REPORTABLE

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION

CIVIL APPERAL Nos. 4757-4760 OF 2018 [Arising out of SLP (C) No.32252-32255 of 2016]

M/s Eureka Builders & Ors.       .. Appellant(s)

Versus

Gulabchand s/o Veljee Dand Since Deceased by L.Rs. & Ors.Etc.Etc.   .. Respondent(s)

J U D G M E N T

Abhay Manohar Sapre, J.

1) Leave granted.

2) These  appeals  arise  from  the  common  final

judgment and order dated 30.09.2015 passed by the

High Court of Karnataka, Circuit Bench at Dharwad

in  R.F.A.  Nos.100017  of  2015,  100018  of  2015,

100016 of 2015 and 100099 of 2015, whereby the

Division  Bench  of  the  High  Court  disposed  of  the

appeals  by  allowing  the  plaintiff’s  appeal  and

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accordingly modified the finding of the Trial Court as

regards the status and the ownership rights of  the

plaintiff in the suit land and held that the plaintiff is

the owner of the suit land and is, therefore, entitled

to claim his 1/5th  share in it along with defendants

Nos.1 to 4, who are legal representatives of late Shah

Veljee Kanjee.

3) In  order  to  appreciate  the  issues  involved  in

these  appeals,  it  is  necessary  to  set  out  the

background facts, which led to filing of the suit by

the  predecessor-in-title  of  respondent  Nos.1  and  2

and  now represented  by  respondent  Nos.  1  and  2

against  the  appellants  and  remaining  respondents

No.3 to 34 herein out of which these appeals arise.

4) The case has a history of litigation as it would

be  clear  from  the  narration  of  the  facts  stated

hereinbelow.  The  facts  mentioned  hereinbelow  are

taken from SLP paper books and its list of dates.  

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5) The appellants herein are defendant Nos. 18 to

25 (who are builder, firm and its partners) whereas

respondent Nos. 1 and 2 are the legal representatives

of original plaintiff and respondent Nos. 3 to 34 are

proforma defendants in a civil suit (O.S. No.37/2010)

out of which these appeals arise. The contest in these

appeals  is  essentially  among  the  appellants  and

respondent Nos. 1 and 2.

6) The dispute relates to a land bearing CTS Nos.

361 and 366 of CTS Ward No.1 (originally bearing RS

Nos. 20/1/& 20/2 admeasuring 3 Acres 20 Guntas

and  1  Acre  25  Guntas  respectively)  situated  at

Kusugal Road, Keshwapur, Hubli described in detail

in the schedule to the plaint (hereinafter referred to

as "the suit land").  

7) The suit land was a "watan" property under the

Maharashtra  Hereditary  Offices  Act  (hereinafter

referred to as “the MHO Act”)  and on its repeal  in

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1961,  was  governed  by  the  Karnataka  Village

Abolition  Act,  1961 (hereinafter  referred  to  as  “the

KVA Act”).   

8) The  suit  land  originally  belonged  to  three

persons namely, Marigouda Patil,  Basangouda Patil

and  Adveppagouda  Patil  (hereinafter  referred  to  as

“three PATIL”).

9) On  23.10.1915,  three  PATIL  leased  out  land

bearing  CTS  No.  366  (3  acres  20  guntas)  to  one

Chaturbhuj Ratansi for a period of 50 years whereas

the land bearing CTS No. 361 (1 acre 25 guntas) was

permanently leased out to one Kanjee Ghelabhai Shet

alias Gujjar on 09.03.1920.

10) In 1942, land bearing CTS No.361 was sold in

Court Auction proceedings and one person by name –

Shah Veljee  Kanjee  purchased  the  said  land being

the highest bidder.

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11) On 14.05.1943, Shah Veljee Kanjee purchased

another parcel of land bearing CTS No.366 by direct

sale/purchase.   Shah  Veljee  Kanjee  died  on

02.12.1957 leaving  behind  his  widow-Gunwantibai,

two  major  daughters  and  four  minor  sons.  By

inheritance, the legal representatives stepped into his

shoes and became the joint owners of the suit land.

