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REPORTABLE

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA

CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION  

CIVIL APPEAL NO.   8367      OF 2018 (ARISING OUT OF SLP (CIVIL) NO.33248 OF 2017)

M/S EMKAY GLOBAL FINANCIAL SERVICES LTD. … APPELLANT

VERSUS

GIRDHAR SONDHI … RESPONDENT

J U D G M E N T

R.F. NARIMAN, J.

1. Leave granted.  

2. The present appeal arises out of a dispute between the Appellant,

who  is  a  registered  broker  with  the  National  Stock  Exchange,  and  the

Respondent,  its  client,  regarding  certain  transactions  in  securities  and

shares. The Respondent had initiated an arbitration proceeding against the

Appellant, claiming an amount of Rs.7,36,620/-, which was rejected by the

Sole Arbitrator vide an Arbitration Award dated 08.12.2009.  

3. The  appeal  arises  out  of  an  agreement  dated  03.07.2008,  which

contains the following clauses:  

“General Clause 1. The parties hereto agree to abide by the provisions of the  Depositories  Act,  1996,  SEBI  (Depositories  and

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Participants)  Regulation,  1996  Bye-Laws  and  Operating Instructions issued by CDSL from time to time in the same manner and to the same extent as if the same were set out herein and formed part of this Agreement.” xxx xxx xxx  “Arbitration 11. The parties hereto shall, in respect of all disputes and differences  that  may  arise  between  them,  abide  by  the provisions relating to arbitration and conciliation specified under the Bye-Laws.” xxx xxx xxx “Jurisdiction 12.  The parties  hereto  agree to submit  to  the exclusive jurisdiction of the courts in Mumbai in Maharashtra (India).”

4. Though  the  bye-laws  referred  to  in  the  agreement  are  under  the

provisions  of  the  Depositories  Act,  1996,  it  is  common  ground  that  the

arbitration proceeding  took place  under  the  National  Stock Exchange bye-

laws.  Under  these  bye-laws,  Chapter  VII  speaks  of  dealings  by  trading

members and grants  exclusive jurisdiction to  the civil  courts  in  Mumbai  in

relation to disputes that arise under the bye-laws as follows:

“CHAPTER VII DEALINGS BY TRADING MEMBERS.

Jurisdiction.  (1)  (a)  Any deal  entered into  through automated trading system of  the  Exchange  or  any  proposal  for  buying  or selling or any acceptance of any such proposal for buying and selling shall be deemed to have been entered at the computerised processing unit of the Exchange at Mumbai and  the  place  of  contracting  as  between  the  trading members shall be at Mumbai. The trading members of the Exchange shall expressly record on their contract note that they have excluded the jurisdiction of all other Courts save and  except,  Civil  Courts  in  Mumbai  in  relation  to  any dispute arising out of or in connection with or in relation to the  contract  notes,  and  that  only  the  Civil  Courts  at Mumbai have exclusive jurisdiction in claims arising out of such dispute. The provisions of this Byelaw shall not object

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the  jurisdiction  of  any  court  deciding  any  dispute  as between trading members and their constituents to which the Exchange is not a party.”

5. The bye-laws go on to  describe the relevant  authority  prescribing

regulations  for  creation  of  seats  of  arbitration  for  different  regions,  or

prescribing geographical locations for conducting arbitrations, and prescribing

the  courts  which  shall  have  jurisdiction  for  the  purpose  of  the  Act  –  see

Chapter  XI  dealing  with  Arbitration  –   clause  4(a)(iv).  Equally,  under  sub-

clause (xiv), the place of arbitration for each reference and the places where

the Arbitrator can hold meetings have also to be designated. It  is common

ground that  the National  Stock Exchange referred the dispute  to  one Shri

Mahmood Ali Khan, who held sittings in Delhi, and delivered an award dated

08.12.2009, whereby the Respondent’s claim was rejected. The Respondent

then filed a Section 34 application under the Arbitration and Conciliation Act,

1996  on  17.03.2010  before  the  District  Court,  Karkardooma,  Delhi.  By  a

judgment dated 22.09.2016, the learned Additional District Judge referred to

the exclusive jurisdiction clause contained in the agreement, and stated that

he would have no jurisdiction to proceed further in the matter and, therefore,

rejected the Section 34 application filed in Delhi. In an appeal filed before the

