REPORTABLE

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA CIVIL ORIGINAL JURISDICTION

ARBITRATION PETITION NOS. 7 & 8 OF 2009

M/s. Cauvery Coffee Traders, Mangalore                        …Petitioners  

Versus

M/s. Hornor Resources (Intern.) Co. Ltd.                        …Respondents

J U D G M E N T

Dr. B.S. CHAUHAN, J.

1. The arbitration  applications  under  Section  11(5)  & (9)  of  the  

Arbitration  and  Conciliation  Act,  1996,  hereinafter  called  the  “Act  

1996” have been filed for appointment of Arbitrator in an international  

arbitration  dispute  to  adjudicate  the  disputes/differences  which have  

arisen between the parties.   

2. The applicants are a partnership concern incorporated under the  

Indian Partnership Act,  1932 and have filed two applications  as  the  

dispute  raised  herein  relate  to  two  consignments.  However,  for

convenience,  facts and issues related to Petition No.7/2009 are being  

considered.    

3. On 24.6.2008, a Purchase Contract bearing No. CCT/SST/027/  

240608 was entered and executed by and between the applicants and  

the  respondents  wherein  the  applicants  agreed  to  sell  and  the  

respondents  agreed  to  purchase  Calibrated  Lumpy Ore  Fines  of  the  

approximate quantity of 40,000/- Wet Metric Tones (hereinafter called  

as `WMT’) (10% more or less at buyers’ option) at the price and on the  

terms and conditions stipulated in the said agreement. The agreement  

provided for the chemical specification/composition of the Ore and for  

guaranteed level of Fe i.e. iron content in the contracted goods which  

could not be less than 63%. In case the iron content was less than 63%,  

the buyer would have a right to reject the cargo.   

4. A large quantity of Ore had been supplied to the respondents  

which had been accepted and payments had been made.  Pursuant to  

the  purchase  contract,  the  applicants  on  6.8.2008  shipped  a  total  

consignment of 24,500 Dry MT of Calibrated Lumpy Ore from  New  

Mangalore Port, India to the port of discharge viz. Rizhao Port, China  

by vessel named “MV. FUJIN”.  The applicants  raised a provisional  

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invoice for a sum of US$ 32,13,529.11 and sent a Certificate of Origin  

and  the  Bill  of  Lading  dated  6.8.2008  as  issued  by  the  carriers  in  

respect  of  the  carriage  of  the  goods  from Mangalore  Port,  India  to  

Rizhao  Port,  China.   The  material  so  supplied  had  been  sent  after  

proper analysis and it had been certified by the analyst in India that the  

goods supplied contained more than 63%  Fe contents.  The said goods  

reached at  China Port.   The delivery of the same was taken by the  

respondents  and  on  chemical  analysis,  according  to  them,  the  iron  

contents Fe, were found to be 62.74%. The goods reached the Port of  

Discharge,  and  were  accepted  by  the  respondents-buyers  who  

promised that payment would be made without any delay.   

5. The  respondents  vide  email  dated  19.9.2008  informed  the  

applicants  that  a  provisional  payment  would  be  released  for  the  

shipment in question based on revised rates and, in case, the applicants  

were  willing  to  accept  the  revised  rates  stipulated  therein,  the  

respondents would request their end buyers’ confirmation to release the  

payment, and for that purpose, applicants were asked to send necessary  

instructions  through  their  banker.  The  respondents  vide  email  dated  

7.10.2008 informed the applicants that US$ 1.5 million could be the  

amount for the final settlement in respect of the shipment in question,  

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in spite of the fact that the agreed amount had been US$ 18,91,204.00.  

By the said email, applicants were asked by the respondents to inform  

through their banker in case of their acceptance to the said proposal.  

Under these peculiar facts and circumstances, as the goods had already  

reached  China  and  applicants  were  in  dire  need  of  money,  they  

informed  through  their  banker  that  they  agreed  to  receive  payment  

under the Letter of Credit in a sum of total claim of US$ 18,91,204.00.  