12) On  19.12.1957,  the  widow  and  2  major

daughters  of  late  Shah Veljee  Kanjee sold  the suit

land to one Gadag Co-operative Cotton Sales Society

Ltd.-defendant No. 17 (hereinafter referred to as the

“Society”).

13) The  son  of  late  Shah  Veljee  Kanjee,  who  is

plaintiff (since dead) and defendant Nos. 1 to 4 in the

present  suit  out  of  which  these  appeals  arise  felt

aggrieved by the sale dated 19.12.1957 made by their

mother and two sisters in favour of the Society and

accordingly  filed  civil  suit  being  O.S.  No.9/1969

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praying therein for a declaration that the sale made

by their  mother and two sisters is  bad in law and

void to the extent of plaintiff's share (5/8th) in the suit

land.  The  mother,  two  sisters  and  the  Society

contested the suit as defendants.

14) This suit was, however, decreed on 26.08.1977

by the Principal Civil Judge (Sr. Division) in plaintiff's

favour. It was held that the sale made by the mother

and two sisters of the plaintiff in favour of the Society

is illegal and thus is not binding on the plaintiff to

the extent of his 5/8th  share in the suit land.  

15) This  decree  was  challenged  by  the  purchaser

(Society) in the High Court and later in this Court but

was not successful. In other words, the Society lost

the  legal  battle  throughout  up  to  this  Court  and

resultantly,  the decree dated 26.08.1977 passed by

the Principal  Civil  Judge (Sr.  Division)  in plaintiff's

favour became final.  

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16) In  execution  of  this  decree,  the  plaintiff  and

defendant Nos.1-4, who are the legal representatives

of late Shah Veljee Kanjee, were accordingly placed in

joint possession of their shares in the suit land.

17) As mentioned above, the appellants herein are

the builder,  firm and its partners.  They claimed to

have  entered  into  an  agreement  with  the  original

owners (three PATIL) on 23.03.2001 for purchase of

the suit land on certain terms and conditions.

18) In  the  year  2004,  the  original  owners  (three

PATIL) claiming their ownership rights over the suit

land filed two civil suits being O.S. Nos.364 & 365 of

2004 against the legal representatives of Shah Veljee

Kanjee  and  the  Society.  The  Civil  Court  dismissed

both these civil suits as barred by time vide judgment

dated  29.01.2007.  The  two  dismissals  attained

finality because the three PATIL did not pursue the

matter further in appeals to the higher Courts.  

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19) During interregnum period,  there were several

rounds of litigation in civil, revenue and rent courts

among  the  parties  and  their  representatives.

Similarly some subsequent developments in relation

to the suit land conferring some rights by the State

on the parties also took place. However, at this stage,

it is not necessary to give details of this litigation and

its development.  The same will  be referred to at a

later stage while dealing with these submissions.

20) It  is  basically  with  the  aforementioned

background  facts,  one  son  of  Shah  Veljee  Kanjee

(respondent No.1 herein (since dead) and represented

by  his  legal  representatives  son/daughter  as

respondent  Nos.1  and  2   filed  civil  suit

(O.S.No.37/2010)  on  23.02.2010  in  the  Court  of

Principal  Civil  Judge,  Sr.  Division  at  Hubli  out  of

which  these  appeals  arise  against  27  defendants

which included the members of Shah Veljee Kanjee

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family,  their  legal  heirs,  legal  representatives  of

original  holders  (three  PATIL)  and   two  intending

purchasers/buyers of the suit land, namely, Society

and the other, M/s Eureka builders - a firm and their

partners (appellants herein).

21) The  suit  was  filed  for  partition  and  separate

possession of plaintiff's 1/5th  share in the suit land

and  also  for  grant  of  permanent  injunction

restraining the two intending buyers/purchasers of

the suit land from interfering in plaintiff's possession

over the suit land.  