High Court, a learned Single Judge of the Delhi High Court held as follows:

“4. Accordingly, since the impugned judgment decides the disputed question of fact without allowing parties to lead evidence  i.e.  depositions  supported  by  documentary evidence,  and  without  opportunity  to  the  other  side  to cross-examine  the  witnesses  who give  depositions,  it  is necessary that the disputed questions of fact as regards

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existence of territorial jurisdiction of the courts at Delhi be decided by the court below after framing an issue to this effect and permitting the parties thereafter to lead evidence on the same.  5.  I  may  hasten  to  add  that  I  have  not  made  any observations one way or the other, for or against any of the parties herein, on the aspect of territorial jurisdiction, and this  issue of  territorial  jurisdiction will  be decided by the courts  below after  parties  have led evidence keeping in mind that if part of cause of action is proved to have arisen in  Mumbai  and  there  is  an  exclusivity  clause  conferring territorial  jurisdiction  of  the  Mumbai  courts,  then  even if Delhi courts otherwise have jurisdiction, possibly the courts at Delhi would not exercise territorial jurisdiction. 6.  Parties  to  appear  before  the  District  and  Sessions Judge, East Karkardooma Courts, Delhi on 7th November, 2017 and the District and Sessions Judge will now mark the  objections  under  Section  34  of  the  Arbitration  and Conciliation  Act  to  a  competent  court  for  disposal  in accordance  with  law and  the  observations  made  in  the present order.”1

6. Learned  counsel  appearing  on  behalf  of  the  Appellant  has  relied

upon the exclusive jurisdiction clause contained both in the agreement as well

as the bye-laws of the National Stock Exchange. According to him,  this case

is  squarely  covered  by  a  recent  judgment  of  this  Court  in  Indus  Mobile

Distribution Pvt. Ltd. v. Datawind Innovations Pvt. Ltd. and Ors., (2017) 7

SCC 678. He also referred to Section 34 and stated that, given the conspectus

of judgments of the High Courts and one judgment of this Court, when Section

34(2)(a) speaks of a party making an application who “furnishes proof” of one

of the grounds in the sub-section, such proof should only be by way of affidavit

of  facts  not  already  contained  in  the  record  of  proceedings  before  the

1  Girdhar Sondhi v. M/s. Emkay Global Financial Services Ltd., FAO 222 of 2017 (decided on 11.10.2017).

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Arbitrator. Further, a mini-trial at this stage is not contemplated, as otherwise,

the whole object of speedy resolution of arbitral disputes would be stultified.

Consequently,  the learned Single Judge was incorrect in referring back the

parties  to  the  District  Judge  to  first  frame  an  issue,  and  then  decide  on

evidence,  including  the  opportunity  to  cross-examine  witnesses  who  give

depositions.  

7. Learned counsel for the Respondent, on the other hand, supported

the impugned judgment,  and argued that  as the seat  of  arbitration was at

Delhi,  the courts at  Delhi  would have jurisdiction,  even though there is  an

exclusive  jurisdiction  clause  vesting  such  jurisdiction  only  in  the  courts  at

Mumbai.   

8. Section 34(2)(a) states as follows:

“34. Application for setting aside arbitral award.— (1) Recourse  to  a  Court  against  an  arbitral  award  may  be made only by an application for setting aside such award in accordance with sub-section (2) and sub-section (3).

