02 July 2013
Supreme Court
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M.P. STATE MINING CORPORATION LTD. Vs SANJEEV BHASKAR .

Bench: T.S. THAKUR,SUDHANSU JYOTI MUKHOPADHAYA
Case number: C.A. No.-004950-004950 / 2013
Diary number: 13790 / 2011
Advocates: SANTOSH KUMAR TRIPATHI Vs KIRTI RENU MISHRA


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REPORTABLE

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA

CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION

Civil Appeal No.   4950    of 2013 (arising out of SLP(C)No.13053 of 2011)

M.P. STATE  MINING  CORPORATION LTD. … APPELLANT

Versus

SANJEEV  BHASKAR & ORS.     … RESPONDENTS

With

Civil Appeal No.  4951   of 2013 (arising out of SLP(C)No.29421 of 2011)

J U D G M E N T

SUDHANSU JYOTI MUKHOPADHAYA, J.

Leave granted. These two appeals are preferred by  

the appellants M.P. State Mining Corporation Ltd.  

(hereinafter referred to as the “Mining Corporation”)  

and the State of Madhya Pradesh (hereinafter referred  

to as the “State”)  against the common judgment dated  

20th April, 2011 passed by the Division Bench of Delhi  

High Court in LPA No. 742 of 2010 with LPA No. 284 of  

2011. By its impugned judgment, the Division Bench  

dismissed the appeals preferred by the   Mining  

Corporation and the State with costs quantified at  

Rs.25,000/­ for each appeal and affirmed the judgment

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dated 21st September, 2010 passed by the learned Single  

Judge of Delhi High Court.

2. The factual matrix  of the case is as follows:­

The Government of  Madhya Pradesh on 3rd November,  

1966 granted a mining lease over an area of 28.00 acres  

in Village Kari, District Tikamgarh, (M.P.) to one  

Rajendra Nath Bhaskar for extraction of Pyrophyllite  

and Diaspore minerals under the   Mines and Minerals  

(Regulation and Development) Act, 1957 (hereinafter  

referred to as “the Act, 1957”) read   with Mineral  

Concession  Rules, 1960 (hereinafter referred to as the  

“Rules, 1960”) for a period of twenty years commencing  

from 3rd November, 1966 to 2nd November, 1986.  After  

about 13 years, a notice dated 18th September, 1979 was  

issued to said Rajendra Nath Bhaskar by the Collector,  

Tikamgarh to show cause as to why his mining lease  

should not be revoked on the ground of certain breaches  

committed by him which were discovered during the  

inspection made by the Mining Inspector on 28th  May,  

1979.  Rajendra Nath Bhaskar submitted his reply on 3rd  

October, 1979 and denied the alleged breaches.  

Thereafter, by an order dated 5th April, 1980,  

determination of the  lease was done by the State  

Government in accordance with the then Rule 27(5) of  

the Rules, 1960,   on the ground of contravention of  

Clause(f) and (g) of sub­rule (1) of  Rule 27 of the

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Rules, 1960.  A Revision  Application was preferred by  

Rajendra Nath Bhaskar  to the Central Government under  

Rule 54, read with Section 30 of the Act, 1957 which  

was ultimately dismissed by an order dated 6th April,  

1981.

3. Being dissatisfied, Rajendra Nath Bhaskar  

challenged the order of  determination and the order  

passed   in revision application   by filing Misc.  

Petition No. 805 of 1981 before the Madhya Pradesh High  

Court. The Division Bench of Madhya Pradesh High Court  

by its judgment dated 16th July, 1986 held that the  

impugned orders did not disclose the aspects which were  

taken into account and accordingly set aside the orders  

with direction to the State Government to decide afresh  

the question of determination of lease in accordance  

with law.

4.  In the meantime and before the decision of the  

Madhya Pradesh High Court, the original lessee,  

Rajendra Nath Bhaskar died on 7th September, 1982, but  

no application for  substitution was filed.  The period  

of lease also   expired on 2nd November, 1986.  

