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REPORTABLE

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA

CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION

CRIMINAL APPEAL NO.1079 OF 2006

ECON ANTRI LTD. … APPELLANT

VS.

ROM INDUSTRIES LTD. & ANR. … RESPONDENTS

JUDGMENT

(SMT.) RANJANA PRAKASH DESAI, J.

1. On 13/10/2006, while granting leave in Special  Leave  

Petition  (Criminal)  No.211  of  2005,  this  Court  passed  the  

following order:

“In  our  view,  the  judgment  relied  upon  by  the   counsel  for  the appellant in the case of  Saketh  India  Ltd.  & Ors.   v.   India  Securities  Ltd.   (1999) 3 SCC 1 requires reconsideration.  Orders   of the Hon’ble the Chief Justice may be obtained   for placing this matter before a larger Bench.”

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Pursuant  to  the  above  order,  this  appeal  is  placed  

before us.   

2. Since the referral order states that the judgment of this  

Court in  Saketh India Ltd. & Ors.  v.  India Securities  

Ltd.1 (“Saketh”)  requires  reconsideration,  we  must  first  

refer to the said judgment.  In that case, this Court identified  

the question of law involved in the appeal before it as under:  

“Whether the complaint filed under Section 138 of   the  NI  Act  is  within  or  beyond  time  as  it  was   contended that it was not filed within one month   from the date on which the cause of action arose   under clause (c) of the proviso to Section 138 of   the NI Act?”

  The same question was reframed in simpler language  

as under:   

“Whether for calculating the period of one month   which  is  prescribed  under  Section  142(b),  the  period has to be reckoned by excluding the date   on which the cause of action arose?”

1 (1999) 3 SCC 1

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3. It is pointed out to us that there is a variance between  

the view expressed by this Court on the above question in  

Saketh and  in  SIL  Import,  USA  v.  Exim  Aides  Silk  

Exporters,  Bangalore  2  .    We  will  have  to  therefore  re-

examine it for the purpose of answering the reference.  The  

basic provisions of law involved in this reference are proviso  

(c)  to  Section  138  and  Section  142(b)  of  the  Negotiable  

Instruments Act, 1881 (“the NI Act”).

4. Facts of  Saketh need to be stated to understand how  

the above question of law arose.  But, before we turn to the  

facts, we must quote Section 138 and Section 142 of the N.I.  

Act.   We  must  also  quote  Section  12(1)  and  (2)  of  the  

Limitation Act, 1963 and Section 9 of the General Clauses  

Act, 1897, on which reliance is placed in Saketh.  

Section 138 of the N.I. Act reads as under:

“138. Dishonour  of  cheque  for  insufficiency, etc., of funds in the account.  

Where any cheque drawn by a person on an  account  maintained  by  him  with  a  banker  for  payment  of  any  amount  of  money  to  another  

2 (1999) 4 SCC 567

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person from out of that account for the discharge,  in whole or in part, of any debt or other liability, is  returned by the bank unpaid. either because of the  amount  of  money standing to  the credit  of  that  account  is  insufficient  to  honour  the  cheque  or  that it  exceeds the amount arranged to be paid  from that  account  by  an  agreement  made  with  that bank, such person shall be deemed to have  committed an offence and shall, without prejudice  to any other provision of this Act, be punished with  imprisonment for a term which may be extended  to  two years,  or  with  fine which may extend to  twice the amount of the cheque, or with both:  

Provided  that  nothing  contained  in  this  section  shall apply unless-

(a) the cheque has been presented to the bank  within  a  period of  six  months from the date  on  which it is drawn or within the period of its validity,  whichever is earlier;

(b) the payee or the holder in due course of the  Cheque, as the case may be, makes a demand for  the  payment  of  the  said  amount  of  money  by  giving  a  notice  in  writing,  to  the  drawer  of  the  cheque,  within  thirty  days  of  the  receipt  of  information by him from the bank regarding the  return of the cheque as unpaid; and

(c) the drawer of such cheque fails to make the  payment  of  the  said  amount  of  money  to  the  payee or, as the case may be, to the holder in due  course of  the cheque,  within fifteen days of  the  receipt of the said notice.”

Section 142 of the N.I. Act reads as under:

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“142. Cognizance of offences: Notwithstanding  anything  contained  in  the  Code  of  Criminal  Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974 ),-

(a) no court shall take cognizance of any offence  punishable  under  section  138  except  upon  a  complaint, in writing, made by the payee or, as the  case  may  be,  the  holder  in  due  course  of  the  cheque;

(b) such complaint is made within one month of  the date on which the cause of action arises under  clause (c) of the proviso to section 138;

[Provided that the cognizance of a complaint may  be taken by the Court after the prescribed period,  if the complainant satisfies the Court that he had  sufficient cause for not making a complaint within  such period.]

(c) no  court  inferior  to  that  of  a  Metropolitan  Magistrate or a Judicial Magistrate of the first class  shall  try  any  offence  punishable  under  section  138.”

Sections 12(1) and (2) of the Limitation Act, 1963 reads  

as under:

“12. Exclusion of time in legal proceedings.-  (1)  In computing the period of limitation for any  suit,  appeal  or  application,  the  day  from  which  such period is to be reckoned, shall be excluded.

(2)  In  computing the  period of  limitation for  an  appeal or an application for leave to appeal or for  revision or for review of a judgment, the day on  

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which  the  judgment  complained  of  was  pronounced and the time requisite for obtaining a  copy of  the decree,  sentence or  order  appealed  from or sought to be revised or reviewed shall be  excluded.”

Section 9 of  the General  Clauses Act,  1897 reads as  

under:

“9.  Commencement  and  termination  of  time.-   

(1) In any [Central Act] or Regulation made after  the  commencement  of  this  Act,  it  shall  be  sufficient, for the purpose of excluding the first in  a series of days or any other period of time, to use  the word “from”, and, for the purpose of including  the last in a series of days or any other period of  time, to use the word “to”.

(2) This section applies also to all [Central Acts]  made after the third day of January, 1868, and to  all  Regulations  made on  or  after  the  fourteenth  day of January, 1887.”

5. In  Saketh cheques  dated  15/3/1995  and  16/3/1995  

issued by the accused therein bounced when presented for  

encashment.   Notices  were  served  on  the  accused  on  

29/9/1995. As per proviso (c) to Section 138 of the NI Act,  

the accused were required to make the payment of the said  

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amount within 15 days of the receipt of the notice i.e. on or  

before 14/10/1995.  The accused failed to pay the amount.  