22) In  substance,  the  plaintiff  (respondent  Nos.1

and 2 herein) had claimed the aforementioned reliefs

on the  basis  of  his  title  over  the  suit  land which,

according  to  him,  was  already  adjudicated  and

recognized  in  his  favour  by  the  Civil  Court  vide

judgment  dated  26.08.1977  passed  in  O.S.

No.9/1969 and it remains upheld up to this Court.  

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23) So far as other family members of Shah Veljee

Kanjee  (defendant  Nos.  1  (a)  to  (c),  2  and  4)  are

concerned,  they  filed  their  counter  claim  and

admitted the claim set up by the plaintiff in the suit.

24) The suit was mainly contested by appellant No.1

herein i.e. the Builder (defendant No. 18) on several

grounds such as, firstly, the suit is not maintainable

because  proper  reliefs  were  not  claimed  by  the

plaintiff;  Second,  the  suit  property  is  not  properly

valued;  Third,  the  plaint  is  insufficiently  stamped;

Fourth, the suit is barred by limitation.  

25) So far as the merits of the claim is concerned,

appellant  No.1  (defendant  No.18)  denied  the

plaintiff's  title  over  the suit  land and averred  inter

alia that the original holders of the suit land (three

PATIL) with whom they entered into an agreement to

purchase the suit land were having subsisting right,

title  and interest  in the  suit  land by virtue  of  two

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re-grant  orders  (31.03.1973 and 01.04.1973)  made

by the State  in  their  favour  under  the  KVA Act  of

1961 on the application of the original holders (three

PATIL)  and,  therefore,  the  original  holders  (three

PATIL) were competent to enter into an agreement to

transfer the suit land in their favour on 23.03.2001.  

26) It  was  also  averred  that  whatever  ownership

rights  in  the  suit  land  which  the  plaintiff  and

defendant Nos.1 to 4 were possessing in their favour

stood  extinguished  on  account  of  the  two  re-grant

orders  dated  31.03.1973  and  01.04.1973  made  by

the  State  in  favour  of  the  original  holders  (three

PATIL)  and,  therefore,  in  the  light  of  these

subsequent  events  which  came  into  existence,  no

decree can now be passed in favour of plaintiff  and

defendant Nos.1 to 4 in relation to the suit land for

any relief on the strength of their title.  

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27) Issues were framed and parties adduced their

evidence. By judgment/decree dated 07.11.2014, the

III  Addl.  Senior  Civil  Judge,  Hubli  decreed  the

plaintiff's  suit  in  part  and  passed  the  preliminary

decree  of  partition  and  separate  possession  in

relation to the suit land in plaintiff's favour as prayed

in the suit.

28) The  Additional  Senior  Civil  Judge  answered

almost  all  the  issues  in  plaintiff's  favour  and held

that  the  plaintiff  is  entitled  for  1/5th share  in  the

leasehold  right  in  respect  of  the  suit  scheduled

property and so also defendant Nos. 1 (a) to (c), 2 and

4  are  entitled  to  claim  their  1/5th share  each  in

leasehold rights in respect of the suit land along with

the plaintiff.  

29) The  plaintiff,  the  legal  representatives  of

defendant  Nos.  2,  3  and 4  and defendant  No.  17-

Society  felt  aggrieved  of  certain  findings  about  the

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ownership status of the plaintiff in the suit land and

accordingly  filed  four  separate  first  appeals  in  the

High Court at Bangalore.  

30) So far as the present appellants are concerned,

they did not prefer any appeal as they seemed to be

satisfied with the judgment of the Trial Court.  

31) By the impugned judgment, the Division Bench

disposed  of  all  the  four  appeals.  The  High  Court

allowed  the  appeal  filed  by  the  plaintiff  and

accordingly modified the finding of the Trial Court as

regards the status and the ownership rights of  the

plaintiff in the suit land and held that the plaintiff is

the owner of the suit land and is, therefore, entitled

to claim his 1/5th share in the suit land along with

defendants,  who  are  legal  representatives  of  late

Shah Veljee Kanjee like the plaintiff.