(2) An arbitral award may be set aside by the Court only if—

(a)  the  party  making  the  application  furnishes proof that—

(i) a party was under some incapacity; or

(ii) the arbitration agreement is not valid under the law to which the parties have subjected it or, failing any indication thereon, under the law for the time being in force; or

(iii)  the party  making  the  application was not given proper  notice of  the appointment  of  an arbitrator or of the arbitral proceedings or was otherwise unable to present his case; or

(iv) the arbitral award deals with a dispute not

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contemplated by or not falling within the terms of the submission to arbitration, or it  contains decisions on matters beyond the scope of the submission to arbitration:

Provided  that,  if  the  decisions  on  matters submitted to arbitration can be separated from those  not  so  submitted,  only  that  part  of  the arbitral  award  which  contains  decisions  on matters not submitted to arbitration may be set aside; or

(v) the composition of the arbitral tribunal or the arbitral procedure was not in accordance with the  agreement  of  the  parties,  unless  such agreement  was in  conflict  with  a  provision of this  Part  from  which  the  parties  cannot derogate, or, failing such agreement, was not in accordance with this Part; or……

xxx xxx xxx”  

9. The effect of an exclusive jurisdiction clause was dealt with by this

Court  in  several  judgments,  the  most  recent  of  which  is  the  judgment

contained in  Indus Mobile Distribution Pvt. Ltd.  (supra). In this case, the

arbitration was to be conducted at Mumbai and was subject to the exclusive

jurisdiction of courts of Mumbai only. After referring to the definition of “Court”

contained in Section 2(1)(e) of the Act, and Section 20 and 31(4) of the Act,

this  Court  referred  to  the  judgment  of  five  learned  Judges  in  Bharat

Aluminium Co. v. Kaiser Aluminium Technical Services Inc., (2012) 9 SCC

552, in which, the concept of juridical seat which has been evolved by the

courts  in  England,  has now taken root  in  our  jurisdiction.  After  referring to

several judgments and a Law Commission Report, this Court held:

“19. A conspectus of all the aforesaid provisions shows that

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the  moment  the  seat  is  designated,  it  is  akin  to  an exclusive jurisdiction clause. On the facts of the present case, it is clear that the seat of arbitration is Mumbai and Clause 19 further makes it clear that jurisdiction exclusively vests in the Mumbai courts. Under the Law of Arbitration, unlike the Code of Civil Procedure which applies to suits filed in courts, a reference to “seat” is a concept by which a neutral  venue  can  be  chosen  by  the  parties  to  an arbitration  clause.  The  neutral  venue  may  not  in  the classical sense have jurisdiction — that is, no part of the cause of action may have arisen at the neutral venue and neither would any of the provisions of Sections 16 to 21 of CPC be attracted. In arbitration law however, as has been held above, the moment “seat” is determined, the fact that the  seat  is  at  Mumbai  would  vest  Mumbai  courts  with exclusive  jurisdiction  for  purposes  of  regulating  arbitral proceedings  arising  out  of  the  agreement  between  the parties. 20. It is well settled that where more than one court has jurisdiction, it  is open for the parties to exclude all other courts.  For  an exhaustive analysis  of  the case law,  see Swastik Gases (P) Ltd.  v. Indian Oil Corpn. Ltd. [Swastik Gases (P) Ltd. v. Indian Oil Corpn. Ltd., (2013) 9 SCC 32 : (2013) 4 SCC (Civ)  157].  This was followed in a recent judgment  in  B.E.  Simoese Von  Staraburg  Niedenthal  v. Chhattisgarh Investment Ltd. [B.E. Simoese Von Staraburg Niedenthal v. Chhattisgarh Investment Ltd., (2015) 12 SCC 225 : (2016) 1 SCC (Civ) 427]. Having regard to the above, it is clear that Mumbai courts alone have jurisdiction to the exclusion of all other courts in the country, as the juridical seat of arbitration is at Mumbai. This being the case, the impugned judgment [Datawind Innovations (P) Ltd. v. Indus Mobile Distribution (P) Ltd., 2016 SCC OnLine Del 3744] is set  aside.  The  injunction  confirmed  by  the  impugned judgment will continue for a period of four weeks from the date  of  pronouncement  of  this  judgment,  so  that  the respondents may take necessary steps under Section 9 in the  Mumbai  Court.  The  appeals  are  disposed  of accordingly.”