The  cause  of  action,  therefore,  arose  on  15/10/1995.  

According  to  the  complainant  for  calculating  one  month’s  

period  contemplated  under  Section  142(b),  the  date  

‘15/10/1995’  has  to  be  excluded.   The complaint  filed  on  

15/11/1995 was,  therefore,  within  time.   According to  the  

accused,  however,  the date on which the cause of  action  

arose i.e. ‘15/10/1995’ has to be included in the period of  

limitation and thus the complaint was barred by time.  The  

accused, therefore, filed petition under Section 482 of the  

Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (“the Code”) for quashing  

the process issued by the learned Magistrate.   That petition  

was  rejected  by  the  High  Court.   Hence,  the  accused  

approached this Court.  This Court referred to its judgment in  

Haru Das Gupta   v.    State of West Bengal.  3 wherein it  

was  held  that  the  rule  is  well  established  that  where  a  

particular time is given from a certain date within which an  

act is to be done, the day on that date is to be excluded; the  

3 (1972) 1 SCC 639

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effect of defining the period from such a day until such a day  

within which an act is to be done is to exclude the first day  

and to  include the last  day.   Referring  to  several  English  

decisions on the point, this Court observed that the principle  

of excluding the day from which the period is to be reckoned  

is incorporated in Section 12(1) and (2) of the Limitation Act,  

1963.   This  Court  observed  that  this  principle  is  also  

incorporated in Section 9 of the General Clauses Act, 1897.  

This Court further observed that there is no reason for not  

adopting the rule enunciated in  Haru Das Gupta, which is  

consistently followed and which is  adopted in the General  

Clauses Act and the Limitation Act.  This Court went on to  

observe  that  ordinarily  in  computing  the  time,  the  rule  

observed is to exclude the first day and to include the last.  

Following  the  said  rule  in  the  facts  before  it,  this  Court  

excluded the date ‘15/10/1995’ on which the cause of action  

had arisen for counting the period of one month.  Saketh  

has been followed by this Court in Jindal Steel and Power  

Ltd.  & Anr.   v.   Ashoka Alloy Steel  Ltd.  & Ors.4  In  

4 (2006) 9 SCC 340

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Subodh S.  Salaskar  v.  Jayprakash  M.  Shah & Anr.,  5    

there is a reference to Jindal Steel & Power Ltd.   

6. We have heard learned counsel for the parties at some  

length.  We  have  also  carefully  perused  their  written  

submissions.  Ms.  Prerna  Mehta,  learned  counsel  for  the  

appellant submitted that Saketh lays down the correct law.  

She submitted that as held by this Court in  Saketh while  

computing  the  period  of  one  month  as  provided  under  

Section 142(b)  of  the N.I.  Act,  the  first  day on which the  

cause of action has arisen has to be excluded.  The same  

principle is  applicable in computing the period of 15 days  

under Section 138(c) of the N.I. Act.  Counsel submitted that  

Saketh has been followed by this Court in Jindal Steel and  

Power Ltd.   and Subodh S. Salaskar. Counsel also relied  

on Section 12(1) of the Limitation Act, 1961 which provides  

that the first day on which cause of action arises is to be  

excluded.   In  this  connection  counsel  relied  on  State of  

Himachal  Pradesh  &  Anr.  v.   Himachal   Techno  

5 (2008)13 SCC 689

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Engineers & Anr.,  6   where it is held that Section 12 of the  

Limitation Act is applicable to the Arbitration and Conciliation  

Act,  1996  (for  short,  “the Arbitration  Act"),  which  is  a  

statute providing for its own period of limitation.  Counsel  

submitted that the N.I. Act is a special statute and it does  

not  expressly  bar  the  applicability  of  the  Limitation  Act.  

Counsel  submitted  that  if  this  Court  reaches  a  conclusion  

that the provisions of the Limitation Act are not applicable to  

the  N.I.  Act,  it  should  hold  that  Section  9  of  the  General  

Clauses Act, 1897 covers this case.  Counsel submitted in  

Tarun Prasad Chatterjee v. Dinanath Sharma  7   Section  

12 of the Limitation Act is held to be in pari materia with  

Section 9 of  the General  Clauses Act.   Counsel  submitted  

that in the same judgment this Court has held that use of  

words  ‘from’  and  ‘within’  does  not  reflect  any  contrary  

intention  and  the  first  day  on  which  the  cause  of  action  

arises has to be excluded.  Counsel submitted that in the  

circumstances this Court should hold that Saketh lays down  

correct proposition of law.  

6 (2010) 12 SCC 210 7 (2000) 8 SCC 649

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7. Shri  Sunil  Gupta,  learned  senior  counsel  for  the  

respondents,  on  the  other  hand,  submitted  that  the  

provisions of the N.I. Act provide for a criminal offence and  

punishment  and,  therefore,  must  be  strictly  construed.  

Counsel  submitted  that  it  is  well  settled  that  when  two  

different words are used in the same provision or statute,  

they convey different meaning.  [The Member, Board of  

Revenue  v.  Arthur  Paul  Benthall  8  ,  The  Labour    

Commissioner, Madhya Pradesh  v.  Burhanpur Tapti   

Mills Ltd. and others  9  , B.R. Enterprises etc. V. State of    

U.P. & Ors. etc.    10  , Kailash Nath Agarwal and ors. v.    

Pradeshiya  Industrial  &  Investment  Corporation  of  

U.P. Ltd. and another  11  , DLF Qutab Enclave Complex    

Educational Charitable Trust  v. State of Haryana and  

others12]. Counsel pointed out that Section 138(a) provides  

a period of 6 months from the date on which the Cheque is  

drawn,  as  the  period  within  which  the  Cheque  is  to  be  

8 AIR 1956 SC 35 9 AIR 1964 SC 1687 10 (1999) 9 SCC 700 11 (2003) 4 SCC 305 12 (2003) 5 SCC 622

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presented to  the  bank.   Section  138(b)  provides  that  the  

payee  must  make  a  demand  of  the  amount  due  to  him  

within 30 days  of the receipt of information from the bank.  

Section 138(c) uses the words ‘within 15 days of the receipt  

of notice’.  Using two different words ‘from’ and ‘of’  in the  

same Section at different places clarifies the intention of the  

legislature to convey different meanings by the said words.  

