M/S. FORTUNE INFRASTRUCTURE (NOW KNOWN AS M/S HICON INFRSTRUCTURE) Vs TREVOR DLIMA
Bench: HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE N.V. RAMANA, HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE S. ABDUL NAZEER
Judgment by: HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE N.V. RAMANA
Case number: C.A. No.-003533-003534 / 2017
Diary number: 42922 / 2016
Advocates: E. C. AGRAWALA Vs
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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION
CIVIL APPEAL NO(S). 3533-3534 OF 2017
M/S. FORTUNE INFRASTRUCTURE (NOW KNOWN AS M/S. HICON INFRASTRUCTURE) & ANR.
…APPELLANT(S)
VERSUS TREVOR D’LIMA & ORS. …RESPONDENT(S)
J U D G M E N T
N.V. RAMANA, J.
1. These appeals are filed against the impugned
orders, dated 08.09.2016 and 03.11.2016, passed
by the National Consumer Disputes Redressal
Commission [hereinafter ‘NCDRC’ for brevity], in
Consumer Complaint No. 636 of 2015 and Review
Application No. 273 of 2016 in the Consumer
Complaint No. 636 of 2015. 2. A few facts which are necessary for the disposal of
this matter are that the appellants, in the year
2011, launched a residential housing project by
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Reportable
name ‘Hicons Onyx’, renamed as Fortune
Residency, which was a re-development of
Mohammadi House. The respondents booked a flat
bearing no. 202, 2nd Floor in ‘A’ wing, admeasuring
828.40 Sq. Ft. with one unit of parking-space. The
total consideration for the flat was Rs.
1,93,00,000/-. It is alleged by the appellants, that
due to increase in the cost beyond what was
expected, they transferred the project to another
company being M/s. Zoy Shelcon Pvt. Ltd. It is to be
noted that the respondents have paid a sale
consideration of Rs. 1,87,00,000/-.
3. In 2015, aggrieved by the fact that appellants were
not willing to deliver the flat to them, the
respondents approached NCDRC through a
consumer complaint, being CC No. 636 of 2015,
with following prayers- a. To hold and declare the Opposite Parties to be
guilty of deficiency in service and unfair trade practices as per the provisions of the Consumer Protection Act, 1986
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b. To direct the Opposite Parties 1 to 4 to comply with their statutory obligations and to execute and register the Agreement for Sale with the complainants in respect of flat No. 202 on the 2nd floor admeasuring 828.40 Sq. Ft. with one car parking in the building known as Hicon Onyx and since re-named as Fortune residency situated at plot no. F/1116-A, Village Bandra, St. Martins Road Bandra (West), Mumbai 400 050 (Maharashtra).
c. To direct the Opposite Parties no. 1 to 4 to complete the construction of the building known as ‘Hicons Onyx’ since renamed as ‘Fortune residency’ and to hand over to the complainants vacant and peaceful possession of the Flat No. 202 on the 2nd floor admeasuring 828.40 Sq. Ft. with one car parking in the building known as Hicons Onyx and since renamed as Fortune residency situated at plot no. F/1116-A, Village Bandra, St. Martins road Bandra (West), Mumbai 400 050 (Maharashtra) on receiving the balance consideration amount of Rs. 6,00,000/-from the complainants
Alternatively In the event of the Opposite Parties no. 1 to 4 having created third party interests in favour of the Opposite Party no. 5, to direct the Opposite parties no. 1 to 4 to hand over to the complainants any other flat of the same size quality and specifications with one car parking in the same building ‘Hicons Onyx’ since re-named as ‘Fortune Residency’ or any flat of the same size, quality and specifications with one car parking in the
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same locality of the present building Hicons Onyx or Fortune Residency.
x x x x x
x x x x x
f. To direct the Opposite Parties No. 1 to 4 jointly and severally pay to the complainants Rs.5,00,000/- (Rupees Five lakhs only) towards compensation for the inconvenience and mental agony suffered by the complainants due to the enormous delay in construction of the building, negligence and deficiency in service of the Opposite Parties No. 1 to 4.
g. To direct the opposite Parties No. 1 to 4 jointly and severally to pay to the complainants the sum of Rs. 1,00,000/- (Rupees One Lakh only) being the Legal and other incidental expenses incurred by the complainants.
h. For such other and further relief as this Hon’ble Commission may deem fit and proper in the nature and circumstances of the above numbered complaint.
4. The NCDRC has allowed the complaint and directed
the appellants: 1. To refund the amount of Rs.
1,87,00,000/- which they have received from the
complainants, within six weeks from the day of the
impugned judgment; 2. The appellants were further
directed to pay a sum of Rs. 3,65,46,000/- as
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compensation and Rs. 10,000/- as cost of litigation
to the complainants within six weeks from the day
of the impugned judgment; 3. The aforesaid amount
was ordered to be paid at 10% per annum from the
date of the order till the actual date of payment. It
may be noted that even the review against the
aforesaid order was dismissed by the NCDRC vide
order dated 03.11.2016.