10. Following this judgment, it is clear that once courts in Mumbai have

exclusive jurisdiction thanks to the agreement dated 03.07.2008, read with the

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National Stock Exchange bye-laws, it is clear that it is the Mumbai courts and

the Mumbai courts alone, before which a Section 34 application can be filed.

The arbitration that was conducted at Delhi was only at a convenient venue

earmarked by the National Stock Exchange, which is evident on a reading of

bye-law 4(a)(iv) read with (xiv) contained in Chapter XI.

11. However, the matter does not rest here. The learned Single Judge

went on to remand the matter for a full-dressed hearing on what he referred to

as a ‘disputed question of fact’ relating to jurisdiction.  

12. What is meant by the expression “furnishes proof” in Section 34(2)

(a)? In an early Delhi High Court judgment,  Sandeep Kumar v. Dr. Ashok

Hans,2 a learned Single Judge of the Delhi High Court specifically held that

there is no requirement under the provisions of Section 34 for parties to lead

evidence. The record of  the Arbitrator  was held to be sufficient  in order to

furnish proof of whether the grounds under Section 34 had been made out.  

13. Again,  a  learned  single  Judge  of  the  Delhi  High  Court  in  Sial

Bioenergie v. SBEC Systems,3 stated:

“5. In my view the whole purpose of the 1996 Act would be completely  defeated  by  granting  permission  to  the applicant/JD  to  lead  oral  evidence  at  the  stage  of objections raised against an arbitral award. The 1996 Act requires  expeditious  disposal  of  the  objections  and  the minimal interference by the Court as is evident from the Statement of Objects and Reasons of the Act which reads as follows:—

“4. The main objectives of the Bill are as under:— (ii)  To  make  provision  for  an  arbitral  procedure

2 (2004) 3 Arb LR 306 3 AIR 2005 Del 95.

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which is fair, efficient and capable of meeting the needs of the specific arbitration.”

xxx xxx xxx

xxx xxx xxx

(v) to minimize the supervisory role of courts in the arbitral process.

6. At the stage of the objections which are any way limited in scope due to the provisions of  the Act  to  permit  oral evidence would completely defeat the objects underlying the 1996 Act. The process of oral evidence would prolong the  process  of  hearing  objections  and  cannot  be countenanced. 7. Furthermore the Supreme Court in FCI v. Indian Council for  Arbitration,  2003  (6)  SCC  564  had  summarized  the ethos underlying the Act as follows:— “The  legislative  intent  underlying  the  1996  Act  is  to minimize the supervisory role of the Courts in the arbitral process  and  nominate/appoint  the  arbitrator  without wasting time leaving all contentious issues to be urged and agitated before the arbitral tribunal itself.” 8. Accordingly, I see no merit in these applications and the prayer made therein is rejected.”

14. We now come to a judgment of  this  Court  in  Fiza Developers &

Inter-Trade Pvt. Ltd. v. AMCI (India) Pvt. Ltd. and Anr., (2009) 17 SCC 796.

In this case, the question that was posed by the Court was whether issues as

contemplated under Order XIV Rule 1 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908

should  be  framed  in  applications  under  Section  34  of  the  Arbitration  and

Conciliation Act, 1996. This Court held:

“14. In a summary proceeding, the respondent is given an opportunity  to  file  his  objections  or  written  statement. Thereafter, the court will permit the parties to file affidavits in proof of their respective stands, and if necessary permit cross-examination  by  the  other  side,  before  hearing arguments. Framing of issues in such proceedings is not

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necessary. We hasten to add that when it is said issues are not necessary, it does not mean that evidence is not necessary.” xxx xxx xxx

“17. The scheme and provisions of  the Act  disclose two significant  aspects  relating to  courts  vis-à-vis  arbitration. The first  is  that  there should be minimal interference by courts  in  matters  relating  to  arbitration.  Second  is  the sense  of  urgency  shown  with  reference  to  arbitration matters brought to court, requiring promptness in disposal.