According  to  counsel,  seen  in  this  light,  the  word  ‘of’  

occurring  in  Section  138(c)  and  Section  142(b)  is  to  be  

interpreted differently as against the word ‘from’ occurring  

in Section 138(a). The word ‘from’ may be taken as implying  

exclusion of the date in question and may well be governed  

by  the General Clauses Act, 1897.  However, the word ‘of’ is  

different and needs to be interpreted to include the starting  

day of the commencement of the prescribed period.  It is not  

governed by Section  9  of  the General  Clauses  Act,  1897.  

Thus, for the purposes of Section 142(b), which prescribes  

that the complaint is to be filed within 30 days of the date on  

which the cause of action arises, the starting date on which  

the cause of action arises should be included for computing  

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the  period  of  30  days.   Counsel  further  submitted  that  

Section  138(c)  and  Section  142(b)  prescribe  the  period  

within which certain acts are required to be done.  Section  

12(1) of the Limitation Act cannot be resorted to so as to  

extend that period even by one day.  If the starting point is  

excluded, that will render the word ‘within’ of Section 142(b)  

of  the  N.I.  Act  otiose.  Counsel  submitted  that  the  word  

‘within’ has been held by this Court to mean ‘on or before’.  

[Danial  Latifi  and Another  v. U.O.I.13]   Therefore,  the  

complaint under Section 142(b) should be filed on or before  

or within, 30 days of the date on which the cause of action  

under Section 138(c) arises.  Counsel submitted that there is  

no justification to exclude the 16th day of the 15 day period  

under Section 138(c) or the first day of the 30 days period  

under  Section  142(b)  as  has  been  wrongly  decided  in  

Saketh  .    This would amount to exclusion of the starting date  

of the period.  Such exclusion has been held to be against  

the law in SIL Import USA.  Counsel further submitted that  

the provisions of the Limitation Act are not applicable to the  

13 (2001) 7 SCC 740

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N.I.  Act  as  held  by  this  Court  in  Subodh  S.  Salaskar.  

Counsel  pointed out  that  by Amending Act  55 of  2002,  a  

proviso  was  added  to  Section  142(b)  of  the  N.I.  Act.   It  

bestows  discretion  upon  the  court  to  accept  a  complaint  

after the period of 30 days and to condone the delay.  This  

amendment signifies that prior to this amendment the courts  

had no discretion to condone the delay or exclude time by  

resorting to Section 5 of the Limitation Act.  The statement  

of  objects  and  reasons  of  the  Amending  Act  55  of  2002  

confirms the legal position that the N.I. Act being a special  

statute, the Limitation Act is not applicable to it.   Counsel  

submitted that the judgment of this Court on the Arbitration  

Act is not applicable to this case because Section 43 of the  

Arbitration  Act  specifically  makes  the  Limitation  Act  

applicable to arbitrations. Counsel submitted that in view of  

the above, it is evident that Saketh does not lay down the  

correct law. It is SIL  Import  USA      which correctly analyses  

the provisions of law and lays down the law. Counsel urged  

that the reference be answered in light of his submissions.  

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8. It is necessary to first refer to  SIL  Import  USA on  

which heavy reliance  is  placed  by the  respondents  as  it  

takes  a  view  contrary  to  the  view  taken  in  Saketh.    In  

SIL  Import  USA, the complainant-Company’s  case was  

that the accused owed a sum of US $ 72,075 (equivalent to  

more  than  26  lakhs  of  rupees)  to  it  towards  the  sale  

consideration of certain materials.  The accused gave some  

post-dated Cheques in repayment thereof.  Two of the said  

Cheques when presented on 3/5/1996 for encashment were  

dishonoured  with  the  remark  “no  sufficient  funds”.    The  

complainant  sent  a  notice  to  the  accused  by  fax  on  

11/6/1996.  On the next day   i.e. 12/6/1996 the complainant  

also  sent  the  same notice by  registered post   which  was  

served  on  the  accused  on  25/6/1996.   On  8/8/1996  the  

complainant filed a complaint under Section 138 of the N.I.  

Act.  Cognizance of the offence was taken and process was  

issued.   Process  was  quashed  by  the  Magistrate  on  the  

grounds urged by the accused.  The complainant moved the  

High Court.  The High Court set aside the Magistrate’s order  

and restored the complaint.  That order was challenged in  

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this Court.  The only point which was urged before this Court  

was that the Magistrate could not have taken cognizance of  

the  offence after  the  expiry  of  30  days  from the date  of  

cause of action.  This contention was upheld by this Court.  

This Court held that the notice envisaged in clause (b) of the  

proviso  to  Section  138  transmitted  by  fax  would  be  in  

compliance  with  the  legal  requirement.   There  was  no  

dispute about the fact that notice sent by fax was received  

by the complainant on the same date i.e. 11/6/1996.  This  

Court observed that as per clause (c) of Section 138, starting  

point of period for making payment is the date of receipt of  

the  notice.   Once  it  starts,  the  offence  is  completed  on  

failure to pay the amount within 15 days therefrom.  Cause  

of action would arise if the offence is committed.  Thus, it  

was held that since the fax was received on 11/6/1996, the  

period of 15 days for making payment expired on 26/6/1996.  

Since  amount  was  not  paid,  offence  was  committed  and,  

therefore,  cause  of  action  arose  from  26/6/1996  and  the  

period of limitation for filing complaint expired on 26/7/1996  

i.e.  the  date  on  which  period  of  one  month  expired  as  

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contemplated under Section 142(b).  The complaint filed on  

8/8/1996  was,  therefore,  beyond  the  period  of  limitation.  

The  relevant  observations  of  this  Court  could  be  quoted  

hereunder:  

“19. The High Court’s view is that the sender of  the  notice  must  know  the  date  when  it  was  received by  the  sendee,  for  otherwise  he would  not be in a position to count the period in order to  ascertain  the  date  when  cause  of  action  has  arisen. The fallacy of the above reasoning is that it  erases the starting date of the period of 15 days  envisaged in clause (c). As per the said clause the  starting date is the date of “the receipt of the said  notice”. Once it starts, the offence is completed on  the  failure  to  pay  the  amount  within  15  days  therefrom.  Cause  of  action  would  arise  if  the  offence is committed.

20. If  a  different  interpretation  is  given  the  absolute interdict  incorporated in  Section 142 of  the Act that no court shall take cognizance of any  offence unless the complaint is made within one  month of the date on which the cause of action  arises, would become otiose.”