5. Having dissatisfied with the impugned orders
passed by the NCDRC, appellants approached
this Court through these civil appeals.
6. At the threshold it was brought to our notice that
on 08.09.2016, when the matter was argued, on
most of the other dates the appellants remained
unrepresented before NCDRC. Further the counsels
representing the appellants stated that their
counsel appointed for the forum below did not file
necessary pleadings except for a proforma reply.
Keeping in view of the above, they argued that this
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case should be remanded back to the NCDRC for
fresh consideration. However, on careful
consideration of facts of this case, we are of the
opinion that a remand may not be required at this
stage. To put a quietus to the litigation, the
controversy can be adjudicated by this Court.
7. Learned counsel for the appellants, primarily
submitted that the present appellants have
transferred the project to a different company
thereby they should be discharged from any liability
for not handing over the disputed property to the
answering respondents (Complainants). He further
argued that, the present circle rate of the disputed
property is pegged at approximately half the price
awarded by the NCDRC. Lastly, he urged before this
Court to consider the downward trends shown in
the real estate market which mandates a lesser
compensation, compared to the one awarded by the
NCDRC.
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8. Per Contra, the learned counsel appearing on behalf
of the answering respondents (Complainants) fully
supported the reasoning of the NCDRC in coming to
a conclusion that, the appellants herein provided
deficient service by delaying the handing over of the
flat to the complainants. In all fairness, learned
counsel for answering respondents have admitted
that prices as contemplated under the impugned
order of NCDRC are not reflective of the true market
rates for similar flats available in the near vicinity of
the disputed flats.
9. It would not be out of context to mention that
during the hearing of this case, many attempts were
made by both parties to amicably settle the issue
concerning the quantum of compensation which
could not fructify. Further we requested Shri. Raju
Ramachandran, learned senior advocate, to use his
good office to persuade parties to settle the matter.
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Such an endeavour also could not impress upon the
parties and therefore this court was called upon to
adjudicate the matter.
10. Having heard learned counsels on either side
and perusing the materials available on record, the
issue that fall for consideration is whether there is
deficiency of service on the part of the appellants? If
so, what is just and reasonable compensation?
11. It is now well established that the contractual
damages are usually awarded to compensate an
injured party to a breach of contract for the loss of
his bargain. In the case of Johnson and Anr. V.
Agnew, [1979] 1 All ER 883, the aforesaid case has
clearly held as under- The general principle for the assessment of damages is compensatory, i.e. that the innocent party is to be placed, so far as money can do so, in the same position as if the contract had been performed.
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12. The aforesaid proposition remains to hold the
field and has been applied consistently. This rule is
more qualified when it comes to the real estate
sector. If the seller wants to limit their liability for
breach of contract under the aforesaid rule, they
have to portray that they have performed their
obligation in a prudent manner. It may be noted
that the onus is on the seller to show his best
efforts and bona fides in discharging the obligation.
It may be noted that even in the absence of fraud,
mere unwillingness to carry out the duty could
constitute bad faith sufficient for the purchaser to
claim damages. 13. To decide whether the respondent ought to be
awarded compensation because of deficiency of
service, it is important to consider the meaning of
deficiency as provided under Section 2(1)(g) of the
Consumer Protection Act, 1986. (g) “deficiency” means any fault, imperfection, shortcoming or inadequacy in the quality, nature and manner of
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performance which is required to be maintained by or under any law for the time being in force or has been undertaken to be performed by a person in pursuance of a contract or otherwise in relation to any service;
In light of the above definition, we have to examine
whether there is any deficiency in service, which
entitles the complainant to damages/compensation.
14. In the present case, the appellants did not give
any valid reasons as to why they transferred the
property to a third party, despite their contractual
obligation to the respondents (complainants). The
obligation was on the appellants to show that he
was unable to transfer the property to the
respondent.
15. Moreover, a person cannot be made to wait
indefinitely for the possession of the flats allotted to
them and they are entitled to seek the refund of the
amount paid by them, along with compensation.
Although we are aware of the fact that when there
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was no delivery period stipulated in the agreement,
a reasonable time has to be taken into
consideration. In the facts and circumstances of
this case, a time period of 3 years would have been
reasonable for completion of the contract i.e., the
possession was required to be given by last quarter
of 2014. Further there is no dispute as to the fact
that until now there is no redevelopment of the
property. Hence, in view of the above discussion,
which draw us to an irresistible conclusion that
there is deficiency of service on the part of the
appellants and accordingly the issue is answered.
When once this Court comes to the conclusion that,
there is deficiency of services, then the question is
what compensation the respondents/complainants
is entitled to ?
