds such as inadequacy of reasons in

support  of  an  award,  error  committed  by  the

arbitrator on facts, alternate or/and more plausible

view  could  be  taken  then  what  is  taken  by  the

arbitrator,  improper appreciation of  evidence done

by the arbitrator in recording any finding etc.  are

not the grounds on which any award much less a

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reasoned award can be set aside. In other words,

none of these grounds can be made the foundation

for setting aside the award because they do not fall

within  the  four  corners  of  any  of  the  three  sub-

clauses of Section 30 of the Act 1940.   

33) Coming  now  to  the  facts  of  this  case,  on

perusal of the impugned judgment, we find that the

High Court while setting aside of the award did not

take  into  consideration  the  aforesaid  view  of  this

Court  and  thus,  in  our  view,  committed  a  legal

error.

34) We are constrained to observe that  the High

Court virtually sat as an appellate Court as if it was

hearing  the  appeal  arising  out  of  the  award  little

realizing rather ignoring  its well defined jurisdiction

in  such  matter  and  proceeded  to  probe  into  all

factual issues arising in the case. It seems to have

gone to the extent of permitting the State’s counsel

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to file some documents in appeal as would be clear

from para 12 of the judgment.  This would also be

clear from the observations of the High Court made

in Paras 12, 13, 18 and 19 which read as under :

“12  The  learned  standing  counsel  has supplied  the  list  of  petty  contractors  in whose  names  the  bills  were  submitted before the Arbitrator.  The details  of  those bills is as below:-

S.No. Names  of  Petty Contractors

Amount

1 Harish  Chandra  & Sons

Rs.  3,11,965.80

2 Vijay Gupta & Sons Rs. 3,04,828.00 3 Phool Chand Gupta

& Sons Rs. 17,95,346.00

4 Ashok  Gupta  & Sons

Rs. 178,84,942.00

5 Vijay Gupta & Sons Rs. 17,78,664.00 6 Phool  Chand  &

Sons Rs. 2,97,583.50

7 Ashok  Gupta  & Sons

Rs. 3,10,258.60

8 Harish  Chandra  & Sons

Rs. 17,84,468.00

9 Ajay Gupta & Sons Rs. 3,00,196.90 10 Ajay Gupta & Sons Rs. 17,73,903.98

13.  The  department  made  enquiries  upon which it was revealed that in the concerned area  there  exist  no  Firms  in  the  aforesaid names  and  addresses.  The  correspondence made in this regard is filed as Annexure No.2 (Collectively) to the Stay Application in the

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appeal  before  this  Court.  The  endorsement made  by  the  postal  department  about non-existence  of  the  said  Firms  is  also Arbitrator has not considered the above facts and allowed the claims 12, 13 and 17 filed by the contractor.  The Department’s allegation is that the contractor for the first time raised claim Nos. 12 to 16 before it vide his letter No.  102/S.C.C./87  dated  20.9.87  and  the department  vide  its  letter  No. 3911/-2/case/647/86,  dated  28.11.87  has rejected the claims. Claim No. 17 was never raised  before  the  Department  and  it  was placed before the Arbitrator directly.  

18.Now we proceed to scrutinize the claims awarded by the Arbitrator to the contractor.  

19. Claim  No.  12  pertains  to  breaking  of large pieces of hard rock in the filling work done  from  Km.  No.  9.00  to  9.80.  The Arbitrator  has  allowed  this  claim  on  the ground that the site is located in the upper Shivalik ranges of the Himalayan mountains. These  ranges  are  mostly  built  of  the sedimentary  rocks  compressed  of  the material flown down the rivers since millions of  years  which  got  compressed  under  their own pressure and weights and got very hard due  to  the  ageing  process.  This  material could  not  be  dugged  out  manually  by  pick axes  or  Phawaras.  The  possible  means  of excavation  were  only  by  mechanical  means either  by  mechanical  shovels,  back  hows, rippers or by blasting. The objections of the Department is that the Arbitrator has allowed the claim on imagination. As per the contract clause 8.05 boulders of 150 mm dimensions were to be used in the filling reach and of more than 150 mm were to be staked at the site. The stones of dimensions of above 150 mm were not to be broken and then filled in

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the  filling  reach.  The  relevant  clause  8.05 clearly indicates “the boulders of more than 150 mm in dimension shall not be permitted in  the  embankments  unless  specifically approved by the Engineer Incharge and shall be stacked by the contractor 10 meters away from the toe of the bank and nothing extra shall be paid to the contractor for this work”. There is no mention of breaking of the stones in the agreement clause. The Arbitrator has acted beyond the provision of the agreement in allowing this claim.”  

35) The High Court then went on to examine the

case on facts and eventually held that the arbitrator

has travelled beyond clauses 26, 3 (1)(a) and 1.46 of

the  agreement  and  hence  committed  legal

misconduct  requiring  the  High Court  to  set  aside

the award.  

36) With respect, we can neither agree and nor can

uphold the approach and the reasoning of the High

Court.  In  our  considered  view,  such  approach  is

wholly against the law laid down by this Court in

the decisions quoted supra.  