9. Undoubtedly, the view taken in SIL  Import  USA runs  

counter to the view taken in  Saketh. What persuaded this  

Court in Saketh to take the view that in computing time, the  

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rule is to exclude the first day and include the last can be  

understood if we have a look at the English cases which have  

been referred to in the passage quoted therein from  Haru  

Das Gupta.

10. We must first refer to The Goldsmiths’ Company   v.   

The  West  Metropolitan  Railway  Company.14 In  that  

case,  under  a  special  Act,  a  railway  company  was  

empowered to take lands compulsorily for the purpose of its  

undertaking, and the powers of the company for this purpose  

were to cease after the expiration of three years from the  

passing of the Act.  The Act received the Royal assent on  

9/8/1899.  On 9/8/1902 the railway company gave notice to  

the plaintiffs to treat for the purchase of lands belonging to  

them which were scheduled in the special Act.  The question  

was whether the notice was served on the plaintiffs within  

three years.  It was held that the notice was served within  

the prescribed time because the day of the passing of the  

14 (1904) 1 K.B, at p. 1, 5

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Act  i.e.  9/8/1899  had  to  be  excluded.   The  relevant  

observations of the Court may be quoted as under:

“The true principle that governs this case is   that  indicated  in  the  report  of  Lester   v.  Garland  15  ,   where  Sir  William  Grant  broke  away from the line of cases supporting the  view that  there  was  a  general  rule  that  in   cases where time is to run from the doing of   an act or the happening of an event the first   day  is  always  to  be  included  in  the  computation  of  the  time.   The  view  expressed by Sir William Grant was repeated  by Parke B.  in Russell   v.  Ledsam  16  ,  and  by other  judges  in  subsequent  cases.   The   rule  is  now  well  established  that  where  a   particular time is given, from a certain date,   within which an act is to be done, the day of   the date is to be excluded.”

11.  The  second  case  referred  to  is   Cartwright    v.  

MacCormack  17  .    In  that  case,  the  plaintiffs  met  with  an  

accident at 5.45 p.m. on 17/12/1959. He was run into by the  

defendant driving a motor  car.   He issued his writ  in this  

action  claiming  damages  for  personal  injuries.    The  

defendant  initiated  third  party  proceedings  against  the  

respondent  insurance  company,  alleging  the  company’s  

liability  to  indemnify  him  under  an  instrument  called  a  15 15 Ves. 248; 10 R. R. 68 16 14 M. & W. 574 17 [1963] 1 All E.R.  11

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temporary  cover  note  admittedly  issued by  the  insurance  

company on 2/12/1959.   The insurance company inter alia  

contended that the policy had expired before the accident  

happened. The insurance company succeeded on this point.  

On appeal the insurance company reiterated that the cover  

note  issued  by  the  insurance  company  contained  the  

expression ‘fifteen days from the date of commencement of  

policy’.  On  the  same  note  date  and  time  were  noted  as  

2/12/1959 and 11.45 a.m.   It  was argued that  the fifteen  

days started at 11.45 a.m. on 2/12/1959 and expired at the  

same time on 17/12/1959.  The accident occurred at 5.45  

p.m. on 17/12/1959 and, therefore, it was not covered by the  

insurance  policy.    The  Court  of  Appeal  treated  the  

expression  ‘fifteen  days  from  the  commencement  of  the  

policy’ as excluding the first date and the cover note was  

held to commence at midnight of that date.  It was observed  

that  the  policy  expired  fifteen  days  from  2/12/1959  and  

these words  on the ordinary rules of construction exclude  

the first date and begin at midnight on that day,  therefore,  

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the policy would cover the accident which had occurred at  

5.45 p.m. on 17/12/1959.

12. The  third  case  referred  to  is  Marren  v.  Dawson  

Bentley & Co. Ltd.  18  . In that case on 8/11/1954 an accident  

occurred whereby the plaintiff was injured in the course of  

his  employment  with  the  defendants.   On  8/11/1957,  he  

issued  a  writ  claiming  damages  for  the  injuries  which  he  

alleged were caused by  the  defendants’  negligence.   The  

defendants pleaded,  inter alia,  that the plaintiff’s cause of  

action,  if  any,  accrued on 8/11/1954 and the proceedings  

had not been commenced within the period of three years  

thereof contrary to Section 2(1) of the Limitation Act, 1939.  

It was held that the day of the accident was to be excluded  

from the computation of the period within which the action  

should be brought and, therefore, the defendants’ plea must  

fail.  While coming to this conclusion reliance was placed on  

passages  from  Halsbury’s  laws  of  England  19  .    It  is  

necessary to quote those passages:

18 (1961) 2Q.B. 135 19 2nd ed., vol. 32 p. 142

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“207. The general rule in cases in which a period   is fixed within which a person must act or take the   consequences is that the day of the act or event   from which the period runs should not be counted   against him. This rule is especially reasonable in   the case in which that person is not necessarily   cognisant  of  the  act  or  event;  and  further  in   support of it there is the consideration that in case   the  period  allowed  was  one  day  only,  the   consequence  of  including  that  day  would  be  to   reduce to a few hours or minutes the time within   which the person affected should take action.  

208. In view of these considerations the general   rule is that, as well in cases where the limitation of   time is imposed by the act of a party as in those   where it is imposed by statute, the day from which   the time begins to run is excluded; thus, where a   period is fixed within which a criminal prosecution   or a civil action may be commenced, the day on   which the offence is  committed or  the cause of   action arises is excluded in the computation.”

Reliance was also placed in this judgment on Radcliffe  

v. Bartholomew  20  .  In that case on June 30 an information  

was laid against the appellant therein in respect of an act of  

cruelty alleged to have been committed by him on May 30.  

An objection was taken on the ground that the complaint had  

not been made within one calendar month after the cause of  

the complaint had arisen.  It was held that the day on which  20 (1892) 1 Q.B.161

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the alleged offence was committed was to be excluded from  

the  computation  of  the  calendar  month  within  which  the  

complaint  was  to  be  made;  that  the  complaint  was,  

therefore, made in time.  