Subsequently, the  legal heirs,  Sanjeev  Bhaskar and  

others–respondents herein, filed an application on 2nd  

September, 1986 before the State Government praying  

therein for  bringing them on record as the legal heirs  

and to permit them to carry out the mining operation

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for the remaining period, which came to 6 years, 6  

months and 29 days as the lease could not be operated  

for the aforesaid remaining period because of illegal  

determination of lease,   which had been quashed vide  

order dated 16th   July, 1986 passed by the Madhya  

Pradesh High Court. No action was taken thereon for  

about  four  years.  The  Collector,  Tikamgarh  issued  a  

demand notice on 8th  June, 1990 determining the dead  

rent for the period before expiry of the lease deed in  

view of audit inspection note.  Subsequently, two other  

demand notices were issued on 14th August, 1990 and 8th  

December, 1993   which according to the State,   were  

inadvertently sent. The stand of the State Government  

was that as per term of the lease, the period of twenty  

years expired on 2nd November, 1986 due to efflux of  

time. Subsequently, legal heirs of the original lessee  

made no application in the prescribed form and in the  

manner for grant of mining lease either by way of a  

fresh grant or by way of  renewal. As the lessee was  

not a holder of the lease the dead rent for the  

subsequent period could not have been demanded and  

therefore, notices dated 14th August, 1990 and 8th  

December, 1993 were inadvertently sent.

5. The first respondent, one of the legal heirs, made  

representations, inter alia, on 28th August, 1996, 14th  

April, 1997 and 23rd September, 1997 to allow him to do

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mining for rest of the period of  6 years, 6 months and  

29 days but it has not been made clear as to why no  

representation was made by legal heirs for more than 10  

years after the order of the Madhya Pradesh High Court  

passed on 16th July,  1986.

6.Receiving no reply, the first respondent filed a  

contempt petition No. 186 of 1998 before the Madhya  

Pradesh High Court which was dismissed on the ground  

of being time barred. However, an observation was made  

by Madhya Pradesh High Court that it could  hope  and  

trust that the Government would implement   the order  

passed in the year 1986, if they had not implemented  

the same so far.

7. For the first time, the State Government responded  

on 21st April, 1999   declining   to extend the mining  

lease.  It was communicated that in view of the order  

passed by the High Court on 16th July, 1986, the mining  

lease was automatically restored for the remaining  

period upto   2nd November, 1986.   In absence of any  

direction given by the High Court for renewal of lease  

and the only direction being given for the State  

Government to decide afresh the question of  

determination of lease of original lessee, no renewal  

could be made.

8.   The first respondent on 7th July, 1999,  filed a  

Revision Application before the Central Government

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under Section 30 of the Act, 1957 read with Rule 55 of  

the Rules, 1960. During the pendency of the said  

revision application, the State Government granted a  

lease for five hectares out of the mining area in  

question to the M.P. State Mining Corporation.   The  

Central Government vide order dated 12th August, 1999,  

granted an interim stay directed the State Government  

not to grant the mining lease to the third party.   The  

Mining Corporation filed a Writ Petition No. 3914/1999  

before the Madhya Pradesh High Court on 24th August,  

1999 seeking a writ of mandamus directing the  

respondents to execute a lease deed for a period of 20  

years commencing from the date of execution in terms of  

the grant made on 30th   July, 1999.   But the first  

respondent was not made a party therein.

9. In the said case on 15th September, 1999 , interim  

mandamus was issued on the State to execute the mining  

lease  in favour of the Mining Corporation which was  

executed on 25th   September, 1999. According to  

appellants, the writ petition filed by the Mining  

Corporation became infructuous.   

10. The first respondent filed another Revision  

Application on 15th December, 1999, inter alia, praying  

for quashing of the grant made on 30th July, 1999 in  

favour of the  Mining Corporation.  The first revision  

application was dismissed on 7th November, 2001 by the

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Mines Tribunal, which was challenged by the first  

respondent in Writ Petition (Civil) No. 8033/2002  but  

this time before the High Court of Delhi.  The Second  

Revision application was dismissed on 31st December,  

2002, inter alia, on the ground that the lease was  

executed in favour of the   Mining Corporation by the  

State Government in compliance of  the order dated 15th  

September, 1999 of interim mandamus by the Madhya  

Pradesh High Court.   The said order was assailed by  

first respondent by filing a Writ Petition(Civil) No.  

5809/04   before the High Court of Delhi. Both the  

aforesaid Writ Petitions were heard by the learned  

Single Judge of   High Court of Delhi who by common  

impugned judgment dated 21st September, 2010 allowed  

both the writ petitions filed by first respondent  

holding that the grant could not have been   made in  

favour of the Mining Corporation and that the first  

respondent was entitled  to the benefit of remaining  

expired period of the original lease to begin from the  

date the decision was taken by the State Government,  

but  subject to the first respondent complying with all  

the requirements of the Act and   Rules and any other  

applicable law and paying the dead rent and other  

charges as required by law.  The common order passed in  

those two writ petitions was upheld by the Division  

Bench of Delhi High Court by its common Judgment dated  

20th April, 2011.