18. Section  5  of  the  Act  provides  that  notwithstanding anything contained in any other law for the time being in force, in matters governed by Part I of the Act, no judicial authority shall intervene except where so provided in the Act.”

xxx xxx xxx

“21. We  may  therefore  examine  the  question  for consideration by bearing three factors in mind. The first is that the Act is a special enactment and Section 34 provides for  a  special  remedy.  The  second  is  that  an  arbitration award  can  be  set  aside  only  upon  one  of  the  grounds mentioned in sub-section (2) of Section 34 exists. The third is that proceedings under Section 34 requires to be dealt with expeditiously.”

xxx xxx xxx

“24. In other words, an application under Section 34 of the Act is a single issue proceeding, where the very fact that the  application  has  been  instituted  under  that  particular provision declares the issue involved. Any further exercise to frame issues will only delay the proceedings. It is thus clear that issues need not be framed in applications under Section 34 of the Act.”

xxx xxx xxx

“31. Applications under Section 34 of the Act are summary proceedings  with  provision  for  objections  by  the

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respondent-defendant,  followed by  an  opportunity  to  the applicant  to  “prove”  the  existence  of  any  ground  under Section 34(2). The applicant is permitted to file affidavits of his witnesses in proof. A corresponding opportunity is given to  the  respondent-defendant  to  place  his  evidence  by affidavit.  Where the case so warrants,  the court  permits cross-examination of the persons swearing to the affidavit. Thereafter,  the  court  hears  arguments  and/or  receives written  submissions  and  decides  the  matter.  This  is  of course the routine procedure. The court may vary the said procedure, depending upon the facts of any particular case or the local rules. What is however clear is that framing of issues as contemplated under Rule 1 of Order 14 of the Code  is  not  an  integral  part  of  the  process  of  a proceedings under Section 34 of the Act.”

15. A Punjab and Haryana High Court  judgment in  M/s Punjab State

Industrial Development Corporation v. Mr. Sunil K. Kansal,4 after referring

to our judgment in Fiza Developers (supra) held:

“30. In view of the above, we answer the question of law framed as follows:

(i) The issues, as required under Order XIV Rule 1  of  the  Code  as  in  the  regular  suit,  are  not required to be mandatorily framed by the Court. However,  it  is  open  to  the  Court  to  frame questions which may arise for adjudication. (ii)  The  Court  while  dealing  with  the  objections under Section 34 of the Act is not bound to grant opportunities to the parties to lead evidence as in the regular civil suit. The jurisdiction of the Court being more akin to the appellate jurisdiction; (iii)  The  proceedings  before  the  Court  under Section  34  of  the  Act  are  summary  in  nature. Even if some questions of fact or mixed questions of law and/or facts are to be decided, the court while permitting the parties to furnish affidavits in evidence,  can  summon  the  witness  for  cross- examination, if  desired by the other party. Such procedure  is  keeping  in  view  the  principles  of

4 2012 SCC OnLine P&H 19641 [CR No. 4216 of 2011 (decided on 11.10.2012)].

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natural justice, fair play and equity.”

16. The Calcutta High Court  in  WEB Techniques and Net Solutions

Pvt.  Ltd.  v.  M/s.  Gati  Ltd.  and  Anr.,5 after  referring  to  Fiza  Developers

(supra), held that oral evidence is not required under a Section 34 application

when the record before the Arbitrator would show whether the petitioners had

received notice relating to his appointment.  