13. The fourth case referred to is Stewart v. Chapman  21  .  

In  that  case,  an  information  was  preferred  by  a  police  

constable  that  Mr.  Chapman  had  on  11/1/1951  driven  a  

motor  car  along  a  road  without  due  care  and  attention  

contrary  to  Section  12 of  the  Road Traffic  Act,  1930.   At  

hearing, a preliminary objection was taken that the notice of  

intended prosecution had not been served on the defendant  

within fourteen days of commission of offence in accordance  

with Section 21 of the Road Traffic Act, 1930, inasmuch as  

although the alleged offence was committed at 7.15 a.m. on  

11/1/1951,  the  prosecutor  did  not  send  the  notice  of  

intended prosecution by registered post; until 1.00 p.m. on  

11/1/1951 and it  was not delivered to the defendant until  

25/1/1951 at about 8.00 a.m. This submission was rejected  

observing  that  in  calculating  the  period  of  fourteen  days  21 (1951) 2 KB 792

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within which the notice of an intended prosecution must be  

served under Section 21 of the Road Traffic Act, 1930, the  

date of commission of the offence is to be excluded.  

14. In  re.  North.  Ex  parte  Hasluck  22  ,  the  execution  

creditor  obtained  judgment  on  19/5/1893.   An  order  was  

made  authorizing  sale  of  the  bankrupt’s  goods.   The  

purchase money thereunder was paid to the sheriff on July  

18.   The  sheriff  retained  the  money  for  fourteen  days  in  

compliance with Section 11 of the Bankruptcy Act, 1890.  In  

August, the solicitor of the execution creditor paid over the  

said money to the execution creditor.  Application was filed  

by the trustee in bankruptcy for an order calling upon the  

execution  creditor  and  his  solicitor  to  pay  over  to  the  

trustee, the proceeds of an execution against the bankruptcy  

goods on the ground that at the time of the sale they had  

notice of prior act of bankruptcy on the part of the bankrupt.  

Under  Section  1  of  the  Bankruptcy  Act,  1890,  a  debtor  

commits an act of bankruptcy if execution against him has  

been levied by seizure of  his  goods,  and the goods have  22 (1895) 2 Q.B. 264

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been held by the sheriff for twenty one days.  The time limit  

of twenty one days was an allowance of time to the debtor  

within  which  to  redeem  if  he  can.   It  was  under  these  

circumstances  it  became  necessary  to  ascertain  whether  

there was, in fact, a holding by the sheriff  for twenty one  

days  prior  to  the  sale.   If  there  was,  then  neither  the  

execution creditor,  nor  his  solicitor  could be heard to say  

that they had no notice of such possession and the act of  

bankruptcy  thereby  constituted.  Vaughan Williams,  J.  held  

that if the goods were seized on June 27 and sold on July 18,  

if June 27 is excluded, there was no holding by the sheriff for  

21 days and consequently there was no act of bankruptcy  

and therefore execution creditor is not bound to hand over  

the money on the ground that he received it with notice of  

an  act  of  bankruptcy.   On  appeal  the  same  view  was  

reiterated.  Rigby L.J referred to Lester v. Garland  23      where  

Sir W. Grant expressed that if  there were to be a general  

rule,  it  ought  to  be  one  of  exclusion,  as  being  more  

reasonable than one to the opposite effect.  

23 15 Ves. 248

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15. We  shall  now  turn  to  Haru  Das  Gupta, where  this  

Court  has  followed  the  law  laid  down  in  the  above  

judgments.  In that case, the petitioner therein was arrested  

and  detained  on  5/2/1971  by  order  of  District  Magistrate  

passed  on  that  day.   The  order  of  confirmation  and  

continuation, which has to be passed within three months  

from the date of detention, was passed on 5/5/1971.  The  

question for  decision was as  to  when the period of  three  

months can be said to have expired.  It was contended by  

the petitioner that the period of three months expired on the  

midnight of 4/5/1971, and any confirmation and continuation  

of  detention  thereafter  would  not  be  valid.   This  Court  

referred to several English decisions on the point apart from  

the  above  decisions  and  rejected  this  submission  holding  

that  the  day  of  commencement  of  detention  namely  

5/2/1971 has to be excluded.  Relevant observations of this  

could read as under:  

“These  decisions  show  that  courts  have  drawn a distinction between a term created  within which an act may be done and a time   

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limited for the doing of an act. The rule is   well-established  that  where  a  particular   time  is  given  from  a  certain  date  within   which an act is to be done, the day on that   date  is  to  be  excluded.  (See  Goldsmiths  Company v. the West Metropolitan Railway  Company).  This  rule  was  followed  in   Cartwright  v.  Maccormack  where  the   expression  “fifteen  days  from the  date  of   commencement  of  the  policy”  in  a  cover   note issued by an insurance company was  construed  as  excluding  the  first  date  and  the cover note to commence at midnight of   that  day,  and  also  in  Marren  v.  Damson   Bentley & Co. Ltd. a case for compensation   for  injuries  received  in  the  course  of   employment,  where  for  purposes  of   computing the period of limitation the date   of the accident, being the date of the cause   of action, was excluded. (See also Stewart   v.  Chadman  and  In  re  North,  Ex  parte  Wasluck). Thus, as a general rule the effect   of defining a period from such a day until   such a day within which an act is to be done   is to exclude the first day and to include the   last day. [See Halsbury’s Laws of England,   (3rd Edn.). Vol. 37, pp. 92 and 95.] There is   no  reason  why  the  aforesaid  rule  of   construction  followed  consistently  and  for   so long should not also be applied here.”

16. We  have  extensively  referred  to  Saketh.   The  

reasoning  of  this  Court  in  Saketh  based  on  the  above  

English decisions  and decision of this Court in   Haru Das  

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Gupta which aptly lay down and explain the principle that  

where a particular time is given from a certain date within  

which an act has to be done, the day of the date is to be  

excluded, commends itself to us as against the reasoning of  

this Court in SIL Import USA  where there is no reference to  

the said decisions.  

17. It  was  submitted  that  in  Saketh this  Court  has  

erroneously placed reliance on Section 12(1) and (2) of the  

Limitation Act, 1963. Section 12 (1)  states that in computing  

the period of limitation for any suit,  appeal or application,  

the day from which such period is to be reckoned, shall be  

excluded. In Section 12(2) the same principle is extended to  

computing period of limitation for an application for leave to  

appeal  or  for  revision  or  for  review  of  a  judgment.  Our  

attention was drawn to  Subodh S. Salaskar wherein this  

Court has held that the Limitation Act, 1963 is not applicable  

to the N.I. Act.   It is true that in Subodh S. Salaskar, this  

Court has held that the Limitation Act, 1963 is not applicable  

to the N.I. Act.  However even if the Limitation Act, 1963 is  

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held not applicable to the N.I. Act, the conclusion reached in  

Saketh could still be reached with the aid of Section 9 of the  

General Clauses Act, 1897.  Section 9 of the General Clauses  

Act, 1897 states that in any Central Act or Regulation made  

after the commencement of the General Clauses Act, 1897,  

it shall be sufficient to use the word ‘from’ for the purpose of  

excluding the first in a series of days or any other period of  

time and to use the word ‘to’ for the purpose of including the  

last  in  a series  of  days or  any other  period of  time.  Sub-

Section (2) of Section 9 of the General  Clauses Act,  1897  

states that this Section applies to all Central Acts made after  

the third day of January, 1868, and to all Regulations made  

on or after the fourteenth day of January, 1887.  This Section  

would, therefore, be applicable to the N.I. Act.   