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11. Learned counsel for the State and the Mining  

Corporation assailed the impugned judgment on the  

following grounds:

(a)  Original Lessee   Rajendra Nath  

Bhaskar having died on 7th September,  

1982,   the   lease   comes to an end. As  

per Rules, 1960 as was prevailing in  

June, 1982, if   lessee dies during the  

continuation of the lease, a fresh  

application has to be presented by his  

heirs or legal representatives if they  

are continuing the   business of the  

deceased and have the required  

qualification to obtain a grant on  

account of special reason for grant.  In  

absence of any such application filed by  

legal heirs for grant of lease in their  

favour, they are not entitled for renewal  

of lease   or to continue for the  

remaining period.

(b) The High Court of Delhi   had no  

jurisdiction to interfere with the  

impugned order of grant passed in favour  

of the Mining Corporation, being granted  

by the State Government pursuant to the

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direction of the Madhya Pradesh High  

Court dated 15th September, 1999.

12. Per Contra, according to first respondent pursuant  

to the original order passed by the Madhya Pradesh High  

Court dated 16th July, 1986 it was the duty on the part  

of the State Government to re­examine and decide the  

matter afresh regarding the question of  determination  

of the lease.  Admittedly, the State Government did not  

proceed to decide the matter afresh.   Therefore, the  

first respondent was entitled for mining   for the  

remaining period of six years, six months and twenty  

nine days.   Learned counsel for the respondents  

contended  that first respondent, Sanjeev  Bhaskar, son  

of   Rajendra Nath Bhaskar, original lessee moved an  

application on 2nd September, 1986 for mutating   his  

name saying that in view of family settlement his name  

be mutated.  He also requested for grant of benefit for  

the period during which mining was unlawfully  

interrupted.   In this background,   the High Court  

rightly interfered with the order as well as the order  

issuing grant in favour of the Mining Corporation which  

was passed during the pendency of the Revision  

Application.

13. Further, according to learned Counsel for the  

first respondent, part of the cause of action having

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taken place at Delhi, the orders in the Revision  

Applications had been passed by the Central Government,  

the Writ Petitions were maintainable before the Delhi  

High Court.

14. It is not disputed that much before the decision  

of the Madhya Pradesh High Court, the original lessee,  

Rajendra Nath Bhaskar died on 7th September, 1982. The  

Miscellaneous Petition No. 805/1981 pending before the  

Madhya Pradesh High Court abated in   absence of any  

petition for substitution filed by the legal heirs.

15. Further, in the year 1982 when the original lessee  

died, there was no provision for orders to continue the  

application for a mining lease. Legal heirs/  

representatives of the original lessee, if they wanted  

to continue the business or mining activity of the  

deceased and also if they had required qualification,  

could at best file an application for grant of fresh  

mining lease.   Admittedly,   after the death of the  

lessee (7th September, 1982), legal heirs including the  

first respondent never applied for fresh grant of  

lease.   It has also not been made clear that whether  

any one of them have required qualification for grant  

of mining lease.  

16. In view of the aforesaid fact, we hold that after  

the death of the original lessee, Rajendra Nath  

Bhaskar, all rights come to an end and the first

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respondent or any other legal heir(s) were neither  

entitled to continue with the lease nor entitled for  

renewal of lease.

17. Similar issue fell for consideration before this  

Court in G. Buchivenkata Rao v. Union of India & Ors.,  

(1972) 1 SCC 734. In the said  case, this  Court held  

as follows: “14.  It has to be remembered that, in  order to enable a legal representative  to continue a legal proceeding, the  right to sue or to pursue a remedy must  survive the death of his predecessor.  In the instant case, we have set out  provision showing that the rights which  an applicant may have had for the grant  of a mining lease, on the strength of  an alleged superior claim, cannot be  separated from his personal  qualifications. No provision has been  pointed out to us in the rules for  impleading an heir who could continue  the application for a mining lease. The  scheme under the rules seems to be  that, if an applicant dies, a fresh  application has to be presented by his  heirs or legal representatives if they  themselves desire to apply for the  grant of a lease. It may be that the  heirs and legal representatives, if  they are continuing the business or  industry of the deceased and have the  required qualifications, obtain  priority over an earlier applicant on  account of special reasons for this  preference. But, in each case, they  have to apply afresh and set out their  own qualifications. It has not been  shown to us that any legal  representatives have applied afresh.  The legal representatives only claim to  be entitled to succeed the deceased

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Buchivenkata Rao under a will. The  assumption underlying the application  is that whatever right the deceased may  have had to obtain a lease survived and  vested in the heirs after his death, we  are unable to accept the correctness of  this assumption.