By email  dated  7.10.2008 the  respondents  stated  that  the  applicants  

should accept US$ 1.5 million in full and final settlement. Accordingly,  

an amount of US$ 1.5 million had been received by them.  Subsequent  

thereto,  the applicants had repeatedly been sending reminders to the  

respondents to make good the balance payment under the said purchase  

contract, but no payment had been made.  As the respondents failed to  

make the payment of the balance amount, the applicants sent a legal  

notice dated 14.11.2008 to call upon the respondents to pay the balance  

amount under the purchase contract and further provided that, in view  

of the arbitration clause 18 contained in the purchase agreement, they  

should  carry  on  friendly  negotiations  to  settle  the  dispute  accrued  

between  the  parties.   As  per  the  terms  of  the  purchase  agreement,  

arbitration can be held only in a third country. The applicants suggested  

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to have the arbitration proceedings either in Singapore or in Australia.  

In spite of receiving the said notice, neither the payment of the balance  

amount  was  made,  nor  the  respondents  came  forward  for  friendly  

negotiations.  Therefore, a further reminder was sent by the applicants  

to  the  respondents  calling  upon  them  to  indicate  the  place  of  

arbitration.   As  neither  the  payment  had  been  made,  nor  the  

respondents  have  agreed  for  arbitration  proceedings,  they  have  

approached this Court by filing these applications.    

6. Shri  V.A.  Mohta,  learned  senior  counsel  appearing  for  the  

applicants, has submitted that in spite of the fact that the supply of iron  

ore has been made strictly in terms of the purchase contract and the  

outstanding  payments  have  not  been  made  even  after  several  

reminders,  the  applicants  served  a  notice  on  the  respondents  for  

appointment of Arbitrator in the third country in terms of Clause 18 of  

the Purchase Agreement but  the respondents did not make any effort  

either  to  come  for  friendly  negotiations  or  to  refer  the  matter  for  

arbitration, therefore, this Court must refer the matter to the Arbitrator  

in a third country preferably Singapore or Australia.   

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7. On  the  contrary,  Shri  Ashok  K.  Srivastava,  learned  senior  

counsel  appearing  for  the  respondents,  has  vehemently  opposed  the  

applications  contending  that  the  applications  themselves  are  not  

maintainable as the purchase agreement can be dealt with Part-II and  

certainly not under Part-I of the Act 1996.  Therefore, the applications  

under  Section  11(5)  & (9)  of  Act  1996  are  not  maintainable,  even  

otherwise,  there has been a complete settlement  between the parties  

and  the  applicants  have  accepted  the  full  and  final  settlement  as  

suggested by the respondents in view of the fact that Fe contents were  

not as per the specifications and certain terms had been offered to the  

applicants  for  settlement,  which  had  been  agreed  by  them.   The  

question of making the reference to arbitration proceedings does not  

arise.   

   8. I have considered the rival submissions made by learned counsel  

for the parties and perused the record.  

9. So far as the issue relating to maintainability of the application  

itself is concerned, is no more res integra. This court in Bhatia  

International v. Bulk Trading S.A, (2002) 4 SCC 105,  held as  

under:   

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“…..notwithstanding the provisions of Section 2(2)  of  the  Arbitration  and  Conciliation  Act,  1996,   indicating that  Part  I  of  the said Act  would apply   where the place of arbitration is  in India,  even in   respect  of  international  commercial  agreements,   which  are  to  be  governed  by  the  laws  of  another  country, the parties would be entitled to invoke the   provisions  of  Part  I  of  the  aforesaid  Act  and  consequently the application made under Section 11  thereof would be maintainable.  It clearly lays down  that the provisions of Part I of the Arbitration and   Conciliation Act, 1996, would be equally applicable   to  international  commercial  arbitrations  held  outside India, unless any of the said provisions are   excluded by agreement between the parties expressly   or  by  implication,  which  is  not  so  in  the  instant   case.”

(See also: Indtel Technical Services Private Limited v. W.S. Atkins  Rail Limited, (2008) 10 SCC 308; and  Citation Infowares Limited  v. Equinox Corporation, (2009) 7 SCC 220).

10.  In Venture Global Engg. Case v. Satyam Computer Services  

Ltd. (2008) 4 SCC 190,  this Court considered the similar issue and  

after considering various earlier judgments, came to the conclusion that  

implied  exclusion  of  provision  of  Part-I  cannot  be  inferred  and  

therefore the principles regarding the arbitral  reference laid down in  

Bhatia International (supra)  are applicable.

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11. Hon’ble Mr. R.C. Lahoti, J. (as His Lordship then was) however,  

has  taken  a  contrary  view  as  in  Shreejee  Traco  (I)  Pvt.  Ltd.  v.  