32) It  is against this judgment of  the High Court,

the appellants herein (defendant Nos. 18 to 25 - who

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are builder, firm and its partners) have felt aggrieved

and filed the present appeals by way of special leave

petitions in this Court.

33) Heard  Mr.  Shekhar  Naphade,  learned  senior

counsel for the appellants and Mr. Basava Prabhu S.

Patil,  learned  senior  counsel,  Mr.  G.V.

Chandrashekhar,  Mr.  Ranbir  Singh  Yadav,  Mr.

Raghavendra S. Srivastava,  learned counsel  for  the

respective respondents.

34) Having heard the learned counsel for the parties

at length and on perusal of the record of the case, we

find  no  merit  in  these  appeals.  In  our  view,  the

reasoning and the conclusion arrived at by the High

Court  cannot  be  faulted  with.  We  are,  therefore,

inclined to uphold the reasoning and the conclusion

arrived  at  by  the  High  Court  by  assigning  our

reasoning infra.  

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35) At  the  outset,  we  observe  that  so  far  as  the

right, title and interest of the appellants in the suit

land is concerned, the appellants neither claim and

nor do they have a right to claim any right, title and

interest in the suit land in their own rights. In other

words, the status of the appellants in this litigation

are that of the intending purchasers of the suit land

from  the  original  holders  of  the  suit  land  (three

PATIL).

36) In our view,  if the original holders (three PATIL)

are  able  to  prove  their  subsisting  right,  title  and

interest over the suit land against the plaintiff,  the

appellants would be able to get the relief in the suit

because they are claiming through original  holders

(three PATIL). But if the original holders (three PATIL)

are not able to prove their subsisting right, title and

interest over the suit land against the plaintiff, then

the appellants would also loose the case.  

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37) As  mentioned  above,  the  appellant  alone  was

contesting the suit as defendant No.18. It is not in

dispute  that  original  holders  (three  PATIL)  did  not

contest  the  suit.  It  is  also  not  in  dispute  that  the

appellant  was  satisfied  with  the  judgment/decree

passed by the Trial Court, therefore, they did not file

any appeal in the High Court.

38) It is with these background facts of the case, we

have to examine the question arising in these appeals

as to whether the respondent (plaintiff) was able to

prove his subsisting title  over the suit land on the

date of  filing of  the suit  and, if  so,  how,  or  in the

alternative, whether the appellants (builder, firm and

its partners) were able to prove the subsisting title of

the original holders (three PATIL) over the suit land, if

so, how.  

39) In our considered opinion, the appellants have

failed to substantiate the right, title and interest of

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the  original  holders  (three  PATIL)  in  the  suit  land

through whom they  claim to  derive  interest  in  the

suit land, whereas the respondent (plaintiff) has been

able to prove his subsisting right, title and interest in

the suit land on the date of filing of the suit, out of

which these appeals arise. The appellants, therefore,

have no locus to claim any interest in the suit land.  

40) It is a settled principle of law that a person can

only transfer to other person a right, title or interest

in any tangible property which he is possessed of to

transfer it for consideration or otherwise.  

41) In  other  words,  whatever  interest  a  person  is

possessed of in any tangible property, he can transfer

only that interest to the other person and no other

interest,  which he himself  does not  possess in  the

tangible property.

42) So, once it is proved that on the date of transfer

of any tangible property, the seller of the property did

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not have any subsisting right, title or interest over it,

then  a  buyer  of  such  property  would  not  get  any

right, title and interest in the property purchased by

him for  consideration  or  otherwise.   Such transfer

would be an illegal and void transfer.

43) In  such eventuality  and subject  to  any  terms

and conditions if agreed between the parties, a buyer

will have a right to claim refund of sale consideration

from his  seller,  which he paid for  purchase  of  the

property under the law of  contract.   The reason is

that  the  contract  to  purchase  has  failed  and,

therefore,  the  parties  have  to  be  restored  back  to

their original positions, which existed at the time of

execution of the contract.