17. In Cochin Shipyard Ltd. v. Apeejay Shipping Ltd., (2015) 15 SCC

522, this Court, in a case arising out of the Arbitration Act, 1940, did not follow

the  decision  in  Fiza  Developers (supra),  as  objections  to  be  filed  under

Sections 30 and 33 of the 1940 Act did not require any kind of oral evidence to

be led.  

18. A recent report of the Justice B.N. Srikrishna Committee to review the

institutionalization of the arbitration mechanism  in India has found:  

“5. Amendment to Section 34(2)(a) of the ACA  Sub-section (2)(a) of section 34 of the ACA provides for the setting  aside  of  arbitral  awards  by  the  court  in  certain circumstances.  The  party  applying  for  setting  aside  the arbitral  award  has  to  furnish  proof  to  the  court.  This requirement  to  furnish  proof  has  led  to  inconsistent practices in some High Courts, where they have insisted on section 34 proceedings being conducted in the manner as a regular civil suit. This is despite the Supreme Court ruling in Fiza Developers & Inter-Trade P. Ltd. v. AMCI (I) Pvt. Ltd. & Anr. that proceedings under section 34 should not be conducted in the same manner as civil suits, with framing of issues under Rule 1 of Order 14 of the CPC.  In light of this, the Committee is of the view that a suitable amendment  may be made to section 34(2)(a)  to  ensure that  proceedings  under  section  34  are  conducted

5 2012 SCC OnLine Cal 4271 [C.O. No. 1532 of 2010 (decided on 02.05.2012)].

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expeditiously.  Recommendation: An amendment may be made to Section 34(2)(a)  of  the  Arbitration  and  Conciliation  Act,  1996, substituting the words “furnishes proof that” with the words “establishes on the basis of  the arbitral  tribunal’s  record that”.”

19. We  have  been  informed  that  the  Arbitration  and  Conciliation

(Amendment) Bill of 2018, being Bill No.100 of 2018, contains an amendment

to Section 34(2)(a) of the principal Act, which reads as follows:

“In section 34 of  the principal  Act,  in  sub-section (2),  in clause (a), for the words “furnishes proof that”, the words “establishes  on  the  basis  of  the  record  of  the  arbitral tribunal that" shall be substituted.”6

20. One more recent development in the law of arbitration needs to be

adverted to. After the decision in  Fiza Developers (supra), Section 34 was

amended by Act 3 of 2016, by which sub-sections (5) and (6) were added to

the principal Act with effect from 23.10.2015. Section 34(5) and 34(6) reads as

under:

“34. Application for setting aside arbitral award.—

xxx xxx xxx

(5)  An application under  this  section shall  be filed  by a party only after issuing a prior notice to the other party and such application shall be accompanied by an affidavit by the  applicant  endorsing  compliance  with  the  said requirement.

(6) An application under this section shall be disposed of expeditiously, and in any event, within a period of one year from the date on which the notice referred to in sub-section (5) is served upon the other party.”

6 Bill No.100 of 2018, THE ARBITRATION AND CONCILIATION (AMENDMENT) BILL, 2018, p. 3.

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21. In a recent judgment of this Bench in The State of Bihar and Ors. v.

Bihar  Rajya  Bhumi  Vikas  Bank  Samiti,  SLP  (Civil)  No.  4475  of  2017

(decided on 30.07.2018), this Court, after holding that the period of one year

mentioned in the aforesaid sub-section is directory, went on to hold:

“27. We are of the opinion that the view propounded by the High Courts of  Bombay and Calcutta represents the correct state of the law. However, we may add that it shall be the endeavour of  every Court  in which a Section 34 application is filed, to stick to the time limit of one year from the date of service of notice to the opposite party by the applicant, or by the Court, as the case may be. In case the Court issues notice after the period mentioned in Section 34(3) has elapsed, every Court shall endeavour to dispose of the Section 34 application within a period of one year from the date  of  filing  of  the said  application,  similar  to what has been provided in Section 14 of the Commercial Courts,  Commercial  Division  and  Commercial  Appellate Division of High Courts Act, 2015. This will give effect to the object sought to be achieved by adding Section 13(6) by the 2015 Amendment Act.