Paperline International Inc., (2003) 9 SCC 79; it was held:

“8. So far as the language employed by Parliament   in drafting sub-section (2) of Section 2 of the Act is   concerned, suffice it to say that the language is clear  and unambiguous. Saying that this Part would apply  where  the  place  of  arbitration  is  in  India  tantamounts to saying that  it  will  not  apply where   the place of arbitration is not in India.”

However, considering the fact that Bhatia International (supra)  

is a three-Judge Bench judgment and has consistently been followed,  

the judgment of the learned Single Judge in  Shreejee Traco (I) Pvt.  

Ltd. (supra)   does not  have binding effect.   As a  consequence,  the  

application is held to be maintainable.

 12. The Relevant part of the Purchase Agreement dated 28.6.2008  

reads as under:

“Clause 5:  Price Adjustment For Fe content: In respect of iron ore which does not meet the Fe   specifications set forth in Clause 3 the base price   referred  to  in  Clause  4  shall  be  adjusted  in   accordance with Fe content as determined pursuant   to the provisions of Clause 8 as follows: The base price shall be increased by single prorate  (USD2.2)  per  dry  metric  tonne  for  each  1%  Fe  below 63.5% upto 63.0 fraction prorate.

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The Buyer has the right to reject  the cargo if  Fe   content is below 63.0% .  

Clause 15:  Title and Risk The title with respect to each shipment shall pass   from  Seller  to  the  Buyers  when  Seller  receives   reimbursement  of  the  proceeds  from  the  opening  bank  through  the  negotiating  bank  against  the  relative shipping documents as set forth in clause 6  after completion of loading on board the vessel at   loading port, with effect retrospective to the time of   delivery of ore.  

Clause 18: Arbitration All disputes in connection with this contract or the   execution  thereof  shall  be  settled  amicably  by   friendly negotiations between the two parties.  If no  settlement can be reached, the case in dispute shall   then be submitted for arbitration to a third country,   which shall be agreed upon by both parties.  The   arbitration  award  shall  be  final  and  binding  on  both the parties and may be enforced in any court   having  jurisdiction  over  the  party  against  which   enforcement is sought. The cost of arbitration shall   be borne by the losing party.”  

       Thus, from the Purchase Agreement it is evident that the ore  

supplied must contain Fe contents not less than 63%. In case the Fe  

contents are less than the specified percentage, the buyers would have a  

right  to  reject  the  cargo.  The  Purchase  Agreement  also  contains  a  

clause providing for price adjustment in case the supplied ore does not  

meet the requirement of specification provided for iron ore. In case of  

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any dispute between the parties, the agreement provides for arbitration  

in any third country.  

13. The documents on record reveal that parties had been negotiating  

for the goods supplied and also in respect  of payment for the same  

(vide emails dated 25.6.2008 and 8.9.2008). Relevant part of the email  

dated 25.9.2008 reads as under:

“……Both cargos were rejected by end buyers due   to the quality failure.  

    In  such  case,  we  regret  to  say  that  the  maximum CFR price we can work here is $110 for  Zhongqiang II  AND $120 FOR Fujin.   Pls  note   current market price for cargo below 63 is only   $100  and  market  is  still  on  the  down  trend.   However in consideration of the long term good  cooperation between the two companies,  we are  offering to bear at least a $10-20 loss on our side   and with the huge risks of further slide of market,   which actually is foreseeable.  

……Our above offer is valid till this Friday (26th  September, 2008) only…”

14.      The  email  dated  7.10.2008  sent  by  the  applicants  to  the  

respondents reads as under:

“Further to telecom just now, pls note as per latest   mutual  agreement  between seller  and buyer,  the  said USD1.50 million  shall be final settlement for  subj.shipment, so please request your bank to revise   the swift msg as follows:

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“beneficiary  agrees  to  receive  USD1,500,000.00 for full and final payment   for  this  set  of  documents  and  under  this   letter of credit, after release of this amount,   the  letter  of  credit  shall  be  considered  expired and cancelled.” (Emphasis added)

15.       Subsequently, the applicants sent an email to the respondents  

dated 14.11.2008 which provided inter-alia,  as under:

“Clause 8 of the Purchase  Contract provided for  the remedies available in the event of there being a  difference  in  percentage  of  the  Fe  content  as   compared  to  the  specifications  mentioned  in  the  Contract.  The said Contract also provided that all   disputes would be settled amicably and that if no  settlement could be reached, the disputes would be   submitted to arbitration to a third country to be   agreed upon by both the parties. …….Since the Arbitration clause provides for the  dispute being submitted for arbitration to a third   country, our clients would suggest conduct of the   arbitration either in Singapore under the auspices   of the Singapore International Arbitration Centre   and/or Australia under the Rules of the Institute of   Arbitrators and Mediators, Australia.”