44) This  principle  of  law  may  apply  inter  se the

original  holders  (three  PATIL)  of  the  land  and  the

intending buyers of the suit land with which we are

not  concerned  in  this  case  because  the  present

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litigation does  not  arise  between these  parties  and

nor we are deciding the inter se rights of these parties

in these appeals.  

45) This principle we have mentioned only to clarify

the inter se rights of the parties against each other in

relation to the suit land and especially the right of

the  appellants  against the  original  holders(three

PATIL) and not beyond it.   

46) In  our  considered  opinion,  the  reasons  as  to

why  the  appellants  failed  to  prove  the  subsisting

right,  title  and  interest  of  the  original  holders

(intending  sellers-three  PATIL)  in  the  suit  land are

more than one as are set out by us hereinbelow.  

47) First, the original holders (three PATIL) had filed

two suits (O.S. Nos. 364 and 365 of 2004) in relation

to  the  suit  land  asserting  therein  their  ownership

rights over the suit land against the present plaintiff

and other members of Shah Veljee Kanjee but both

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the  suits  were  dismissed  by  the  Civil  Court  on

23.11.2004.  

48) These  dismissal  attained  finality  regardless  of

the  fact  as  to  on  what  grounds  they  suffered

dismissal.  These  dismissals  were  binding  on  the

original  holder  (three  PATIL).  A  fortiori,  these

dismissals are binding on the appellants too because

the  appellants  were  claiming  through  the  original

holders (three PATIL).  

49) It is for this reason, we are of the view that the

original  owners  did  not  have  any  subsisting  right,

title and interest in the suit land, which they could

have  or/and  were  capable  to  transfer  to  the

appellants whether for consideration or otherwise on

the date when they entered into an agreement of sale

of the suit land to the appellants on 23.03.2001.  

50) Second,  it  cannot  be  disputed  that  original

holders (three PATIL) had parted with the suit land

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long  back  by  legal  mode  of  transfer,  one  through

Court Auction proceedings in 1942 and the other by

direct  sale/purchase  on  14.05.1943  in  favour  of

Shah Veljee Kanjee.  

51) Since  then,  the  original  holders  (three  PATIL)

did not have any subsisting right, title and interest in

the  suit  land  because  whatever  rights,  title  and

interest which they had in the suit land, the same

were transferred to Shah Veljee Kanjee through Court

Auction  proceedings  in  1942  and  by  direct

sale/purchase on 14.05.1943. These rights were then

devolved on his legal representatives by inheritance

consequent upon the death of Shah Veljee Kanjee.

52) It  also  cannot  be  disputed,  as  taken  note  of

above,  that  the  Civil  Court  had  already  recognized

the  rights,  title  and  interest  of  the  legal

representatives of Shah Veljee Kanjee in the suit land

in  O.S.  No.9/1969  filed  by  them  against the

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purchaser-Society.  This suit was decreed in favour of

legal  representative  of  Shah  Veljee  Kanjee  on

26.08.1977 and remained upheld up to this Court.

53) It  is  due to these reasons also,  all  the rights,

title and interest of original holders (three PATIL) in

the suit land stood extinguished.

54) Now  coming  to  the  main  argument  of  Mr.

Shekhar  Naphade,  learned  senior  counsel  for  the

appellants,  which  he  pressed  in  service  with

vehemence.

55) Learned senior counsel urged that the original

holders of the suit land (three PATIL) having parted

with the suit land in 1942 and 14.05.1943, again got

back the suit land by way of re-grant in their favour

by order dated 31.03.1973 in respect  of  land (CTS

No. 361) passed by the State under KVA Act of 1961

and by other re-grant order dated 01.04.1973 passed

by the State in respect of land (CTS No. 366).  

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56) It  was,  therefore,  his  submission  that  in  this

way, the title in the suit land stood reverted to the

original holders (three PATIL) from the dates of these

two orders.