28. We may also add that in cases covered by Section 10  read  with  Section  14  of  the  Commercial  Courts, Commercial Division and Commercial Appellate Division of High Courts Act, 2015, the Commercial Appellate Division shall endeavour to dispose of appeals filed before it within six  months,  as  stipulated.  Appeals  which  are  not  so covered  will  also  be  disposed  of  as  expeditiously  as possible, preferably within one year from the date on which the appeal is filed……”

22. It  will  thus be seen that  speedy resolution of arbitral disputes has

been the reason for enacting the 1996 Act, and continues to be the reason

for adding amendments to the said Act to strengthen the aforesaid object.

Quite obviously, if  issues are to be framed and oral evidence taken in a

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summary proceeding under Section 34, this object will be defeated. It is also

on the cards that if Bill No.100 of 2018 is passed, then evidence at the stage

of  a  Section 34  application  will  be  dispensed with  altogether.  Given  the

current state of the law, we are of the view that the two early Delhi High

Court judgments, cited by us hereinabove, correctly reflect the position in

law as to furnishing proof under Section 34(2)(a). So does the Calcutta High

Court  judgment  (supra).  We  may  hasten  to  add  that  if  the  procedure

followed by the Punjab and Haryana High Court judgment (supra) is to be

adhered to, the time limit of one year would only be observed in most cases

in the breach. We therefore overrule the said decision. We are constrained

to observe that Fiza Developers (supra) was a step in the right direction as

its ultimate ratio is that issues need not be struck at the stage of hearing a

Section  34  application,  which  is  a  summary  procedure.  However,  this

judgment must now be read in the light of the amendment made in Section

34(5) and 34(6). So read, we clarify the legal position by stating that an

application  for  setting  aside  an  arbitral  award  will  not  ordinarily  require

anything beyond the record that was before the Arbitrator. However, if there

are  matters  not  contained  in  such  record,  and  are  relevant  to  the

determination of issues arising under Section 34(2)(a), they may be brought

to the notice of the Court by way of affidavits filed by both parties. Cross-

examination of  persons swearing to  the affidavits  should not  be allowed

unless absolutely necessary, as the truth will emerge on a reading of the

16

affidavits filed by both parties. We, therefore, set aside the judgment of the

Delhi High Court and reinstate that of the learned Additional District Judge

dated 22.09.2016. The appeal is accordingly allowed with no order as to

costs.  

……………………………..J. (R.F. Nariman)

……………………………..J. (Indu Malhotra)

New Delhi; August 20, 2018.

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ITEM No. 1501          Court No. 9               SECTION  XIV (For Judgment)                  

S U P R E M E   C O U R T   O F   I N D I A                          RECORD OF PROCEEDINGS        

Civil Appeal  No.        of 2018      (Arising out of SLP (Civil) No. 33248 of 2017)

M/S. EMKAY GLOBAL FINANCIAL SERVICES LTD.   Appellant(s)

                               VERSUS

GIRDHAR SONDHI                     Respondent(s)

 Date : 20.08.2018   This matter  was called on for pronouncement of

judgment today.

For Appellant(s) Mr. Divyakant Lahoti, Adv. Mr. Parikshit Ahuja, Adv.

                        For Respondent(s) Mr. Arup Banerjee, Adv.          

Hon'ble Mr. Justice Rohinton Fali Nariman

pronounced the judgment of the Bench comprising His

Lordship and Hon'ble Ms. Justice Indu Malhotra.

Leave granted  

The appeal is allowed in terms of the signed

reportable judgment.

Pending applications, if any, shall stand disposed

of.

(Shashi Sareen) AR­cum­PS

(Saroj Kumari Gaur) Branch Officer

(Signed reportable judgment is placed on the file)