16.    The  applicants  again  asked  the  respondents  for  reference  to  

Arbitrator vide email dated 21.11.2008, but in vein.   

17. Stand of the respondents throughout had been that under Clause  

5 of the Purchase Contract dated 24.6.2008 in respect of the iron ore,  

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the buyers had a right to reject the whole consignment in case the iron  

contents were less than 63%, as has been in the instant case.  However,  

considering other factors that goods had already reached the port  of  

discharge  in  China,  the  buyers  accepted  the  delivery  thereof  and  

therefore,  the  buyers  made  a  proposal  for  adjustment  of  price.  

Negotiations  started  as  is  evident  from  the  email  messages  dated  

8.9.2008, 25.9.2008 and 7.10.2008 as referred to hereinabove, and it  

was  in  pursuance  of  these  negotiations  that  the  applicants  had  

instructed their banker to accept the proposal made by the respondents  

and it  was in  pursuance  of  their  instructions,  the banker vide email  

dated 8.10.2009 accepted the proposal and agreed to receive a sum of  

US$500,000.00 as  full  and final settlement  for the consignment  in  

issue.  The payment made was accepted by the applicants and it was  

after  3  months  thereafter  that  they  served  a  legal  notice  dated  

14.11.2008 for making a reference to the Arbitrator.  The applicants in  

the  present  application  do  not  dispute  the  negotiations  or  giving  

instructions to their banker or in respect of the email by their banker to  

the respondents or receiving the money in lieu thereof.  Therefore, the  

question  does  arise  as  to  whether  the  banker’s  acceptance  of  

instructions  given by the  applicants  can be  treated  as  full  and final  

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settlement of the dispute.  The main ground in this regard had been  

taken in this application in Paragraph (P) as under:

“In  spite  of  the  fact  that  the  Applicants  had   specifically informed their Bankers that an amount  of US$ 1.5 million was to be received in lieu of   provisional payment,  an  erroneous message was  forwarded  by  the  Applicants’  Bankers  to  the   Respondents  that  the  beneficiary  being  the  Applicants  herein  had  agreed  to  receive  an  amount of US$ 1.5 million towards full and final   payment and that the Letters of Credit would be   considered expired and cancelled on receipt of the  said payment.” (Emphasis added)

18.    Error means – a mistake in judgment/assessment  in a process or  

proceedings;  some wrong decision taken inadvertently;  unintentional  

mistakes;  something  incorrectly  done  through  ignorance  or  

inadvertence; mistake occurred from an accidental slip; deviation from  

standard or course of right or accuracy – unintentionally; to be wrong  

about;  to  think  or  understand   wrongly;  an  omission  made  not  by  

design, but by mischance.  

19.      In  Nathani Steels Ltd. v. Associated Constructions,  1995  

Supp (3) SCC 324, while dealing with a similar issue, this Court held:  

“……once the parties have arrived at a settlement   in respect of any dispute or difference arising under   a  contract  and  that  dispute  or  the  difference  is   amicably settled by way of a final settlement by and  

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between  the  parties,  unless  that  settlement  is  set   aside  in  proper  proceedings,  it  cannot  lie  in  the   mouth  of  one  of  the  parties  to  the  settlement  to  spurn it  on the ground that it  was a mistake and  proceed to invoke the Arbitration clause. If this is   permitted  the  sanctity  of  contract,  the  settlement   also being a contract, would be wholly lost and it   would be open to one party to take the benefit under   the settlement and then to question the same on the   ground of mistake without having the settlement set   aside.  In  the  circumstances,  we  think  that  in  the   instant  case  since  the  dispute  or  difference  was   finally settled and payments were made as per the   settlement,  it  was  not  open  to  the  respondent   unilaterally to treat the settlement as non est and  proceed to invoke the Arbitration clause….”