16. Before we come to the aspect of quantum of
compensation, it would be appropriate to look at the
settled legal position concerning the same. At the
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outset, we may note that even under the Consumer
Protection Act, 1986, the damages for commercial
contracts need to be determined as per the Indian
Contract Act.
17. It would be pertinent to note that in common
law, claim for damages is the rule and specific
performance is an exception, while in civil law front,
specific performance has traditionally been a prime
remedy for the breach of contract.1
18. This Court in Ghaziabad Development
Authority v. Balbir Singh, (2004) 5 SCC 65, has
observed that there is no fixed formula for fixing
damages in the following manner-
8. However, the power and duty to award compensation does not mean that irrespective of facts of the case compensation can be awarded in all matters at a uniform rate of 18% per annum. As seen above, what is being awarded is compensation i.e. a recompense for the loss or injury. It therefore necessarily has to be based on a
1 Apparent from the study of French Civil Code (FCC) and German Civil Code (BGB).
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finding of loss or injury and has to correlate with the amount of loss or injury. Thus, the Forum or the Commission must determine that there has been deficiency in service and/or misfeasance in public office which has resulted in loss or injury. No hard-and-fast rule can be laid down, however, a few examples would be where an allotment is made, price is received/paid but possession is not given within the period set out in the brochure. The Commission/Forum would then need to determine the loss. Loss could be determined on basis of loss of rent which could have been earned if possession was given and the premises let out or if the consumer has had to stay in rented premises then on basis of rent actually paid by him. Along with recompensing the loss the Commission/Forum may also compensate for harassment/injury, both mental and physical. Similarly, compensation can be given if after allotment is made there has been cancellation of scheme without any justifiable cause.
9. That compensation cannot be uniform and can best be illustrated by considering cases where possession is being directed to be delivered and cases where only monies are directed to be returned. In cases where possession is being directed to be delivered the compensation for harassment will necessarily have to be less because in a way that party is being compensated by increase in the value of the property he is getting. But in cases where monies are being simply returned then the party is suffering a loss
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inasmuch as he had deposited the money in the hope of getting a flat/plot. He is being deprived of that flat/plot. He has been deprived of the benefit of escalation of the price of that flat/plot. Therefore, the compensation in such cases would necessarily have to be higher. … We clarify that the above are mere examples. They are not exhaustive. The above shows that compensation cannot be the same in all cases irrespective of the type of loss or injury suffered by the consumer.
(emphasis supplied) 19. It must be noted that the law is well settled in
this regard. Whenever the builder has refused to
perform the contract without valid justification, the
buyer is entitled for compensation as he has been
deprived of price escalation of the flat. Every breach
of contract gives rise to an action for damages. Such
amount of damages must be proved with reasonable
certainty.
20. Before we assess the damages, another
important issue to be delved upon is the reckoning
date for the purpose of the assessing the damages.
Whether should it be from the date on which the
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breach took place or should it be from the date of
judgment?
21. Learned counsel for the appellants, with some
vehemence, argued that the rates of the property
have considerably slumped due to downfall in the
real-estate market. Such submissions are to be
tested as per the established principles of law. As
per the settled law, the damages become due on the
date when the breach of contract takes place, and
are normally assessed by the reference to the time
of breach. The aforesaid rule is based on the
principle that the injured party is presumed to be in
knowledge of the breach as soon as it is committed
and at that time he can take appropriate measures
of mitigation to control the loss flowing from the
breach. The courts may deviate from the aforesaid
rule and fix appropriate date in facts and
circumstance of a case if aforesaid presumptions
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could not be established or it would not be
reasonable to follow the rule. It may be noted that
where there is non-delivery of the flat/house, and
the developer has refused to provide alternative and
equivalent accommodation, and the buyer lacks
means to purchase a substitute from the market,
then in such circumstances, damages would not be
reasonable to be assessed on the breach date.
22. We have already noted that the appellants were
to perform the contract within a reasonable period
of three years from the date of the agreement i.e., by
the last quarter of 2014. Aggrieved by the delay in
handing over the possession, the respondents
(complainants) approached the NCDRC for
conveyance and in alternative prayed for damages.
It is now settled that where a party sustains loss by
reason of a breach of contract, the damages are to
be granted so as to place the suffering party in the
same position as if the contract had been
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performed. In light of the above, the damages other
than consequential loss have to be measured at the
time of the breach. However, the aforesaid rule is
flexible which needs to be assessed in facts and
circumstances of individual case. In this case at
hand the respondents tried to execute the
agreement and sought for conveyance of the
property through the NCDRC. In these
circumstances we may note that, even in the first
appeal, offers were being made on behalf of
appellants to convey alternative properties, which
were refused as being insufficient. Therefore, in
facts and circumstances of this case, the damage
need not be determined from the date of breach of
contract.