57)  On this  basis,  the  contention of  the  learned

counsel for the appellants was that whatever rights,

title  and  interest  in  the  suit  land  which  the

respondent (plaintiff) might have got in 1942 and on

14.05.1943 while acquiring the suit land, the same

stood extinguished on account of re-grant made by

the State in favour of original holder (three PATIL) in

1973 by the two orders referred above.

58) We find no merit  in this submission for  more

than one reason. Assuming for the sake of argument

that as a result of the re-grant orders made by the

State in favour of the original holders (three PATIL),

the rights,  title  and interest  in the suit  land again

reverted to them in 1973 but they failed to exercise

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their right of ownership over the suit land for a long

time,  hence  their  right  of  ownership  stood

extinguished.

59) It  was  only  after  31  years  from  the  re-grant

order, the original holders woke up from slumber and

filed two suits (O.S. Nos.364 and 365/2004) against

the  plaintiff  and  other  members  of  Shah  Veljee

Kanjee in the Civil Court. It is not in dispute that the

two civil suits also suffered dismissal from the Civil

Court on 23.11.2004 and attained finality.

60) In  our  considered  opinion,  whatever  so-called

rights,  title  and interest  which the original  holders

derived from the orders of re-grant in 1973 in the suit

property in their favour, the same stood extinguished

by efflux of time.  

61) The reason was that in order to keep such new

rights  intact  and  enforceable,  the  original  holders

(three PATIL) were under a legal  obligation to have

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filed a suit for claiming a declaration and possession

of the suit land and this ought to have been done by

them within 12 years from the date of re-grant, i.e.,

1973.  

62) They, however, failed to do so within 12 years

and when they actually tried to exercise their rights

by filing the suit in 2004 (after 31 years from 1973),

by then it was too late to exercise such rights in law.

By  that  time,  their  rights  in  the  suit  land  stood

extinguished.

63) Section  27  of  the  Limitation  Act  deals  with

extinguishment of  right to property.  It  says that at

the determination of the period prescribed in the Act

for  any person to institute a suit  for possession of

any  property,  his  right  to  such  property  shall  be

extinguished. Articles  64  and  65  of  the  Schedule

provide  12  years  period  for  filing  a  suit  to  claim

possession of any immovable property. The period of

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12 years prescribed in these two articles is required

to  be  counted  from  “the  date  of  dispossession”

(Article  64)  and  “when  the  possession  of  the

defendant  becomes adverse  to  the  plaintiff”  (Article

65).  

64) As held supra, the original holders (three PATIL)

failed to file the civil suit against the plaintiff claiming

possession of the suit land on the strength of their

new title namely, re-grant in relation to the suit land,

within  12  years  from  the  date  of  re-grant  and,

therefore,  by virtue of  Section 27 of  the Limitation

Act, their all rights, title and interest in the suit land

got extinguished.     

65) In  view  of  these  reasons,  we  are  of  the

considered  view  that  neither  the  original  holders

(three PATIL) and nor the appellants could take any

benefit  of  the  orders  of  re-grant  dated  31.03.1973

and 01.04.1973 made by the State so as to divest the

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legal representatives of Shah Veljee Kanjee (plaintiffs)

from their rights, title and interest in the suit land

which  they  had  legally  acquired  through  Court

Auction and direct purchase in 1942/43.  

66) This  issue can be  examined from yet  another

legal angle on the admitted facts situation arising in

the case.  

67) It is not in dispute that Shah Veljee kanjee, in

the first instance, acquired legal and valid title in the

suit land through Court Auction proceedings in the

year 1942 and second, by direct purchase of the part

of  the  suit  land  on  14.05.1943  from  the  original

holders (three PATIL).

68) In our view, the plaintiff  in alternative can be

held  to  have  acquired  title  against  the original

holders(three PATIL) by operation of law. The reason

is not far to seek.

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69) Admittedly, the plaintiff continued to remain in

lawful possession of the suit land since 1942/1943,

first through Shah Veljee Kanjee and after his death

through his legal representatives. It is not in dispute

that the original holders (three PATIL) were aware of

the ownership rights of Shah Veljee Kanjee over the

suit land since 1942/1943 as Shah Veljee Kanjee got

the suit land by State Auction proceedings and also

by direct sale/purcahse.