18. Counsel,  however,  submitted that  using two different  

words  ‘from’  and  ‘of’  in  Section  138  at  different  places  

clarifies the intention of the legislature to convey different  

meanings by the said words.  He submitted that the word ‘of’  

occurring in Sections 138(c) and 142(b) of the N.I. Act is to  

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be  interpreted  differently  as  against  the  word  ‘from’  

occurring in Section 138(a) of the N.I. Act.  The word ‘from’  

may be taken as implying exclusion of the date in question  

and that may well be governed by the General Clauses Act,  

1897.  However, the word ‘of’ is different and needs to be  

interpreted  to  include  the  starting  day  of  the  

commencement of the prescribed period.  It is not governed  

by  Section  9  of  the  General  Clauses  Act  1897.   Thus,  

according to  learned counsel,  for  the  purposes  of  Section  

142(b),  which  prescribes  that  the  complaint  is  to  be filed  

within  30 days  of  the  date  on  which  the  cause of  action  

arises, the starting date on which the cause of action arises  

should be included for computing the period of 30 days.  

19. We  are  not  impressed  by  his  submission.   In  this  

connection,  we  may  refer  to  Tarun Prasad  Chatterjee.  

Though,  this  case  relates  to  the  provisions  of  the  

Representation of the People Act, 1951 (for short ‘the RP  

Act, 1951’), the principle laid down therein would have a  

bearing on the present case.   What is important to bear in  

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mind is that the Limitation Act is not applicable to it. In that  

case the short question involved was whether in computing  

the period of limitation as provided in Section 81(1) of the RP  

Act,  1951,  the  date of  election  of  the  returned candidate  

should  be  excluded  or  not.   The  appellant  was  declared  

elected on 28/11/1998.  On 12/1/1999, the respondent filed  

an election petition under Section 81(1) of the RP Act, 1951  

challenging the election of the appellant.  The appellant filed  

an application under Order VII Rule 11 of the CPC read with  

Section  81  of  the  RP  Act,  1951  praying  that  the  election  

petition was liable to be dismissed at the threshold as not  

maintainable as the same had not been filed within 45 days  

from the date of election of the returned candidate. While  

dealing with this issue, this Court referred to Section 67-A of  

the RP Act, 1951 which states that for the purpose of the RP  

Act, 1951 the date on which a candidate is declared by the  

returning  officer  under  Section  53  or  Section  66  to  be  

elected shall be the date of election of the candidate.  As  

stated earlier, the appellant was declared elected as per this  

provision by the returning officer on 28/11/1998.  Section 81  

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of the RP Act, 1951 which relates to presentation of petition  

reads thus:

“81. Presentation of petitions.  — (1)  An  election petition  calling  in  question any election   may be presented on one or more of the grounds   specified  in  sub-section  (1)  of  Section  100  and   Section 101 to the High Court by any candidate at   such election or any elector within forty-five days  from, but not earlier than the date of election of   the returned candidate or if there are more than  one returned candidate at the election and dates   of their  election are different,  the later of those   two dates.

Explanation.—In this sub-section, ‘elector’ means  a person who was entitled to vote at the election   to which the election petition relates, whether he   has voted at such election or not.

* * *

(3) Every election petition shall be accompanied   by  as  many  copies  thereof  as  there  are   respondents mentioned in the petition and every   such  copy  shall  be  attested  by  the  petitioner   under his own signature to be a true copy of the   petition.”

Before analyzing this provision, this Court made it clear  

that it was an accepted position that the Limitation Act had  

no application to the RP Act, 1951.   This Court then referred  

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to sub-clause (1) of Section 9 of the General Clauses Act,  

1897, which states that it shall be sufficient for the purpose  

of excluding the first in a series of days or any other period  

of  time  to  use  the  words  ‘from’  and  for  the  purpose  of  

including last in a series of days or any other period of time  

to use the word ‘to’.   This  Court  observed that  Section 9  

gives statutory recognition to the well established principle  

applicable  to  the construction  of  statute  that  ordinarily  in  

computing the period of time prescribed, the rule observed  

is to exclude the first and include the last day.  This Court  

quoted  the  relevant  provisions  of  Halsbury’s  Laws  of  

England, 37th Edn., Vol.3, p. 92.  We deem it appropriate to  

quote the same.

“Days included or excluded — When a period of   time running from a given day or even to another   day  or  event  is  prescribed  by  law  or  fixed  as   contract,  and  the  question  arises  whether  the   computation  is  to  be  made  inclusively  or   exclusively of  the first-mentioned or  of  the last- mentioned day, regard must be had to the context   and  to  the  purposes  for  which  the  computation   has to be made. Where there is room for doubt,   the  enactment  or  instrument  ought  to  be  so   construed as to effectuate and not to defeat the   intention of  Parliament  or  of  the parties,  as  the   

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case may be.  Expressions such as ‘from such a   day’ or ‘until such a day’ are equivocal, since they   do not make it clear whether the inclusion or the   exclusion of the day named may be intended. As a   general  rule,  however,  the  effect  of  defining  a   period in such a manner is to exclude the first day   and to include the last day.”

The  further  observations  made  by  this  Court  are  

pertinent and need to be quoted:

“12. Section  9  says  that  in  any  Central  Act  or   regulation made after the commencement of the   General Clauses Act, 1897, it shall be sufficient for   the purpose of  excluding the first  in  a series of   days or any other period of time, to use the word   “from”, and, for the purpose of including the last   in a series of days or any period of time, to use   the word “to”. The principle is that when a period   is delimited by statute or rule, which has both a   beginning and an end and the word “from” is used   indicating the beginning, the opening day is to be   excluded and if the last day is to be included the   word “to” is to be used. In order to exclude the   first  day  of  the  period,  the  crucial  thing  to  be   noted  is  whether  the  period  of  limitation  is   delimited  by  a  series  of  days  or  by  any  fixed  period. This is intended to obviate the difficulties   or  inconvenience  that  may  be  caused  to  some  parties. For instance, if a policy of insurance has to   be good for one day from 1st January, it might be   valid only for a few hours after its execution and  the party or the beneficiary in the insurance policy   would not get reasonable time to lay claim, unless   1st  January  is  excluded  from  the  period  of   computation.”