A similar view has been re-iterated in  State of Maharashtra v.  

Nav Bharat Builders, 1994 Supp (3) SCC 83.  

 20. This Court in M/s. P.K. Ramaiah & Company v. Chairman &  

Managing Director, NTPC, (1994) Supp. 3 SCC 126 considered the  

ambit of accord and satisfaction by the parties voluntarily entered into  

and dispute raised thereunder. This Court after considering the entire  

controversy held that:

“Admittedly  the  full  and  final  satisfaction  was  acknowledged  by  a  receipt  in  writing  and  the   amount was received unconditionally. Thus there  is accord and satisfaction by final settlement of the  claims.  The subsequent  allegation of  coercion is   an  afterthought  and  a  devise  to  get  over  the   settlement  of  the  dispute,  acceptance  of  the  payment and receipt voluntarily given.... Having  

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acknowledged  the  settlement  and  also  accepted  measurements and having received the amount in  full  and  final  settlement  of  the  claim,  there  is   accord  and  satisfaction.  There  is  no  existing  arbitrable  dispute  for  reference  to  the   arbitration.”   (Emphasis added)  

21.   In   National Insurance Company Limited v. M/s. Boghara  

Polyfab Private Limited,  AIR 2009 SC 170, this Court held:

“26. When we refer to a discharge of contract by   an  agreement  signed  by  both  the  parties  or  by  execution  of  a  full  and  final  discharge  voucher/receipt by one of the parties, we refer to an   agreement  or  discharge  voucher  which  is  validly   and  voluntarily  executed.  If  the  party  which  has   executed  the  discharge  agreement  or  discharge  voucher,  alleges  that  the  execution  of  such  discharge agreement or voucher was on account of   fraud/coercion/undue  influence practised  by  the   other party and is able to establish the same, then   obviously  the  discharge  of  the  contract  by  such   agreement/voucher is rendered void and cannot be  acted  upon.  Consequently,  any  dispute  raised  by  such  party  would  be  arbitrable.”  (Emphasis   added).

xx xx xx

29. It is thus clear that the arbitration agreement   contained in a contract cannot be invoked to seek   reference  of  any  dispute  to  arbitration,  in  the   following  circumstances,  when  the  contract  is   discharged on account of performance, or accord  and satisfaction,  or  mutual  agreement,  and the  same is reduced to writing (and signed by both the  parties or by the party seeking arbitration):

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(a) where the obligations under a contract are  fully performed and discharge of the contract by  performance is acknowledged by a full and final   discharge  voucher/receipt,  nothing  survives  in   regard to such discharged contract;

(b) where the parties to the contract, by mutual   agreement,  accept  performance  of  altered,   modified and substituted obligations and confirm  in  writing  the  discharge  of  contract  by  performance of the altered, modified or substituted   obligations;

(c) where the parties to a contract, by mutual   agreement, absolve each other from performance  of their respective obligations (either on account   of  frustration  or  otherwise)  and  consequently   cancel the agreement and confirm that there are   no outstanding claims or disputes.”

                                                               (Emphasis added)

22. In  R.L. Kalathia v. State of Gujarat, (2011) 2 SCC 400,  this  

court considered a similar issue and held:

“(i) Merely because the contractor has issued “no- dues certificate”, if there is an acceptable claim, the   court  cannot  reject  the  same  on  the  ground  of   issuance of “no-dues certificate”.

(ii)  Inasmuch  as  it  is  common  that  unless  a   discharge  certificate  is  given  in  advance  by  the   contractor, payment of bills are generally delayed,   hence such a clause in the contract would not be an  absolute  bar  to  a  contractor  raising claims which   are genuine at a later date even after submission of   such “no-claim certificate”.

(iii) Even after execution of full and final discharge  voucher/receipt  by  one  of  the  parties,  if  the  said   

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party is able to establish that he is entitled to further   amount for which he is having adequate materials,   he is not barred from claiming such amount merely  because of acceptance of the final bill by mentioning   “without  prejudice”  or  by  issuing  “no-dues   certificate”.

23. In view of the above, law on the issue stands crystallised to the  

effect that, in case, final settlement has been reached amicably between  

the  parties  even  by  making  certain  adjustments  and  without  any  

misrepresentation or fraud or coercion, then, acceptance of money as  

full  and  final  settlement/issuance  of  receipt  or  vouchers  etc.  would  

conclude the controversy and it is not open to either of the parties to  

lay any claim/demand against the other party.