70) In this way, it was proved that the possession of

Shah Veljee Kanjee over the suit land was throughout

long, continuous, uninterrupted, open and peaceful

with assertion of  ownership from 1942 till  2004 to

the knowledge of the whole world.

71) The  aforesaid  undisputed  facts  confirm  the

possessory rights, title and interest of the plaintiff in

the suit land against everyone including the original

holders (three PATIL) by operation of law.  

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72) Mr.  Shekhar  Naphade,  learned senior  counsel

then referred the provisions of MHO Act and KVA Act

and pointed out the nature of grant and the re-grant

of the suit land made in favour of the original holders

by the State and how it devolved on the holders etc.  

73) In our view, this submission need not be dealt

with in detail because it has no relevance in the light

of our findings recorded above against the appellants.

74) In other words, once the rights of the original

holders  in  the  suit  land  stood  extinguished,  this

submission does not survive for consideration on its

merits.  

75) A  right  in  the  property  once  extinguished  by

operation of law, it cannot be revived unless the law

itself provides for its revival in a particular situation.

Such is not the case here.

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76)   There is, however, another infirmity in the case

of the appellants, which disentitle them to claim any

relief in relation to the suit land.

77) As mentioned above, the appellants, for proving

the right of ownership of the original holders (three

PATIL) in the suit land,  have placed reliance on the

two orders dated 31.03.1973 and 01.04.1973 of the

State  by  which  the  State  is  alleged  to  have  made

re-grant  of  the  suit  land  in  favour  of  the  original

holders (three PATIL).  

78) In our view, in the absence of any adjudication

of the right of ownership of the original holders (three

PATIL)  on the  strength of  these  two orders  by  the

competent  Court  as against  the  other  stakeholders

having an interest in the suit land and especially the

legal representatives of Shah Veljee Kanjee, it is not

possible  to  give  any benefit  of  these  two orders  in

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favour of the original holders (three PATIL) in these

proceedings.

79) That apart, what is the effect of passing of the

two  orders  on  the  rights,  title  and  interest  of  the

purchasers of the suit land because admittedly, the

suit land was sold to the purchaser (Late Shah Veljee

Kanjee)  prior  to  passing  of  these  two  orders  and

whether  these  orders  will  ipso  facto divest  the

purchasers of  their  rights,  title  and interest  in  the

suit  land  were  required  to  be  gone  into  by  the

competent  Court  after  affording  an  opportunity  to

such affected persons, namely, legal representatives

of late Shah Veljee Kanjee.

80) The original holders (three PATIL) though filed

the civil suits to get these issues adjudicated against

the affected persons but failed in their attempt to get

these issues adjudicated. In other words, by the time

the  original  holders  (three  PATIL)  approached  the

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Civil Court, their all rights in the suit land itself got

extinguished on account of efflux of time (31 years)

as has been held supra.

81)    It is for these reasons also, we are of the view

that the appellants have no case.

82) In our view, therefore, the High Court was right

in its reasoning and the conclusion in holding that

the original holders (three PATIL) having lost all their

rights, title and interest in the suit land on the expiry

of 12 years from the date of re-grant in their favour

(assuming  the  re-grant  to  be  valid)  in  1985  and

secondly, they again lost their ownership rights due

to dismissal of their two suits (O.S. Nos. 364 and 365

of 2004) on 23.11.2004, neither the original holders

(three  PATIL)  and nor  the  appellants,  who claimed

through original holders, had any right to claim any

interest in the suit land.                   

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83) In view of the foregoing discussion, we are of the

considered opinion that looking at the issues involved

in this case from any angle, these appeals have no

merits.  The  appeals  thus  fail  and  are  accordingly

dismissed.

.………………………………..J (R.K. AGRAWAL)

             ..………………………………J.      (ABHAY MANOHAR SAPRE)

New Delhi, May 03, 2018

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