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It  was argued in that case that the language used in  

Section  81(1)  that  “within  forty-five  days  from,  but  not  

earlier than the date of election of the returned candidate”  

expresses a different intention and Section 9 of the General  

Clauses  Act  has  no  application.   While  rejecting  this  

submission, this Court observed that:

“We do not  find any force in this contention.  In   order to apply Section 9, the first condition to be   fulfilled  is  whether  a  prescribed  period  is  fixed  “from”  a  particular  point.  When  the  period  is   marked by terminus a quo and terminus ad quem,   the canon of interpretation envisaged in Section 9   of  the  General  Clauses  Act,  1897  require  to   exclude  the  first  day.  The  words  “from”  and  “within” used in Section 81(1) of the RP Act, 1951  do not express any contrary intention.”

This Court concluded that a conjoint reading of Section  

81(1)  of  the  RP  Act,  1951  and  Section  9  of  the  General  

Clauses Act, 1897 leads to the conclusion that the first day  

of the period of limitation is required to be excluded for the  

convenience of the parties.  This Court observed that if the  

declaration  of  the  result  is  done  late  in  the  night,  the  

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candidate  or  elector  would  hardly  get  any  time  for  

presentation of election petition.  Law comes to the rescue of  

such parties to give full forty-five days period for filing the  

election  petition.  In  the  facts  before  it  since  the  date  of  

election  of  the  returned  candidate  was  28/11/1998,  the  

election petition filed on 12/1/1999 on exclusion of the first  

day from computing the period of limitation, was held to be  

in time.   

20. As the Limitation Act is held to be not applicable to N.I.  

Act, drawing parallel from Tarun Prasad Chatterjee  where  

the Limitation Act  was held not  applicable,  we are of  the  

opinion that with the aid of Section 9 of the General Clauses  

Act, 1897 it can be safely concluded  in the present case that  

while calculating the period of one month which is prescribed  

under Section 142(b) of the N.I.  Act, the period has to be  

reckoned by excluding the date on which the cause of action  

arose.  It is not possible to agree with the counsel for the  

respondents that the use of the two different words ‘from’  

and  ‘of’  in  Section  138  at  different  places  indicates  the  

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intention of the legislature to convey different meanings by  

the said words.  

21.  In this connection we may also usefully refer to the  

judgment of the Division Bench of the Bombay High Court in  

Vasantlal Ranchhoddas Patel & Ors.   v. Union of India   

&  Ors.  24   which  is  approved  by  this  Court  in  Gopaldas  

Udhavdas Ahuja and another   v.  Union of India and   

others  25  ,   though  in  different  context.  In  that  case  the  

premises of the appellants were searched by the officers of  

the  Enforcement  Directorate.   Several  packets  containing  

diamonds were seized.  The appellants made an application,  

for return of the diamonds, to the learned Magistrate, which  

was rejected.  Similar prayer made to the Single Judge of the  

Bombay  High  Court  was  also  rejected.   An  appeal  was  

carried  by  the  appellants  to  the  Division  Bench  of  the  

Bombay High Court.   It was pointed out that under Section  

124  of  the  Customs Act,  1962,  no  order  confiscating  any  

goods or imposing any penalty on any person shall be made  

24 AIR 1967 Bombay 138 25 (2004) 7 SCC 33

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unless  the owner  of  the goods or  such person is  given a  

notice  in  writing  with  the  prior  approval  of  the  officer  of  

customs not below the rank of an Assistant Commissioner of  

Police, informing him of the grounds on which it is proposed  

to  confiscate  the  goods  or  to  impose  a  penalty.    Under  

Section 110(1) of the Customs Act,  1962 a proper officer,  

who  has  reason  to  believe  that  any  goods  are  liable  to  

confiscation may seize such goods.  Under sub-Section(2) of  

Section 110 of the Customs Act, 1962, where any goods are  

seized under sub-Section (1) and no notice in respect thereof  

is given under clause (a) of Section 124 within six months of  

the seizure of the goods, the goods shall be returned to the  

person from whose possession  they were seized.   Under  

proviso  to  Section  110,  sub-section  (2),  however,  the  

Collector could extend the period of six months on sufficient  

cause being shown.  It was argued that the Customs Officers  

had seized the goods within the meaning of Section 110 of  

the  Customs  Act,  1962  on  4/9/1964.   The  notice  

contemplated  under  Section  124(a)  was  given  after  

3/3/1965, that is after the period of six months had expired.  

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As per  Section 110(2),  notice contemplated under Section  

124(a) of the Customs Act, 1962 had to be given within six  

months of the seizure of the goods, and, therefore, notice  

issued after the expiry of six months was bad in law and,  

hence,  the  Collector  of  Customs  was  not  competent  to  

extend the period of six months under the proviso to sub-

section (2) of Section 110 as he had done.  Therefore, no  

order confiscating the goods or imposing penalty could have  

been  made  and  the  goods  had  to  be  returned  to  the  

appellants.   It  was  argued  that  Section  9  of  the  General  

Clauses  Act,  1897  has  no  application  because  the  words  

‘from’ and ‘to’  found in Section 9 of the General Clauses Act,  

1897 are not used in sub-Section 2 of Section 110 of the  

Customs  Act,  1962.   This  submission  was  rejected  and  

Section  9  of  the  General  Clauses  Act,  1897  was  held  

applicable.   Speaking for the Bench Chainani, C.J. observed  

as under:

“…  …  …The  principle  underlying  section  9  has  been applied even in the cases of judicial orders   passed  by  Courts,  even  though  in  terms  the  section is not applicable, See. Ramchandra Govind   