37) In the first place, the High Court did not apply

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the law laid down by this Court while deciding the

appeal and hence committed a jurisdictional error;

Secondly,  the  High  Court  acted  like  an  appellate

Court  and virtually  treated as if  the appeal  arose

directly  against  the  award and then proceeded to

examine  all  factual  findings  of  the  arbitrator  by

appreciating the evidence.   It was not permissible

in  law;   Thirdly,  the  High  Court  should  have

confined its inquiry to find out as to whether any

legal  misconduct  was committed by the arbitrator

and,  if  so,  how  and  in  what  manner.  It  was,

however, not done; Fourthly, the High Court went

into the factual question by referring to clause 26 of

the agreement for holding that the arbitrator passed

an award contrary to clause 26 and thereby traveled

beyond the terms of agreement which constituted a

legal misconduct on his part.  This finding, in our

view, is,  on the face of it, untenable in law for the

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reason,  inter  alia,  that  this  objection  was  neither

raised before the arbitrator and nor before the Trial

Court in the manner in which it was raised for the

first  time in the High Court.  In any event,  in the

absence  of  any finding  recorded by the  arbitrator

and the Trial Court, such issue could not have been

gone into for the first time in appeal by the High

Court. That apart, it has otherwise no substance on

facts for the simple reason that it being a question

of fact, the same could not be examined in appeal;

Fifthly, the High Court failed to see that clause 26

only  prohibits  the  appellant  from  assigning  the

agreement  to  any  third  person.   Clause  26,

therefore, had nothing to do with the claims filed by

the  appellants.  It  was  an  admitted  fact  that  the

appellant did not assign the agreement to any third

person. If some work was got done by the appellant

by employing some small contractor then it did not

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constitute  a  case  of  assignment  of  a  whole

agreement in favour of small contractors within the

meaning of clause 26 so as to empower the State to

cancel the agreement on such ground.  The finding

of the High Court that the award is rendered bad

because it was passed in contravention of clause 26

of  the  agreement  is,  therefore,  not  legally

sustainable in law;  Sixthly, the High Court further

failed to see that there was no error apparent on the

face of  the record in the findings recorded by the

arbitrator; Seventhly, the High Court also failed to

see that the Trial Court had elaborately gone into all

the  factual  issues  and  rightly  did  not  find  any

substance  in  the  objections  raised  by  the

respondent; and lastly, the award being a reasoned

one  (running  into  36  pages-Annexure  P5  pages

127-163 of the SLP paper book),  the reasoning of

the arbitrator could not be said to be perverse to the

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extent  that no man with ordinary prudence could

take such view and nor any finding of the arbitrator

was against any provision of law or in contravention

of  any of  the  clauses  of   the  agreement  so  as to

constitute a case of legal misconduct on the part of

the arbitrator within the meaning of Section 30 of

the Act for setting aside an award.

38) We,  on  perusal  of  the  award,  find  that  the

main claim of the appellant (claimant) against the

State was  "claim No. 12" which was in relation to

the work done by the appellant of breaking of large

pieces  of  hard  rock  from  9.00  Km  to  9.80  Km

distance.  Since the respondent (State) disputed the

appellant's  claim  on  various  factual  grounds  and

hence the issue centered around to the questions as

to whether the appellant did this work and, if  so,

how and in what manner and to what extent and

lastly,  what  should  be  the  rate  at  which  the

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appellant  should  be  paid,  if  it  is  held  that  the

appellant has done the work.

39) The arbitrator in Paras 19 to 36 of the award

examined these issues on the basis of the evidence

adduced by the parties and held that the appellant

has done the work in question and, therefore, they

were entitled to claim its price for the work done.

Though  the  appellant,  in  their  claim  petition,

claimed the money at the rate of Rs.30 per Cu M

but the arbitrator did not accept the rates claimed

by the appellant and instead awarded the amount to

the appellant at the rate of Rs.12.97 per Cu.M.  

40) So  far  as  claim  No.  13  was  concerned,  it

pertained  to  interest  claimed by  the  appellant  on

their some amount whereas the claim No. 17 was in

relation  to  some deductions  already  made  by  the

respondent in the appellant's bills for certain work

done under the agreement.

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41) In  our  considered  view,  it  is  clear  from  the

facts  of  the  case  that  the  claims  made  by  the

appellant were essentially based on facts. They were

accordingly  probed  on  oral  and  documentary

evidence adduced by the parties, which resulted in

partial success of 3 claims in appellant's favour and

rejection  of  3  claims.  So  far  as  the  State  is

concerned, they did not pursue their counter claim

consequent upon its rejection by the arbitrator.

42) We have not been able to notice any kind of

perversity in the arbitrator's reasoning and nor are

we able to notice any kind of apparent error whether

legal  or  otherwise  in  the  award  which  may

constitute  a  case  of  any  legal  misconduct  on  the

part of the arbitrator empowering the Court to set

aside the award by taking recourse to Section 30 of

the Act. The reasoning and the conclusion arrived at

by the arbitrator is one of the possible view which is

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capable  of  being  taken  by  the  arbitrator  on  the

material  brought  on  record  and  we  find  no  legal

ground to set it aside the same.   

43) Learned  counsel  for  the  respondent  made

sincere attempt  to  support  the  reasoning  and the

conclusion  reached by  the  High Court  but  in  the

light of what we have discussed above, we can not

accept any of his submissions.  

44) In  the  light  of  foregoing  discussion,  we  are

unable  to  concur  with  the  reasoning  and  the

conclusion arrived at by the High Court.

45) As  a  result,  the  appeal  succeeds  and  is

accordingly  allowed.   Impugned order  is  set  aside

and that of the Trial Court restored.    

In Special Leave Petition (c) No. 23950 of 2007

As  prayed  for,  the  petitioner  is  permitted  to

withdraw this  special  leave  petition  with  a  liberty

granted to the petitioner to file review petition before

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the High Court.  In the event of review petition being

dismissed,  the  petitioner  would  be  at  liberty  to

challenge the impugned order including the order in

the review petition.   

With  the  aforesaid  liberty,  the  special  leave

petition is dismissed as withdrawn.

                       ………...................................J.

[J. CHELAMESWAR]

                             …...……..................................J.

 [ABHAY MANOHAR SAPRE] New Delhi; September 08, 2016  

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