23. Even though the appellants raised a factual
issue concerning the non-payment of
part-consideration, we do not think it is necessary
to go into this aspect, as the NCDRC has given a
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categorical finding that Rs. 1,87,00,000/- has been
paid by the respondents (complainants).
24. Appellants have produced circle rates of
properties in the vicinity of the disputed flats. These
rates vary from Rs. 18,655 per Sq. Ft. to Rs.
25,787/- per Sq. Ft. Whereas the respondents have
produced executed sale deeds in the nearby vicinity,
which was Rs. 65,000 per Sq. ft., Rs. 69,342/- per
Sq. ft., Rs. 75,000/- per Sq. Ft. and Rs. 88,050/-
per Sq. Ft. NCDRC has taken the minimum
available market price as the reference point for
awarding compensation at the rate of Rs. 65,000/-
per Sq. Ft. We are of the opinion that excessive
reliance on the aforesaid sale deed may not be
appropriate as the present property is a
redevelopment of an earlier property. Our attention
has been drawn to the fact that usually the real
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estate rates for re-developed properties are on the
lower side instead of green-field projects.
25. In light of the above, we consider that the claim
of the respondents (complainants) as granted by the
NCDRC seems to surpass the actual-loss based
damages and enter the domain of gain-based
remedy. Although we do not recognize any a priopri
limitations on such claim, but we do not think that
it would be appropriate to grant such damages in
the case at hand. There is no dispute about the fact
that damages for the contractual breach is generally
compensatory arising out of the breach. Therefore,
the damages awarded should not be excessive and a
court/tribunal needs to take a balanced approach
so as to ensure right compensation.
26. Taking into consideration of factual aspects
involved in the matter and on consideration of the
submissions of the counsels on either side, we deem
it appropriate, just and reasonable that the market
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rate be fixed at Rs. 50,000/- per Sq. Ft. (Rupees
Fifty Thousand per square feet) as the reference rate
for determination of market price prevailing in the
vicinity of the disputed property. Hence, the
estimated market price would be Rs.4,14,20,000/-
instead of Rs.5,38,46,000/- as granted by the
NCDRC. However, we do not see any reason to
interfere in respect of the compensation granted for
the parking space.
27. Therefore, the appellants are directed as under- a. To refund the amount of Rs. 1,87,00,000/- which
they have received from the complainants. b. To pay a sum of Rs. 2,27,20,000/- as
compensation to the complainants. c. To pay a sum of Rs. 20,00,000/- as
compensation for one unit of parking lot. d. The appellants shall also pay Rs. 10,000/- as the
cost of litigation to the complainants. e. The aforesaid amount is required to be paid
within six weeks from the day of this order. If the payment in terms of this order is not made within the time stipulated herein, it shall carry interest of 9 % per annum from the date of this order.
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28. It is to be noted that this Court vide order
dated 23.02.2017, while issuing notice, directed the
appellants to deposit Rs. 2,50,00,000/- before
NCDRC as a condition precedent for hearing this
case. Later it was represented to us that the
appellants as on 31.05.2017, had deposited the
aforesaid amount before NCDRC. In view of the
above, we allow the respondents (complainants) to
withdraw the aforesaid amount with accrued
interest, if any and the same be adjusted to the
appellants’ liability as indicated above.
29. In light of the above discussions, we allow the
appeals in part to the extent indicated above. There
shall be no order as to the costs.
………………………J. (N. V. Ramana)
………………………J. (S. Abdul Nazeer)
New Delhi March 12, 2018
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ITEM NO.1503 COURT NO.9 SECTION XVII S U P R E M E C O U R T O F I N D I A RECORD OF PROCEEDINGS Civil Appeal No(s). 3533-3534/2017 M/S. FORTUNE INFRASTRUCTURE (NOW KNOWN AS M/S HICON INFRSTRUCTURE) & ANR. Appellant(s) VERSUS TREVOR D'LIMA & ORS. Respondent(s) ([HEARD BY : HON. N.V. RAMANA AND HON. S. ABDUL NAZEER, JJ.]) Date : 12-03-2018 These appeals were called on for pronouncement of today. For Appellant(s) Mr. E. C. Agrawala, AOR For Respondent(s)
Mr. Abhir Phukan, Adv. For Mr. V. Shyamohan, AOR
Hon'ble Mr. Justice N.V. Ramana pronounced the judgment of the Bench comprising His Lordship and Hon'ble Mr. Justice S. Abdul Nazeer.
In light of the discussions, we allow the appeals in part to the extent indicated in the signed reportable judgment. There shall be no order as to the costs.
(SUKHBIR PAUL KAUR) (RENUKA SADANA) AR CUM PS ASST.REGISTRAR
(Signed reportable judgment is placed on the file)
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