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v.  Laxman  Savleram,  AIR  1938  Bom  447,   Dharamraj  v  Addl.  Deputy  Commr.,  Akola,  AIR  1957 Bom 154, Puranchand v. Mohd Din. AIR 1935  Lah 291, Marakanda Sahu v. Lal Sadananda, AIR  1952 Orissa 279, and Liquidator Union Bank, Mal,   v.  Padmanabha Menon,  (1954)  2  Mad LJ  44.The   material  words  in  sub-s.  (2)  of  section  110  are   "within six months of the seizure of the goods". In   such provisions the word "of" has been held to be   equivalent to "from": see Willims v. Burgess and  Walcot,  (1840)  12  Ad  and  El  635.  In  that  case   section  1  of  the  relevant  statute  enacted  that   warrants of attorney shall be filed "within twenty- one days after the execution. Section 2 enacted   that unless they were "filed as aforesaid within the   said space of twenty-one days from the execution,   "they  and  the  judgment  thereon  shall  be  void   subject to the conditions specified in the section.   The  warrant  of  attorney  was  executed  on  9th   December,  1839 and it  was filed,  and judgment   entered up on the 30th December. It was held that   in  computing  the  period  of  21  days  the  day  of   execution must be excluded, Reliance was placed   on  Ex  parte  Fallon,  (1793)  5  Term  Rep  283  in   which the word used was "of" and not "from". It   was observed that "of", "from" and "'after" really   meant  the  same  thing  and  that  no  distinction   could  be  suggested from the  nature  of  the  two  provisions.  In Stroud's  Judicial  Dictionary,  Vol.  3,   1953 Edition in Note (5) under the word "of", it has   been  observed  that  "of"  is  sometimes  the  equivalent of "after" e.g., in the expression "within   21  days  of  the  execution".  The  principle   underlying section 9 of  the General  Clauses Act   cannot  therefore,  be  held  to  be  inapplicable,   merely because the word used in sub-section (2)   of section 110 is "of" and not "from".

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Relevant extracts from Halsbury’s laws of England  26    

were quoted.  They read as under:  

“The  general  rule  in  cases  in  which  a  period  is  fixed within which a person must act or take the  consequences is that the day of the act or event  from which the period runs should not be counted  against him.  

This  general  rule applies irrespective of  whether  the limitation of time is imposed by the act of a  party or by statute; thus, where a period is fixed  within which a criminal prosecution or a civil action  may be commenced, the day on which the offence  is  committed  or  the  cause  of  action  arises  is  excluded in the computation.”

In the circumstances, it was held that the day on which  

the goods were seized has to be excluded in computing the  

period of  limitation contemplated under sub-section (2)  of  

Section 110 and therefore the notice was issued within the  

period of limitation.  It is pertinent to note that under Section  

110 (2) of the Customs Act, notice had to be given within six  

months of the seizure of the goods.  Similarly, under Section  

142(b) of the N.I. Act, the complaint has to be made within  

one month of the date of which cause of action arose.  The  

26 3rd  Edn., vol. 37 p. 95

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view taken in  Vasantlal Ranchhoddas Patel meets with  

our approval.  

 22. In view of the above, it is not possible to hold that the  

word ‘of’ occurring in Section 138(c) and 142(b) of the N.I.  

Act is to be interpreted differently as against the word ‘from’  

occurring in Section 138(a) of the N.I. Act; and that for the  

purposes  of  Section  142(b),  which  prescribes  that  the  

complaint is to be filed within 30 days of the date on which  

the cause of  action arises,  the starting day on which the  

cause of action arises should be included for computing the  

period of 30 days.  As held in Ex parte Fallon  27   the words  

‘of’, ‘from’ and ‘after’ may, in a given case, mean really the  

same thing.  As stated in Stroud’s Judicial Dictionary, Vol. 3  

1953 Edition, Note (5), the word ‘of’ is sometimes equivalent  

of ‘after’.   

23. Reliance placed on Danial Latifi  is totally misplaced.  

In that case the Court was concerned with Section 3(1)(a) of  

the  Muslim Women (Protection  of  Rights  on  Divorce)  Act,  27  (1793) 5 Term Rep 283  

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1986.  Section 3(1)(a) provides that a divorced woman shall  

be  entitled  to  a  reasonable  and  fair  provision  and  

maintenance to be made and paid to her within the Iddat  

period  by  her  former  husband.   This  provision  is  entirely  

different from Section 142(b) of the N.I. Act, which provides  

that the complaint is to be made ‘within one month  of the  

date  on  which  the  cause  of  action  arises’.   (emphasis  

supplied).   

24. We may, at this stage, note that learned counsel for the  

appellant  relied on  State of Himachal  Pradesh   where,  

while  considering  the  question  of  computation  of  three  

months’ limitation period and further 30 days within which  

the  challenge  to  the  award  is  to  be  filed,  as  provided  in  

Section 34(3) and proviso thereto of the Arbitration Act, this  

Court  held  that  having  regard  to  Section  12(1)  of  the  

Limitation Act, 1963 and Section 9 of the General Clauses  

Act, 1897, day from which such period is to be reckoned is to  

be excluded for calculating limitation.  It was pointed out by  

counsel  for  the  respondents  that  Section  43  of  the  

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Arbitration Act makes the Limitation Act, 1963 applicable to  

the Arbitration Act whereas it is held to be not applicable to  

the  N.I.  Act  and,  therefore,  this  judgment  would  not  be  

applicable to the present case.   We have noted that in this  

case reliance is not merely placed on Section 12(1) of the  

Limitation Act.  Reliance is also placed on Section 9 of the  

General Clauses Act.  However, since, in the instant case we  

have reached a conclusion on the basis of Section 9 of the  

General Clauses Act, 1897 and on the basis of a long line of  

English decisions that where a particular time is given, from  

a certain date, within which an act is to be done, the day of  

the date is  to  be excluded,  it  is  not  necessary to discuss  

whether  State of Himachal Pradesh is applicable to this  

case or not because Section 12(1) of the Limitation Act is  

relied upon therein.  

25. Having considered the question of law involved in this  

case in proper perspective, in light of relevant judgments,  

we are of  the opinion that  Saketh lays down the correct  

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proposition  of  law.   We  hold  that  for  the  purpose  of  

calculating  the  period  of  one  month,  which  is  prescribed  

under Section 142(b) of the N.I.  Act, the period has to be  

reckoned by excluding the date on which the cause of action  

arose.  We hold that SIL Import USA  does not lay down the  

correct law.  Needless to say that any decision of this Court  

which takes a view contrary to the view taken in Saketh by  

this Court,  which is confirmed by us, do not lay down the  

correct law on the question involved in this reference.  The  

reference is answered accordingly.   

…………………………………………..CJI (P. SATHASIVAM)

……………………………………………..J. (RANJANA PRAKASH DESAI)

……………………………………………..J. (RANJAN GOGOI)

NEW DELHI, AUGUST 26, 2013

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