24. The applicants have not pleaded that there has been any kind of  

misrepresentation or fraud or coercion on the part of the respondents.  

Nor it is their case that payment was sent by the respondents without  

any settlement/agreement with the applicants, and was a unilateral act  

on their part.   The applicants reached the final settlement with their  

eyes open and instructed their banker to accept the money as proposed  

by the respondents.  Proposal itself was on the basis of clause 5 of the  

Purchase Contract which provided for Price Adjustment.  For a period  

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of three months after acceptance of the money under the full and final  

settlement,  applicants  did  not  raise  any  dispute  in  respect  of  the  

agreement of price adjustment.  In such a fact-situation, the plea that  

instructions were given by the applicants to the banker  erroneously,  

being, afterthought is not worth acceptance.    

The transaction stood concluded between the parties, not  

on  account  of  any  unintentional  error,  but  after  extensive  and  

exhaustive bilateral deliberations with a clear intention to bring about a  

quietus  to  the  dispute.   These  negotiations,  therefore,  are  self-

explanatory steps of the intent and conduct of the parties to end the  

dispute and not to carry it further.  

25.       In R.N. Gosain v. Yashpal Dhir, AIR 1993 SC 352, this  Court  

has observed as under:–

“Law does not permit a person to both approbate   and  reprobate.  This  principle  is  based  on  the   doctrine of election which postulates that no party   can accept and reject the same instrument and that   “a  person  cannot  say  at  one  time  that  a   transaction  is  valid  and  thereby  obtain  some  advantage, to which he could only be entitled on  the footing that it is valid, and then turn round and  say  it  is  void  for  the  purpose  of  securing  some  other advantage.”

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26.   A party cannot be permitted to “blow hot and cold”, “fast and  

loose” or “approbate and reprobate”.   Where one knowingly accepts  

the benefits  of a contract  or conveyance or an order,  is  estopped to  

deny  the  validity  or  binding  effect  on  him  of  such  contract  or  

conveyance or order. This rule is applied to do equity, however, it must  

not be applied in a manner as to violate the principles of right and good  

conscience. (Vide: Nagubai Ammal & Ors. v. B. Shama Rao & Ors.,  

AIR 1956 SC 593;  C.I.T.  Vs.  MR. P.  Firm Maur,  AIR 1965 SC  

1216; Maharashtra State Road Transport Corporation v. Balwant  

Regular Motor Service, Amravati & Ors., AIR 1969 SC 329;  P.R.  

Deshpande v. Maruti Balaram Haibatti,  AIR 1998 SC 2979; Babu  

Ram v. Indrapal Singh, AIR 1998 SC 3021;   Chairman and MD,  

NTPC Ltd. v. Reshmi Constructions, Builders & Contractors, AIR  

2004 SC 1330; Ramesh Chandra Sankla & Ors. v. Vikram Cement  

&  Ors.,  AIR  2009  SC  713;  and  Pradeep  Oil  Corporation  v.  

Municipal Corporation of Delhi & Anr., (2011) 5 SCC 270).  

27.    Thus, it is evident that the doctrine of election is based on the rule  

of  estoppel-  the  principle  that  one  cannot  approbate  and  reprobate  

inheres in it. The doctrine of estoppel by election is one of the species  

of estoppels in pais (or equitable estoppel), which is a rule in equity.  

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By that law, a person may be precluded by his actions or conduct or  

silence when it is his duty to speak, from asserting a right which he  

otherwise would have had.

28.   In the facts  and circumstances of the case,  as the respondents  

resorted  to  clause  5  of  the  Purchase  Agreement  dated  28/6/2008,  

regarding price adjustment and the offer so made by the respondents  

has been accepted by the applicants and agreed to receive a particular  

sum  offered  by  the  respondents  as  a  full  and  final  settlement,  the  

dispute comes to an end.

          The applicants cannot take a complete somersault and agitate the  

issue  that  the  offer  made  by  the  respondents  had  erroneously  been  

accepted.

          In view of the above, as no dispute survives, the applications are  

dismissed.

…………………… …J.

(Dr.  B.S.  CHAUHAN) New Delhi,

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September 13, 2011

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