15.  In support of the contention on  behalf of the heirs of Buchivenkata  Rao, our attention was drawn to the  case of  Dhani Devi  v.  Sant Bihari7  which related to a right to obtain  transfer of a permit for a Motor  Vehicle under Section 61, sub­section  (2) of the Motor Vehicles Act. It was  held there that, in the case of the  death of an applicant for the grant of  a permit in respect of his motor  vehicle, the Regional Transport  Authority had the power to substitute  the person succeeding to the possession  of the vehicle in place of the deceased  applicant. It was routed out there that  the right to the permit was related to  the possession of the vehicle.  Moreover, there was a rule enabling the  Transport Authorities to substitute the  heir or legal representatives of the  deceased. No such rule applicable to  the case of the heirs of the deceased  Buchivenkata Rao has been pointed out  to us. Therefore, we are unable to hold  that  the heirs,  who  have  been  heard,  had  any  right  to continue  the  appeal  before us. This feature of the case is  decisive not only on the right to be  heard on the fresh ground but also on  the  right  to  advance any  argument  in  support of the appeal of the deceased.”

18. After a period of more than 9 years from the death  

of original lessee,  Rule 25A was inserted in the Rules

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1960 by GSR 129(E), dated 20th February, 1991, which  

reads as follows:

“25A. Status of the grant on the death  of applicant for mining lease.­(1)  where an applicant for grant or renewal  of mining lease dies before the order  granting him a mining lease or its  renewal is passed, the application for  the grant or renewal of a mining lease  shall be deemed to have been made by  his legal representative.

(1.2)In the case of an applicant  in respect of whom an order  granting or renewing a mining  lease is passed, but who dies  before the deed referred to in  sub­rule (1) of rule 31 is  executed, the order shall be  deemed to have been passed in the  name of the legal representative  of the deceased.”

19.The aforesaid substituted provision of Section 25A  

is not applicable in the present case as it was not a  

case of death of the applicant during the pendency of  

grant or renewal of mining lease. Further Section 25A  

having inserted nine years after the death of the  

assessee, the first respondent and the other legal  

heirs  cannot derive advantage of the same.

20. The Original Lessee died on 7th September, 1982  

during the pendency of Miscellaneous   Petition No.  

805/81 and much before the final order dated 16th July,  

1986   passed in the said case by the Madhya Pradesh  

High Court. In the absence of petition for substitution

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of legal heirs,  the said case got abated.  The legal  

heirs including the first respondent cannot derive the  

advantage of the order dated 16th July, 1986, which was  

inadvertently passed by the Madhya Pradesh High Court  

in absence of knowledge of death of the original  

petitioner/lessee.

21. From the impugned judgment, it is clear that after  

1986, the first respondent made representations on 28th  

August, 1996, 14th April, 1997 and 23rd November, 1997.  

In 1998, a Contempt Application No. 186/98  was filed  

by the first respondent which was dismissed for being  

barred by time. The first respondent had not explained  

the   delay of more than 14 years after the death of  

the original lessee and   delay of 10 years after the  

order dated 16th July, 1986 passed by the   Madhya  

Pradesh High Court as to why they did not choose to  

move before any Court of Law.  In absence  of  any such  

valid explanation, we are of the view that the High  

Court ought  to have  dismissed the case on the ground  

of delay and latches.  

22. Admittedly,   the third party rights were created  

in the meantime in favour of the Mining Corporation  

pursuant to the order of Madhya Pradesh High Court  

dated 16th  July, 1986. The order passed by the Madhya  

Pradesh High Court was not challenged in any appeal.  

The Delhi High Court also failed to notice the

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aforesaid fact and failed to decide the jurisdiction of  

the High Court to entertain the appeal against the  

order passed in favour of the Mining Corporation which  

was passed pursuant to the direction of the Madhya  

Pradesh High Court.  In this back­ground,  it was not  

desirable for the Delhi High Court to entertain the  

writ petition. Even  though the revisional order  was  

passed by the Central Government, the Delhi High Court  

ought to have asked the first respondent to move before  

the Madhya Pradesh High Court for appropriate relief.

23. In view of our  findings given in  the preceding  

paragraph, the order dated  21st September, 2010 passed  

by  the Single Judge of the  High Court of Delhi and  

the impugned order dated 20th April, 2011 passed   by  

the Division Bench of the Delhi High Court cannot be  

upheld.   They are accordingly set aside.   Both the  

appeals are allowed  but there shall be no order as to  

costs.

……………………………………………………………………………J.   (T.S.THAKUR)

…………………………………………………………………………J.            (SUDHANSU JYOTI MUKHOPADHAYA)

NEW DELHI, JULY 2,2013.